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The Chinese Civil War, 1945-49

Practise 18 exam-style questions on The Chinese Civil War, 1945-49 for Edexcel GCSE History (Mao's China 1945-76). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
  • Instant marking
  • No sign-up needed
18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From a despatch (report) sent by Edmund Clubb, the American Consul General in Beiping (Peiping, now Beijing), to the US Ambassador in China, 3 January 1948. Clubb was summarising what Marcy Ditmanson, an American who had worked for eight months in Communist-held areas of Hebei province for UNRRA (the United Nations relief organisation), had told one of his consuls on 31 December 1947. The despatch was later published by the US government.

Mr. Ditmanson remarked a heightening of the tempo of anti-American feeling in Communist controlled areas, that feeling apparently being deliberately exacerbated by the Communist authorities. ... A common question put to the Consulate's informant was why the American Government supported the Nationalist Government. Mr. Ditmanson reported that, from his observation, Soviet support of the Chinese Communists was apparently limited to moral support, he having seen no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition during his several months of residence in the Communist controlled area.

Mr. Ditmanson reported that it was freely admitted by Communist officials that, with the conclusion of the civil war, the Communists would desire to resume friendly relations with the United States, for they would need American financial and technical assistance in reconstruction of communications and utilities.

Source C: From a telegram sent to the US Secretary of State on 8 January 1948 by Siebens, the American Vice Consul at Changchun in Manchuria (north-east China), based mainly on information from a GMD intelligence officer. Soviet troops had occupied Manchuria from August 1945 to May 1946. The Kwantung Army was the Japanese army in Manchuria, which surrendered to the Soviets in August 1945. The telegram was later published by the US government.

Chief Soviet Intelligence and Propaganda Agency Communist-controlled areas Manchuria named International Directing Group with headquarters Harbin ... First project Directing Group after establishment was launching in September of Communist political and educational activities through organization six units ... Work these units apparently to organize Communist propaganda groups various localities. ...

It is becoming increasingly evident that Soviet influence north Manchuria growing. As frequently reported concrete evidence active Soviet military assistance to Chinese Communists lacking, and such aid probably continues to be small. Chief contribution that line made shortly after V-J Day with turnover substantial amount Japanese supplies well equipped Kwantung Army to Chinese Communists, and now probably restricted to trade involving petroleum products and items Japanese armament initially removed by Soviets which Chinese Communists may desire and which difficult to trace to source.

Interpretation 1: From Moscow's Hand: Stalin and the Chinese Revolution by Gerald Ashbury (fictional), published in 1979.

The Soviet Union gave the Chinese Communists a great deal of help. When the Soviet army occupied the north-east in August 1945, it allowed tens of thousands of Communist troops to move in, while it delayed the arrival of GMD armies. It handed over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese, turning lightly armed guerrillas into a modern army. Until the Soviet withdrawal in the spring of 1946 the Communists took over much of the countryside behind the Soviet screen, and afterwards Soviet advisers, trade and the use of North Korea as a safe rear area kept them supplied.

Interpretation 2: From Standing Alone: The CCP and Stalin, 1945-48 by Fiona Lathom (fictional), published in 2006.

Soviet help to the CCP was far more limited than its enemies claimed. In August 1945 Stalin signed a treaty of friendship with Jiang Jieshi's government, not with Mao, and he urged the Communists to negotiate with the GMD. Soviet troops stripped Manchuria of factory machinery and let GMD forces take over Shenyang and other cities as they withdrew in 1946. Observers who lived in Communist areas saw no Soviet advisers or supplies. The weapons the CCP used came mainly from defeated Japanese and, increasingly, GMD armies. The CCP had to rely on its own efforts, building support in the villages and a disciplined army of its own.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about how much help the Soviet Union gave the CCP in the years 1945-48. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

One reason is that the authors have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 1 may have relied on evidence like Source C. Siebens reports that Soviet influence in north Manchuria was 'growing', that a Soviet propaganda agency in Harbin was organising Communist activities, and that the Soviets had handed over a 'substantial amount' of Japanese supplies from the Kwantung Army to the Chinese Communists, with trade in petroleum and arms continuing. This supports Interpretation 1's view that the Soviets 'handed over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese' and that 'Soviet advisers, trade' kept the CCP supplied.

The author of Interpretation 2 may have relied on evidence like Source B. Ditmanson, who lived for months in Communist areas, saw 'no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition' and thought Soviet support was 'limited to moral support'. This supports Interpretation 2's claim that 'Observers who lived in Communist areas saw no Soviet advisers or supplies' and that Soviet help was 'far more limited than its enemies claimed'.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching specific details in a source to specific claims in an interpretation, such as Source B's 'no evidence of Russian advisers' and Interpretation 2's observers who 'saw no Soviet advisers'. Simply saying that the historians 'used different sources', or repeating the difference between the interpretations, scores little. Reasons based on the date of publication are not valid.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 2: an American who had lived for eight months in Communist areas reported that Soviet support was 'apparently limited to moral support' and that he had seen 'no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition'; this matches Interpretation 2's claim that 'Observers who lived in Communist areas saw no Soviet advisers or supplies' and that Soviet help was 'far more limited than its enemies claimed'. Source C gives some support to Interpretation 1: Siebens reports a Soviet 'Intelligence and Propaganda Agency' in Harbin organising Communist propaganda, that 'Soviet influence north Manchuria' was 'growing', that the Soviets' chief contribution was the 'turnover substantial amount Japanese supplies well equipped Kwantung Army to Chinese Communists' and that trade in petroleum and Japanese arms continued; this matches Interpretation 1's view that the Soviets 'handed over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese' and that 'Soviet advisers, trade' kept the CCP supplied. A student may note that each source also contains material for the other view (Source C says 'concrete evidence active Soviet military assistance' was 'lacking' and the aid 'probably continues to be small'), so the difference may come from which parts of the evidence each historian selected; and that Source C relies largely on GMD intelligence, which had reasons to exaggerate Soviet help, while Source B's informant saw only part of north China (Hebei, not Manchuria). The interpretations may also differ because of a different focus or time: Interpretation 1 stresses the Soviet occupation of 1945-46 and the handover of Japanese arms, while Interpretation 2 stresses Stalin's diplomacy with Jiang, the stripping of Manchuria's industry and the CCP's own efforts after 1946. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported from the interpretations (and, if used, matched to details in the sources). Answers that only say 'they used different sources' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or the titles of the books.

Question 2

4 marks

Interpretation 1: From Land and Revolution in North China by Thomas Wyverne (fictional), published in 1972.

Land reform won the Communists the loyalty of the peasants. From 1946 the CCP stopped merely reducing rents and began taking land from landlords and giving it to the peasants who farmed it, a policy set out for the whole country in the Outline Land Law of October 1947. Millions of poor peasants received land for the first time. They knew that a GMD victory would bring the landlords back, so they joined the PLA in huge numbers, paid their grain taxes and carried supplies to the front. The armies that won the great battles of 1948 were peasant armies, fighting to keep the land the revolution had given them.

Interpretation 2: From Fear and Obedience: The Communist Advance, 1946-49 by Alison Brackley (fictional), published in 2010.

It is a myth that grateful peasants carried the Communists to power. Land reform was often violent: landlords and richer peasants were beaten or killed at mass meetings, and many middle peasants feared they would be next. Even the Party's leaders had to restrain the excesses in 1948. Most villagers obeyed whichever army was strongest and joined the PLA because they were told to. Many of the PLA's soldiers were not volunteers at all but captured GMD troops. Peasants followed the Communists because their organisation and their armies were the strongest force in the villages, not because they loved them.

Study Interpretations 1 and 2. They give different views about peasant support for the CCP in the years 1946-49. What is the main difference between these views? Explain your answer, using details from both interpretations.

Model answer

The main difference is that Interpretation 1 sees peasant support for the CCP as willing and grateful, won by land reform, while Interpretation 2 argues that much of it came from fear and obedience to the strongest power.

Interpretation 1 says that land reform 'won the Communists the loyalty of the peasants'. Because 'Millions of poor peasants received land for the first time' and feared the return of the landlords, they joined the PLA 'in huge numbers' and carried supplies, so the PLA's armies were 'peasant armies, fighting to keep the land'.

Interpretation 2 calls the grateful peasants 'a myth'. It stresses that land reform was 'often violent', that villagers 'obeyed whichever army was strongest' and that many soldiers were 'captured GMD troops'. It concludes that peasants followed the Communists because their organisation and armies were 'the strongest force in the villages, not because they loved them'.

Explanation

Top answers state the overall difference (grateful peasants fighting for their land v. fear, obedience and organisation) and support it with a detail from each interpretation. Weaker answers list details, such as the Outline Land Law or the captured GMD soldiers, without stating the difference in view. Both interpretations accept that land reform happened; they disagree about why peasants backed the CCP and how willing that support was.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): The interpretations are analysed and a key difference of view is identified and supported from them.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Limited analysis of the interpretations is shown by the extraction or paraphrase of some content, but differences of surface detail only are given, or a difference of view is asserted without direct support.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The main difference is that Interpretation 1 sees peasant support for the CCP as willing and grateful, won by land reform, while Interpretation 2 argues that much of it was not willing at all, but the obedience of frightened villagers to the strongest power. Interpretation 1 supports its view with land reform having 'won the Communists the loyalty of the peasants', 'Millions of poor peasants received land for the first time', peasants who knew that 'a GMD victory would bring the landlords back' joining the PLA 'in huge numbers', paying grain taxes and carrying supplies, and 'peasant armies, fighting to keep the land'. Interpretation 2 supports its view with 'It is a myth that grateful peasants carried the Communists to power', land reform that was 'often violent', middle peasants who 'feared they would be next', villagers who 'obeyed whichever army was strongest' and joined the PLA 'because they were told to', soldiers who were 'captured GMD troops', and peasants who followed the Communists because their 'organisation and their armies were the strongest force in the villages, not because they loved them'. Level 2 needs this difference (willing, grateful support v. fear, obedience and organisation) supported from both interpretations. Differences of surface detail only (e.g. one mentions the Outline Land Law and the other mentions captured GMD troops) stay in Level 1. Both agree that land reform took place and that peasants served in the PLA, so 'one says the peasants helped the CCP and the other says they did not' is a misreading. Answers that explain why the views differ are answering a different question.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why the Guomindang (GMD) seemed to be in a stronger position than the CCP at the start of the Civil War in 1946.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the size of the GMD armies
- support from the USA

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

At the start of the Civil War in 1946 most observers expected the Guomindang to win. It seemed far stronger than the CCP for several connected reasons.

First, the GMD had much larger and better-equipped armies. In 1945-46 Jiang Jieshi commanded somewhere between 3 and 4 million troops, while the CCP had about 1 to 1.2 million regular soldiers and a part-time militia. Around 39 GMD divisions had been trained and equipped by the Americans during the war against Japan, and the GMD had aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery and a navy, none of which the CCP possessed. On paper, the GMD could outnumber and outgun the Communists in any battle.

Second, the GMD had the support of the USA. The Americans saw Jiang's government as the legitimate government of China and an ally against communism. In 1945-46 US ships and aircraft carried several hundred thousand GMD troops to north China and Manchuria so that they could take over from the Japanese before the Communists arrived, and about 50,000 US Marines guarded Beijing, Tianjin and the railways. After 1945 the USA gave the GMD around 2 billion dollars in aid and large amounts of surplus war equipment. The CCP received nothing comparable.

Third, the GMD was the recognised government of China. It was one of the Allies that had defeated Japan and gained a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1945. Even the USSR signed a treaty with Jiang's government in August 1945. This international recognition gave the GMD prestige that the CCP lacked.

Fourth, the GMD controlled most of China's resources. The Japanese in China had been ordered to surrender to the GMD, so it took over the large cities, ports, railways and factories, together with Japanese stocks of weapons and supplies. It also collected the customs revenue and held the richer south and east. The CCP's base areas, by contrast, were mainly poor villages in the north, with almost no industry.

Finally, the early fighting seemed to prove the GMD's strength. In 1946 GMD armies pushed the Communists out of many towns, taking Siping and Changchun in Manchuria in May and Zhangjiakou in October, and in March 1947 they even captured Yan'an, the CCP's wartime capital.

For all these reasons the GMD looked much stronger in 1946. Its size and foreign support hid weaknesses such as corruption, inflation and poor morale, which would only become clear later in the war.

Explanation

Top answers explain why each factor made the GMD look stronger, for example that US transport allowed GMD armies to reach northern cities before the Communists, and go beyond the stimulus points with aspects such as international recognition, control of the cities and early victories like the capture of Yan'an. A common mistake is to write about why the CCP eventually won, which is a different question. Figures for army sizes vary, so an approximate figure is fine.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The size and equipment of the GMD armies: in 1945-46 the GMD had about 3 to 4.3 million troops (a US estimate of January 1946 gives about 3.1 million; figures of about 4 million or more are also quoted, so accept this range), against about 1 to 1.2 million regular CCP troops plus militia; around 39 GMD divisions had been trained and equipped with US help; the GMD had an air force, tanks, heavy artillery and a navy, which the CCP lacked. Support from the USA: the USA recognised and armed Jiang's government; in 1945-46 US ships and aircraft moved several hundred thousand GMD troops (accept about 400,000-500,000) into north and east China and Manchuria to accept the Japanese surrender; about 50,000 US Marines held Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao and railway lines in 1945-46; US aid after 1945 ran to about 2 billion dollars or more in grants and credits (accept 2-3 billion), as well as surplus war supplies and military advisers. International standing: the GMD was the recognised government of China and one of the Allies that had defeated Japan, with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (1945); in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945 the USSR recognised Jiang's government, not the CCP. The Japanese surrender: Allied orders of August 1945 told Japanese forces in China proper to surrender to the GMD, so it took over most cities, ports, railways and Japanese stocks. Control of resources: the GMD held the major cities, most of China's industry, the customs revenue and the richest regions of the south and east, while the CCP's base areas were mainly poor rural districts of the north. Jiang's prestige as the leader of the war against Japan in 1945. Early GMD victories in 1946-47 (e.g. Siping and Changchun in May 1946, Zhangjiakou in October 1946, Yan'an in March 1947) seemed to confirm this strength; credit these as evidence of how strong the GMD seemed. Answers may also explain the CCP's apparent weaknesses: fewer and lightly armed troops, no air force or industry, few cities. Answers that explain three or more aspects of content, linked to why the GMD seemed stronger, can reach Level 4. Answers that explain why the GMD later lost should be credited only where they show that its strength was more apparent than real (e.g. corruption or low morale hidden by its size); an answer that is mainly about the GMD's defeat stays in Level 2. Do not credit claims that the CCP had no army in 1945, that US combat troops fought for the GMD in the Civil War, or that the USSR openly backed the CCP against the GMD government in 1945.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From The Nationalists' Lost Chance: China, 1945-47 by Douglas Penwarden (fictional), published in 1987.

In 1945 the Guomindang was in a commanding position. Its armies were three times the size of the Communists' regular forces, many of its best divisions were armed and trained by the Americans, and it held almost all the major cities of China proper. The world recognised Jiang Jieshi as the leader of a victorious ally. For more than a year after fighting began in 1946 his armies advanced: they drove the Communists out of most of the towns of southern Manchuria, took Zhangjiakou and in March 1947 captured Yan'an itself. The GMD was not doomed. It threw away its advantages by stretching its armies too thinly across the north and by failing to reform its government and its finances once the war with Japan was over.

Interpretation 2: From Victory Without Strength: The Guomindang and the War with Japan by Harriet Coldridge (fictional), published in 2011.

The Guomindang that celebrated victory in 1945 was an exhausted regime. Eight years of war had destroyed many of its best troops in the battles of 1937 and driven it from the coastal cities that had provided most of its taxes. To pay for the war it printed money, causing an inflation that ruined the salaried classes who should have been its firmest supporters. Its conscripts were seized from the villages and half-starved, and many of its generals were more interested in protecting their own forces than in fighting. The Japanese offensive of 1944 had shown how hollow its armies were. Its weaknesses were not created by the Civil War; they were already there when it began.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the strength of the GMD at the start of the Civil War? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that the GMD in 1945 was 'an exhausted regime' whose weaknesses 'were already there' when the Civil War began. Interpretation 1 disagrees, claiming that the GMD was 'in a commanding position' and 'not doomed', but 'threw away its advantages'. I largely agree with Interpretation 2 about the GMD's underlying weaknesses, but I think Interpretation 1 is right that the GMD was still strong enough in 1946 to have won.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about the damage done by the war with Japan. In 1937 the GMD lost many of its best-trained divisions defending Shanghai and Nanjing, and by 1938 it had lost the coastal cities, most of its industry and its customs revenue. Forced back to Chongqing, it paid for the war by printing money, so prices soared, and teachers, civil servants and other salaried people were ruined. Conscription was brutal and corrupt, and the Japanese Ichigo offensive of 1944 routed GMD armies across central and southern China. By contrast, the CCP had grown during the war to about 1.2 million members and around a million soldiers. These were serious weaknesses that existed before the Civil War started.

However, Interpretation 1 is right that the GMD still had great advantages. Its armies of 3 to 4 million men were about three times larger than the Communists' regular forces, and 39 of its divisions were US-equipped. It had an air force, tanks and a navy, held the major cities, and was recognised by the USA and even the USSR. American ships and planes moved several hundred thousand of its troops to the north in 1945-46, and it received around 2 billion dollars in US aid. Its early victories also show its strength: it took Siping and Changchun in 1946 and captured Yan'an in March 1947.

The interpretations differ partly because of what they choose to stress. Interpretation 2 selects long-term problems and uses words like 'exhausted' and 'hollow' to suggest decay, while Interpretation 1 selects military and diplomatic strengths and uses phrases such as 'commanding position' and 'threw away' to emphasise choices. Both are accurate about what they describe.

Overall, I agree with Interpretation 2 that the GMD began the Civil War with deep weaknesses in its finances, its army and its support among the people, and these explain why it collapsed so quickly in 1948-49. But Interpretation 2 goes too far if it implies that defeat was certain. As Interpretation 1 shows, in 1946 the GMD had the larger army and was winning, and its later decisions, such as sending its best troops into Manchuria and the disastrous gold yuan reform of 1948, turned weakness into defeat.

Explanation

Top answers keep the focus on the GMD's strength at the start of the war, testing Interpretation 2's claims with precise knowledge (the losses of 1937, wartime inflation, the Ichigo offensive) and using Interpretation 1 and own knowledge (army size, US support, the capture of Yan'an) to challenge it. They comment on how each view is conveyed, for example Interpretation 2's language of decay, and reach a clear judgement with criteria. Weaker answers write a general account of why the CCP won or agree with each interpretation in turn.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that the GMD was already fatally weakened by the war against Japan when the Civil War began, so that its defeat had roots before 1946. Points that support Interpretation 2: the GMD lost many of its best-trained (partly German-trained) divisions in the battles for Shanghai and Nanjing in 1937; it lost the coastal cities, industry and customs revenue to Japan and retreated to Chongqing; it financed the war by printing money, causing severe inflation (prices in GMD-held China rose hundreds or even thousands of times between 1937 and 1945; estimates vary, so accept approximate figures) that ruined civil servants, teachers and other salaried people; conscription was brutal and corrupt and many conscripts died before reaching their units; many generals were former warlords who protected their own armies; the Japanese Ichigo offensive of 1944 routed GMD forces in central and southern China; corruption and the misuse of power in the takeover of Japanese-held areas in 1945 alienated people quickly; the CCP had meanwhile grown to about 1.2 million members and around 1 million troops. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): in 1945-46 the GMD had about 3 to 4.3 million troops against about 1-1.2 million CCP regulars, with 39 US-equipped divisions, an air force and a navy; it held the major cities and was internationally recognised, with US support (transport of troops, Marines, about 2 billion dollars or more in aid) and a treaty with the USSR (August 1945); it won the early campaigns, taking Siping and Changchun (May 1946), Zhangjiakou (October 1946) and Yan'an (March 1947); its later defeats followed decisions taken after 1945, such as sending its best armies to Manchuria, defending isolated cities, the failed gold yuan reform (August 1948) and the failure to reform. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 2 uses language of decay ('exhausted', 'hollow') and selects long-term weaknesses; Interpretation 1 uses words such as 'commanding position' and 'threw away', selects military and international strengths and early victories, and stresses choices. A substantiated judgement might argue that Interpretation 2 is right that serious weaknesses existed in 1945 (inflation, morale, corruption) but goes too far in implying that defeat was inevitable, since the GMD's military advantages were real and its early victories show it could still have won; or that the GMD's strength was largely an appearance. Credit any reasoned judgement using both interpretations and precise knowledge. Do not credit material on the 1950s, or a narrative of the Civil War not linked to the strength of the GMD at the start.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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