Question 1
4 marksSource B: From a despatch (report) sent by Edmund Clubb, the American Consul General in Beiping (Peiping, now Beijing), to the US Ambassador in China, 3 January 1948. Clubb was summarising what Marcy Ditmanson, an American who had worked for eight months in Communist-held areas of Hebei province for UNRRA (the United Nations relief organisation), had told one of his consuls on 31 December 1947. The despatch was later published by the US government.
Mr. Ditmanson remarked a heightening of the tempo of anti-American feeling in Communist controlled areas, that feeling apparently being deliberately exacerbated by the Communist authorities. ... A common question put to the Consulate's informant was why the American Government supported the Nationalist Government. Mr. Ditmanson reported that, from his observation, Soviet support of the Chinese Communists was apparently limited to moral support, he having seen no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition during his several months of residence in the Communist controlled area.
Mr. Ditmanson reported that it was freely admitted by Communist officials that, with the conclusion of the civil war, the Communists would desire to resume friendly relations with the United States, for they would need American financial and technical assistance in reconstruction of communications and utilities.
Source C: From a telegram sent to the US Secretary of State on 8 January 1948 by Siebens, the American Vice Consul at Changchun in Manchuria (north-east China), based mainly on information from a GMD intelligence officer. Soviet troops had occupied Manchuria from August 1945 to May 1946. The Kwantung Army was the Japanese army in Manchuria, which surrendered to the Soviets in August 1945. The telegram was later published by the US government.
Chief Soviet Intelligence and Propaganda Agency Communist-controlled areas Manchuria named International Directing Group with headquarters Harbin ... First project Directing Group after establishment was launching in September of Communist political and educational activities through organization six units ... Work these units apparently to organize Communist propaganda groups various localities. ...
It is becoming increasingly evident that Soviet influence north Manchuria growing. As frequently reported concrete evidence active Soviet military assistance to Chinese Communists lacking, and such aid probably continues to be small. Chief contribution that line made shortly after V-J Day with turnover substantial amount Japanese supplies well equipped Kwantung Army to Chinese Communists, and now probably restricted to trade involving petroleum products and items Japanese armament initially removed by Soviets which Chinese Communists may desire and which difficult to trace to source.
Interpretation 1: From Moscow's Hand: Stalin and the Chinese Revolution by Gerald Ashbury (fictional), published in 1979.
The Soviet Union gave the Chinese Communists a great deal of help. When the Soviet army occupied the north-east in August 1945, it allowed tens of thousands of Communist troops to move in, while it delayed the arrival of GMD armies. It handed over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese, turning lightly armed guerrillas into a modern army. Until the Soviet withdrawal in the spring of 1946 the Communists took over much of the countryside behind the Soviet screen, and afterwards Soviet advisers, trade and the use of North Korea as a safe rear area kept them supplied.
Interpretation 2: From Standing Alone: The CCP and Stalin, 1945-48 by Fiona Lathom (fictional), published in 2006.
Soviet help to the CCP was far more limited than its enemies claimed. In August 1945 Stalin signed a treaty of friendship with Jiang Jieshi's government, not with Mao, and he urged the Communists to negotiate with the GMD. Soviet troops stripped Manchuria of factory machinery and let GMD forces take over Shenyang and other cities as they withdrew in 1946. Observers who lived in Communist areas saw no Soviet advisers or supplies. The weapons the CCP used came mainly from defeated Japanese and, increasingly, GMD armies. The CCP had to rely on its own efforts, building support in the villages and a disciplined army of its own.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how much help the Soviet Union gave the CCP in the years 1945-48. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
One reason is that the authors have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 1 may have relied on evidence like Source C. Siebens reports that Soviet influence in north Manchuria was 'growing', that a Soviet propaganda agency in Harbin was organising Communist activities, and that the Soviets had handed over a 'substantial amount' of Japanese supplies from the Kwantung Army to the Chinese Communists, with trade in petroleum and arms continuing. This supports Interpretation 1's view that the Soviets 'handed over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese' and that 'Soviet advisers, trade' kept the CCP supplied.
The author of Interpretation 2 may have relied on evidence like Source B. Ditmanson, who lived for months in Communist areas, saw 'no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition' and thought Soviet support was 'limited to moral support'. This supports Interpretation 2's claim that 'Observers who lived in Communist areas saw no Soviet advisers or supplies' and that Soviet help was 'far more limited than its enemies claimed'.
Explanation
Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching specific details in a source to specific claims in an interpretation, such as Source B's 'no evidence of Russian advisers' and Interpretation 2's observers who 'saw no Soviet advisers'. Simply saying that the historians 'used different sources', or repeating the difference between the interpretations, scores little. Reasons based on the date of publication are not valid.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 2: an American who had lived for eight months in Communist areas reported that Soviet support was 'apparently limited to moral support' and that he had seen 'no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition'; this matches Interpretation 2's claim that 'Observers who lived in Communist areas saw no Soviet advisers or supplies' and that Soviet help was 'far more limited than its enemies claimed'. Source C gives some support to Interpretation 1: Siebens reports a Soviet 'Intelligence and Propaganda Agency' in Harbin organising Communist propaganda, that 'Soviet influence north Manchuria' was 'growing', that the Soviets' chief contribution was the 'turnover substantial amount Japanese supplies well equipped Kwantung Army to Chinese Communists' and that trade in petroleum and Japanese arms continued; this matches Interpretation 1's view that the Soviets 'handed over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese' and that 'Soviet advisers, trade' kept the CCP supplied. A student may note that each source also contains material for the other view (Source C says 'concrete evidence active Soviet military assistance' was 'lacking' and the aid 'probably continues to be small'), so the difference may come from which parts of the evidence each historian selected; and that Source C relies largely on GMD intelligence, which had reasons to exaggerate Soviet help, while Source B's informant saw only part of north China (Hebei, not Manchuria). The interpretations may also differ because of a different focus or time: Interpretation 1 stresses the Soviet occupation of 1945-46 and the handover of Japanese arms, while Interpretation 2 stresses Stalin's diplomacy with Jiang, the stripping of Manchuria's industry and the CCP's own efforts after 1946. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported from the interpretations (and, if used, matched to details in the sources). Answers that only say 'they used different sources' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or the titles of the books.