Level:
Correct: 0
Incorrect: 0
Marks: 0/0
Exam Practice
Course:
Topics:
Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The development of the civil rights movement, 1954-60
Unit 2
Key topic 2: Protest, progress and radicalism, 1960-75
Unit 3
Key topic 3: US involvement in the Vietnam War, 1954-75
Unit 4
Key topic 4: Reactions to, and the end of, US involvement in Vietnam, 1964-75
Avg
score:
–
Topics
done:
0/16

Escalation of the conflict under Johnson

Practise 18 exam-style questions on Escalation of the conflict under Johnson for Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
  • Instant marking
  • No sign-up needed
18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source A: From the Joint Resolution of the US Congress passed on 7 August 1964 and signed into law by President Johnson on 10 August 1964, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Congress passed it after reports that North Vietnamese boats had attacked US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2 and 4 August. The House of Representatives voted for it by 416 votes to 0 and the Senate by 88 votes to 2.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam ... have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: ...

[Congress therefore resolved] That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Section 2. ... the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured ...

Give two things you can infer from Source A about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964).

Set out your answer under these headings, once for each inference:
What I can infer:
Details in the source that tell me this:

Model answer

What I can infer: Congress gave President Johnson very wide powers to use force in South-East Asia without declaring war.
Details in the source that tell me this: It supports the President's determination 'to take all necessary measures' and 'all necessary steps, including the use of armed force', 'as the President determines'.

What I can infer: Congress accepted the government's account of the Gulf of Tonkin attacks without questioning it.
Details in the source that tell me this: It states as fact that North Vietnamese boats 'deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters'.

Explanation

Top answers make two different inferences, for example about the breadth of the powers given to the President or Congress's acceptance of the official account of the attacks, and support each with a short quotation. Copying a phrase such as 'all necessary measures' without saying what it shows is not an inference. Own knowledge, such as the later doubts about the attack of 4 August, earns no marks here.

Mark scheme
  1. 1 mark

    A valid inference about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964), e.g. Congress gave the President very wide powers to use force without declaring war / Congress accepted the government's account of the attacks without question / Congress treated the attacks as part of a wider campaign by North Vietnam, so the resolution was about more than one incident / the resolution could be used to justify a much wider war in South-East Asia / the powers had no fixed time limit and the President would decide when they ended / the USA used the SEATO treaty to justify defending South Vietnam / the USA wanted to present itself as defending others, not as a colonial power / Congress was almost united behind the President.

    Award 1 mark for each valid inference up to a maximum of two inferences. The second mark for each example should be awarded for supporting detail selected from the source. e.g. Congress gave the President very wide powers to use force without declaring war (1). It supports his determination 'to take all necessary measures' and 'all necessary steps, including the use of armed force', 'as the President determines' (1). Congress accepted the government's account of the attacks without question (1). It states that North Vietnamese boats 'deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters' (1). Congress saw the attacks as part of something bigger than one incident (1). They were 'part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression' by North Vietnam 'against its neighbors' (1). The resolution could be used for a much wider war than a reprisal (1). It allowed action 'to prevent further aggression' and to help 'any member or protocol state' of SEATO (1). The President, not Congress, would decide when the powers ended (1). It would 'expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured' (1). The USA used its treaty obligations to justify defending South Vietnam (1). It refers to the 'Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty' and its 'protocol' states (1). The USA wanted to show that it was not a colonial power (1). It has 'no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area' (1). Congress was almost united behind the President (1). It passed 'by 416 votes to 0' and '88 votes to 2' (1). An inference must go beyond what the source says: 'Congress approved the President's determination' or 'the resolution mentions SEATO' is comprehension and earns no mark. Own knowledge (e.g. 'Senators Morse and Gruening voted against', 'Johnson used it to justify sending troops in 1965', 'it was repealed in 1971', 'the attack of 4 August probably never happened') is not an inference from Source A. Accept other appropriate alternatives.

  2. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the first inference, e.g. 'all necessary measures' / 'all necessary steps, including the use of armed force' / 'as the President determines' / 'deliberately and repeatedly attacked' / 'lawfully present in international waters' / 'a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression' / 'to prevent further aggression' / 'any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty' / 'shall expire when the President shall determine' / 'no territorial, military or political ambitions' / '416 votes to 0' and '88 votes to 2'.

    Award only if the first inference has been credited and the detail genuinely supports it (a short quotation or a close reference to Source A). A detail that does not support the inference given, or information from own knowledge, earns no mark.

  3. 1 mark

    A second valid inference about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964), different from the first (see the examples under the first inference).

    The second inference must be a different point, not the first reworded (e.g. 'the President was given wide powers' and 'the President could use force' are the same inference). Apply the same rules: no credit for paraphrase or own knowledge.

  4. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the second inference.

    Award only if the second inference has been credited and the detail from Source A supports it. The same quotation may support two different inferences only if it genuinely shows both.

Question 2

4 marks

Source B: From a secret memorandum sent to President Johnson on 27 January 1965 by McGeorge Bundy, his National Security Adviser, setting out his own views and those of Robert McNamara ('Bob'), the Secretary of Defense. It was written the morning after the South Vietnamese army had removed yet another government in Saigon.

2. What we want to say to you is that both of us are now pretty well convinced that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat. What we are doing now, essentially, is to wait and hope for a stable government. ... In the last six weeks that effort has been unsuccessful, and Bob and I are persuaded that there is no real hope of success in this area unless and until our own policy and priorities change. ...

5. Bob and I believe that the worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role which can only lead to eventual defeat and an invitation to get out in humiliating circumstances.

6. We see two alternatives. The first is to use our military power in the Far East and to force a change of Communist policy. The second is to deploy all our resources along a track of negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major addition to our present military risks. Bob and I tend to favor the first course, but we believe that both should be carefully studied and that alternative programs should be argued out before you.

7. Both of us understand the very grave questions presented by any decision of this sort. We both recognize that the ultimate responsibility is not ours.

Source C: From a memoir written for this course, based on the accounts of officials who worked in President Johnson's White House in 1965.

Nobody who worked for Lyndon Johnson doubted who was in charge. He listened to McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and the generals, but he made the decisions himself, often after weeks of questioning them. He chose many of the bombing targets himself at lunches with his closest advisers. In July 1965 he held meeting after meeting about sending more troops, let George Ball argue the case against, and then did what he had already decided to do. He was determined that South Vietnam would not fall while he was President, and just as determined that the war would not wreck his plans at home. Those of us around him learned to bring him the advice he wanted.

Interpretation 1: From Inherited Counsel: Lyndon Johnson's Advisers and Vietnam by Joanna Grimsthorpe (fictional), published in 1997.

Johnson inherited Kennedy's advisers and leaned on them heavily. He had little experience of foreign affairs, and he deeply respected men such as Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Dean Rusk, who seemed to have every fact at their fingertips. It was the warnings of McNamara and Bundy in early 1965 that the war was being lost which persuaded him to begin bombing the North, and it was the military, led by General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who pressed for more and more troops. Doubters such as George Ball were heavily outnumbered. Again and again Johnson was given choices that pointed to only one answer. The escalation of 1965 was the advice of the experts, and Johnson followed it.

Interpretation 2: From Johnson's Own War: The President and the Decisions of 1965 by Neil Dunsfold (fictional), published in 2009.

The decisions to escalate in 1965 were Johnson's own. He was a forceful, domineering man who used his advisers rather than followed them. He questioned his officials closely, kept control of the smallest details of the bombing and set the pace of the build-up himself, often giving the military less than it asked for. He heard the case against escalation from George Ball, and rejected it. Johnson escalated because he was convinced that South Vietnam must not fall while he was President. His advisers shaped the choices put before him, but the choices were his.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the role of President Johnson's advisers in the decisions to escalate the war in 1965. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because their authors have given weight to different sources.

The author of Interpretation 1 may have relied on evidence like Source B, a memo in which McNamara and Bundy tell Johnson that 'our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat' and that they 'tend to favor' using 'our military power in the Far East'. This supports Interpretation 1's claim that 'the warnings of McNamara and Bundy in early 1965' persuaded him to act, and that he was given 'choices that pointed to only one answer', since the memo describes negotiation as 'salvaging what little can be preserved'.

The author of Interpretation 2 may have relied on accounts like Source C, which says 'Nobody ... doubted who was in charge', that Johnson chose bombing targets himself and 'did what he had already decided to do'. This matches Interpretation 2's view that he 'used his advisers rather than followed them' and kept control of 'the smallest details of the bombing'. Even Source B admits that 'the ultimate responsibility is not ours', which an author like this would use to argue that the choices were Johnson's.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason and support it by matching details in each source with details in the interpretation it supports, for example the memo's warning of 'disastrous defeat' with Interpretation 1's claim about the advisers' warnings. Saying only that one historian used Source B, without showing the match, stays in Level 1. Repeating the difference between the views without explaining why it exists does not answer this question.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Different weight given to different sources: the author of Interpretation 1 may have relied on evidence like Source B, in which the President's two most senior advisers tell him that 'our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat', that the 'worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role', and that they 'tend to favor' using 'our military power in the Far East' to 'force a change of Communist policy', while describing negotiation as 'salvaging what little can be preserved'; this supports Interpretation 1's claim that 'the warnings of McNamara and Bundy in early 1965 that the war was being lost' persuaded Johnson to act and that he was given 'choices that pointed to only one answer'. The author of Interpretation 2 may have relied on evidence like Source C, an insider's account that 'Nobody ... doubted who was in charge', that Johnson chose bombing targets himself and 'did what he had already decided to do' after hearing George Ball; this supports Interpretation 2's view that he 'used his advisers rather than followed them', 'kept control of the smallest details of the bombing' and rejected Ball's case. Source B can also be read in support of Interpretation 2: the advisers say that both alternatives 'should be argued out before you' and that 'the ultimate responsibility is not ours', which fits Interpretation 2's point that 'His advisers shaped the choices put before him, but the choices were his'; an answer that explains how the two authors could read the same kind of evidence differently is valid. Different focus: Interpretation 1 focuses on the content of the advice Johnson received (memos, the military's requests); Interpretation 2 focuses on how Johnson made decisions and on his own convictions. Different emphasis: Interpretation 1 stresses Johnson's inexperience in foreign affairs; Interpretation 2 stresses his forceful personality and the times he gave the military less than it wanted. A valid reason must be explained and supported with details from both interpretations (and, for a source-based reason, matched details from Sources B and C). Do not credit: undeveloped claims that an author is biased; reasons based only on publication dates or book titles; a description of the difference without a reason (that is a different question).

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why the Vietcong became a greater threat to South Vietnam in the years 1963-65.

You may use the following in your answer:
- support in the countryside
- the South Vietnamese army (ARVN)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The Vietcong became a far greater threat to South Vietnam between 1963 and 1965 because they had strong support in the countryside, growing help from North Vietnam, and an enemy in Saigon weakened by political chaos and a demoralised army.

First, the Vietcong had built up support in the countryside. The National Liberation Front, set up in 1960, had organisers in villages across the South who offered what Saigon did not: land for families who rented their fields, and a voice against officials who took bribes and soldiers who mistreated villagers. Local young men joined Vietcong units, and villagers hid them, fed them and warned them when government troops were coming. Where persuasion failed, the Vietcong used fear, killing village officials who worked for Saigon. By early 1965 one US estimate put their strength at around 40,000 full-time fighters and up to 100,000 part-time guerrillas.

Second, help from North Vietnam grew. After Diem's fall Hanoi's leaders chose to intensify the war, hoping to defeat Saigon before large American forces could arrive. Supplies and trained men reached the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and by sea; in February 1965 a North Vietnamese ship was discovered unloading weapons at Vung Ro Bay. Modern weapons such as AK-47 rifles gave Vietcong units more firepower than many government soldiers, who still carried older American rifles. From late 1964 regular North Vietnamese regiments also began to arrive, allowing the communists to fight bigger battles.

Third, the chaos in Saigon helped the Vietcong. After Diem was overthrown in November 1963, General Khanh seized power in January 1964, there were failed coups in September 1964 and February 1965, and Buddhist protests continued. Generals spent their energy on politics, and the Strategic Hamlet Program collapsed, leaving villages open to Vietcong control.

Fourth, the South Vietnamese army was too weak to stop them. Many officers were chosen for political loyalty rather than skill, pay and morale were low, and desertion was very high. The Vietcong captured weapons from overrun government posts and began to fight in large units, defeating government forces at Binh Gia at the turn of 1964-65 and at Ba Gia and Dong Xoai in mid-1965.

Finally, this success made the Vietcong bold enough to attack Americans directly, at Bien Hoa air base in November 1964 and at Pleiku in February 1965. By 1965, therefore, local support, Northern help and Saigon's weakness together meant that the Vietcong threatened to defeat South Vietnam altogether.

Explanation

Top answers explain how each factor increased the threat, for example how Northern weapons and regiments let the Vietcong fight in larger units, and add own knowledge beyond the stimulus, such as help from North Vietnam or the coups in Saigon. Weaker answers describe guerrilla tactics in general or drift into later events such as the Tet Offensive. Ranking the reasons is not required.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Support in the countryside: the National Liberation Front (set up in 1960) had cadres in villages across the South; it promised land to peasants who paid high rents to absent landlords and exploited anger at corrupt officials and at government troops who arrested suspects and burned villages; local young men joined, and villagers supplied food, shelter and information; the Vietcong also used intimidation, killing village officials who worked for Saigon; by early 1965 one US estimate was about 40,000 full-time fighters and 80,000-100,000 part-time guerrillas (accept 'over 100,000' or similar), controlling or contesting much of the Mekong Delta and the Central Highlands. The South Vietnamese army (ARVN): officers were often appointed for political loyalty rather than ability, and senior generals were absorbed in coups; pay and morale were low and desertion very high; many units avoided night operations and heavy casualties; small Regional and Popular Force posts were overrun and their weapons captured by the Vietcong; heavy-handed sweeps and shelling turned villagers against the government; defeats such as Binh Gia showed the Vietcong could now beat government units in open battle. Help from North Vietnam: at the end of 1963, after Diem's fall, Hanoi's leaders decided to step up the armed struggle and try to win before the USA could intervene in strength; more cadres and supplies came down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and by sea (a North Vietnamese supply ship was caught at Vung Ro Bay in February 1965); modern weapons from China and the USSR (AK-47 rifles, rocket launchers) outclassed the old American rifles of many government units; from late 1964 regular North Vietnamese army regiments began to arrive (about three regiments at first). Political instability in Saigon: after Diem's overthrow (November 1963) came a series of governments: Khanh's coup (January 1964), failed coups in September 1964 and February 1965, the removal of the civilian Prime Minister Huong in January 1965, and Buddhist protests; generals were absorbed in politics; the Strategic Hamlet Program collapsed after Diem's fall, leaving villages open to the Vietcong. Growing military success: the Vietcong began to fight in large units, e.g. Binh Gia (December 1964-January 1965), Ba Gia and Dong Xoai (May-June 1965), and attacked Americans at Bien Hoa (November 1964) and Pleiku (February 1965). Nationalism: the Vietcong presented themselves as fighting foreign domination, and the growing American presence helped their recruiting. Answers must explain why the threat grew, not simply describe guerrilla tactics; tactics are credited only when linked to the growth of the threat in 1963-65. Do not credit: the Tet Offensive (1968) or other events after 1965 as causes; the claim that the Vietcong were simply the North Vietnamese army; Dien Bien Phu (1954) as a cause.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From Containing Peking: China and America's War in Vietnam, 1949-1968 by Douglas Chalgrove (fictional), published in 1981.

American leaders fought in Vietnam because they believed that they were really facing China. Communist China had sent its armies against American troops in Korea, had attacked India in 1962 and in October 1964 exploded its first atomic bomb. Its leaders openly encouraged revolutionary wars in Asia, and China supplied many of the weapons used by the communists in South Vietnam. To Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, North Vietnam was the advance guard of Chinese power, and in April 1965 Johnson himself warned Americans of the shadow that communist China cast over the whole of Asia. If South Vietnam fell, they believed, China would dominate the region. The bombing and the troops of 1965 were, above all, meant to show Peking that its expansion would be stopped.

Interpretation 2: From Remembering the Yalu: Lyndon Johnson, China and the Limits of War by Helen Ashampstead (fictional), published in 2010.

China did more to limit the American war in Vietnam than to cause it. Johnson never forgot what had happened in Korea in 1950, when American forces advanced towards the Chinese border and hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops entered the war. He was determined not to make the same mistake. He ruled out an invasion of North Vietnam, kept American bombers away from the Chinese border and, at first, away from Hanoi, and raised the pressure step by step. His advisers believed that China would probably stay out of the fighting as long as the Americans did not invade the North. The reasons for escalating lay in South Vietnam, which was close to collapse by 1965. Fear of China decided how far the United States would go, not whether it would go to war.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the part played by China in the escalation of the conflict in 1964-65? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that China 'did more to limit the American war in Vietnam than to cause it', so that fear of China decided 'how far the United States would go, not whether it would go to war'. I largely agree, although Interpretation 1 is right that fear of China helps to explain why American leaders thought South Vietnam was worth fighting for.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about the limits of escalation. Johnson remembered the Korean War: in late 1950, as American-led forces approached the Yalu River, huge Chinese armies entered the war and a quick victory turned into a costly stalemate. He was determined not to repeat this. He never sent ground forces into North Vietnam, and when Operation Rolling Thunder began on 2 March 1965 its first targets were in the south of North Vietnam. The Hanoi and Haiphong areas were kept off limits in 1965, and a zone along the Chinese border was left alone. In July 1965 McNamara advised that China would probably not send its own forces into the war as long as the Americans did not invade the North. The phrase 'step by step' fits this cautious, gradual approach.

Interpretation 2 is also right that the reasons for escalating lay mainly in South Vietnam. After Diem's overthrow there were coups in January 1964 and February 1965, the army was beaten at Binh Gia, and in January 1965 McNamara and Bundy warned Johnson that existing policy would lead to defeat. It was the Vietcong attack on Pleiku in February 1965 that triggered the first reprisal raids, and the threat to air bases that brought the Marines to Da Nang in March.

However, Interpretation 1 shows that China was more than a brake. American leaders saw China standing behind North Vietnam. China had fought American troops in Korea, attacked India in 1962 and exploded its first atomic bomb in October 1964, and it supplied many of the weapons used by the communists in the South. The domino theory itself rested on the fear that China would dominate South-East Asia if South Vietnam fell. In his speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965 Johnson spoke of the shadow of communist China over Asia and claimed that Hanoi was urged on by Peking. The phrase 'they believed that they were really facing China' conveys how central this fear was.

Yet Interpretation 1 overstates its case when it says the escalation was 'above all' aimed at China. North Vietnam had its own aims, China and the Soviet Union were rivals by the 1960s, and the timing of escalation was set by events in South Vietnam, not by anything China did.

Overall, I agree with Interpretation 2 to a large extent. Fear of China was part of the Cold War thinking that made South Vietnam seem important, but judged by what actually shaped the decisions of 1964-65, China mainly determined how far and how fast Johnson escalated, while the collapse of South Vietnam determined when he did so.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2's claim that China limited the war, using knowledge such as the memory of Korea, the decision never to invade North Vietnam and the limits on bombing, and weigh it against Interpretation 1's evidence that fear of China lay behind the domino theory. They comment on how each view is conveyed and reach a judgement with clear criteria, such as why the USA escalated versus how far it went. Weaker answers describe the Korean War or the domino theory in general without linking them to the escalation of 1964-65.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that fear of China mainly limited the escalation, deciding how far the USA went rather than whether it fought, and that the reasons for escalating lay in South Vietnam. Points from the interpretations and own knowledge that support Interpretation 2: the memory of Korea: in late 1950, as UN forces neared the Yalu River, Chinese forces entered the war in huge numbers and it became a costly stalemate; Johnson never sent ground forces into North Vietnam; Operation Rolling Thunder (from 2 March 1965) began with targets in the southern part of North Vietnam, a zone along the Chinese border was not bombed, and the Hanoi and Haiphong areas were kept off limits in 1965; targets were approved in Washington and pressure was increased gradually; McNamara's memo of 20 July 1965 judged that China would probably not send regular ground forces or aircraft into the war as long as the USA did not invade North Vietnam; the danger was real: China publicly promised support to North Vietnam and from mid-1965 sent support troops (engineers and anti-aircraft units) to the North; the immediate causes of escalation were in Vietnam: the Vietcong's growing strength, repeated coups in Saigon (January 1964, February 1965), defeats such as Binh Gia (December 1964-January 1965), the McNamara-Bundy memo of 27 January 1965 and the attack on Pleiku (7 February 1965); concern for American credibility and fear of being blamed at home for 'losing' Vietnam. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): containment of communist China was central to American thinking, and the domino theory assumed that China would dominate South-East Asia if South Vietnam fell; China had fought American forces in Korea, attacked India in 1962 and exploded its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964; China supplied many of the communists' weapons (e.g. Chinese-made versions of the AK-47); in his speech at Johns Hopkins University (7 April 1965) Johnson spoke of the deepening shadow of communist China over Asia and said Hanoi was urged on by Peking; Chinese statements in support of 'people's war' (e.g. Lin Biao's article of September 1965) seemed to confirm these fears; the 'loss' of China in 1949 still shaped American politics. Weaknesses: Interpretation 1 ignores the split between China and the Soviet Union and North Vietnam's own aims; Interpretation 2 underplays how far fear of China lay behind the domino theory itself. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 2's 'did more to limit ... than to cause it' and 'how far ... not whether' present China as a brake; Interpretation 1's 'really facing China' and 'above all' present China as the driving force. A substantiated judgement might argue that fear of China helped make South Vietnam seem worth defending but mainly shaped the limits and pace of escalation, while events in South Vietnam set its timing; criteria might include why the USA escalated versus how far it went. Do not credit general accounts of the Korean War or the domino theory that are not linked to the escalation of 1964-65; do not credit the claim that Chinese combat divisions fought in South Vietnam.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

Ready to try the rest? Every answer you write is marked against the mark scheme, so you can see exactly where the marks are.

Study Helper Hints first, answers after you try

Stuck on this one? Ask for a hint and I’ll point you in the right direction, without giving the answer away. Once you’ve checked your answer, I’ll show you how the marks are awarded.