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The Provisional Government, 1917

Practise 20 exam-style questions on The Provisional Government, 1917 for Edexcel GCSE History (Russia and the Soviet Union 1917-41). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 20 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From a report sent by David R. Francis, the American Ambassador in Russia, to the US Secretary of State, 17 April 1917 (Western calendar; 4 April in the Russian calendar). Francis printed the report in his memoirs, Russia from the American Embassy, published in 1921. The 'Workingmen and Soldiers' Deputies' were the Petrograd Soviet.

For a week or ten days after our recognition of the Provisional Government the tension continued very great, as the Council of Ministers or Provisional Government was trying to establish itself but was so fearful of the consequences of a test of strength with the Workingmen and Soldiers' Deputies that it proceeded very cautiously. The soldiers were permitted to parade with banners and bands throughout the city and the workingmen if returning to work at all were making unreasonable demands as to wages and hours and in some or many instances were selecting their own foremen. There has been, however, no contest between these two authorities up to this time and I think there is likely to be none. The Provisional Government or Council of Ministers has been gaining strength from day to day; ... the entire situation is much better than it has been at any day since March 12th, when the first regiment mutinied. ... On Friday last, April 13th, this body [the Soviet's representatives] passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution favoring a vigorous prosecution of the war to a successful issue and either the same day or the day after adopted another resolution endorsing the Provisional Government.

Source C: From a letter written by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, to the Foreign Office in London on 21 May 1917 (Western calendar; 8 May in the Russian calendar). Buchanan published it in his memoirs, My Mission to Russia, in 1923. The 'note to the Powers' was Milyukov's note to the Allies about Russia's war aims, which led to protests in Petrograd in April 1917.

The last two weeks have been very anxious ones, as the victory which the Government had won over the Soviet in the matter of the note to the Powers was not nearly so complete as Miliukoff had imagined. So long as the Soviet maintained its exclusive right to dispose of the troops, the Government, as Prince Lvoff remarked, was 'an authority without power,' while the Workmen's Council was 'a power without authority.' Under such conditions it was impossible for Guchkoff, as Minister of War, and for Korniloff, as military governor of Petrograd, to accept responsibility for the maintenance of discipline in the army. They both, consequently, resigned, while the former declared that if things were to continue as they were the army would cease to exist as a fighting force in three weeks' time. Guchkoff's resignation precipitated matters, and Lvoff, Kerensky and Tereschenko came to the conclusion that, as the Soviet was too powerful a factor to be either suppressed or disregarded, the only way of putting an end to the anomaly of a dual Government was to form a Coalition.

Interpretation 1: From The Hopeful Spring: Russia, March-April 1917 by Owen Tredgold (fictional), published in 1977.

In its first weeks the Provisional Government enjoyed more support than any Russian government had known for years. Generals, civil servants and local councils accepted its authority, and Russia's allies hurried to recognise it. The leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, most of them Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, had no wish to rule; they promised to support the new ministers as long as they kept to the programme agreed in March, and in the early spring the Soviets voted to back both the government and the defence of the country. 'Dual Control' existed, but in these weeks it worked more as an uneasy partnership than as a contest, and many observers believed that the government's position was growing stronger.

Interpretation 2: From Two Masters: Government and Soviet in 1917 by Miriam Pellatt (fictional), published in 2001.

From its first day the Provisional Government held office but not power. The men with rifles in the capital - the soldiers of the garrison and the armed workers of the factory districts - looked to the Petrograd Soviet, not to the ministers. Order Number 1 told the troops to obey the Duma's Military Commission (and so the new government) only when its orders did not contradict the Soviet's. Ministers could not move a single regiment without the Soviet's agreement. When they tried to act alone, as Milyukov did over Russia's war aims in April, soldiers and workers poured onto the streets and he was soon forced out of office. By May the government had to bring Soviet leaders into the cabinet simply to survive.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how much authority the Provisional Government had under 'Dual Control' in the spring of 1917. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

One reason the interpretations differ is that their authors have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1, which argues that 'Dual Control' worked as 'an uneasy partnership' and that the government's position seemed to be 'growing stronger', fits evidence like Source B. Francis reported in April 1917 that there had been 'no contest between these two authorities', that the government 'has been gaining strength from day to day' and that the Soviet's representatives had voted for a resolution 'endorsing the Provisional Government'. Interpretation 2, which argues that the government 'held office but not power', fits Source C. Buchanan reported in May that, because the Soviet had the 'exclusive right to dispose of the troops', the government was 'an authority without power' and had to form a coalition because the Soviet was too powerful to be 'suppressed or disregarded'. The authors also focus on different periods: Interpretation 1 on the first weeks, Interpretation 2 on the whole spring, including the April crisis.

Explanation

Full marks need a reason that is explained and supported by matching details from a source and an interpretation, such as Francis's 'no contest between these two authorities' and Interpretation 1's 'uneasy partnership'. Showing that each author focuses on a different period is another valid reason. Simply saying 'the author used Source B' or 'the author is biased', or repeating the difference between the views, does not answer the question.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 1: Francis reports 'no contest between these two authorities', that the government 'has been gaining strength from day to day' and that the Soviet's representatives voted for the war and for 'a resolution endorsing the Provisional Government', which matches Interpretation 1's 'uneasy partnership', the Soviets voting 'to back both the government and the defence of the country' and the view that the government 'was growing stronger'. Source C gives some support to Interpretation 2: Buchanan reports Lvov's remark that the government was 'an authority without power', that the Soviet had the 'exclusive right to dispose of the troops' and was 'too powerful a factor to be either suppressed or disregarded', and that a coalition had to be formed, which matches Interpretation 2's 'held office but not power', ministers unable to 'move a single regiment' and the coalition formed 'simply to survive'. The interpretations may differ because they focus on different periods: Interpretation 1 concentrates on the first weeks ('in these weeks'), before the April crisis, while Interpretation 2 covers the whole spring, including Milyukov's note and the May coalition. They may differ because of a different emphasis: Interpretation 1 looks at who accepted the government's authority (generals, officials, allies, Soviet leaders), Interpretation 2 at who controlled force in Petrograd (the garrison, Order Number 1). Answers that simply assert that one author used Source B, or that one author is biased, without matching details from both a source and an interpretation, stay in Level 1. Reasons based only on the dates of publication or the titles of the books are not valid unless substantiated from the content. Repeating the main difference between the views (the DIFF4 task) without suggesting a reason scores 0. 'Dual Control' (the specification's term) is also called 'dual power'; accept either.

Question 2

4 marks

Interpretation 1: From The General's Gamble: Kornilov and the Russian Right by Caroline Pendrill (fictional), published in 1975.

There is little doubt that Kornilov intended to make himself master of Russia. From the moment he became commander-in-chief in July he made one demand after another - the death penalty in the rear, curbs on the soldiers' committees, martial law in Petrograd - and he was surrounded by officers, industrialists and right-wing politicians who talked openly of a military dictatorship. At the Moscow State Conference in August they greeted him as a saviour. When he ordered General Krymov's cavalry towards the capital, his aim was to crush the Soviet and bring the government under his control. Kerensky's dismissal of him was not a misunderstanding but the only way to save the revolution.

Interpretation 2: From Confusion at Headquarters: The Kornilov Affair Reconsidered by Douglas Elphick (fictional), published in 2005.

The Kornilov affair was less a conspiracy than a muddle, and Kerensky must take much of the blame. He had himself agreed that troops should be brought to Petrograd to deal with a Bolshevik rising that both men expected. Messages between the two were carried by Vladimir Lvov, a former minister with no official role, who garbled them. When Lvov reported that Kornilov was demanding dictatorial powers, Kerensky held only a brief and vague exchange with Kornilov over the telegraph before dismissing his commander-in-chief and branding him a traitor. Only then did Kornilov, convinced that the government had fallen under the Soviet's control, refuse to obey. By turning a misunderstanding into a revolt, Kerensky destroyed his own standing with the army.

Study Interpretations 1 and 2. They give different views about who was responsible for the Kornilov affair. What is the main difference between these views? Explain your answer, using details from both interpretations.

Model answer

The main difference is that Interpretation 1 blames Kornilov, seeing the affair as his deliberate attempt to seize power, while Interpretation 2 blames Kerensky, seeing it as a misunderstanding that he turned into a revolt. Interpretation 1 says Kornilov 'intended to make himself master of Russia' and that his aim in sending Krymov's cavalry was 'to crush the Soviet', so Kerensky's dismissal of him was 'not a misunderstanding'. Interpretation 2 calls the affair 'less a conspiracy than a muddle', points out that Kerensky had himself 'agreed that troops should be brought to Petrograd' and that Lvov 'garbled' the messages, and argues that Kornilov refused to obey 'only' after Kerensky had dismissed him and branded him a traitor.

Explanation

For Level 2, state the overall difference - a deliberate attempt at power by Kornilov against a muddle made worse by Kerensky - and support both sides with details from the interpretations. Noting that only one mentions Vladimir Lvov is a surface detail, not a difference of view. Do not use own knowledge to decide which view is right; that is not what this question asks.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): The interpretations are analysed and a key difference of view is identified and supported from them.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Limited analysis of the interpretations is shown by the extraction or paraphrase of some content, but differences of surface detail only are given, or a difference of view is asserted without direct support.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The main difference is that Interpretation 1 holds Kornilov responsible, as the leader of a deliberate attempt to seize power, while Interpretation 2 holds Kerensky largely responsible, seeing the affair as a misunderstanding that he turned into a revolt. Interpretation 1 supports this by saying Kornilov 'intended to make himself master of Russia', describing his demands and the right-wing supporters who 'talked openly of a military dictatorship', and saying his aim was 'to crush the Soviet'; it calls Kerensky's dismissal of him 'not a misunderstanding'. Interpretation 2 supports its view by calling the affair 'less a conspiracy than a muddle', saying Kerensky had 'agreed that troops should be brought to Petrograd', that Lvov 'garbled' the messages, that Kerensky dismissed Kornilov after only a 'brief and vague exchange', and that Kornilov refused to obey 'only then'. Differences of surface detail only (e.g. one mentions the Moscow State Conference, the other Vladimir Lvov) stay in Level 1, as does a difference asserted without support from both interpretations. Explaining why they differ earns no extra credit.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why Kerensky had become the leading figure in the Provisional Government by July 1917.

You may use the following in your answer:
- his membership of both the government and the Petrograd Soviet
- the resignations of Guchkov and Milyukov in the spring of 1917

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

Kerensky's rise owed much to his unique position in both halves of 'dual power'. In March 1917 he was the only socialist in the Provisional Government, as Minister of Justice, and also a vice-chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. The liberal ministers needed the Soviet's support, and the Soviet trusted Kerensky more than any other minister, so he became the link that held the two together. This made him far more important than his post suggested.

His skill as a speaker strengthened this position. Kerensky could hold huge crowds of workers and soldiers spellbound, and the government repeatedly used him to calm protests and win support for its policies. In a revolution in which meetings and speeches mattered enormously, this gave him a personal popularity that no other minister had.

His early reforms as Minister of Justice also made him popular. He was associated with the amnesty for political prisoners and the abolition of the death penalty in March 1917, which made him a symbol of the new freedoms.

The resignations of Guchkov and Milyukov then removed his main rivals and gave him the War Ministry. In April, Milyukov's note to the Allies, which suggested that Russia still wanted to gain territory such as Constantinople, provoked angry demonstrations in Petrograd. Kerensky had opposed annexations, so the crisis discredited Milyukov but not him. Guchkov resigned as Minister of War at the end of April and Milyukov left in early May. When the first coalition government was formed on 5 May, bringing Soviet leaders into the cabinet, Kerensky became Minister of War and of the Navy, which put him in charge of the most important issue of all. He toured the front making passionate speeches to prepare the June offensive, and its early successes made him seem the man who could revive the army.

Finally, the crisis of July made him Prime Minister. The Kadet ministers resigned on 2 July and the armed demonstrations of the July Days shook the government. Prince Lvov, worn out and opposed to the socialist ministers' plans for the land, resigned on 7 July, and Kerensky took over as Prime Minister the next day while remaining Minister of War. He was the only figure acceptable to both the liberals and the moderate socialists, and no other politician had his popularity. By July 1917, therefore, his position between the government and the Soviet, his personal appeal and the removal of his rivals had made him the leading figure in the Provisional Government.

Explanation

Top-level answers explain how each factor increased Kerensky's importance, for example why his place in both the government and the Soviet made him indispensable, rather than giving a biography of him. Cover at least three aspects of content, such as his dual role, his oratory, the April crisis and the July crisis. Do not drift into a narrative of the June offensive or the July Days without linking it to his rise.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Kerensky was the only socialist in the first Provisional Government (Minister of Justice) and also a vice-chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, so he was the link between the two halves of 'dual power': the liberal ministers needed the Soviet's support and the Soviet trusted him more than any other minister. He was an outstanding speaker who could sway crowds of workers and soldiers, and the government relied on him to calm unrest and win support. As Minister of Justice he was associated with popular reforms: the amnesty for political prisoners and the abolition of the death penalty (March 1917). The April crisis over Milyukov's note to the Allies (18 April), which seemed to support annexations such as Constantinople, provoked demonstrations and discredited Milyukov, whereas Kerensky had opposed annexations. Guchkov resigned as Minister of War (30 April) and Milyukov left the government (early May); in the first coalition (5 May) Kerensky became Minister of War and the Navy, putting him in charge of the war. He toured the front making speeches to prepare the June offensive, whose early success boosted his standing. In July the Kadet ministers resigned (2 July), the July Days shook the government, and Prince Lvov resigned (7 July); Kerensky became Prime Minister on 8 July while keeping the War Ministry, as the only leader acceptable to both the liberals and the moderate socialists. He had joined the Socialist Revolutionaries in March 1917, which gave him a party base among the peasants, and there was no rival with his popularity. Answers need not rank the reasons. Do not credit claims that Kerensky was Prime Minister from March, that he was a Bolshevik or Menshevik, or that he led the Soviet (Chkheidze was its chairman). A narrative of the July Days or the June offensive that is not linked to Kerensky's rise should not be credited above Level 2. Accept New Style dates (e.g. Prime Minister on 21 July).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From The Long Unravelling: Russia's Army and Government in 1917 by Colin Haverfield (fictional), published in 1968.

The failure of the June offensive is often seen as the moment when the Provisional Government lost its last chance, but this exaggerates its importance. The army was falling apart long before the offensive began: since the spring, soldiers' committees had questioned their officers' orders, men had deserted in large numbers and fraternisation with the enemy was common. Nor did the defeat destroy the government. It survived the July Days, the Bolshevik leaders were arrested or driven into hiding, and Kerensky became Prime Minister. What really undermined the government were its failures at home: food queues grew longer, prices kept rising and the peasants were still waiting for land. It was the Kornilov affair at the end of August, not the defeat in Galicia, that finally turned the soldiers and workers of Petrograd against Kerensky.

Interpretation 2: From A Fatal Gamble: The June Offensive and the Fall of the Provisional Government by Edmund Stanbury (fictional), published in 2008.

The June offensive was the Provisional Government's fatal mistake. Kerensky, the Minister of War, toured the front making speeches to rouse the troops, and the attack was launched on 18 June in the hope that victory would restore discipline and satisfy Russia's allies. After a few days of success against the Austrians, the advance stalled. In Petrograd, soldiers who feared being sent to the front helped to start the armed demonstrations of the July Days, and when the Germans counter-attacked a few days later the Russian armies broke and fled. The defeat finished the army as a fighting force: desertion soared and soldiers turned on their officers. In the crisis that followed, Kerensky became Prime Minister and turned to General Kornilov to restore order in the army. From the failure of the offensive came both the July Days and the Kornilov affair, and, in the end, the Bolshevik seizure of power.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the importance of the failure of the June offensive (1917) for the Provisional Government? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that the June offensive was 'the Provisional Government's fatal mistake' because its failure led to the July Days, the Kornilov affair and finally the Bolshevik seizure of power. Interpretation 1 argues that this 'exaggerates its importance' and that the government was undermined mainly by its failures at home. I partly agree with Interpretation 2: the offensive was a turning point, but it speeded up problems that already existed.

There is strong evidence for Interpretation 2. Kerensky, as Minister of War, toured the front making speeches and launched the offensive on 18 June against the Austrians in Galicia. After early gains, the attack stalled, and the German counter-attack in July turned it into a rout. The army's discipline collapsed, desertion rose and soldiers attacked their officers. The offensive also helped to cause the July Days: soldiers of the First Machine Gun Regiment, who feared being sent to the front, helped to start the armed demonstrations. In the crisis, Prince Lvov resigned and Kerensky became Prime Minister. He restored the death penalty at the front and made Kornilov Commander-in-Chief, which led directly to the Kornilov affair at the end of August. The offensive also damaged the moderate socialists who had supported it, while the Bolsheviks, who had opposed it, could claim they had been right.

However, Interpretation 1 is right that the army was falling apart before June. Since Order Number 1 in March, soldiers' committees had questioned officers' orders, and desertion and fraternisation were common in the spring. It is also right that the government survived the July Days. The Bolsheviks were blamed and accused of being German agents, Lenin fled to Finland and Trotsky was arrested. The government's failures at home were just as damaging: food queues and prices grew, peasants began to seize land, and in August the elections to the Constituent Assembly were postponed again. As Interpretation 1 says, it was the Kornilov affair that armed the Red Guards and was followed by Bolshevik majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets in September.

The interpretations convey their views differently. Interpretation 2 builds a chain of cause and effect, ending 'and, in the end, the Bolshevik seizure of power', while Interpretation 1 uses words such as 'exaggerates' and 'What really undermined' to play down the offensive.

Overall, I agree with Interpretation 2 that the failure of the offensive was very important, because it began the chain of events that led to the Kornilov affair. But it did not create the government's problems. The army's collapse and the anger over land and bread were already there, so the offensive is best seen as the event that turned these problems into a crisis the government could not survive.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2's chain of consequences (the rout, the July Days, Kerensky's appointment of Kornilov) against Interpretation 1's evidence that the army was already collapsing and that problems at home mattered more, and reach a judgement with clear criteria. Weaker answers describe the offensive or the July Days without linking them to the government's survival, or mix up the Russian and Western calendars.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that the June offensive was 'the Provisional Government's fatal mistake', from which came the July Days, the Kornilov affair and the Bolshevik seizure of power. Points that support Interpretation 2: Kerensky, Minister of War from May, toured the front (he was nicknamed the 'persuader-in-chief') and launched the offensive on 18 June (1 July in the Western calendar) in Galicia against Austria-Hungary; after early gains (Kornilov's Eighth Army took Galich and Kalush) the attack stalled, and the German counter-attack from 6 July (19 July) turned it into a rout, with Tarnopol lost; casualties ran into tens of thousands and desertion grew; soldiers of the First Machine Gun Regiment, who feared being sent to the front, helped to start the July Days (3-5 July); the Kadet ministers had resigned on 2 July and Prince Lvov resigned on 7 July, so Kerensky became Prime Minister (8 July); the death penalty was restored at the front (12 July) and Kornilov was made Commander-in-Chief (18 July), which led to the Kornilov affair (27-31 August); the offensive discredited the moderate socialists of the Soviet who had backed it, while the Bolsheviks, who had opposed it, gained support. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): the army was disintegrating before June (Order Number 1, soldiers' committees, desertion and fraternisation in the spring); the government survived July, when the Bolsheviks were blamed and accused of being German agents, Lenin fled to Finland and Trotsky and Kamenev were arrested; food shortages, inflation, peasant land seizures and the postponement of the Constituent Assembly elections (in August, from September to November) eroded support at home; the Kornilov affair armed the Red Guards and was followed by Bolshevik majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets (early September). Answers may note how the views are conveyed: Interpretation 2 builds a chain of consequences ('From the failure of the offensive came...'), while Interpretation 1 uses words such as 'exaggerates' and 'What really undermined'. A substantiated judgement might argue that the offensive did not create the army's collapse or the problems at home but turned them into a political crisis, or that it mattered mainly because of the chain it began (the July Days, then Kornilov). Do not credit treatment of the interpretations as sources to be judged for reliability. Dates may be given in either calendar.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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