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Consolidating the CCP's hold on power, 1951-52

Practise 18 exam-style questions on Consolidating the CCP's hold on power, 1951-52 for Edexcel GCSE History (Mao's China 1945-76). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
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18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From a record of a conversation at the US State Department in Washington on 13 April 1951, written by an official of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs. Dr Han Li-wu, an adviser to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the Guomindang leader who now ruled Taiwan, was speaking to Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The record was published by the US government in 1983.

He [Han Li-wu] said that mass executions on the mainland had been planned as long ago as last June but were not carried out because of Communist uncertainty about their effect at that time. The Korean war had made this policy opportune; Dr. Han said that the executions would undoubtedly hamper guerrilla operations.

Dr. Han spoke of the widespread Russian influence on the Communist regime, which was exercised through the international element in the Party and through the use of commissars.

Source C: From a CIA information report on China, distributed to US government departments on 6 June 1951. The report was released by the CIA in 2001.

1. On 24 May a committee called the Shanghai Counter-revolutionary Cases Investigating Committee held its third meeting. This meeting was attended by SHENG P'ei-hua, deputy mayor of Shanghai ...

2. ... At the meeting it was decided that all public security and police organizations in Shanghai were to be asked to complete their work as soon as possible in clearing up all cases of counter-revolutionaries and to submit the cases to the Committee for further investigation and eventual punishment of the guilty in accordance with the law for the suppression of counter-revolutionary elements. ...

[A comment added by the CIA:] It may be that authorities in the Shanghai area are preparing to bring an end to the purge.

Interpretation 1: From Orders from the Top: Mao and the Terror of 1951 by Wilfred Kirkandrews (fictional), published in 1994.

The killings of 1951 were not the work of angry crowds or over-eager local officials. They were planned and driven from Beijing. In January 1951 Mao himself sent telegrams to regional leaders suggesting how many people should be executed in their cities, and proposed that around one person in every thousand might have to die. Provinces reported their totals to the centre, and leaders thought to be too gentle were criticised. Public trials in the big cities, such as the one in Beijing in May 1951 at which more than two hundred people were sentenced and shot, were organised by the Party and attended by senior officials. The terror was a deliberate policy, which the leaders had been preparing before the Korean War gave them the moment to carry it out.

Interpretation 2: From Beyond the Quota: Local Violence in the Campaign of 1951 by Patience Kirkoswald (fictional), published in 2015.

Mao certainly wanted a fierce campaign, but the scale of the killing in 1951 owed much to what happened lower down. The definitions of 'counter-revolutionary' were so vague that local officials, eager to show results, arrested people on rumour or to settle old scores, and crowds at mass trials demanded death sentences. By the spring the leaders in Beijing were alarmed. In May 1951 they took the power to approve arrests and executions away from local officials and gave it to higher authorities, and ordered that many death sentences should be suspended for two years while the prisoners worked. Committees were set up in the cities to review cases. Even so, Mao admitted in 1957 that there had been 'mistakes' and, in some cases, 'excesses'.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how far the CCP's leaders controlled the killings during the Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 argues that the killings were 'planned and driven from Beijing' as 'a deliberate policy' prepared 'before the Korean War gave them the moment'. This view is supported by evidence like Source B, in which Han Li-wu claims that mass executions 'had been planned as long ago as last June' and that 'the Korean war had made this policy opportune'. Interpretation 2, however, argues that much of the killing came from 'lower down', and that by spring 1951 the leaders 'were alarmed' and set up 'committees ... to review cases'. This is closer to Source C, which shows Shanghai's leaders ordering the police to send all cases to an investigating committee to be punished 'in accordance with the law', and the CIA suggesting that the authorities were 'preparing to bring an end to the purge'. A historian relying on Source B would stress central planning; one relying on Source C would stress the leaders' attempts to bring the killing under control.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason, such as the use of different sources, and match specific details in Sources B and C to specific claims in each interpretation. A different focus or period (Mao's orders in early 1951 versus the controls from May 1951) is also valid if explained with details. Simply repeating the difference, or saying one historian is biased, stays in Level 1.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 1: Han Li-wu claims that mass executions 'had been planned as long ago as last June' and were held back only because of 'uncertainty about their effect', and that 'the Korean war had made this policy opportune'; this matches Interpretation 1's view that the terror was 'a deliberate policy' that the leaders 'had been preparing before the Korean War gave them the moment to carry it out'. (A student may note that Han was an adviser to Jiang Jieshi with a reason to portray the Communists as cold-blooded planners, which is why a historian might treat it with care.) Source C gives some support to Interpretation 2: in May 1951 Shanghai set up a 'Counter-revolutionary Cases Investigating Committee', ordered the police to 'submit the cases to the Committee for further investigation' and punishment 'in accordance with the law', and the CIA thought the authorities might be 'preparing to bring an end to the purge'; this matches Interpretation 2's claim that by spring 1951 the leaders 'were alarmed', took approval of executions to 'higher authorities' and set up 'committees ... to review cases'. The interpretations may differ because they focus on different periods: Interpretation 1 on January to May 1951 (Mao's telegrams, the spring trials), Interpretation 2 on what happened from May 1951 and on Mao's later admission of 'excesses' (1957). They may differ because of a different focus: Interpretation 1 on the instructions from the centre, Interpretation 2 on local officials, crowds and the vagueness of the definitions. Level 2 needs an explained reason supported by details from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Do not credit answers that only describe the difference, reasons based only on the dates of publication or titles, or bare assertions that an author is biased.

Question 2

4 marks

Source B: From a directive on ending the 'five antis' movement, issued by the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government on 13 June 1952 (translated for this course). The 'five poisons' were the five crimes the movement attacked.

The principle for handling cases is: 'be strict in the struggle, lenient in the settlement; be strict where strictness is called for and lenient where leniency is called for'. ... It is necessary to continue the spirit of combining leniency with strictness, ... so as both to help clear away the 'five poisons' of industrialists and businessmen and to help unite with them to develop production and trade.

In the 'five antis' movement, the amounts of illegal gains calculated for businesses in various places were in some respects too high and too wide, because the calculations went back too far, set prices too high, covered too wide a range, used standards that changed over time, and for other reasons. Cases must be checked again and settled: what should not be counted must certainly not be counted, what may or may not be counted should also not be counted, but what should be counted must be counted ...

Source C: From a telegram sent to the US State Department by Julian Harrington, the US Consul General in Hong Kong, on 30 December 1952, reviewing three years of communist rule in China. The Consulate in Hong Kong was the main US post watching mainland China. The telegram was published by the US government in 1985.

Developments during period 1949-1952 might be characterized as "cheap" period of ChiCom [Chinese Communist] revolution, that is, period in which regime has concentrated on implementation of policies not requiring large amounts of money. These programs include such things as: ... (4) Fund-raising campaigns to squeeze money from all segments population for state purposes. ... (7) Five-anti campaign timed at economic milking of bourgeois. (8) Three-anti campaign aimed at cleaning up ChiCom party and govt. ...

Interpretation 1: From Fear in the Counting House: Shanghai's Businessmen in 1952 by Tobias Cranmore (fictional), published in 2003.

For China's businessmen the 'five antis' movement was a reign of terror. Workers' inspection teams moved into their firms, owners were made to confess at mass meetings in front of their own staff, and the sums they were said to owe grew with every accusation. Hundreds of businessmen in Shanghai alone took their own lives in the first months of 1952. Repayments and fines drained firms of their cash, and many survived only with state loans and orders. Whatever the regulations said, the campaign squeezed the bourgeoisie of its wealth and its confidence.

Interpretation 2: From Struggle and Settlement: The State and Private Business, 1949-53 by Yolanda Pitchcombe (fictional), published in 2016.

The 'five antis' movement was fierce, but it was also controlled. Each city's businesses were sorted into five classes, and most ended up as 'law-abiding' or 'basically law-abiding', while only a small minority were classed as serious or complete law-breakers. For most, the penalty was repayment of illegal gains or a fine; prison and the death penalty were kept for a small minority. When the movement was wound up in June 1952 the government ordered that inflated claims should be recalculated and reduced, in line with the slogan 'strict in the struggle, lenient in the settlement'. The Party still needed private industry and trade to rebuild the economy, and most capitalists kept their firms until the mid-1950s.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how harshly China's businessmen were treated in the 'five antis' movement (1952). You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because the historians have focused on different stages of the movement and given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 concentrates on what businessmen experienced during the campaign: inspection teams, confessions at 'mass meetings' and sums that 'grew with every accusation', so it calls the movement 'a reign of terror' that 'squeezed the bourgeoisie of its wealth'. This fits Source C, in which Harrington describes campaigns 'to squeeze money from all segments' of the population and calls the 'five-anti' campaign the 'economic milking of bourgeois'. Interpretation 2 concentrates on the final settlement, when most firms were classed as 'law-abiding' or 'basically law-abiding' and 'inflated claims' were 'recalculated and reduced'. This fits Source B, the government's own directive, which orders officials to be 'lenient in the settlement' and admits that illegal gains had been calculated 'too high and too wide'. A historian relying on the official directive would stress control; one relying on an outside observer would stress the terror and the squeeze.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason, such as a different focus (the experience of the campaign versus the final settlement) or the use of different sources, and support it by matching details in Sources B and C to claims in each interpretation. Answers that only restate the two views, or say that a historian is biased, stay in Level 1.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 2: the government's directive sets the principle 'be strict in the struggle, lenient in the settlement', aims 'to unite with' businessmen 'to develop production and trade', and admits that illegal gains were calculated 'too high and too wide' and must be reduced ('what should not be counted must certainly not be counted'); this matches Interpretation 2's view that the movement was 'controlled' and that 'inflated claims' were 'recalculated and reduced'. Source C gives some support to Interpretation 1: Harrington describes 'fund-raising campaigns to squeeze money from all segments' of the population and calls the 'five-anti' campaign the 'economic milking of bourgeois'; this matches Interpretation 1's view that the campaign 'squeezed the bourgeoisie of its wealth' and that 'repayments and fines drained firms of their cash'. Students may note that B is an official directive showing how the government wanted the settlement to look, while C is an outside US view, hostile to the regime; a historian who relies on the official record would stress control, one who relies on observers' reports would stress terror. The interpretations may also differ because of a different focus: Interpretation 1 concentrates on the experience of businessmen during the campaign (inspection teams, mass meetings, suicides in Shanghai), Interpretation 2 on the final settlement (classification, recalculation, the survival of firms until the mid-1950s); or because of different scope (Interpretation 1 on Shanghai, Interpretation 2 on cities in general). Level 2 needs an explained reason supported by details from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Do not credit answers that only describe the difference, reasons based only on publication dates or titles, or bare assertions of bias.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why the CCP launched the Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries in the years 1950-51.

You may use the following in your answer:
- bandits
- the Korean War

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The CCP launched the Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries because it believed that its new government faced dangerous enemies inside China, and because the outbreak of the Korean War gave it both a reason and an opportunity to crush them.

One reason was the threat from Guomindang agents. When Jiang Jieshi fled to Taiwan in 1949, his government left behind agents and supporters, and his regime openly talked of returning to the mainland. The CCP feared spying, sabotage and assassinations, and there were many former Guomindang officials, police and soldiers in the cities. In 1950 the authorities made many of them register, and the information they gave was later used to arrest them. The Party saw these people as a hidden network that could rise up if China was attacked.

A second reason was armed resistance in the countryside. In 1950 bands of 'bandits', many of them former Guomindang soldiers, attacked officials and seized grain in the south and west. Chinese sources later claimed that hundreds of risings took place in 1950 and that tens of thousands of cadres and activists were killed. As early as March 1950 the Party ordered harsh punishment for armed rebels, showing that it saw them as a real danger to its control.

Thirdly, the CCP feared the secret societies. Groups such as the Yiguandao had millions of followers, their own leaders and their own beliefs. They competed with the Party for people's loyalty, and the Regulations of February 1951 made using a secret society for counter-revolution punishable by death.

The most important trigger was the Korean War. After Chinese troops entered Korea in October 1950, the leaders feared an American attack and an 'enemy within'. Mao's directive of 10 October 1950 launched the campaign, and the patriotic mood of 'Resist America, Aid Korea' made it easier to present every opponent as a traitor. Executions that might have caused protest in peacetime now met little opposition.

Finally, Mao believed that the revolution had to be secured by force. The people's democratic dictatorship meant using violence against 'enemies of the people', and Mao thought that earlier policy had been too lenient. Public trials, often attended by thousands, were meant to frighten opponents and to involve ordinary people in supporting the new government.

These reasons were linked: the war made the threat from agents, bandits and secret societies seem much more serious, and gave Mao the chance to destroy them while the country was united behind the war effort.

Explanation

Top answers explain why each factor led the CCP to launch the campaign, for example how the Korean War turned former Guomindang members into a feared 'enemy within', and go beyond the stimulus points with knowledge such as Guomindang agents, secret societies, the Double Ten directive or the Regulations of 1951. A common weakness is to describe the trials and executions instead of explaining the reasons for the campaign.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Guomindang agents: when Jiang Jieshi's government fled to Taiwan in 1949 it left behind agents and networks; the CCP feared spying, sabotage and assassination, and Taiwan's leaders openly planned to return; former Guomindang officials, police and soldiers were numerous in the cities, and many were made to register in 1950. Bandits and armed resistance: in 1950 armed bands, many of them former Guomindang soldiers, operated in the south and west; Chinese sources later claimed more than 800 'counter-revolutionary' risings between January and October 1950 and tens of thousands of cadres and activists killed (accept 'many attacks on officials'); a CCP directive of March 1950 already ordered harsh punishment of armed rebels. Secret societies: groups such as the Yiguandao, with millions of members, had their own leaders, beliefs and loyalties, competed with the Party for people's allegiance and were accused of plotting; Article 8 of the Regulations of February 1951 made their use for counter-revolution punishable by death. The Korean War: after China entered the war (Chinese troops crossed the Yalu on 19 October 1950) the leaders feared an American or Guomindang attack and an 'enemy within'; Mao's 'Double Ten' directive of 10 October 1950 launched the campaign; the war's patriotic mood made harsh measures easier to justify and harder to oppose. Securing communist rule: the CCP was new to governing the cities and wanted to destroy every rival source of power and deter opposition; public trials and executions spread fear. Mao's ideas: class struggle and the people's democratic dictatorship meant using force against 'enemies of the people'; Mao believed earlier policy had been too lenient. Mass mobilisation: the campaign drew people into politics through accusation meetings and public trials, binding them to the new regime. Land reform: the campaign ran alongside land reform, and local 'tyrants' and landlords who resisted were targeted. Answers that only describe the campaign (trials, executions, numbers) without explaining why it was launched should not go beyond Level 2. Do not credit claims that the campaign began after the Korean War ended or that it was mainly aimed at the 'three antis' targets. Accept figures for executions from about 500,000 to 2 million if used (the official figure of 1954 was 712,000; historians' estimates vary widely), but they are not needed.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From Revolution First: The Domestic Roots of Mao's Campaigns by Adela Scorton (fictional), published in 1999.

The campaigns of 1950-52 grew out of the Communist revolution itself, not out of the war in Korea. The Party had always believed that its enemies - the landlords, the Guomindang's agents and, in time, the capitalists - would have to be crushed, and it had issued instructions to punish 'counter-revolutionaries' severely in the spring of 1950, months before fighting began in Korea. Corruption among Party members in the cities had worried the leaders since 1949. Mao intended to move China towards socialism, and that meant breaking every rival source of power. The war changed the timing of the campaigns, but not their direction.

Interpretation 2: From War at Home: Korea and the Making of the People's Republic by Ursula Fenstead (fictional), published in 2012.

The Korean War transformed the CCP's campaigns at home. Until October 1950 the leaders had been cautious, worried that harsh measures would alarm the 'national bourgeoisie' and the democratic parties. Once Chinese troops crossed into Korea, any opponent could be presented as an American agent, and in the patriotic fever of 'Resist America, Aid Korea' mass trials and executions met little protest. The war's huge cost drove the drive for economy that produced the 'three antis', and stories of businessmen selling faulty goods to the army fed the anger behind the 'five antis'. Without the war, the campaigns would have been slower, smaller and less violent.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the importance of the Korean War in the CCP's campaigns against its opponents in the years 1950-52? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that the Korean War 'transformed' the CCP's campaigns and that without it they would have been 'slower, smaller and less violent'. I agree that the war was very important in shaping how and when the campaigns happened, but I think Interpretation 1 is right that their aims came from the revolution itself.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about the timing and violence of the Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries. Mao's 'Double Ten' directive, which launched the large-scale campaign, was issued on 10 October 1950, just as China decided to send troops to Korea, and Chinese forces crossed the Yalu on 19 October. Before this, many former Guomindang members had been allowed to register and were treated fairly leniently. Once China was at war with the United States, opponents could be presented as agents of imperialism, as Article 3 of the 1951 Regulations shows, and in the patriotic mood of 'Resist America, Aid Korea' mass trials and executions met little protest.

Interpretation 2 is also right about the 'antis' movements. The huge cost of the war led to the drive to 'increase production and practise economy', from which the 'three antis' campaign against waste and corruption grew in late 1951. In the 'five antis' movement, businessmen were accused of cheating on army contracts and selling faulty medicines to the troops, and the fines and repayments raised money for the state.

However, Interpretation 1 shows that the war did not create the campaigns. It points out that the Party had issued instructions to punish counter-revolutionaries severely 'in the spring of 1950, months before fighting began in Korea'. Land reform, with its attacks on landlords, also began before the war, under the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950. Mao had warned in 1949 that city life could corrupt Party members with 'sugar-coated bullets', so the 'three antis' reflected a long-standing concern. Above all, Mao intended to move China from 'New Democracy' towards socialism, and the 'five antis' weakened the capitalists before the state took over private industry in 1953-56.

The interpretations convey their views differently. Interpretation 1 says the campaigns 'grew out of the Communist revolution itself' and that the war changed only 'the timing', while Interpretation 2 uses strong language, such as 'transformed' and 'patriotic fever', and a confident claim about what would have happened 'without the war'.

Overall, I agree with Interpretation 2 to a large extent about the speed and scale of the campaigns. The war gave the CCP the excuse, the urgency and the patriotic support to act with great violence. But its claim goes too far, because the targets - Guomindang agents, landlords, corrupt officials and capitalists - were enemies the Party intended to deal with anyway. The war was the accelerator, not the cause.

Explanation

Top answers keep the focus on Interpretation 2, testing it with precise knowledge (the Double Ten directive, the 'increase production' drive, accusations against businessmen over army supplies) and using Interpretation 1 and own knowledge (the directive of spring 1950, land reform, Mao's long-term aims) to challenge it. They comment on how the views are conveyed and reach a judgement with clear criteria, such as distinguishing the timing of the campaigns from their aims. Weaker answers write a general account of the Korean War.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that the Korean War 'transformed' the campaigns, making them larger, faster and more violent. Points that support it: the 'Double Ten' directive launching the large-scale Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries came on 10 October 1950, as China decided to intervene, and Chinese troops crossed the Yalu on 19 October 1950; before that, the CCP had followed a relatively lenient policy towards registered former Guomindang members, and some leaders criticised it as too soft; the war raised fears of an American or Guomindang invasion and of an 'enemy within', so opponents could be branded agents of imperialism (Article 3 of the 1951 Regulations: 'colludes with imperialism'); the 'Resist America, Aid Korea' movement created a patriotic mood in which mass trials and executions met little protest; the cost of the war led to the 'increase production and practise economy' drive from which the 'three antis' grew in late 1951; in the 'five antis' businessmen were accused of cheating on army contracts and selling faulty medicines and supplies, and fines and repayments raised money for the state; a US report of 1952 (Harrington) noted that the war allowed the CCP to tighten its controls 'much faster than might have been anticipated'. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): the CCP's ideology of class struggle and the people's democratic dictatorship meant that enemies were to be crushed anyway; a CCP directive of March 1950 already ordered the severe punishment of counter-revolutionaries and armed bandits; land reform, with its violence against landlords, began before the war (Agrarian Reform Law, June 1950) and continued alongside it; Mao had warned in 1949 against the 'sugar-coated bullets' of city life corrupting Party members, so the 'three antis' reflected long-standing concerns; Mao intended to move from 'New Democracy' to socialism, and the 'five antis' weakened the bourgeoisie before the socialist transformation of industry (1953-56); the campaigns also served to mobilise the masses and bind them to the Party. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 1 uses 'grew out of the Communist revolution itself' and 'changed the timing ... but not their direction'; Interpretation 2 uses 'transformed', 'patriotic fever' and the counterfactual 'Without the war'. A substantiated judgement might argue that the war was the trigger and accelerator, as Interpretation 2 says, but that the aims and targets came from the CCP's revolution, as Interpretation 1 argues; or that the war was decisive because it made extreme violence possible without opposition. Credit any reasoned judgement supported from both interpretations and own knowledge. Do not credit a general narrative of the Korean War not linked to the campaigns at home.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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