Question 1
4 marksSource B: From the press communiqué issued on 29 August 1973 at the end of the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in the official English translation published in Peking (Beijing) by the Foreign Languages Press in 1973. It was the first Party congress since Lin Biao (Lin Piao in this translation), Mao's chosen successor, had died in a plane crash in September 1971 after, the Party said, plotting against Mao.
The great leader of our Party Comrade Mao Tsetung presided over the congress. ... When Chairman Mao appeared on the rostrum, cheers resounded through the hall. The delegates excitedly greeted him with prolonged and hearty applause and cheered, "Long live our great leader Chairman Mao! A long, long life to Chairman Mao!" ...
The congress indignantly denounced the Lin Piao anti-Party clique for its crimes. All the delegates firmly supported this resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Expel Lin Piao, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counter-revolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor, from the Party once and for all ... The congress pointed out: At present we should continue to put the task of criticising Lin Piao and rectifying style of work above all else. We should make full use of that teacher by negative example, the Lin Piao anti-Party clique, to educate the whole Party, Army and people in class struggle and two-line struggle ...
Source C: From 'The Purge of Lin Piao's "Conspiratorial Clique": A Tentative Reconstruction', a top secret report written by the Special Research Staff of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in July 1972. Here the writers assess Mao's position after the fall of Lin Biao. Chou En-lai is Zhou Enlai, China's Premier. The report was released by the CIA in 2010.
It should be noted that Mao's domination appears to be increasingly qualified in important respects. He is old, his health is probably deteriorating, he is absent from Peking much of the time. ... He relies for the formulation of many and the implementation of all policies primarily on a man, Chou En-lai, whose predilections are not the same as his. He has probably (as always before) created new opponents in the latest purge. He has lost prestige for his demonstrated bad judgment in selecting successors ... He is still heavily dependent on the PLA for governing China outside Peking. ... it took him more than four years to purge Liu Shao-chi and his proteges, about two years to purge Lin Piao's group, and his time is running out. Increasingly, his lieutenants will be looking past him to the post-Mao situation ...
Interpretation 1: From The Broken Succession: Mao and the Fall of Lin Biao by Gwendolyn Ashcroft (fictional), published in 1990.
The death of Lin Biao in September 1971 did lasting damage to Mao's authority. For five years the whole country had been told that Lin was Mao's 'closest comrade-in-arms', and his name had been written into the Party constitution as Mao's successor. Now ordinary Chinese learned, first in briefings for Party members and later in public, that he had plotted to kill the Chairman. Many people, especially young people sent to the countryside, began to ask how Mao could have chosen so badly. The ageing Chairman came to rely more and more on Zhou Enlai to run the country, and the cult that had surrounded him since 1966 never recovered its old power.
Interpretation 2: From The Chairman Prevails: Mao and the Lin Biao Affair by Desmond Whitlow (fictional), published in 2011.
Mao came out of the Lin Biao affair with his power intact. Within weeks, Lin's leading supporters in the high command had been arrested and the army was brought back under the control of the Party. A nationwide campaign to criticise Lin was organised from above, and Party members across China studied documents that blamed Lin for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution while praising Mao's wisdom in exposing him. Mao continued to decide who held power, bringing Deng Xiaoping back in 1973 and promoting the young Shanghai radical Wang Hongwen, and no other leader dared to oppose him openly while he lived.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the effects of the Lin Biao affair (1971) on Mao's authority. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
One reason is that the historians have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 2 seems to have relied on evidence like Source B, the official communiqué of the 1973 Party congress. It shows Mao presiding while delegates cheered 'Long live our great leader Chairman Mao!', the whole congress supporting the expulsion of Lin 'once and for all', and the criticism of Lin being made the most important task. This fits Interpretation 2's view that Mao 'came out of the Lin Biao affair with his power intact', that a campaign against Lin was 'organised from above' and that no leader dared oppose him. The author of Interpretation 1 is closer to evidence like Source C, in which the CIA judged that Mao's domination was 'increasingly qualified', that he relied on 'Chou En-lai' and that he had 'lost prestige for his demonstrated bad judgment in selecting successors'. This matches Interpretation 1's claim that the affair did 'lasting damage to Mao's authority', that people asked 'how Mao could have chosen so badly' and that he relied 'more and more on Zhou Enlai'.
Explanation
Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching details: the cheering and unanimity of the 1973 congress with Interpretation 2, and the CIA's view that Mao had 'lost prestige' and relied on Zhou with Interpretation 1. Another valid reason is a different focus, public faith in Mao against his power inside the leadership. Weaker answers simply say which source each historian 'used', or describe the difference again instead of explaining it.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Source B supports Interpretation 2: at the Party congress of 1973 Mao 'presided', delegates cheered 'Long live our great leader Chairman Mao!', they 'firmly supported' the resolution to expel Lin 'once and for all', and the congress made criticising Lin a task 'above all else', using his group as a 'teacher by negative example'; this matches Interpretation 2's view that Mao 'came out of the Lin Biao affair with his power intact', that the campaign against Lin was 'organised from above' and that 'no other leader dared to oppose him openly'. Source C supports Interpretation 1: the CIA judged that 'Mao's domination appears to be increasingly qualified', that he 'relies ... primarily on ... Chou En-lai', that he had 'lost prestige for his demonstrated bad judgment in selecting successors' and was 'heavily dependent on the PLA', with his lieutenants 'looking past him'; this matches Interpretation 1's 'lasting damage to Mao's authority', people asking 'how Mao could have chosen so badly' and Mao relying 'more and more on Zhou Enlai'. The interpretations may differ because of their focus: Interpretation 1 looks at public opinion and the cult of Mao (what ordinary people and young people thought), while Interpretation 2 looks at power inside the leadership (arrests of Lin's generals, control of appointments). They may differ because of the kind of evidence used: official Chinese documents that show public unity and loyalty to Mao (as in Source B), against secret foreign analyses of the leadership's weaknesses (as in Source C). They may differ in the period they stress: Interpretation 2 uses later events such as Deng's return in 1973 to show that Mao still controlled appointments. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations and, if used, matched details from the sources. Answers that only say 'Interpretation 2 used Source B' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view without explaining it, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or an assertion that a historian is biased.