Question 1
4 marksSource B: From a record of a conversation at the US State Department in Washington on 13 April 1951, written by an official of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs. Dr Han Li-wu, an adviser to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the Guomindang leader who now ruled Taiwan, was speaking to Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The record was published by the US government in 1983.
He [Han Li-wu] said that mass executions on the mainland had been planned as long ago as last June but were not carried out because of Communist uncertainty about their effect at that time. The Korean war had made this policy opportune; Dr. Han said that the executions would undoubtedly hamper guerrilla operations.
Dr. Han spoke of the widespread Russian influence on the Communist regime, which was exercised through the international element in the Party and through the use of commissars.
Source C: From a CIA information report on China, distributed to US government departments on 6 June 1951. The report was released by the CIA in 2001.
1. On 24 May a committee called the Shanghai Counter-revolutionary Cases Investigating Committee held its third meeting. This meeting was attended by SHENG P'ei-hua, deputy mayor of Shanghai ...
2. ... At the meeting it was decided that all public security and police organizations in Shanghai were to be asked to complete their work as soon as possible in clearing up all cases of counter-revolutionaries and to submit the cases to the Committee for further investigation and eventual punishment of the guilty in accordance with the law for the suppression of counter-revolutionary elements. ...
[A comment added by the CIA:] It may be that authorities in the Shanghai area are preparing to bring an end to the purge.
Interpretation 1: From Orders from the Top: Mao and the Terror of 1951 by Wilfred Kirkandrews (fictional), published in 1994.
The killings of 1951 were not the work of angry crowds or over-eager local officials. They were planned and driven from Beijing. In January 1951 Mao himself sent telegrams to regional leaders suggesting how many people should be executed in their cities, and proposed that around one person in every thousand might have to die. Provinces reported their totals to the centre, and leaders thought to be too gentle were criticised. Public trials in the big cities, such as the one in Beijing in May 1951 at which more than two hundred people were sentenced and shot, were organised by the Party and attended by senior officials. The terror was a deliberate policy, which the leaders had been preparing before the Korean War gave them the moment to carry it out.
Interpretation 2: From Beyond the Quota: Local Violence in the Campaign of 1951 by Patience Kirkoswald (fictional), published in 2015.
Mao certainly wanted a fierce campaign, but the scale of the killing in 1951 owed much to what happened lower down. The definitions of 'counter-revolutionary' were so vague that local officials, eager to show results, arrested people on rumour or to settle old scores, and crowds at mass trials demanded death sentences. By the spring the leaders in Beijing were alarmed. In May 1951 they took the power to approve arrests and executions away from local officials and gave it to higher authorities, and ordered that many death sentences should be suspended for two years while the prisoners worked. Committees were set up in the cities to review cases. Even so, Mao admitted in 1957 that there had been 'mistakes' and, in some cases, 'excesses'.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how far the CCP's leaders controlled the killings during the Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 argues that the killings were 'planned and driven from Beijing' as 'a deliberate policy' prepared 'before the Korean War gave them the moment'. This view is supported by evidence like Source B, in which Han Li-wu claims that mass executions 'had been planned as long ago as last June' and that 'the Korean war had made this policy opportune'. Interpretation 2, however, argues that much of the killing came from 'lower down', and that by spring 1951 the leaders 'were alarmed' and set up 'committees ... to review cases'. This is closer to Source C, which shows Shanghai's leaders ordering the police to send all cases to an investigating committee to be punished 'in accordance with the law', and the CIA suggesting that the authorities were 'preparing to bring an end to the purge'. A historian relying on Source B would stress central planning; one relying on Source C would stress the leaders' attempts to bring the killing under control.
Explanation
Top answers give one clear reason, such as the use of different sources, and match specific details in Sources B and C to specific claims in each interpretation. A different focus or period (Mao's orders in early 1951 versus the controls from May 1951) is also valid if explained with details. Simply repeating the difference, or saying one historian is biased, stays in Level 1.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 1: Han Li-wu claims that mass executions 'had been planned as long ago as last June' and were held back only because of 'uncertainty about their effect', and that 'the Korean war had made this policy opportune'; this matches Interpretation 1's view that the terror was 'a deliberate policy' that the leaders 'had been preparing before the Korean War gave them the moment to carry it out'. (A student may note that Han was an adviser to Jiang Jieshi with a reason to portray the Communists as cold-blooded planners, which is why a historian might treat it with care.) Source C gives some support to Interpretation 2: in May 1951 Shanghai set up a 'Counter-revolutionary Cases Investigating Committee', ordered the police to 'submit the cases to the Committee for further investigation' and punishment 'in accordance with the law', and the CIA thought the authorities might be 'preparing to bring an end to the purge'; this matches Interpretation 2's claim that by spring 1951 the leaders 'were alarmed', took approval of executions to 'higher authorities' and set up 'committees ... to review cases'. The interpretations may differ because they focus on different periods: Interpretation 1 on January to May 1951 (Mao's telegrams, the spring trials), Interpretation 2 on what happened from May 1951 and on Mao's later admission of 'excesses' (1957). They may differ because of a different focus: Interpretation 1 on the instructions from the centre, Interpretation 2 on local officials, crowds and the vagueness of the definitions. Level 2 needs an explained reason supported by details from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Do not credit answers that only describe the difference, reasons based only on the dates of publication or titles, or bare assertions that an author is biased.