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The use of terror in the 1930s

Practise 20 exam-style questions on The use of terror in the 1930s for Edexcel GCSE History (Russia and the Soviet Union 1917-41). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 20 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
  • Instant marking
  • No sign-up needed
20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source A: From Operational Order No. 00447 of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), signed by its head, Nikolai Yezhov, on 30 July 1937 (translated for this course). The order was top secret. The Politburo approved it on 31 July 1937. It was first published in Russia in 1992.

The organs of state security are faced with the task of smashing this whole gang of anti-Soviet elements in the most merciless way ... and of putting an end, once and for all, to their vile work of undermining the foundations of the Soviet state.

Accordingly I ORDER: FROM 5 AUGUST 1937, IN ALL REPUBLICS, TERRITORIES AND REGIONS, AN OPERATION IS TO BEGIN TO REPRESS FORMER KULAKS, ACTIVE ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS AND CRIMINALS. ...

1. All kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements to be repressed are divided into two categories: a) the first category includes all the most hostile of the elements listed above. They are to be arrested immediately and, after their cases have been considered by the troikas [panels of three officials], SHOT. b) the second category includes all the remaining, less active but still hostile elements. They are to be arrested and imprisoned in camps for terms of 8 to 10 years ...
2. ... the following numbers to be repressed are approved: [for example] Belorussian SSR: first category 2,000; second category 10,000; total 12,000. ...
3. The approved figures are approximate. However, the people's commissars of the republican NKVDs and the heads of the territorial and regional NKVD administrations have no right to exceed them on their own initiative. ... In cases where the situation requires the approved figures to be increased, ... they must send me reasoned requests. ...

The investigation is to be carried out quickly and by a simplified procedure.

Give two things you can infer from Source A about the work of the NKVD in 1937.

Set out your answer under these headings, once for each inference:
What I can infer:
Details in the source that tell me this:

Model answer

What I can infer: The NKVD's arrests and executions were planned in advance by numbers set in Moscow, not decided by the evidence against each person.
Details in the source that tell me this: The order says 'the following numbers to be repressed are approved', for example 2,000 to be shot in the Belorussian SSR, and local chiefs 'have no right to exceed them on their own initiative'.

What I can infer: People were condemned without any real trial, simply for belonging to groups the regime saw as hostile.
Details in the source that tell me this: The targets are 'former kulaks, active anti-Soviet elements and criminals', their cases were 'considered by the troikas', and the investigation was 'carried out quickly and by a simplified procedure'.

Explanation

Top answers work out what the order reveals about the NKVD, for example that fixed figures for each region show terror planned by numbers, and support each inference with a precise detail. Copying the categories or dates is not an inference. Own knowledge of how many people died under the order earns no marks here, although it belongs in other questions.

Mark scheme
  1. 1 mark

    A valid inference about the work of the NKVD in 1937, e.g. it worked to numbers (quotas) fixed in advance rather than to evidence against individuals / the Terror was planned and controlled from the centre / it targeted whole social groups (former kulaks, 'anti-Soviet elements', criminals) / it decided people's fate without proper trials / it was expected to kill on a huge scale / it kept its work secret / local NKVD chiefs might want to repress more people than planned / it was expected to act quickly, without careful investigation.

    Award 1 mark for each valid inference up to a maximum of two inferences. The second mark for each example should be awarded for supporting detail selected from the source. e.g. The NKVD worked to quotas fixed in advance rather than to evidence against individuals (1). 'The following numbers to be repressed are approved', e.g. 2,000 to be shot in the Belorussian SSR (1). The operation was planned and controlled from Moscow (1). Local chiefs 'have no right to exceed' the figures and must 'send me reasoned requests' (1). The NKVD targeted whole social groups rather than people proven guilty of crimes (1). 'Former kulaks, active anti-Soviet elements and criminals' (1). People were sentenced without proper trials (1). Their cases were 'considered by the troikas' and the investigation 'carried out quickly and by a simplified procedure' (1). The NKVD was expected to carry out killings and imprisonment on a huge scale (1). Two categories, the first to be 'SHOT', the second sent to camps for '8 to 10 years', with thousands in one republic alone (1). The leaders expected local NKVD chiefs to want to go further than the plan (1). The order forbids them to exceed the figures 'on their own initiative' and sets out how to ask for increases (1). The NKVD's work was secret (1). The order was 'top secret' and not published until 1992 (1). An inference must go beyond the source: 'there were two categories' or 'the operation began on 5 August' only repeats the source. Own knowledge (e.g. that about 387,000 people were shot under this order, or that the limits were raised many times) is not an inference from the source, although the provenance may be used. Accept other appropriate alternatives.

  2. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the first inference, e.g. 'the following numbers to be repressed are approved' / 'first category 2,000' / 'no right to exceed them' / 'reasoned requests' / 'former kulaks, active anti-Soviet elements and criminals' / 'considered by the troikas' / 'quickly and by a simplified procedure' / 'SHOT' / 'top secret'.

    Award only if the first inference has been credited and the detail genuinely supports it (a short quotation, a close reference to Source A or a detail of its provenance). A detail that does not support the inference given, or information from own knowledge, earns no mark.

  3. 1 mark

    A second valid inference about the work of the NKVD in 1937, different from the first (see the examples under the first inference).

    The second inference must be a different point, not the first reworded (e.g. 'it had targets' and 'it worked to quotas' are the same inference). Apply the same rules: no credit for paraphrase or own knowledge.

  4. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the second inference.

    Award only if the second inference has been credited and the detail from Source A supports it.

Question 2

4 marks

Source B: From a report by Stalin to a meeting (plenum) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 3 March 1937 (translated for this course). It was published in Pravda on 29 March 1937. At the same plenum Bukharin and Rykov had been expelled from the Party and arrested.

It is necessary to remember and never forget that as long as there is capitalist encirclement there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies and terrorists sent behind the lines of the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign states ... Explain that in the struggle against present-day Trotskyism what is needed now is not the old methods, not the methods of discussion, but new methods, methods of uprooting and smashing. ...

It is necessary to smash and cast aside the rotten theory that with every step forward we take the class struggle here must die down more and more ... On the contrary, the further we advance, the more successes we have, the more furious the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes will become, the sooner they will turn to sharper forms of struggle ...

It is necessary to smash and cast aside another rotten theory, which says that a person cannot be a wrecker if he does not always wreck and sometimes shows successes in his work. ... a real wrecker must from time to time show successes in his work, for that is the only way for him to survive as a wrecker, to worm his way into people's confidence and to carry on his wrecking work.

Source C: From a telegram sent by Loy Henderson, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, to the US Secretary of State on 20 January 1938, about a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party published in the Soviet press that day. The telegram was published by the US government in 1952.

The resolution severely criticizes Party leaders for the manner in which they have permitted "mass exclusions from the Party" ... It would appear from the wording of the resolution that in the past an accused Party member was presumed to be guilty until he could prove his innocence whereas in the future a burden is also imposed upon the accuser to furnish proof of the truth of his charges. ...

In the present instance it is not charged that the excesses were the result of too much zeal, but rather of the distortion of the Party directives either by "masked enemies" or by "Communist careerists" in the Party. Care is taken in the resolution to absolve the Commissariat for Internal Affairs from any responsibility for the excesses of the Party purge.

Interpretation 1: From Orders from the Kremlin: The Great Terror, 1936-38 by Matthias Ferrier (fictional), published in 1971.

The Great Terror was directed from the top. It was Stalin who, in his speeches to the Central Committee in 1937, told the Party that enemies were everywhere and must be 'uprooted'. The Politburo approved the NKVD's orders, which set the number of people to be shot or imprisoned in each region. Local NKVD chiefs had to report every few days and ask Moscow before going further. Stalin personally signed lists containing the names of tens of thousands of people to be sentenced. When he decided in November 1938 that the mass arrests should stop, they stopped. The Terror was the policy of the leadership from beginning to end.

Interpretation 2: From The Terror from Below by Dorothea Kinloch (fictional), published in 2004.

Moscow started the Terror, but it could not control how far it went. Local NKVD chiefs and Party secretaries competed to prove their vigilance, and many asked for higher limits than they had been given. Careerists denounced their superiors in order to take their jobs, and people denounced neighbours and colleagues to settle old scores or to protect themselves. Expulsions and arrests snowballed, until even the Central Committee, in January 1938, complained that Party organisations were expelling members without proof. Much of the Terror was driven by the actions of thousands of officials and ordinary people across the country.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how far the Terror of 1937-38 was directed by Stalin and the central leadership. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 may be based on evidence like Source B, in which Stalin tells the Central Committee that there will be 'wreckers, diversionists, spies and terrorists' as long as there is 'capitalist encirclement', that 'methods of uprooting and smashing' are now needed, and that even a worker who 'shows successes' may be a wrecker. This matches Interpretation 1's view that 'Stalin ... told the Party that enemies were everywhere and must be "uprooted"' and that the Terror was 'the policy of the leadership from beginning to end'. Interpretation 2 is closer to Source C, which reports that in January 1938 the Central Committee criticised 'mass exclusions from the Party' and blamed 'masked enemies' and 'Communist careerists' for them. This supports Interpretation 2's argument that 'careerists denounced their superiors' and that 'even the Central Committee, in January 1938, complained' about expulsions without proof.

Explanation

Top answers give one reason, such as the weight given to different sources or a different focus on central orders compared with local actions, and match specific details in Sources B and C to the interpretations. Strong answers may note that the resolution in Source C could also be read as the centre shifting blame onto local officials. Saying only that one historian 'used Source B', or repeating the difference of view, stays in Level 1.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 1: Stalin himself, at the Central Committee plenum, tells the Party that 'wreckers, diversionists, spies and terrorists' will exist 'as long as there is capitalist encirclement', that 'methods of uprooting and smashing' are needed, that the class struggle sharpens as socialism advances, and that even successful workers may be wreckers - matching Interpretation 1's view that 'Stalin ... told the Party that enemies were everywhere and must be "uprooted"' and that the Terror was 'the policy of the leadership'. Source C gives some support to Interpretation 2: the Central Committee resolution of January 1938, as reported by Henderson, criticises 'mass exclusions from the Party', suggests that accused members had been 'presumed to be guilty' and blames 'masked enemies' and 'Communist careerists' in local Party organisations - matching Interpretation 2's 'careerists' who denounced others and its point that 'even the Central Committee, in January 1938, complained' about expulsions without proof. Students may note that Henderson points out that the resolution 'absolve[s]' the NKVD, which could suggest that the centre was shifting blame onto local officials - so Source C can also be read as support for Interpretation 1. The interpretations may also differ because of their focus: Interpretation 1 looks at the orders and decisions of the leadership (Politburo approval of quotas, Stalin's lists), Interpretation 2 at how the Terror worked locally (requests for higher limits, denunciations). Or because of the evidence they use: Interpretation 1 the documents of the central leadership, Interpretation 2 local records and denunciations. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without matching details, or that repeat the difference without a reason, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication, the titles or an assertion that a historian is biased.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why Stalin purged the leadership of the Red Army in the years 1937-38.

You may use the following in your answer:
- Marshal Tukhachevsky
- links between the Red Army and the German army before 1933

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

Stalin purged the leadership of the Red Army in 1937-38 because he feared that the army could challenge him, because he believed, or claimed to believe, that its commanders were in league with Germany, and because he wanted an army of unquestioned loyalty for the war he expected.

The case of Marshal Tukhachevsky shows Stalin's fear of an independent military leader. Tukhachevsky was a Civil War hero, Deputy Commissar for Defence and the man who had modernised the army with tanks and aircraft. His prestige and independent views made him a possible rival, and he had clashed with Stalin as far back as the war against Poland in 1920 and with Stalin's ally Voroshilov. In May 1937 he was arrested, and in June he and seven other senior commanders were tried in secret and shot for treason and spying.

Secondly, the earlier links between the Red Army and the German army made the charge of treason seem believable. Under the Rapallo agreement of 1922 Soviet officers trained with the German army, and many admired it. After Hitler came to power these old contacts could be presented as proof that the generals were working for Germany. The official charge was that they had supplied military secrets to 'a certain foreign nation' and prepared the army's defeat.

Thirdly, Stalin feared a military coup. The army was the only institution with the weapons and organisation to overthrow him. Many commanders had served under Trotsky, who had created the Red Army, and some had disliked collectivisation. Stalin wanted to remove anyone whose loyalty was not total, and in May 1937 political commissars were brought back to watch over commanders.

Fourthly, the threat of war increased his determination. Germany and Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, and the Spanish Civil War had made the idea of a 'fifth column' of traitors familiar. Stalin wanted no possible traitors in command when war came.

Finally, the purge was driven forward by the NKVD under Yezhov, which produced confessions of a 'military-fascist plot' and arrested officers named by others. As a result, the purge spread far beyond the high command. About 35,000 officers were removed in 1937-38, and three of the five marshals died.

These causes were linked: Stalin's suspicion of an independent army, made more urgent by the danger of war, was turned by the NKVD into a purge of the whole officer corps.

Explanation

Top answers explain why Stalin turned on the army, for example by linking Tukhachevsky's prestige and the old German contacts to Stalin's fear of a coup in a coming war, and go beyond the stimulus with points such as the NKVD's role or the reintroduction of commissars. A common weakness is to describe the purge and its effects on the army in 1941 instead of explaining its causes.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Marshal Tukhachevsky: the most famous Soviet commander, a hero of the Civil War, Deputy Commissar for Defence and a moderniser of the army (tanks, aircraft, mechanised forces); his prestige and independence made him a possible rival or a leader around whom discontent could gather; he had clashed with Stalin during the war with Poland in 1920 and had disputes with Voroshilov, Stalin's ally; he was arrested in May 1937 and, with seven other senior commanders, tried in secret and shot on 11-12 June 1937 for treason and spying for 'a foreign nation'. Links with the German army before 1933: under the Rapallo agreement (1922) the Red Army and the Reichswehr cooperated secretly, with joint training and exchanges, and many Soviet commanders had visited Germany and admired its army; after Hitler came to power these contacts could be presented as evidence of treason, and the charge of working for Germany made the purge seem necessary; reports reached Moscow, including from abroad, of plots in the Red Army (their importance is disputed by historians). Beyond the stimulus: fear of a military coup - the army was the only institution with the weapons and organisation to overthrow Stalin, and he wanted it completely loyal; the threat of war with Germany and Japan (the Anti-Comintern Pact, 1936) and the idea of a 'fifth column' (from the Spanish Civil War) made him determined to remove anyone whose loyalty was in doubt; many commanders owed their careers to Trotsky, who had created the Red Army; earlier opposition in the army to collectivisation; the NKVD under Yezhov produced 'evidence' and confessions of a 'military-fascist plot'; the arrests followed the show trials, in which defendants named commanders; the reintroduction of political commissars (May 1937) increased Party control; the purge spread down the ranks, removing about 35,000 officers in 1937-38 (accept figures in the range 34,000-38,000, including political officers), of whom about 11,500 had been reinstated by 1940; three of the five marshals (Tukhachevsky, Yegorov and Blyukher) died. Answers should explain why the purge took place, not only describe it. Do not credit claims that all officers were shot, or that Tukhachevsky was tried in a public show trial.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From Stalin's New Men: The Purges and the Soviet Elite by Ralph Sedgefield (fictional), published in 1994.

By 1939 the purges had given Stalin exactly what he wanted. Every leader who had known Lenin and might have challenged him was dead or in prison, and the Party, the army and the government were run by people who owed everything to Stalin. Stalin himself told the Party congress of 1939 that more than half a million young people had been promoted to leading posts. Many of them were the children of workers and peasants, trained in the new technical schools, and some would lead the country for decades. The purges created a new ruling class, loyal, ambitious and grateful, and left Stalin's power stronger than ever.

Interpretation 2: From The Self-Inflicted Wound: The Purges and Soviet Power by Clemency Aldous (fictional), published in 2015.

The purges seriously weakened the Soviet Union. Experienced managers, engineers and planners were arrested in their thousands, and industrial growth slowed in 1937 and 1938 as factories lost their leaders and those who remained were afraid to take decisions. Scientists and aircraft designers were sent to prison or to the camps. The diplomatic service and the army lost many of their most able men. Fear spread through every office, so that officials preferred to do nothing rather than risk being accused of 'wrecking'. When war with Germany came closer, the Soviet Union faced it with a damaged economy, an army in disorder and a frightened administration.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the consequences of the purges for the Soviet Union by 1939? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that 'the purges seriously weakened the Soviet Union', damaging its economy, science, diplomacy and army and leaving 'a frightened administration'. Interpretation 1 argues the opposite: that the purges 'left Stalin's power stronger than ever' by creating 'a new ruling class, loyal, ambitious and grateful'. I partly agree with Interpretation 2: the purges did serious damage to the country, but Interpretation 1 is right that they strengthened Stalin's own position.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about the damage. After the trial of Pyatakov in January 1937, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry was purged, and many managers, engineers and planners were arrested. Industrial growth slowed in 1937 and 1938. Because any failure could be called 'wrecking', officials were afraid to take decisions or to report problems. Scientists and designers were also arrested: the aircraft designer Tupolev was imprisoned in 1937 and made to work in a prison design bureau. The diplomatic service lost many experienced men, and the Red Army lost about 35,000 officers and three of its five marshals. By 1939 the camps held about 1.3 million prisoners, many of them skilled people whose talents were wasted.

However, Interpretation 1 is right about the effect on Stalin's power. By 1939 every leader who had known Lenin and might have challenged Stalin, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin, had been shot. At the Eighteenth Congress in March 1939 Stalin claimed that over 500,000 young Bolsheviks had been promoted to leading posts. Many were engineers from worker or peasant families, trained in the new technical institutes, and some, like Brezhnev and Kosygin, later led the country. They owed their careers to Stalin, which made the new elite more loyal than the old.

The historians convey their views differently. Interpretation 1 writes from Stalin's point of view, stressing that he got 'exactly what he wanted'. Interpretation 2 uses the language of injury, calling the purges a 'self-inflicted wound'.

Overall, the two interpretations use different measures. If the question is whether the purges strengthened Stalin, Interpretation 1 is right. But if the question is whether they strengthened the Soviet Union, Interpretation 2 is more convincing, because the loss of skilled people and the climate of fear weakened the economy and the army just as war was approaching. I therefore largely agree with Interpretation 2 about the consequences for the country, while accepting that Stalin's personal power had never been greater.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2's claims, such as the damage to industry and the army, against precise knowledge, use Interpretation 1 and evidence such as the promotion of new cadres to challenge them, and reach a judgement with clear criteria, for example distinguishing Stalin's power from the strength of the country. Strong answers comment on how each historian conveys the view. Weaker answers describe the purges rather than assessing their consequences.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that the purges seriously weakened the Soviet Union: the economy, science, diplomacy and the army lost able people, and fear paralysed officials. Points that support Interpretation 2: many managers, engineers and planners were arrested (e.g. in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry after Pyatakov's trial and Ordzhonikidze's death in February 1937; Gosplan's leaders); industrial growth slowed in 1937-38 and the Third Five-Year Plan started badly; accusations of 'wrecking' made officials afraid to take decisions or report problems; scientists and engineers were imprisoned (the aircraft designer Tupolev was arrested in 1937 and worked in a prison design bureau; the rocket engineers Korolev and Glushko were also arrested); the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs lost many diplomats; the Red Army lost about 35,000 officers in 1937-38 (accept figures in the range 34,000-38,000) and three of five marshals; the Comintern and foreign Communists in Moscow were purged; the camps held about 1.3 million prisoners by 1939; families of victims were stigmatised and fear damaged trust throughout society. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): Stalin's power was absolute by 1939 - all possible rivals (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tukhachevsky) had been removed; in his report to the Eighteenth Congress (March 1939) Stalin said that over 500,000 young Bolsheviks had been promoted to leading posts; many of these 'promotees' (vydvizhentsy) were trained engineers from worker or peasant backgrounds, and some, such as Brezhnev, Kosygin and Gromyko, rose quickly and led the country for decades; the new elite owed its position to Stalin; the economy continued to grow, especially in defence industries, and some growth returned in 1939-40; the Gulag supplied labour; the regime survived and the population, on the surface, remained obedient. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 1 stresses benefits to Stalin ('exactly what he wanted', 'stronger than ever'); Interpretation 2 uses the language of injury ('self-inflicted wound', 'damaged', 'frightened'). A substantiated judgement might argue that the purges strengthened Stalin's personal power but weakened the country's ability to fight and to run its economy, so the two interpretations judge by different criteria (Stalin's power or the strength of the state); or that the damage was real but partly repaired by 1939-41. Credit any reasoned judgement supported from both interpretations and own knowledge. Do not credit detailed narrative of the war of 1941-45, except brief reference to the problems of 1939-41.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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