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Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The development of the civil rights movement, 1954-60
Unit 2
Key topic 2: Protest, progress and radicalism, 1960-75
Unit 3
Key topic 3: US involvement in the Vietnam War, 1954-75
Unit 4
Key topic 4: Reactions to, and the end of, US involvement in Vietnam, 1964-75
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Reasons for US involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, 1954-63

Practise 18 exam-style questions on Reasons for US involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, 1954-63 for Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
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18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From President Eisenhower's answer to a question at a news conference in Washington on 7 April 1954, published by the US government in the Public Papers of the Presidents. A reporter had asked him to comment on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world, because across the country there seemed to be some lack of understanding of what it meant to the USA.

You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.

First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical [hostile] to the free world.

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences. ...

Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula [Malaya], and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people. ...

So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.

Source C: From NSC 5405, a top secret statement of US policy towards South-East Asia approved by President Eisenhower on 16 January 1954. It was drawn up by the National Security Council, the committee of the President's most senior advisers on defence and foreign policy, to guide the work of government departments. It was not made public at the time.

1. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests. ...

c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.

d. The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic consequences for many nations of the free world and conversely would add significant resources to the Soviet bloc. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities. The rice exports of Burma, Indochina and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan and India, all important areas of free Asia. Furthermore, this area has an important potential as a market for the industrialized countries of the free world.

e. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

Interpretation 1: From Lines in the Jungle: Cold War Beliefs and US Policy in Asia, 1950-1960 by Daniel Wembury (fictional), published in 1979.

American involvement in Vietnam under Eisenhower grew out of fear. After the communist victory in China in 1949 and the invasion of South Korea in 1950, Americans saw communism as a single movement, directed from Moscow and Beijing, that was advancing across Asia. Eisenhower's warning in 1954 that the nations of South-East Asia could fall like a row of dominoes expressed a belief shared by politicians, newspapers and the public. At home, the campaigns of Senator Joseph McCarthy had shown that any leader accused of 'losing' a country to communism would pay a heavy price. Supporting South Vietnam was therefore less a calculation of costs and benefits than a matter of principle: the line had to be held.

Interpretation 2: From Rice, Rubber and Allies: The Interests behind America's Asian Policy, 1950-1961 by Helen Lydford (fictional), published in 2003.

The domino theory was the public face of American policy, but the planners in Washington were thinking about more practical interests. South-East Asia supplied much of the world's rubber and tin, and its rice and markets mattered to Japan, whose recovery was central to American plans for Asia. A communist South-East Asia would threaten the island bases from Japan to the Philippines and leave Japan dependent on China. Once SEATO had been signed, the credibility of American promises was also at stake. Eisenhower himself mentioned tin, rubber and Japan's trade when he first spoke of falling dominoes. Vietnam mattered not because of its own value, but because of what its loss might cost the United States elsewhere.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the role of the domino theory in US policy towards Vietnam under President Eisenhower. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

One reason is that the authors have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 treats the domino theory as a real belief, arguing that involvement 'grew out of fear' of communism 'advancing across Asia'. This fits Source B, in which Eisenhower tells reporters that if the first domino is knocked over the last 'will go over very quickly', that Asia 'has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship' and that 'we simply can't afford greater losses'. Interpretation 2 calls the domino theory 'the public face of American policy' and says that 'the planners in Washington were thinking about more practical interests'. This matches Source C, a secret policy paper, which stresses 'the Pacific offshore island chain', 'natural rubber and tin', rice for Japan and the danger of 'Japan's eventual accommodation to communism'. The author of Interpretation 1 seems to have relied on public statements like Source B, made to explain the danger to Americans, while the author of Interpretation 2 used secret planning documents like Source C, which show the interests that lay behind those statements.

Explanation

Top answers explain one reason fully, for example that one author relied on public statements and the other on secret planning documents, and back it with matching details from an interpretation and a source. Simply saying that 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without showing the match, or repeating the difference between the views, does not explain why they differ. Claims that an author is biased, or that the date of publication explains the difference, are not credited unless they are proved from the content.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B, Eisenhower's public answer at a news conference, puts the 'falling domino' principle at the centre: knock over the first domino and the last 'will go over very quickly'; Asia 'has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship' and 'we simply can't afford greater losses'; the loss of Indochina could be followed by Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia, and the consequences would be 'incalculable to the free world'. This supports Interpretation 1's view that involvement 'grew out of fear' of communism as a single movement 'advancing across Asia', that the domino warning 'expressed a belief shared by politicians, newspapers and the public', and that 'the line had to be held'. Source C, the secret NSC policy paper, sets out practical interests: 'the Pacific offshore island chain', 'the principal world source of natural rubber and tin', rice exports that mattered to 'Japan and India', markets for 'the industrialized countries of the free world' and the danger of 'Japan's eventual accommodation to communism'. This supports Interpretation 2's view that 'the planners in Washington were thinking about more practical interests' such as rubber, tin, Japan and 'the island bases from Japan to the Philippines'. A strong answer may link the sources' purposes to the interpretations: Source B was a public explanation of the danger for the American people, while Source C was a secret guide for the government, which fits Interpretation 2's claim that the domino theory was 'the public face of American policy'. Both sources contain both strands (Source B mentions 'materials that the world needs'; Source C warns that communist domination would 'endanger ... United States security interests'), so an answer that says the authors have chosen to stress different parts of the evidence is also valid. The interpretations may differ because they focus on different groups: Interpretation 1 on public opinion, newspapers and domestic politics (McCarthy, fear of 'losing' a country); Interpretation 2 on the calculations of government planners. They may differ because of a different emphasis: Interpretation 1 treats the domino theory as a genuine belief that drove policy, while Interpretation 2 treats it as the public expression of economic and strategic interests. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations (and, for a source-based reason, matched details from Sources B and C). Do not credit assertions that one author is biased, or reasons based only on the dates of publication or the titles of the books, unless clearly linked to content. Do not credit an answer that only describes the difference between the views (a different question).

Question 2

4 marks

Source B: From a top secret telegram sent to the State Department in Washington on 29 August 1963 by Henry Cabot Lodge, who had arrived in Saigon as the new US ambassador a week earlier. In a cable on 24 August Lodge had been told that, if Diem would not remove his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the generals who were planning a coup could be told that the USA would support them. The telegram was published in the Pentagon Papers in 1971.

1. We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: The overthrow of the Diem government. There is no turning back in part because U.S. prestige is already publicly committed to this end in large measure and will become more so as facts leak out. In a more fundamental sense, there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration ...

2. The chance of bringing off a Generals' coup depends on them to some extent; but it depends at least as much on us.

3. We should proceed to make all-out effort to get Generals to move promptly. ...

4. Vietnamese Generals doubt that we have the will power, courage, and determination to see this thing through. They are haunted by the idea that we will run out on them even though we have told them pursuant to instructions, that the game had started.

Source C: An account written for this course, based on the later recollections of South Vietnamese army officers who took part in the coup of 1 November 1963.

We did not act because the Americans told us to. Many of us had wanted a change since the summer. In August, Nhu's Special Forces raided the pagodas wearing army uniforms, so that the people blamed the army. Our soldiers' families were Buddhists, and the army was losing the respect of the people. Promotions went to men who were loyal to the family, and we heard rumours that Nhu was talking secretly to the North. When we were ready, we chose the day ourselves and told the Americans only at the last moment. We wanted to know that they would not stop us. That is all we needed from them.

Interpretation 1: From Green Light in Saigon: Washington and the Fall of Diem by Thomas Shebbear (fictional), published in 1982.

The coup of November 1963 would not have happened without the United States. On 24 August, days after the pagoda raids, Washington instructed its new ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, that Diem must remove his brother, and that the generals should be told they would have American support if he did not. Lodge kept his distance from Diem, and a CIA officer, Lucien Conein, met the plotters and assured them that the United States would not interfere. In October, the suspension of aid sent a clear signal that Diem had lost Washington's backing. On the day of the coup, Conein was at army headquarters and handed the generals money. The generals moved only when they were sure of American approval, and the United States must share responsibility for what followed.

Interpretation 2: From The Generals' Revolution: Saigon, November 1963 by Catherine Winkleigh (fictional), published in 2008.

The overthrow of Diem was a Vietnamese decision. Army officers had already tried to remove him in 1960, and in 1962 two air force pilots bombed his palace. In 1963 the generals were furious that Nhu's Special Forces had carried out the pagoda raids in army uniforms, and they feared that the war was being lost. Washington, by contrast, was divided and hesitant: after the cable of 24 August the generals drew back, and for weeks American officials argued about whether to encourage them. The generals chose the date and kept it from the Americans until the last moment. Kennedy did not want Diem killed and was shocked when he heard the news. The Americans allowed the coup to happen, but they did not make it.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the role of the USA in the overthrow of Diem (1963). You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

One reason is that the authors have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 argues that 'The coup of November 1963 would not have happened without the United States' and that the generals 'moved only when they were sure of American approval'. This is supported by Source B, in which the American ambassador, Lodge, tells Washington that the USA is 'launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: The overthrow of the Diem government', that a coup 'depends at least as much on us' and that the USA should make an 'all-out effort to get Generals to move promptly'. Interpretation 2 argues that the overthrow 'was a Vietnamese decision'. This matches Source C, the officers' own recollections, which insists 'We did not act because the Americans told us to', lists their anger at the pagoda raids carried out 'wearing army uniforms', and says 'we chose the day ourselves'. The author of Interpretation 1 relied on American documents, which put the USA at the centre, while the author of Interpretation 2 relied on Vietnamese accounts, which stress the generals' own motives.

Explanation

Top answers explain one reason fully, such as each author's reliance on American or Vietnamese evidence, and support it with matching details from an interpretation and a source. Saying only that 'Interpretation 2 used Source C', or repeating the difference between the views, does not explain why they differ. Assertions of bias or arguments based on the date of publication are not credited unless proved from the content.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B, a top secret telegram from the American ambassador, Lodge, on 29 August 1963, says that the USA is 'launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: The overthrow of the Diem government', that 'U.S. prestige is already publicly committed', that a coup 'depends at least as much on us' as on the generals, and that the USA should make an 'all-out effort to get Generals to move promptly'; this supports Interpretation 1's view that 'The coup of November 1963 would not have happened without the United States', that Washington encouraged the plotters from the cable of 24 August onwards, and that 'The generals moved only when they were sure of American approval' (Lodge also reports that the generals 'doubt' American determination and fear 'we will run out on them'). Source C, based on the officers' own recollections, insists 'We did not act because the Americans told us to', lists the generals' own grievances (the pagoda raids carried out in army uniforms, promotions for loyalty to the family, rumours about Nhu and the North) and says 'we chose the day ourselves'; this supports Interpretation 2's view that the overthrow 'was a Vietnamese decision' and that the generals 'kept it from the Americans until the last moment'. A strong answer may note that Source B was written in August, when, as Interpretation 2 says, the generals 'drew back' despite Lodge's urging, which helps to explain why a historian using Vietnamese accounts might see the Americans as following events rather than making them. The interpretations may differ because they focus on different places and people: Interpretation 1 on decisions in Washington and by American officials (the cable of 24 August, Lodge, Conein, the aid cuts); Interpretation 2 on the motives of South Vietnamese officers in Saigon and on earlier Vietnamese attempts (1960, 1962). They may differ in emphasis: Interpretation 1 stresses what the USA did to make the coup possible, while Interpretation 2 stresses American hesitation and Kennedy's shock at Diem's death. Answers must be substantiated with details from the interpretations (and, if used, the sources) to reach Level 2. Do not credit claims that one author is biased, or reasons based only on publication dates or titles, unless linked to content; do not credit an answer that only describes the difference between the views.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why the USA decided to support Ngo Dinh Diem in the years 1954-56.

You may use the following in your answer:
- Diem's nationalism
- the refugees from North Vietnam

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The USA decided to support Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954-56 because he seemed to be the only Vietnamese leader who was both a nationalist and a determined anti-communist, and because backing him was the surest way to keep the South out of communist hands.

First, Diem's nationalism made him valuable to the USA. In 1933 he had resigned as a minister in protest at French control, and he had refused to work either for the French or for Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh. As the French withdrew after the Geneva Agreements, the USA did not want to look like the new colonial power. A leader with a record of opposing the French could compete with Ho Chi Minh for the support of Vietnamese nationalists, whereas the head of state, Bao Dai, was widely seen as a French puppet.

Second, Diem's anti-communism fitted the domino theory. In April 1954 Eisenhower had warned that if Indochina fell, the rest of South-East Asia could follow. After the communist victory in China in 1949 and the Korean War, Washington wanted a reliable leader to hold the line at the 17th parallel. Diem also had powerful American friends, such as Senator Mike Mansfield, Senator John F. Kennedy and Cardinal Spellman, whom he had met while living in the USA in the early 1950s.

Third, the refugees from North Vietnam strengthened the case for Diem. Up to a million people moved south in 1954-55, most of them Catholics, and the US Navy carried about 310,000 of them. To Americans, this exodus proved that people were fleeing communism. Because Diem was himself a Catholic, the refugees gave him a loyal base of support, and American money for their resettlement tied the USA more closely to his government.

Fourth, Diem showed that he could take control. In April and May 1955 his army crushed the Binh Xuyen, a criminal organisation with its own armed forces in Saigon. Washington had been considering replacing him, but his victory persuaded Eisenhower's government to back him fully. In October 1955 he defeated Bao Dai in a referendum with over 98 per cent of the vote, a rigged result, and declared himself President of the Republic of Vietnam.

Finally, supporting Diem allowed the USA to avoid the elections planned for 1956. American leaders feared that Ho Chi Minh would win a nationwide vote. Diem refused to hold the elections, and the USA backed his refusal. From 1955 American aid went directly to his government and American advisers took over the training of his army, so the USA had chosen Diem as its partner in the fight against communism.

Explanation

Top answers explain how each factor made Diem attractive to Washington, for example how his nationalism offered an alternative to Ho Chi Minh, and add aspects beyond the stimulus such as the domino theory, his defeat of the Binh Xuyen or the 1956 elections. Weaker answers describe Diem's background or the refugees without linking them to the American decision. Ranking the reasons is not required.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Diem's nationalism: he had resigned as a minister in 1933 in protest at French control and refused to serve either the French-backed government or Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh, so the USA saw him as a nationalist untainted by colonialism who could compete with Ho Chi Minh for nationalist support, unlike Bao Dai, who was seen as a French puppet; the USA did not want to look like the new colonial power as the French withdrew. Anti-communism: Diem was fiercely anti-communist, which fitted containment and the domino theory (Eisenhower's 'falling domino' press conference of April 1954); after the communist victory in China (1949) and the Korean War (1950-53) Washington wanted a strong leader to hold the line at the 17th parallel. The refugees from North Vietnam: up to about a million people moved south in 1954-55, most of them Catholics; the US Navy carried about 310,000 (Operation Passage to Freedom); the USA saw the exodus as proof that people rejected communism and as a propaganda success; the Catholic refugees gave the Catholic Diem a loyal base, and US resettlement aid tied the USA to his government. American contacts: Diem had lived in the USA in the early 1950s and won supporters such as Senator Mike Mansfield, Senator John F. Kennedy and Cardinal Spellman. Lack of alternatives: the French were leaving and no other non-communist leader had similar credentials. Diem's strength: in April-May 1955 his army defeated the Binh Xuyen and then the armed religious sects; Washington had been considering replacing him but decided to back him fully; in October 1955 he won a rigged referendum against Bao Dai (over 98 per cent; more votes in Saigon than registered voters) and became President of the Republic of Vietnam. The 1956 elections: the USA feared Ho Chi Minh would win nationwide elections; Diem refused to hold them and the USA supported his refusal. Commitments: SEATO's protocol (September 1954) covered South Vietnam; Eisenhower's letter of October 1954 offered aid directly to Diem's government, and from 1955 US aid went directly to Saigon and US advisers took over training the army. Answers must explain why the USA backed Diem, not describe his life. Do not credit: the claim that Diem won a free election; Kennedy-era policies (the Strategic Hamlet Program, 1962) as reasons for a decision taken in 1954-56; a narrative of Dien Bien Phu, which may be mentioned only briefly as the background to the French withdrawal.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From The Cautious General: Eisenhower and Asia, 1953-1961 by Robert Ashwater (fictional), published in 1997.

Eisenhower's policy towards Vietnam was marked by caution. As a former general, he knew how costly a land war in Asia could be, and he had ended the fighting in Korea within months of taking office. In 1954 he refused to commit American forces to the war in Indochina without allies and the support of Congress. When Vietnam was divided, he chose to help the South with money, equipment and training rather than soldiers. He expected reforms in return for aid to Diem and insisted that the South Vietnamese must defend themselves. When he left office in January 1961, there were fewer than a thousand American military advisers in South Vietnam and no American combat units. Eisenhower's aim was to help South Vietnam to stand on its own, and he kept the American commitment limited.

Interpretation 2: From Saigon's Sponsor: Eisenhower's Commitment to South Vietnam, 1954-1960 by Julia Stokenham (fictional), published in 2006.

Eisenhower's policy did far more than offer help: it tied the United States to the survival of South Vietnam. After Geneva, his government decided to build a separate anti-communist state in the South and chose Ngo Dinh Diem to lead it. It brought South Vietnam under the protection of SEATO, backed Diem's refusal to hold the 1956 elections and, between 1955 and 1961, gave his government well over a billion dollars in aid. American advisers trained and equipped the South Vietnamese army, and American money paid for much of it. Eisenhower explained all this through the domino theory, which made South Vietnam's survival a test of American credibility. By 1960 the South Vietnamese state existed largely because the United States had decided that it must exist, and American prestige was so bound up with it that the commitment could not easily be abandoned.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about President Eisenhower's policy towards Vietnam in the years 1954-60? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that Eisenhower's policy 'tied the United States to the survival of South Vietnam'. I largely agree: Eisenhower made a political and financial commitment that was almost impossible to abandon, although Interpretation 1 is right that he kept American military involvement small.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about the political commitment. After the Geneva Agreements divided Vietnam in 1954, the USA chose to back Ngo Dinh Diem. Eisenhower's letter of October 1954 offered aid directly to Diem's government, and the SEATO Protocol placed 'the free territory' of South Vietnam under the protection of the new alliance. When Diem refused to hold the elections planned for 1956, Washington supported him, because American leaders feared Ho Chi Minh would win. The interpretation's claim that the state 'existed largely because the United States had decided that it must exist' is strong language, but it is supported by the scale of the aid: between 1955 and 1961 the USA gave well over a billion dollars, much of it through the Commodity Import Program, and American advisers in MAAG trained and equipped the South Vietnamese army. When Eisenhower greeted Diem at Washington's airport in May 1957, he was showing the world that American prestige was tied to South Vietnam.

However, Interpretation 1 is right that Eisenhower was cautious about using force. It stresses that he 'ended the fighting in Korea within months of taking office' and in 1954 refused to send American forces into Indochina without allies and Congress. By the end of 1960 there were only about 900 American military personnel in South Vietnam, and the first two advisers killed, at Bien Hoa in July 1959, were among only a handful of American deaths. The decisive military escalation came under Kennedy, who raised adviser numbers to about 16,000, sent helicopter units and set up MACV in 1962. Interpretation 1's phrase 'kept the American commitment limited' therefore fits the military evidence.

Yet Interpretation 1 underestimates the effect of Eisenhower's choices. By making South Vietnam's survival a test of the domino theory, he bound American prestige so closely to it that, as Interpretation 2 says, 'the commitment could not easily be abandoned'. Kennedy, who as a senator had supported Diem, inherited not just advisers but a promise. The rise of the Vietcong, after North Vietnam decided in 1959 to support armed struggle, then put that promise to the test.

Overall, I mostly agree with Interpretation 2. Judged by military involvement, Eisenhower was cautious, as Interpretation 1 argues. But judged by the commitment he made to build and protect South Vietnam, and by how far it limited his successors' choices, Eisenhower laid the foundations of the war, and Interpretation 2 is the more convincing view.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2's claims, such as the scale of aid and the SEATO commitment, against precise knowledge, use Interpretation 1's evidence of military restraint as the counter-argument, and comment on how each view is conveyed through language and selection. They reach a clear judgement using criteria such as political versus military commitment. Weaker answers retell Eisenhower's policies without evaluating the interpretations, or drift into Kennedy's and Johnson's decisions.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that Eisenhower created a deep and lasting American commitment to South Vietnam, building and sustaining a state that would not have existed without the USA. Points from the interpretations and own knowledge that support Interpretation 2: after the Geneva Agreements (July 1954) the USA backed Diem, who became Prime Minister in 1954 and President in October 1955; the SEATO Protocol (September 1954) placed South Vietnam under the treaty's protection; Eisenhower's letter of October 1954 offered aid directly to Diem's government, and direct aid began in 1955; the USA supported Diem's refusal to hold the 1956 elections; from 1955 to 1961 the USA gave well over a billion dollars in aid (estimates range from about 1.4 billion to over 2 billion dollars, depending on the years and kinds of aid counted), mostly through the Commodity Import Program; MAAG took over training the army from the French and built it into a conventional force largely paid for by American aid; Diem was welcomed by Eisenhower at Washington's airport in May 1957 and addressed Congress; the domino theory (April 1954 press conference) made the South's survival a matter of credibility; US prestige was committed, so the next President inherited the commitment. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): Eisenhower ended the Korean War in 1953 and was wary of a land war in Asia; in 1954 he refused to intervene militarily without allies and Congress; he relied on aid, advisers and alliances rather than troops; there were about 900 US military personnel in South Vietnam by the end of 1960 and no combat units; American deaths were few (two advisers were killed at Bien Hoa in July 1959); his October 1954 letter said that the USA expected reforms in return for its aid; the decisive increases (from about 900 to about 16,000 advisers, helicopters, MACV in 1962) came under Kennedy; the North Vietnamese decision of 1959 to support armed struggle and the founding of the NLF (December 1960) changed the situation after Eisenhower's main decisions. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 2 uses language of creation and dependence ('tied', 'existed largely because the United States had decided that it must exist'); Interpretation 1 stresses restraint ('marked by caution', 'kept the American commitment limited') and selects military evidence. A substantiated judgement might argue that Interpretation 2 is convincing about political and financial commitment but Interpretation 1 is right that Eisenhower avoided military involvement; criteria might include the scale of commitment, military versus political involvement, and how far later Presidents were bound by his decisions. Do not credit events after January 1961 as Eisenhower's policy, except to compare the scale of later involvement.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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