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Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The development of the civil rights movement, 1954-60
Unit 2
Key topic 2: Protest, progress and radicalism, 1960-75
Unit 3
Key topic 3: US involvement in the Vietnam War, 1954-75
Unit 4
Key topic 4: Reactions to, and the end of, US involvement in Vietnam, 1964-75
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The nature of the conflict in Vietnam, 1964-68

Practise 20 exam-style questions on The nature of the conflict in Vietnam, 1964-68 for Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

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  • 4–20 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Interpretation 1: From Rotors over the Highlands: Helicopters in the Vietnam War by Stephen Blencogo (fictional), published in 1992.

The helicopter changed the way the Americans fought. In a country of jungles, mountains and flooded rice fields with few good roads, the UH-1 'Huey' could carry a squad of soldiers into a clearing in minutes and lift them out again. In the Ia Drang valley in 1965 the new air cavalry division flew its battalions into battle and kept them supplied by helicopter. Armed helicopters gave close support to troops on the ground, and medical helicopters flew the wounded to field hospitals, often within an hour, so that far more of them survived than in earlier wars. Without helicopters, the American army could never have fought across the whole of South Vietnam.

Interpretation 2: From Mobility without Victory: Helicopters and US Strategy in Vietnam by Catherine Aikton (fictional), published in 2016.

Helicopters gave the Americans mobility, but mobility was not the same as control. The noise of the rotors warned the Vietcong long before the troops landed, and the few clearings big enough for a landing zone were easy to watch and to ambush. Soldiers were flown in, fought or searched for a few days, and were flown out again, so they never got to know an area or protect its people. The ease of calling in helicopter gunships encouraged commanders to rely on firepower rather than patient patrolling. Helicopters were also fragile, and thousands were lost during the war. They helped the Americans to win battles, but they did nothing to solve the problem of a war that was decided in the villages.

Study Interpretations 1 and 2. They give different views about the importance of helicopters to US forces in Vietnam in the years 1965-68. What is the main difference between these views? Explain your answer, using details from both interpretations.

Model answer

The main difference is that Interpretation 1 sees helicopters as essential, transforming how the Americans fought, while Interpretation 2 argues that the mobility they gave did not bring real control and so did little to help the USA win the war.

Interpretation 1 says the helicopter 'changed the way the Americans fought'. It stresses that Hueys could carry soldiers into a clearing 'in minutes', that at Ia Drang a whole air cavalry force was flown into battle and supplied by air, and that medical helicopters meant 'far more of them survived'. It concludes that without them the army 'could never have fought across the whole of South Vietnam'.

Interpretation 2 accepts that helicopters gave 'mobility', but argues that 'mobility was not the same as control'. The noise warned the Vietcong, landing zones were 'easy to watch and to ambush', and troops 'never got to know an area'. It concludes that helicopters 'did nothing to solve the problem of a war that was decided in the villages'.

Explanation

Full marks need the overall difference of view (helicopters as essential and transforming versus helpful in battle but not in winning the war), supported with details from both interpretations. Simply listing details from each in turn without stating the difference stays in Level 1. Explaining why the historians disagree is not required here.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): The interpretations are analysed and a key difference of view is identified and supported from them.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Limited analysis of the interpretations is shown by the extraction or paraphrase of some content, but differences of surface detail only are given, or a difference of view is asserted without direct support.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The main difference is that Interpretation 1 sees helicopters as essential and transforming, the key to how the Americans fought ('changed the way the Americans fought'; 'could never have fought across the whole of South Vietnam'), whereas Interpretation 2 argues that their importance was limited, because the mobility they gave did not bring control of the countryside and even encouraged the wrong approach ('mobility was not the same as control'; 'did nothing to solve the problem'). Supporting details from Interpretation 1: Hueys carried a squad into a clearing 'in minutes'; the air cavalry at Ia Drang was flown into battle and supplied by air; gunships gave close support; medical helicopters meant 'far more of them survived'. Supporting details from Interpretation 2: rotor noise warned the Vietcong; landing zones were 'easy to watch and to ambush'; troops were flown in and out and 'never got to know an area'; reliance on firepower; 'thousands were lost'. Credit an answer that frames the difference as military advantage versus strategic limitation, or as winning battles versus winning the villages, if supported from both. Surface differences only (e.g. 'one mentions Ia Drang and the other mentions landing zones') stay in Level 1 unless linked to the overall views. Material explaining why the views differ is answering a different question.

Question 2

4 marks

Interpretation 1: From Holding the Cities: South Vietnam and the Tet Offensive by Keith Matterdale (fictional), published in 1995.

The Tet Offensive left South Vietnam stronger, not weaker. The communists expected the people of the cities to rise up and the army to fall apart, and neither happened. Although about half of its soldiers were at home for the holiday, not a single army unit broke or went over to the enemy, and in Hue it was South Vietnamese troops who raised their flag over the Citadel on 24 February. Many townspeople who had tried to keep out of the war were angry that the communists had attacked during Tet, and news of the killing of civilians by communist forces in Hue hardened their feelings. In June 1968 the government passed a general mobilisation law and began calling up far more young men into the armed forces. Tet gave South Vietnam a unity and determination it had lacked before.

Interpretation 2: From Allies in Name: Saigon and the American War, 1965-1968 by Lorna Raughton (fictional), published in 2008.

Tet exposed how weak South Vietnam really was. With half its soldiers on holiday leave, the army was caught unprepared, and in many places its units held on only until American troops, aircraft and artillery arrived. In Hue the hardest street fighting south of the river was done by US Marines. The fighting destroyed tens of thousands of homes, left much of Hue in ruins and drove hundreds of thousands more people from their homes. As government troops pulled back to defend the towns, the villages were left open to the Vietcong again. Above all, Tet showed that South Vietnam still could not defend itself without American help.

Study Interpretations 1 and 2. They give different views about the significance of the Tet Offensive (1968) for South Vietnam. What is the main difference between these views? Explain your answer, using details from both interpretations.

Model answer

The main difference is that Interpretation 1 argues that Tet made South Vietnam stronger and more united, while Interpretation 2 argues that Tet showed how weak South Vietnam was and how much it depended on the Americans.

Interpretation 1 says that Tet 'left South Vietnam stronger, not weaker'. It stresses that the people did not rise up and 'not a single army unit broke', and that anger at the attacks during Tet and the killings in Hue turned townspeople against the communists. It concludes that Tet gave South Vietnam 'a unity and determination it had lacked before'.

Interpretation 2 says that Tet 'exposed how weak South Vietnam really was'. It argues that the army held on 'only until American troops, aircraft and artillery arrived', that the fighting drove hundreds of thousands more people from their homes, and that 'the villages were left open to the Vietcong again'. It concludes that South Vietnam 'still could not defend itself without American help'.

Explanation

Full marks need the overall difference of view (Tet strengthened and united South Vietnam versus Tet exposed its weakness and its dependence on the USA), supported with details from both interpretations. Pointing only to details both share, such as half the army being on leave or the fighting in Hue, or listing details without stating the difference, stays in Level 1. Explaining why the historians disagree, or writing about Tet's effect on American opinion, is not required here.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): The interpretations are analysed and a key difference of view is identified and supported from them.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Limited analysis of the interpretations is shown by the extraction or paraphrase of some content, but differences of surface detail only are given, or a difference of view is asserted without direct support.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The main difference is that Interpretation 1 argues that Tet strengthened South Vietnam, because its army stayed loyal, its people turned against the communists and its government became more determined ('left South Vietnam stronger, not weaker'; 'a unity and determination it had lacked before'), whereas Interpretation 2 argues that Tet weakened South Vietnam and showed how much it depended on the USA ('exposed how weak South Vietnam really was'; 'still could not defend itself without American help'). Supporting details from Interpretation 1: the people did not rise up and 'not a single army unit broke or went over to the enemy'; South Vietnamese troops raised their flag over the Citadel in Hue on 24 February; townspeople were 'angry' that the communists attacked during Tet and the killings in Hue 'hardened their feelings'; the general mobilisation law of June 1968 called up 'far more young men'. Supporting details from Interpretation 2: the army was 'caught unprepared' and units 'held on only until American troops, aircraft and artillery arrived'; US Marines did 'the hardest street fighting' in Hue; tens of thousands of homes were destroyed and 'hundreds of thousands more people' were driven from their homes; troops pulled back to the towns and 'the villages were left open to the Vietcong again'. Credit an answer that frames the difference as unity and strength versus weakness and dependence, or as a turning point that helped South Vietnam versus one that harmed it, if supported from both. Note that both mention that about half the army was on leave and both refer to the fighting in Hue: an answer that only notes these shared details, or other surface differences (e.g. 'one mentions the mobilisation law, the other mentions homes destroyed'), stays in Level 1 unless linked to the overall views. Material explaining why the views differ is answering a different question; comments on Tet's effect on American opinion or on President Johnson are not part of the difference between these views.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why the USA used Search and Destroy tactics in Vietnam in the years 1965-68.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the strategy of attrition
- US firepower

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The USA used Search and Destroy because it fitted General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition, because it allowed the Americans to use their huge advantage in firepower, and because the kind of war they faced and the limits placed on them left few other choices.

The main reason was the strategy of attrition. Westmoreland, who commanded US forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, believed the war could be won by killing Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldiers faster than they could be replaced. Once this 'crossover point' was reached, the enemy would be worn down and give up. Search and Destroy was the method of achieving this: American units would find enemy forces, destroy them and then withdraw. Success was measured by the 'body count', which gave a clear figure for progress.

Secondly, Search and Destroy made use of US firepower. The Americans had fighter-bombers, B-52s, artillery, helicopter gunships and napalm. The aim was to find the enemy so that this firepower could be brought down on them, killing large numbers while risking fewer American lives. Helicopters made this possible, because troops such as the 1st Cavalry Division at Ia Drang in 1965 could be flown into remote jungle within minutes.

Thirdly, the nature of guerrilla war pushed the Americans towards this tactic. There was no front line, and the Vietcong avoided battle, hiding in villages, jungle and tunnels. If the Americans waited in their bases, the enemy would choose when to strike. Instead, they went out to attack base areas, as in Operation Cedar Falls against the Iron Triangle in January 1967.

Fourthly, in 1965 South Vietnam seemed close to collapse. Westmoreland wanted to keep the large enemy units away from the cities and bases, giving the South Vietnamese army and government time to recover and to protect the villages themselves.

Finally, political limits and pressures mattered. Johnson would not invade North Vietnam, for fear of war with China, so the enemy had to be worn down in the South. The US army had also been trained for large conventional battles, and big operations and body counts gave the President and the public visible evidence of progress. As US troop numbers grew from about 184,000 at the end of 1965 to about 485,000 at the end of 1967, ever larger Search and Destroy operations became possible.

Explanation

Top answers explain why the USA chose Search and Destroy, for example linking attrition and the body count to Westmoreland's aim of reaching a 'crossover point', and add own knowledge beyond the stimulus such as helicopters, the nature of guerrilla war or the refusal to invade the North. A common weakness is to describe what happened on missions, or to explain why the tactic failed, instead of why it was used. Ranking the reasons is not required.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The strategy of attrition: General Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to mid-1968, aimed to kill Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldiers faster than they could be replaced (the 'crossover point'), so that the enemy would be worn down and give up; Search and Destroy was the way to do this: find enemy units, destroy them, then withdraw; success was measured by the 'body count'. US firepower: the USA's great advantages were air power (fighter-bombers, B-52s), artillery, helicopter gunships and napalm; Search and Destroy aimed to find the enemy so that this firepower could be used, saving American lives. Helicopters: airmobile tactics (e.g. the UH-1 'Huey', the 1st Cavalry Division at Ia Drang, November 1965) let troops be flown quickly into remote areas, making it possible to hunt for an enemy who would not stand and fight. The nature of guerrilla war: there was no front line and the Vietcong avoided battle, hiding in jungle, villages and tunnels, so they had to be sought out; base areas such as the Iron Triangle were targets (Operation Cedar Falls, January 1967; Junction City, 1967). Protecting South Vietnam: in 1965 South Vietnam seemed close to collapse; keeping large enemy units away from cities and bases gave time for the South Vietnamese army and government to survive and to carry out pacification. The US army's training and outlook: it was organised and trained for large-unit conventional war and favoured big operations. Political limits: the USA would not invade North Vietnam, or (in these years) send ground troops against enemy bases in Laos and Cambodia, for fear of a wider war with China, so the war had to be fought by wearing down the enemy in the South. The need to show progress: body counts and big operations gave Johnson and the public measurable evidence that the war was being won. Growing troop numbers (about 184,000 by the end of 1965, about 485,000 by the end of 1967) made large operations possible. Answers must explain why the tactic was used, not simply describe it or judge its failure. Do not credit: Vietnamisation or events after 1968; the claim that Search and Destroy was designed to target civilians.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From Shadows in the Paddy Fields: The Vietcong's War against America, 1965-1968 by Gordon Uldale (fictional), published in 1974.

For most American soldiers the war was a hunt for an enemy they rarely saw. Patrols spent days moving through rice paddies and jungle, losing men to mines, booby traps and snipers, without once meeting the Vietcong face to face. When contact came, it was usually a short, sharp ambush started by the enemy, who then melted away into the villages or into tunnels beneath them. The Vietcong decided when and where the fighting would happen. They wore no uniforms, fought in small groups and refused the large battles in which American firepower would have destroyed them. The great battles that filled the newspapers were rare. The real war was a guerrilla war, fought one ambush and one booby trap at a time.

Interpretation 2: From Divisions from the North: The Big-Unit War in Vietnam, 1965-1968 by Alison Bewcastle (fictional), published in 2014.

The picture of a war fought only by peasant guerrillas is misleading. From 1965 North Vietnam sent whole regiments and divisions of its regular army into the South, and these troops, with modern rifles, machine guns, mortars and rockets, fought the Americans in large battles. In the Ia Drang valley in November 1965 they fought the first major battle against US troops. In 1967 they fought long battles near the border with North Vietnam and around Dak To in the Central Highlands, and in January 1968 they besieged the Marine base at Khe Sanh. Many of the heaviest American losses came in these battles. By 1968 the war against the Americans was, to a large extent, a conventional war between armies.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the nature of the fighting in Vietnam in the years 1965-68? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that the idea of a war fought only by guerrillas is 'misleading' and that by 1968 the war was, 'to a large extent, a conventional war between armies'. Interpretation 1 takes the opposite view: for most American soldiers 'the real war was a guerrilla war, fought one ambush and one booby trap at a time'. I agree with Interpretation 2 that big conventional battles were an important part of the war, but I think it overstates their importance.

There is good evidence for Interpretation 2. From 1965 North Vietnam sent regular regiments down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. At Ia Drang in November 1965 they fought a set-piece battle against the US 1st Cavalry Division, and more than 230 Americans were killed. In 1967 there was heavy fighting near the demilitarised zone and at Dak To, where around 300 or more US soldiers died. In January 1968 North Vietnamese divisions surrounded about 6,000 Marines at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland's whole strategy of Search and Destroy was aimed at finding and destroying these main-force units. Even the Tet Offensive was not hit-and-run: in Hue communist troops held the city for almost a month. Interpretation 2 conveys its view through this list of named battles.

However, Interpretation 1 describes what most of the war was like for most Americans. Ordinary patrols spent days in the jungle and paddies, losing men to booby traps, mines and snipers. Booby traps and mines caused a significant share of American casualties. Contacts were usually short ambushes started by the Vietcong, who then vanished into villages or tunnels such as those at Cu Chi. Large sweeps like Operation Cedar Falls in 1967 found tunnels and stores of rice but few enemy soldiers to fight. After Ia Drang showed how costly open battle against American firepower was, the communists usually avoided it and fought at close range instead. Interpretation 1 is also right that the communists, not the Americans, decided when fighting happened; even at Ia Drang and Dak To they broke off the battle when they chose.

Overall, I only partly accept Interpretation 2. It is right that the war was not just a peasant guerrilla war and that North Vietnamese regulars fought major battles, especially in the border regions, and this part of the war grew in 1967-68. But for most of the time, in most of South Vietnam, the fighting was the guerrilla war Interpretation 1 describes. The best judgement is that it was a war of two kinds at once, and the guerrilla war, which wore down American units and made Search and Destroy so frustrating, was the more typical.

Explanation

Top answers weigh Interpretation 2's named battles (Ia Drang, Dak To, Khe Sanh) against knowledge of the small-unit war of ambushes, booby traps and tunnels described in Interpretation 1, and reach a judgement using criteria such as where most fighting took place and who chose when to fight. Weak answers describe guerrilla tactics in general without testing Interpretation 2's claim, or treat the interpretations as sources to be judged for bias.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that by 1965-68 the fighting was largely a conventional war between armies, with North Vietnamese regular divisions fighting big battles. Points from the interpretations and own knowledge that support Interpretation 2: North Vietnamese army (PAVN) regiments entered the South from 1965 down the Ho Chi Minh Trail; Ia Drang (14-18 November 1965) was a set-piece battle in which over 230 Americans died; battles near the demilitarised zone in 1967 and at Dak To (November 1967, about 290-380 US troops killed: sources differ, so accept figures in this range); the siege of Khe Sanh from 21 January 1968 by North Vietnamese divisions, with about 6,000 Marines defending the base; regular units had AK-47s, mortars, rockets and artillery; Westmoreland's Search and Destroy strategy targeted these main-force units; the Tet Offensive (1968) itself involved large attacks on cities and a month-long battle for Hue, not guerrilla hit-and-run. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): the Vietcong remained central, especially in the Mekong Delta and around Saigon; most US contacts were small, short and started by the enemy; booby traps and mines caused a significant share of US casualties; ambushes, sniping and night attacks wore down US units; tunnels such as Cu Chi let fighters vanish; the communists usually avoided big battles after Ia Drang showed the cost of facing US firepower, fighting at close range instead; Search and Destroy sweeps such as Cedar Falls (1967) often found tunnels and supplies rather than the enemy; even the big battles were chosen by the communists, who broke them off when they wished; the Vietcong carried most of the attacks on cities during Tet. Analysis of how the views are conveyed: Interpretation 1 stresses what the ordinary soldier experienced ('a hunt for an enemy they rarely saw') and dismisses big battles as 'rare'; Interpretation 2 uses a list of named battles and says the guerrilla picture is 'misleading'. A substantiated judgement might argue that the war was both: a guerrilla war in the villages and a conventional war in the border regions, with the conventional element growing by 1967-68; criteria might include where the fighting happened, which side chose it, and what caused most US casualties. Do not credit: events after 1968 (e.g. Nixon's policies); treating the interpretations as sources to be judged for reliability.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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