Question 1
4 marksSource B: From National Intelligence Estimate 13-63, 'Problems and Prospects in Communist China', a secret report prepared for the US government by its intelligence agencies and dated 1 May 1963. It was published by the US government in 1996.
Communist China's domestic situation appears slightly improved from its recent grievous state. To a considerable extent this improvement reflects relatively moderate, pragmatic policies which have replaced the excesses of the "leap forward" and commune programs. With good luck and good management, the economy could within the next couple of years resume a rapid rate of growth approaching that of the First Five-Year Plan, though it is likely to fall short of this. A critical question over the next five years will be whether the Chinese Communist leadership will sustain a pragmatic course in the face of its strong ideological compulsions. Unsound doctrinaire policies, bad weather, and other unfavorable factors could combine to cause complete economic stagnation.
Source C: From National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-62, 'Prospects for Communist China', a secret report prepared for the US government by its intelligence agencies and dated 2 May 1962. It was published by the US government in 1996.
The future course of events in Communist China will be shaped largely by three highly unpredictable variables: the wisdom and realism of the leadership, the level of agricultural output, and the nature and extent of foreign economic relations. During the past few years all three variables have worked against China. In 1958 the leadership adopted a series of ill-conceived and extremist economic and social programs; in 1959 there occurred the first of three years of bad crop weather; and in 1960 Soviet economic and technical cooperation was largely suspended. ...
We believe that over the next few years Communist China will follow relatively conservative and rational policies of the kind recently instituted, that the odds favor improved crop weather, and that increased trade with Western Europe and Japan will partially compensate for the severe reduction in Soviet economic and technical cooperation. We therefore believe that the most likely prospect is for slow recovery and a gradual resumption of economic growth.
Interpretation 1: From Rebuilding after the Leap: China's Planners, 1961-65 by Hartley Venables (fictional), published in 1985.
China's recovery after 1962 was the achievement of the leaders who took over the running of the economy from Mao. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun replaced the slogans of the Great Leap with careful planning. They cut investment in heavy industry, closed wasteful factories, gave priority to agriculture and restored private plots and rural markets. Work points were linked to work again, managers and engineers regained their authority, and bonuses were paid in industry. These practical policies explain why, by 1965, grain output was close to the level of 1957 and industrial output was well above it.
Interpretation 2: From After the Leap: China's Economy, 1961-66 by Juliana Fothergill (fictional), published in 2009.
The recovery of 1962-65 owed less to new policies than is often claimed. Once the madness of the Leap had stopped, a rebound from the catastrophe of 1960-61 was almost bound to happen. The weather was generally kinder than in the drought and flood years of 1959-61, and China bought about five or six million tons of grain a year from Canada, Australia and other countries, which eased the pressure on the peasants. About twenty million people were sent back from the cities, leaving fewer mouths for the state to feed. Many of the reforms were small or short-lived: household farming was halted in 1962, and by 1965 the amount of grain for each person was still below the level of 1957.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the reasons for China's economic recovery in the years 1962-65. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
One reason is that the historians have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 1 may have relied on evidence like Source B, in which US intelligence judged in 1963 that China's improvement 'to a considerable extent' reflected 'relatively moderate, pragmatic policies' that had 'replaced the excesses of the "leap forward"'. This fits Interpretation 1's view that the recovery was 'the achievement of the leaders' who brought in 'careful planning' and 'practical policies'. The author of Interpretation 2 seems closer to evidence like Source C, which says that China's prospects depended on 'unpredictable variables' such as 'the level of agricultural output' and foreign trade, and expected recovery because 'the odds favor improved crop weather' and trade with the West would 'partially compensate'. This matches Interpretation 2's argument that recovery came from better harvests and grain imports, a rebound that was 'almost bound to happen'.
Explanation
Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching details: the 1963 estimate's 'pragmatic policies' with Interpretation 1, and the 1962 estimate's weather and foreign trade with Interpretation 2. A different focus or a different measure of recovery (total output against output per person) is also a valid reason. Simply saying which source each historian 'used', or repeating the difference, stays in Level 1.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Source B supports Interpretation 1: the 1963 estimate says the improvement 'to a considerable extent' reflects 'relatively moderate, pragmatic policies which have replaced the excesses of the "leap forward"', and that the key question is whether the leadership will 'sustain a pragmatic course'; this fits Interpretation 1's view that recovery was 'the achievement of the leaders' who replaced slogans 'with careful planning' and 'practical policies'. Source C supports Interpretation 2: the 1962 estimate says China's future depends on three 'unpredictable variables', including 'the level of agricultural output' and 'foreign economic relations', blames the crisis partly on 'three years of bad crop weather' and the loss of Soviet cooperation, and expects recovery because 'the odds favor improved crop weather' and trade with the West will 'partially compensate'; this fits Interpretation 2's emphasis on kinder weather after the drought and floods of 1959-61, grain imports and 'a rebound' that was 'almost bound to happen'. A student may note that Source C also expects 'conservative and rational policies', so it does not wholly contradict Interpretation 1. The interpretations may also differ because of their focus: Interpretation 1 concentrates on the leaders and their policies, while Interpretation 2 concentrates on circumstances (weather, imports, fewer people in the cities) and on the limits of recovery (grain per head still below 1957). They may differ in their measure of recovery: Interpretation 1 compares total output with 1957, Interpretation 2 output per person. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations and, if used, matched details from the sources. Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or an assertion that a historian is biased.