Question 1
4 marksSource B: From a secret directive sent on 22 January 1933 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of People's Commissars (the Soviet government) to Party and government leaders in the North Caucasus, Ukraine and several regions of Russia and Belorussia (translated for this course). It was signed by Molotov, the head of the government, and by Stalin. The Kuban was part of the North Caucasus region and had a large Ukrainian population; the OGPU was the secret police. The directive was first published in the 1990s, after the Soviet archives were opened.
Information has reached the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars that in the Kuban and in Ukraine a mass departure of peasants 'in search of bread' has begun, to the Central Black Earth region, the Volga, the Moscow region, the Western region and Belorussia. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR have no doubt that this departure of peasants, like the departure from Ukraine last year, has been organised by enemies of Soviet power, Socialist Revolutionaries and agents of Poland, for the purpose of agitation 'through the peasants' in the northern regions of the USSR against the collective farms and against Soviet power in general. Last year the Party, Soviet and Cheka [secret police] bodies of Ukraine failed to notice this counter-revolutionary scheme of the enemies of Soviet power. This year a repetition of last year's mistake cannot be allowed.
... Second. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars instruct the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine ... not to allow a mass departure of peasants from Ukraine to other regions, or entry into Ukraine from the North Caucasus.
Third. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars instruct the OGPU representatives in the Moscow region, the Central Black Earth region, the Western region, Belorussia, the Lower Volga and the Middle Volga to arrest the 'peasants' of Ukraine and the North Caucasus who have made their way north and, after the counter-revolutionary elements have been picked out, to return the rest to their places of residence.
Source C: From an article by Gareth Jones, 'Ruin of Russian Agriculture', published in the Financial News, a London newspaper for business readers, on 13 April 1933. Jones, a Welsh journalist who spoke Russian, had walked through villages in the USSR in March 1933. It was the third of three articles in which he assessed the results of the First Five-Year Plan.
In the eyes of responsible foreign observers and of peasants, the famine in Russia to-day is far worse than that of 1921. ...
The writer has visited villages in the Moscow district, in the Black Earth district, and in North Ukraine, parts, which are far from being the most badly hit in Russia. He has collected evidence from peasants and foreign observers and residents concerning the Ukraine, Crimea, North Caucasia, Nijni-Novgorod district, West Siberia, Kazakstan, Tashkent area, the German Volga and Ukrainian colonists, and all the evidence proves that there is a general famine threatening the lives of millions of people. The Soviet Government tries its best to conceal the situation, but the grim facts will out. ...
What are the causes of the famine? The main reason for the catastrophe in Russian agriculture is the Soviet policy of collectivisation. ... In the first place, the policy of creating large collective farms, where the land was to be owned and cultivated in common, led to the land being taken away from more than two-thirds of the peasantry, and incentive to work disappeared. Moreover, last year nearly all the crops were violently seized, and the peasant was left almost nothing for himself.
Interpretation 1: From Hunger Across the Union: The Soviet Famine of 1932-33 by Graham Tunnicliffe (fictional), published in 1999.
The famine of 1932-33 struck many parts of the Soviet Union, not Ukraine alone. Kazakhstan lost a larger share of its people than any other republic, and there was mass starvation in the North Caucasus, along the Volga and in western Siberia. Everywhere the causes were much the same. Forced collectivisation had destroyed the peasants' will to work and much of the livestock, the harvest of 1932 was poor, and Moscow went on demanding grain at almost any cost to feed the towns and the army and to pay for imports. Stalin was ruthless and indifferent to the lives of peasants, and he refused to admit that there was a famine at all. But the evidence suggests that his aim was to extract grain, not to destroy a nation.
Interpretation 2: From The Black Years: Ukraine and the Famine by Catherine Nettleford (fictional), published in 2015.
In Ukraine the famine was made far worse by decisions aimed at Ukrainians and at Ukraine itself. Stalin feared that he might 'lose Ukraine', and he treated the failure to meet grain targets there as sabotage by nationalists. In late 1932 villages that fell behind were put on blacklists and cut off from all supplies, and in January 1933 peasants were stopped from leaving Ukraine and the Kuban to look for food. At the same time the Ukrainian Communist Party was purged, and policies that had encouraged the Ukrainian language and culture were reversed. For many historians, and for Ukraine itself, which officially recognises the famine, the Holodomor, as genocide, these measures show a deliberate attack on the Ukrainian nation.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about whether the famine of 1932-33 was deliberately directed against Ukraine. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
One reason is that the historians have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 2 seems to have relied on evidence like Source B, the secret directive of January 1933. It singles out peasants from 'in the Kuban and in Ukraine', blames their flight on 'agents of Poland' and other 'enemies of Soviet power', and orders that they be stopped from leaving and arrested if they reach the north. This fits Interpretation 2's view that Stalin treated Ukraine's problems as 'sabotage by nationalists' and that 'in January 1933 peasants were stopped from leaving Ukraine and the Kuban'. The author of Interpretation 1 is closer to evidence like Source C, in which Jones describes 'a general famine' with evidence from the North Caucasus, West Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Volga, caused by collectivisation and by crops being 'violently seized'. This matches Interpretation 1's view that the famine 'struck many parts of the Soviet Union, not Ukraine alone' and that the causes were 'much the same' everywhere.
Explanation
Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching specific details: the directive's measures against peasants from Ukraine and the Kuban with Interpretation 2, and Jones's evidence of famine across many regions with Interpretation 1. Weaker answers simply say which source each historian 'used', or describe the difference again. Remember that historians still disagree about Stalin's intentions, so a reason based on 'one historian is biased' is not valid.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different evidence. Source B supports Interpretation 2: the directive of 22 January 1933, signed by Stalin and Molotov, singles out peasants from 'in the Kuban and in Ukraine', blames their search for food on 'enemies of Soviet power, Socialist Revolutionaries and agents of Poland', criticises the Ukrainian Party and police for failing to stop it 'last year', and orders that peasants be kept in Ukraine and the North Caucasus and arrested if they reach the north; this matches Interpretation 2's view that Stalin saw Ukraine's problems as 'sabotage by nationalists' and that 'in January 1933 peasants were stopped from leaving Ukraine and the Kuban'. Source C supports Interpretation 1: Jones reports evidence of 'a general famine' from many regions, including 'Crimea, North Caucasia ... West Siberia, Kazakstan' and the Volga, and names collectivisation and the violent seizure of 'nearly all the crops' as the causes; this matches Interpretation 1's view that the famine 'struck many parts of the Soviet Union, not Ukraine alone' and that the causes 'were much the same' everywhere: collectivisation and Moscow's demand for grain. The interpretations may differ because of their focus: Interpretation 1 compares Ukraine with other regions, especially Kazakhstan, and looks at the causes common to them all, while Interpretation 2 concentrates on measures that applied to Ukraine and the Kuban. They may differ because they use different kinds of evidence: secret orders from Moscow that were first published in the 1990s (like Source B) against reports from observers at the time (like Source C), which could see the suffering but not the decisions behind it. They may differ because they ask different questions: Interpretation 1 asks what Stalin's main aim was (to extract grain), Interpretation 2 asks what the effect of his measures was on Ukrainians as a nation. Historians still disagree about intent; both interpretations accept that the famine was man-made and that Stalin's policies caused it. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations and, if used, matched details from the sources. Answers that only say 'Interpretation 2 used Source B' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view without explaining it, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or an assertion that a historian is biased.