'Hannibal's crossing of the Alps was a costly mistake.'
How far do you agree with this view?
You must use and analyse the ancient sources you have studied as well as supporting your answer with your own knowledge.
Model answer
The crossing of the Alps cost Hannibal dearly, but it was not a mistake, because it was the only way to fight the war in Italy and it gave him the surprise that led to his greatest victories.
The cost is clear from the sources. Polybius says Hannibal left the Rhone with 38,000 infantry and over 8,000 cavalry, but reached the Po valley with only 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. The second figure is strong evidence, because Polybius says it comes from the inscription Hannibal himself set up at Lacinium. The march was full of disasters: the attack by the Allobroges, the ambush by the tribe that pretended friendship, the snow and the landslide on the descent. Polybius, who says he questioned survivors and crossed the Alps himself, describes animals falling over cliffs and elephants starving. Livy paints an even darker picture of an army terrified by the snowy peaks and the 'wild and unkempt' mountain people, though his dramatic style, written for Roman readers two centuries later, may exaggerate. The march also cut Hannibal off from Iberia: his brother Hasdrubal only followed him in 207 BC and was destroyed at the Metaurus.
However, there was no real alternative. Rome controlled the sea after the First Punic War, and Polybius says the Romans expected to fight in Iberia, not Italy. Livy shows how the consul Publius Scipio arrived at the Rhone three days too late and decided to wait for Hannibal in Italy instead. By the time Rome reacted, Hannibal was in the Po valley, where the Gauls joined him. Polybius stresses that this was planned: Hannibal had found out about the Gauls' hatred of Rome and secured guides such as Magilus. Polybius admired Hannibal's rational planning, and he attacked writers who claimed gods had guided him, so he may emphasise preparation, but the arrival of the Gallic chiefs at the Rhone supports him.
The results also justify the crossing. Within weeks Hannibal defeated the Romans at the Ticinus and the Trebia, and later at Trasimene and Cannae. The crossing also undermined Rome's plans: Polybius notes that the Senate had expected a long war fought in Iberia, with Saguntum as a base, and had sent the consul Sempronius to Sicily to prepare an invasion of Africa; he had to be recalled in haste to defend northern Italy. The ordeal also bound the army to its general: at the summit he showed them Italy and 'where Rome itself lay', and they followed him for fifteen years.
In conclusion, the crossing was extremely costly, as Polybius' figures prove, but given Rome's command of the sea it was the only way to strike at Italy, and it achieved surprise and Gallic support. The real mistake was not the crossing but Hannibal's later failure to build a secure link with Iberia.
Explanation
A top answer uses Polybius' figures and both writers' accounts of the dangers, judges how far each can be trusted (Polybius' journey and use of Hannibal's inscription, Livy's dramatic style), and weighs the cost against the strategic gains. Answers that only tell the story of the crossing, or never discuss reliability, are capped.