Question 1
4 marksSource B: From President Eisenhower's answer to a question at a news conference in Washington on 7 April 1954, published by the US government in the Public Papers of the Presidents. A reporter had asked him to comment on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world, because across the country there seemed to be some lack of understanding of what it meant to the USA.
You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.
First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.
Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical [hostile] to the free world.
Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences. ...
Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.
But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula [Malaya], and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people. ...
So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.
Source C: From NSC 5405, a top secret statement of US policy towards South-East Asia approved by President Eisenhower on 16 January 1954. It was drawn up by the National Security Council, the committee of the President's most senior advisers on defence and foreign policy, to guide the work of government departments. It was not made public at the time.
1. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests. ...
c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.
d. The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic consequences for many nations of the free world and conversely would add significant resources to the Soviet bloc. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities. The rice exports of Burma, Indochina and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan and India, all important areas of free Asia. Furthermore, this area has an important potential as a market for the industrialized countries of the free world.
e. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.
Interpretation 1: From Lines in the Jungle: Cold War Beliefs and US Policy in Asia, 1950-1960 by Daniel Wembury (fictional), published in 1979.
American involvement in Vietnam under Eisenhower grew out of fear. After the communist victory in China in 1949 and the invasion of South Korea in 1950, Americans saw communism as a single movement, directed from Moscow and Beijing, that was advancing across Asia. Eisenhower's warning in 1954 that the nations of South-East Asia could fall like a row of dominoes expressed a belief shared by politicians, newspapers and the public. At home, the campaigns of Senator Joseph McCarthy had shown that any leader accused of 'losing' a country to communism would pay a heavy price. Supporting South Vietnam was therefore less a calculation of costs and benefits than a matter of principle: the line had to be held.
Interpretation 2: From Rice, Rubber and Allies: The Interests behind America's Asian Policy, 1950-1961 by Helen Lydford (fictional), published in 2003.
The domino theory was the public face of American policy, but the planners in Washington were thinking about more practical interests. South-East Asia supplied much of the world's rubber and tin, and its rice and markets mattered to Japan, whose recovery was central to American plans for Asia. A communist South-East Asia would threaten the island bases from Japan to the Philippines and leave Japan dependent on China. Once SEATO had been signed, the credibility of American promises was also at stake. Eisenhower himself mentioned tin, rubber and Japan's trade when he first spoke of falling dominoes. Vietnam mattered not because of its own value, but because of what its loss might cost the United States elsewhere.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the role of the domino theory in US policy towards Vietnam under President Eisenhower. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
One reason is that the authors have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 treats the domino theory as a real belief, arguing that involvement 'grew out of fear' of communism 'advancing across Asia'. This fits Source B, in which Eisenhower tells reporters that if the first domino is knocked over the last 'will go over very quickly', that Asia 'has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship' and that 'we simply can't afford greater losses'. Interpretation 2 calls the domino theory 'the public face of American policy' and says that 'the planners in Washington were thinking about more practical interests'. This matches Source C, a secret policy paper, which stresses 'the Pacific offshore island chain', 'natural rubber and tin', rice for Japan and the danger of 'Japan's eventual accommodation to communism'. The author of Interpretation 1 seems to have relied on public statements like Source B, made to explain the danger to Americans, while the author of Interpretation 2 used secret planning documents like Source C, which show the interests that lay behind those statements.
Explanation
Top answers explain one reason fully, for example that one author relied on public statements and the other on secret planning documents, and back it with matching details from an interpretation and a source. Simply saying that 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without showing the match, or repeating the difference between the views, does not explain why they differ. Claims that an author is biased, or that the date of publication explains the difference, are not credited unless they are proved from the content.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B, Eisenhower's public answer at a news conference, puts the 'falling domino' principle at the centre: knock over the first domino and the last 'will go over very quickly'; Asia 'has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship' and 'we simply can't afford greater losses'; the loss of Indochina could be followed by Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia, and the consequences would be 'incalculable to the free world'. This supports Interpretation 1's view that involvement 'grew out of fear' of communism as a single movement 'advancing across Asia', that the domino warning 'expressed a belief shared by politicians, newspapers and the public', and that 'the line had to be held'. Source C, the secret NSC policy paper, sets out practical interests: 'the Pacific offshore island chain', 'the principal world source of natural rubber and tin', rice exports that mattered to 'Japan and India', markets for 'the industrialized countries of the free world' and the danger of 'Japan's eventual accommodation to communism'. This supports Interpretation 2's view that 'the planners in Washington were thinking about more practical interests' such as rubber, tin, Japan and 'the island bases from Japan to the Philippines'. A strong answer may link the sources' purposes to the interpretations: Source B was a public explanation of the danger for the American people, while Source C was a secret guide for the government, which fits Interpretation 2's claim that the domino theory was 'the public face of American policy'. Both sources contain both strands (Source B mentions 'materials that the world needs'; Source C warns that communist domination would 'endanger ... United States security interests'), so an answer that says the authors have chosen to stress different parts of the evidence is also valid. The interpretations may differ because they focus on different groups: Interpretation 1 on public opinion, newspapers and domestic politics (McCarthy, fear of 'losing' a country); Interpretation 2 on the calculations of government planners. They may differ because of a different emphasis: Interpretation 1 treats the domino theory as a genuine belief that drove policy, while Interpretation 2 treats it as the public expression of economic and strategic interests. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations (and, for a source-based reason, matched details from Sources B and C). Do not credit assertions that one author is biased, or reasons based only on the dates of publication or the titles of the books, unless clearly linked to content. Do not credit an answer that only describes the difference between the views (a different question).