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The end of the Cultural Revolution, 1968-76

Practise 18 exam-style questions on The end of the Cultural Revolution, 1968-76 for Edexcel GCSE History (Mao's China 1945-76). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
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18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From 'Mao's Last Hurrah: The Campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping', a secret study written in August 1976 by a member of the Office of Political Research of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The author said that other CIA offices had been consulted but that the study had not been formally agreed with them. Teng Hsiao-ping is Deng Xiaoping, who had been dismissed in April 1976. Tienanmen Square is Tiananmen Square. It was released by the CIA in 2004.

The anti-Teng campaign has demonstrated not so much the strength as the weakness of Mao's revolutionary supporters. Over the past decade, Mao has alienated in turn:

-- most of the old Party cadres (in the Cultural Revolution),
-- most of the military (in the anti-Lin Piao campaign), and
-- most of the industrial work force (in the anti-Confucian campaign).

Those actively supporting Mao in the current campaign appear to be only the ideologues (who control the media); the worker-peasant-soldier students (who control the campuses); and the young Leftist cadres who emerged during the Cultural Revolution (and who do not control much of anything). ... The most striking indication, however, was the demonstration at Tienanmen Square in Peking in early April, the first mass demonstration in China directed against Mao's leadership.

Source C: From a report to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate by Senator Hugh Scott, the leader of the Republican senators, published in September 1976. Scott had visited China from 10 to 24 July 1976 as the guest of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao is Zhang Chunqiao, one of the Gang of Four. Premier Chou is Zhou Enlai, who had died in January 1976.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing was hardly mentioned to us by Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, by the senior Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, or by the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Shanghai Municipality, but with almost ritualistic regularity, criticism of Teng was a part of conversations we had everywhere else, at Peking University, in factories, at a May 7th cadre school, in museums, at two communes, in hospitals, sports centers, musical performances, and even in kindergartens. ...

A power-seeking "left," speaking as ideologues and moralists, and citing Chairman Mao as their authority, was telling the people to condemn Teng Hsiao-p'ing -- the elitist, the capitalist roader, and the betrayer of the revolution. The pragmatists and the administrators, in whom Premier Chou placed great trust in his January 1975 "will and testament," were largely silent ...

Interpretation 1: From The Shanghai Radicals by Cecil Draycott (fictional), published in 1989.

From 1973 until Mao's death the Gang of Four was the most powerful group in China after Mao himself. Wang Hongwen became the Party's third-ranking leader at the Tenth Congress in 1973, Zhang Chunqiao became a Vice-Premier and head of the army's political department, and Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan controlled the newspapers, the radio and the arts. Through the campaign to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius they attacked Zhou Enlai, and in 1976 they turned the whole country against Deng Xiaoping. In every factory, school and commune people had to repeat their slogans.

Interpretation 2: From Paper Tigers: The Gang of Four, 1973-76 by Rowena Kettleby (fictional), published in 2013.

The Gang of Four was much weaker than its noisy propaganda suggested. Its members never controlled the government ministries, which Zhou Enlai and then Deng Xiaoping filled with experienced administrators, and they had little support among army commanders and provincial leaders. Mao himself warned them in 1974 and 1975 not to act as a 'gang of four'. When Zhou died, Mao chose Hua Guofeng, not Zhang Chunqiao, as acting Premier. Their power rested on the media and on Mao's protection, and when Mao died it collapsed within a month.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how much power the Gang of Four had in China in the years 1973-76. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

One reason is that the historians have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 1 seems to have relied on evidence like Source C, in which Senator Scott found criticism of Deng repeated 'with almost ritualistic regularity' in universities, factories, communes, hospitals 'and even in kindergartens', while a 'power-seeking "left"' told 'the people to condemn Teng' and the pragmatists 'were largely silent'. This fits Interpretation 1's view that the Gang 'turned the whole country against Deng Xiaoping' and that people everywhere 'had to repeat their slogans'. The author of Interpretation 2 is closer to evidence like Source B, where the CIA concluded that the campaign showed 'the weakness' of Mao's radical supporters, who had alienated the old cadres, 'most of the military' and the workers, and controlled only 'the media' and 'the campuses'. This matches Interpretation 2's claim that the Gang had 'little support among army commanders and provincial leaders' and that its 'power rested on the media and on Mao's protection'.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching details: Scott's experience of the anti-Deng campaign everywhere he went with Interpretation 1, and the CIA's judgement that the radicals controlled only the media and campuses with Interpretation 2. Another valid reason is a different focus, propaganda and public campaigns against real control of the government, army and provinces. Weaker answers say which source each historian 'used' without showing the link.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Source B supports Interpretation 2: the CIA judged that the anti-Teng campaign showed 'not so much the strength as the weakness' of Mao's radical supporters, who had alienated 'most of the old Party cadres', 'most of the military' and 'most of the industrial work force', and who controlled only 'the media', 'the campuses' and young cadres who 'do not control much of anything'; the Tiananmen demonstration of April 1976 was 'directed against Mao's leadership'; this matches Interpretation 2's view that the Gang 'never controlled the government ministries', had 'little support among army commanders and provincial leaders' and that 'their power rested on the media and on Mao's protection'. Source C supports Interpretation 1: Scott found criticism of Deng 'with almost ritualistic regularity' in universities, factories, communes, hospitals 'and even in kindergartens', while 'a power-seeking "left"' was 'telling the people to condemn Teng' and the pragmatists 'were largely silent'; this matches Interpretation 1's claim that the Gang 'turned the whole country against Deng Xiaoping' and that 'in every factory, school and commune people had to repeat their slogans'. The interpretations may differ because of their focus: Interpretation 1 looks at the Gang's control of propaganda, campaigns and public life, Interpretation 2 at the real instruments of power (ministries, army, provinces) and at their dependence on Mao. They may differ because of the evidence used: what visitors and ordinary people saw and heard in public (as in Source C) against secret analysis of who held power (as in Source B). They may differ because Interpretation 2 uses hindsight about the Gang's rapid collapse after Mao's death. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations and, if used, matched details from the sources. Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source C' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view without explaining it, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or an assertion that a historian is biased.

Question 2

4 marks

Source A: From the 'Message to the Whole Party, the Whole Army and the People of All Nationalities Throughout the Country', issued on 9 September 1976 jointly by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Party's Military Commission, to announce the death of Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung in this translation). This official English translation was published in Peking Review on 13 September 1976. Teng Hsiao-ping is Deng Xiaoping, who had been dismissed in April 1976. The 'Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts' was the charge made against Deng: that he had tried to undo the judgements of the Cultural Revolution.

Chairman Mao Tsetung was the founder and wise leader of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic of China; Chairman Mao led our Party ... during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, triumphing over the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping ...

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China calls on the whole Party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities in the country to resolutely turn their grief into strength:

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and persist in taking class struggle as the key link ...

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and strengthen the centralized leadership of the Party, resolutely uphold the unity and unification of the Party and closely rally round the Party Central Committee. ...

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and ... deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping, continue the struggle to repulse the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ...

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and ... strengthen the building of the militia, strengthen preparedness against war, heighten our vigilance ...

Give two things you can infer from Source A about the political situation in China at the time of Mao's death in September 1976.

Set out your answer under these headings, once for each inference:
What I can infer:
Details in the source that tell me this:

Model answer

What I can infer: The leadership was afraid that the Party would split after Mao's death, because no single leader had clearly taken his place.
Details in the source that tell me this: The message calls for 'the centralized leadership of the Party', urges everyone to 'uphold the unity and unification of the Party' and tells them to 'rally round the Party Central Committee' rather than a named new leader.

What I can infer: The radicals' policies were still official, so the Cultural Revolution was meant to continue even after Mao.
Details in the source that tell me this: It calls on the people to 'deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping' and to 'consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'.

Explanation

Top answers draw conclusions about the situation at Mao's death, for example that the leaders feared a split, that no successor was named, or that the radicals' line was still official, and support each with a short quotation. Repeating a slogan such as 'turn their grief into strength' is not an inference. Own knowledge of what happened a month later, the arrest of the Gang of Four, should not replace inferences from the source.

Mark scheme
  1. 1 mark

    A valid inference about the political situation in China at the time of Mao's death in September 1976, e.g. the radicals' policies still dominated, so the Cultural Revolution was meant to continue after Mao / the leadership feared that the Party would split after Mao's death / no single successor had clearly taken Mao's place / Deng Xiaoping was still officially treated as an enemy, like Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao / China's leaders needed to claim Mao's legacy to justify their own authority / the leadership feared unrest or danger and wanted the army and militia ready.

    Award 1 mark for each valid inference up to a maximum of two inferences. The second mark for each example should be awarded for supporting detail selected from the source. e.g. The radicals' line still dominated, so the Cultural Revolution was meant to continue (1). The message calls for the leadership to 'deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping' and 'consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (1). The leadership feared a split in the Party after Mao's death (1). It calls for 'the centralized leadership of the Party' and urges all to 'uphold the unity and unification of the Party' (1). No single successor had clearly taken Mao's place (1). People are told to 'rally round the Party Central Committee', not round a named new leader (1). Deng was officially treated as an enemy like Liu and Lin (1). Mao triumphed over 'the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping' (1). The leaders needed Mao's legacy to justify their authority (1). Each task begins 'We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao' (1). The leadership feared unrest or danger (1). It calls for strengthening 'the building of the militia' and 'preparedness against war' and to 'heighten our vigilance' (1). An inference must go beyond what the source says: 'they wanted to criticise Teng Hsiao-ping' or 'they called for unity' simply repeats the source and earns no mark until the student says what it suggests (for example, that the radicals still had the upper hand, or that the leaders feared a split). Own knowledge (e.g. 'the Gang of Four was arrested on 6 October 1976') is not an inference from Source A. Comments on the reliability of the message are not inferences and earn no marks in this question. Accept other appropriate alternatives.

  2. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the first inference, e.g. 'deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping' / 'consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' / 'persist in taking class struggle as the key link' / 'strengthen the centralized leadership of the Party, resolutely uphold the unity and unification of the Party' / 'closely rally round the Party Central Committee' / 'the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping' / 'We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao' (repeated) / 'strengthen the building of the militia, strengthen preparedness against war, heighten our vigilance'.

    Award only if the first inference has been credited and the detail genuinely supports it (a short quotation or a close reference to Source A). A detail that does not support the inference given, or information from own knowledge, earns no mark.

  3. 1 mark

    A second valid inference about the political situation in China at the time of Mao's death in September 1976, different from the first (see the examples under the first inference).

    The second inference must be a different point, not the first reworded (e.g. 'the leaders wanted unity' and 'they were afraid of division' are the same inference). Apply the same rules: no credit for paraphrase or own knowledge.

  4. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the second inference.

    Award only if the second inference has been credited and the detail from Source A supports it. The same detail may support two different inferences only if it genuinely shows both.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why Mao brought the Red Guard movement to an end in 1968.

You may use the following in your answer:
- violence between rival Red Guard groups
- the workers' propaganda teams (July 1968)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

Mao brought the Red Guard movement to an end in 1968 because it had done what he needed, and because its violence now threatened to destroy order in China and the authority of the regime itself.

First, the Red Guards had served their purpose. Mao had unleashed them in 1966 to attack 'capitalist roaders' in the Party. By 1968 Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had been overthrown, most of the old Party committees had collapsed, and revolutionary committees, led by army officers, rebels and approved cadres, were being set up in every province. Mao no longer needed a mass movement of students to destroy his opponents; he needed order to rebuild.

Secondly, the Red Guards had turned on each other. They had split into rival factions, each claiming to be Mao's true followers, and from 1967 their quarrels became armed fighting with weapons seized from army stores. In the spring and summer of 1968 the fighting was at its worst. At Tsinghua University in Beijing rival factions fought a 'hundred days' war', and in Guangxi towns were burned and the railway to Vietnam was cut. Many people were killed.

Thirdly, the chaos threatened the economy and the state. Industrial production had fallen in 1967-68, transport was disrupted and supplies for North Vietnam were held up. Army leaders wanted order restored, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made a divided China look dangerously weak.

Fourthly, Mao acted through the workers' propaganda teams. On 27 July 1968 tens of thousands of workers, backed by soldiers, marched into Tsinghua University to stop the fighting. The Red Guards resisted and several workers were killed. The next day Mao summoned five leading Red Guard leaders, including Kuai Dafu, and made it clear that the fighting had to stop. Over the following weeks propaganda teams took over schools and universities across China, ending student control.

Finally, Mao had become disillusioned with the young rebels, who had failed to unite and had not behaved as the reliable revolutionaries he had hoped for. Dispersing them was the surest way to end their power. Older students were 'graduated' without examinations, and from December 1968 millions were sent to the countryside.

So Mao ended the Red Guard movement because his political aims had been achieved, while the factional violence and its threat to the economy and to China's security had made the movement a danger rather than a tool.

Explanation

Top answers explain why Mao ended the movement, linking the achievement of his aims, the factional violence and its threat to the economy and security, and the means he used, such as the workers' propaganda teams and his meeting with Red Guard leaders on 28 July 1968. They go beyond the stimulus points, for example with the dispersal of students to the countryside. A common weakness is to describe what the Red Guards did in 1966 instead of explaining why they were stopped in 1968.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The Red Guards had served Mao's purpose: Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and many 'capitalist roaders' had been overthrown, and revolutionary committees had been set up to replace Party committees (in all 29 provinces, municipalities and regions by September 1968), so Mao no longer needed a mass movement of students. Violence between rival groups: Red Guards and rebels had split into factions, each claiming to be Mao's true followers; from 1967 'armed struggle' was fought with weapons seized from army stores; in the spring and summer of 1968 fighting was intense, e.g. the 'hundred days' war' between factions at Tsinghua University in Beijing and fighting in Guangxi, where towns were burned and the railway to Vietnam was cut; many people were killed (numbers uncertain). Threat to the state and economy: industrial output fell in 1967-68, transport was disrupted, supplies for North Vietnam were held up, and the leadership feared complete loss of control; army leaders were pressing for order, and the army itself had been attacked (e.g. the Wuhan Incident, July 1967). Mao's orders: notices of 3 and 24 July 1968 ordered an end to armed fighting in Guangxi and Shaanxi. Workers' propaganda teams: on 27 July 1968 tens of thousands of workers (accept about 30,000), backed by soldiers, entered Tsinghua University; Red Guards resisted and some workers were killed; on 28 July Mao summoned five leading Red Guard leaders (including Kuai Dafu and Nie Yuanzi) and made clear that the fighting must stop; propaganda teams then took over schools and universities ('the working class must exercise leadership in everything', August 1968). Mao's disillusion: the Red Guards had failed to unite and had turned on each other rather than on his enemies. Dispersal: older students were 'graduated' without exams and, from December 1968, millions were sent to the countryside or to army farms, which broke up their organisations. Foreign threat (credit when linked): the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) and rising tension on the Sino-Soviet border made order more urgent (border clashes followed in March 1969). Answers that describe Red Guard activities without explaining why Mao ended the movement should not go beyond Level 2. Do not credit claims that all Red Guards were imprisoned or executed, or that the Cultural Revolution officially ended in 1968.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From The Army and the Nation: The PLA in the Cultural Revolution by Gordon Fothergill (fictional), published in 1984.

The army saved China from civil war. By 1967 the Party had collapsed and armed fighting between rival rebel groups had spread across the country. Only the People's Liberation Army had the discipline and the national chain of command to restore order. Soldiers guarded factories, banks and railways, kept the harvest moving and, in 1968, helped to end the Red Guard movement. Army officers led the new revolutionary committees that governed every province. Without the PLA the economy might have collapsed, and China's borders, then threatened by the Soviet Union, would have been in danger. The restoration of order allowed the government to begin rebuilding.

Interpretation 2: From Order by the Gun by Lucinda Marchmont (fictional), published in 2017.

The restoration of order by the PLA replaced one kind of violence with another. In many provinces army units took sides in factional struggles, and when they crushed the rebels they often did so brutally. The campaign to 'cleanse the class ranks', run by army-dominated revolutionary committees in 1968-69, led to the arrest, torture and death of very large numbers of people, probably more than all the Red Guard violence before it. Military men took over the government of China, and Lin Biao's generals came to dominate the Party leadership. Mao soon found that he had created a new threat to his own power.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the significance of the restoration of order by the PLA in the years 1967-69? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that the PLA's restoration of order 'replaced one kind of violence with another' and created military rule that threatened Mao himself. I agree that its consequences were harsh and politically dangerous, but Interpretation 1 is right that, without the army, China faced chaos or even civil war.

There is strong evidence for Interpretation 2. When Mao ordered the army to 'support the left' in 1967, many units took sides in factional struggles, as in the Wuhan Incident of July 1967, and in 1968 army-led forces crushed rebel groups, sometimes with great loss of life, for example in Guangxi. Once order was restored, the campaign to 'cleanse the class ranks' in 1968-69 was run by revolutionary committees that were usually led by army officers. Huge numbers of people were arrested, interrogated and tortured, and research suggests that more died in this campaign than in the Red Guard violence before it. Politically, the army took over: most provincial revolutionary committees were headed by officers, nearly half of the Ninth Central Committee in 1969 were military men, and Lin Biao, the Defence Minister, became Mao's named successor while his generals dominated the high command. Mao soon came to fear this power, which led to the fall of Lin Biao in 1971.

However, Interpretation 1 is right that the PLA saved China from something worse. By 1967 the Party had collapsed and rival rebel groups were fighting with seized weapons. The army was the only organisation that still had a national chain of command. Soldiers protected railways, banks and factories and helped to bring in the harvest. In July 1968 the army supported the workers' propaganda teams that ended the Red Guard movement, and by September revolutionary committees governed every province. As a result, industrial output recovered strongly in 1969 and the Ninth Party Congress could meet. Order also mattered for security, because the Soviet Union had invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on the border in 1969.

The interpretations convey their views differently. Interpretation 1 uses the language of rescue, claiming the army 'saved China from civil war', while Interpretation 2 stresses repression, describing 'order by the gun' and the 'arrest, torture and death' of very many people.

Overall, I partly agree with Interpretation 2. Judged by short-term stability, the PLA's restoration of order was essential, as Interpretation 1 argues. But judged by its human cost and its political consequences, Interpretation 2 is more convincing: the army's victory brought a new wave of repression and created the military power that led to the crisis of Lin Biao.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2 against precise knowledge, such as the 'cleansing of the class ranks', the military dominance of the revolutionary committees and of the Ninth Central Committee, and the later fall of Lin Biao, and use Interpretation 1's evidence of the collapse of the Party and the recovery of 1969 to counter it. They reach a judgement with clear criteria, for example short-term stability against human and political costs. Weaker answers narrate the end of the Red Guards without assessing significance.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that the PLA's restoration of order was significant mainly because it brought new repression and military domination that threatened Mao himself. Points from the interpretations and own knowledge that support Interpretation 2: in January 1967 Mao ordered the PLA to 'support the left', and in many provinces units backed one faction and suppressed others (e.g. the Wuhan Incident, July 1967, when the local commander backed a conservative faction); in 1968 army-led forces crushed rebel groups, sometimes with great loss of life (e.g. in Guangxi); the campaign to 'cleanse the class ranks' (1968-69), run by revolutionary committees in which army officers usually dominated, led to mass arrests, torture and killings, and research suggests that more people died in this campaign than in the Red Guard violence of 1966-67 (numbers uncertain; accept 'hundreds of thousands'); army officers led most provincial revolutionary committees; around 45 per cent of the Ninth Central Committee (1969) were military men; Lin Biao was named successor and his generals (Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo) dominated the high command and the Politburo's military seats; military control of factories, schools and offices ('three supports and two militaries'); Mao's growing suspicion of the army after 1969, ending in the fall of Lin Biao (1971) and the rotation of regional commanders (1973). Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): the Party had collapsed and factional fighting threatened civil war, so the PLA was the only nationwide organisation left; soldiers protected key installations, banks, railways and the harvest from 1967; the army supported the workers' propaganda teams that ended the Red Guard movement in July 1968; revolutionary committees were set up in all 29 provinces, municipalities and regions by September 1968, restoring administration; industrial output recovered strongly in 1969; the Ninth Congress (1969) could meet and the Party began to be rebuilt; order mattered for national security after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) and the border clashes of 1969; the PLA also helped send millions of young people to the countryside and army farms. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 1 stresses rescue and rebuilding ('saved China from civil war'); Interpretation 2 stresses repression and political consequences ('replaced one kind of violence with another'). A substantiated judgement might weigh short-term stability against the human cost and long-term political danger, or argue that both are right about different aspects; criteria might include whether order was restored, at what cost, and what it meant for the balance of power. Answers that describe the Red Guards or Lin Biao's later fall without analysing the significance of the restoration of order, or that judge the interpretations' reliability, should not go beyond Level 2. Do not credit claims that the PLA had no role in politics before 1967 or that order was fully restored in 1967.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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