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Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The development of the civil rights movement, 1954-60
Unit 2
Key topic 2: Protest, progress and radicalism, 1960-75
Unit 3
Key topic 3: US involvement in the Vietnam War, 1954-75
Unit 4
Key topic 4: Reactions to, and the end of, US involvement in Vietnam, 1964-75
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Reasons for the failure of the USA in Vietnam

Practise 20 exam-style questions on Reasons for the failure of the USA in Vietnam for Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 20 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-66, 'Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation', 4 August 1966. It was a secret report by the CIA and the other American intelligence agencies for President Johnson and his advisers. In June 1966 the USA had begun bombing North Vietnam's oil stores, and China had responded with mass demonstrations all over the country in support of North Vietnam. 'Peking' is the Chinese capital, Beijing; 'NVN' is North Vietnam.

These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to reiterate the Chinese view that the war must be continued to final victory. At the same time, the Chinese seem likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and, for the first time, they may move some infantry troops into North Vietnam as a precautionary step against the contingency of invasion.

We do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded or if the collapse of the Communist regime seemed likely. But we continue to believe that, at present levels of US action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to the war, nor its air force to deliberate and sustained action against US forces.

Source C: From a top secret summary of the answers that American government departments, the CIA and the US commanders and embassy in Saigon gave to a list of questions about the war set by President Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, in January 1969. The summary was written by Kissinger's staff and sent to the Vice-President and Nixon's senior ministers on 22 March 1969. Here it gives points on which the departments generally agreed. 'Peking' is Beijing; 'NVN/VC' means North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

(4) The enemy have suffered some reverse but they have not changed their essential objectives and they have sufficient strength to pursue these objectives. We are not attriting enemy forces faster than they can recruit or infiltrate. Soviet and Chinese supplies have enabled the enemy to carry on despite our operations. ...

Neither Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to do so, although their military and economic assistance give them important leverage. CIA notes that "in competing for influence Peking and Moscow tend to cancel out each other." For its own reasons, Hanoi's tendency in the last year has been in the Soviet direction. However, the Hanoi leadership is attempting to chart its own independent course, despite its reliance on its allies for supplies. ...

It is generally agreed that the NVN/VC manpower pool is sufficiently large to meet the enemy's replenishment needs over an extended period of time within the framework of current rules of engagement.

Interpretation 1: From Arsenal of the Revolution: Moscow, Peking and Hanoi's War by Martin Ledsworth (fictional), published in 1978.

North Vietnam could not have fought the USA for long without the Soviet Union and China. It was a poor country of farmers with almost no heavy industry. Its surface-to-air missiles, MiG fighters, radar and many of its anti-aircraft guns came from the Soviet Union, which also supplied trucks, fuel and, later, tanks. China sent rifles, ammunition, food and uniforms, and in the late 1960s, according to Chinese figures, some 320,000 Chinese engineering, railway and anti-aircraft troops served in the North, repairing bomb damage and freeing North Vietnamese soldiers to go south. Just as important, the Chinese presence warned Washington that an invasion of the North might bring another Korean War. Hanoi's allies made it possible for North Vietnam to survive the bombing and to keep its armies in the South supplied.

Interpretation 2: From A War of Their Own: North Vietnam and its Allies, 1965-75 by Yvonne Castlerigg (fictional), published in 2016.

Soviet and Chinese aid mattered, but it did not win the war. It was the North Vietnamese and their supporters in the South who did the fighting and the dying. Hanoi's leaders mobilised the whole population: men served for as long as the war lasted, women and teenagers kept the roads and bridges open, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers walked south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hanoi was also careful never to become a puppet of either ally. The quarrel between Moscow and Peking allowed it to take help from both while making its own decisions, sometimes against their advice: Moscow wanted Hanoi to negotiate, while Peking opposed the peace talks in Paris. What kept North Vietnam fighting was a determination to unite the country, whatever the cost.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the importance of Soviet and Chinese support to North Vietnam's war effort. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because their authors have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 could be based on evidence like Source B. The CIA reported that China had made 'pledges of complete support for Hanoi', was likely to send 'more manpower for logistical and engineering functions', and 'would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded'. This matches Interpretation 1's view that Chinese troops repaired bomb damage, freed North Vietnamese soldiers to go south and warned Washington that an invasion 'might bring another Korean War'. Interpretation 2 is closer to Source C. Although Source C admits that 'Soviet and Chinese supplies have enabled the enemy to carry on', it stresses that 'the Hanoi leadership is attempting to chart its own independent course', that Moscow and Peking 'tend to cancel out each other', and that North Vietnam's 'manpower pool' could replace its losses. This supports Interpretation 2's view that the North Vietnamese 'did the fighting and the dying' and made 'its own decisions'.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason, such as the different sources the historians relied on, and support it by matching specific details in the sources to specific details in the interpretations. Source C contains evidence for both views, so strong answers pick the details carefully. Simply saying that a historian 'used Source B', or repeating the difference of view, scores little; reasons based on the date of publication or an assumed bias are not valid.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 1: it shows China's 'pledges of complete support for Hanoi', that China was likely to send 'more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam' and perhaps infantry against 'invasion', and that Peking 'would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded'; this matches Interpretation 1's Chinese troops 'repairing bomb damage and freeing North Vietnamese soldiers to go south' and its point that the Chinese presence warned Washington of 'another Korean War'. Source C also gives some support to Interpretation 1 ('Soviet and Chinese supplies have enabled the enemy to carry on despite our operations'; aid gave them 'important leverage'), but much of it supports Interpretation 2: Hanoi 'is attempting to chart its own independent course'; neither ally had 'exerted heavy pressure'; Peking and Moscow 'tend to cancel out each other' (Interpretation 2's 'quarrel between Moscow and Peking'); the enemy had 'not changed their essential objectives'; and the 'manpower pool is sufficiently large' to replace losses, which matches Interpretation 2's stress on the North Vietnamese who 'did the fighting and the dying'. A student may note that a historian who used only American intelligence on China, like Source B, might stress outside help, while the evidence in Source C of Hanoi's independence and manpower points the other way. The interpretations may also differ because of a different focus: Interpretation 1 looks at what North Vietnam lacked (weapons, industry, air defence) and at deterrence, while Interpretation 2 looks at people, will and decision-making. Or because of a different emphasis on time: Interpretation 1 stresses the late 1960s, when Chinese troops were in the North, while Interpretation 2 takes the whole war. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without matching details, or that only describe the difference, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or an assertion that a historian is biased.

Question 2

4 marks

Interpretation 1: From Lifeline: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War by Gordon Fellbeck (fictional), published in 1998.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was the lifeline of the communist war in the South. What began in 1959 as a few jungle paths through Laos grew into a network of roads and tracks thousands of kilometres long. Down it marched hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers, and down it came the rifles, rockets and ammunition they needed. After the huge Vietcong losses of 1968, it was the Trail that allowed Hanoi to rebuild its forces in the South. By the 1970s it carried tanks, and a fuel pipeline ran alongside it. America's failure to cut the Trail was, more than anything else, the reason it could not win.

Interpretation 2: From Rice, Taxes and Recruits: Supplying the Revolution in South Vietnam by Laura Mickleby (fictional), published in 2013.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail has become a symbol of the communist war, but its importance in the years of the heaviest American fighting is often exaggerated. Until 1968 most communist fighters in the South, including the guerrillas, were southerners, recruited in their own villages and fed with rice collected as taxes from local farmers or bought in Cambodia. Between 1966 and 1970 a large share of the weapons used in the southern half of South Vietnam was shipped through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville rather than carried down the Trail. The communists' real strength in these years lay in their organisation in the villages. The Trail became decisive later, when the war turned into a conventional conflict between armies.

Study Interpretations 1 and 2. They give different views about the importance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the communist war effort in South Vietnam. What is the main difference between these views? Explain your answer, using details from both interpretations.

Model answer

The main difference is that Interpretation 1 sees the Ho Chi Minh Trail as the key to the communist war and to America's failure, while Interpretation 2 argues that it was less important during the years of heaviest American fighting. Interpretation 1 calls the Trail 'the lifeline of the communist war in the South', down which came 'hundreds of thousands' of soldiers and their weapons, and says that failure to cut it was 'more than anything else, the reason it could not win'. Interpretation 2, however, says that its importance is 'often exaggerated': until 1968 most communist fighters were 'southerners, recruited in their own villages', food came from local taxes or Cambodia, and many weapons came through Sihanoukville 'rather than ... down the Trail'. For Interpretation 2 the communists' 'real strength' lay in the villages, and the Trail 'became decisive later'.

Explanation

Top answers state the overall difference - the Trail as the decisive lifeline against a route whose importance came mainly later - and support it from both interpretations. Strong answers notice that both agree the Trail mattered by the 1970s, so the disagreement is about the main years of American fighting. A common weakness is to describe the Trail from own knowledge instead of analysing the two views.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): The interpretations are analysed and a key difference of view is identified and supported from them.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Limited analysis of the interpretations is shown by the extraction or paraphrase of some content, but differences of surface detail only are given, or a difference of view is asserted without direct support.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The main difference is that Interpretation 1 sees the Ho Chi Minh Trail as the lifeline of the communist war and the main reason the USA could not win, while Interpretation 2 argues that its importance in the years of heaviest American fighting has been exaggerated, because the communists relied mainly on resources in the South (and on Cambodia), and that the Trail became decisive only later. Support from Interpretation 1: 'the lifeline of the communist war in the South'; 'hundreds of thousands' of soldiers and their 'rifles, rockets and ammunition' came down it; it 'allowed Hanoi to rebuild its forces' after 1968; tanks and a fuel pipeline by the 1970s; failure to cut it was 'more than anything else, the reason it could not win'. Support from Interpretation 2: its importance is 'often exaggerated'; until 1968 most fighters were 'southerners, recruited in their own villages'; food came from 'rice collected as taxes' or 'bought in Cambodia'; weapons for the southern half came through 'Sihanoukville rather than ... down the Trail'; 'real strength' lay in 'their organisation in the villages'; the Trail 'became decisive later'. Both agree that the Trail mattered by the 1970s; the difference is about how important it was in the main years of American fighting. Answers that give surface differences only (e.g. 'Interpretation 1 mentions tanks and Interpretation 2 mentions rice') or an asserted difference without support from both interpretations stay in Level 1. Do not credit answers that explain why the interpretations differ.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why the USA was unable to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the years 1965-73.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the jungles and mountains of Laos
- the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was the network of routes that carried men and supplies from North Vietnam to the communist forces in the South. The USA spent huge efforts trying to cut it, but it never succeeded, for several reasons.

First, the jungles and mountains of Laos made the Trail very hard to attack. Most of it ran through steep, forested mountains in eastern Laos, where the jungle canopy hid trucks and porters from American aircraft. For months each year the monsoon brought cloud and rain, which made bombing even less accurate. Because traffic moved mostly at night and was carefully camouflaged, pilots often could not see what they were attacking.

Second, the Trail was not a single road but a huge web of roads, tracks, paths and river routes, which grew to thousands of kilometres. If one route was bombed, traffic switched to another. The North Vietnamese built bypasses, fords and hidden bridges just below the surface of rivers, and stored supplies in caves. An army unit, Group 559, ran the network, and thousands of soldiers, engineers and young volunteers repaired bomb damage, often within hours. In 1966 McNamara reported that North Vietnam had about 300,000 people working on its supply routes.

Third, the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia stopped the USA from using ground troops against the Trail. Laos had been declared neutral in 1962, and President Johnson refused to send American forces into Laos because he feared widening the war and provoking China. Later Congress banned American ground troops in Laos and Cambodia. Cambodia's neutrality also protected communist bases and another supply route through the port of Sihanoukville. When South Vietnamese forces did attack the Trail in Laos in 1971, they were driven back with heavy losses.

Fourth, bombing alone could not do the job. The USA dropped more than two million tons of bombs on Laos, much of it on the Trail, especially after bombing of North Vietnam stopped in 1968. It also tried electronic sensors and planned a barrier of fences and mines, the 'McNamara Line'. But claims of trucks destroyed were exaggerated, anti-aircraft guns made attacks costly, and Soviet and Chinese trucks and fuel replaced what was lost. By the 1970s there were fuel pipelines and roads that could take tanks.

Finally, the communists in the South did not need huge amounts of supplies from the North, because much of their food came from local villages. McNamara himself admitted in 1966 that the road network would still be adequate even if its capacity were cut by a third.

So the Trail survived because geography, neutrality and the communists' organisation together made it impossible to cut by bombing alone.

Explanation

Level 4 answers explain several different reasons why the Trail could not be cut and link each to the outcome, for example how the neutrality of Laos ruled out American ground troops or how a web of routes and fast repairs defeated bombing. To get beyond the stimulus points, add aspects such as the repair workforce, Soviet and Chinese trucks, the failure of sensors and the McNamara Line, or the small amount of supplies the forces in the South needed. Avoid writing a general description of the Trail.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The terrain: the Trail ran through the mountains and thick jungle of eastern Laos (and later Cambodia); the forest canopy hid traffic from the air, and monsoon rain and cloud hampered air attacks for months each year. The size and nature of the network: it was not one road but a web of roads, tracks, paths, river routes and bypasses, growing to thousands of kilometres (estimates vary with what is counted, from a few thousand kilometres of main routes to 16,000-20,000 km for every branch and bypass; accept any figure in this range); if one route was cut, traffic moved to another; there were hidden bridges just below the surface of rivers, fords, caves and underground depots. Organisation and labour: the North Vietnamese army's Group 559 (formed 1959) ran it; tens of thousands of soldiers, engineers, porters and young volunteers repaired bomb damage quickly (McNamara reported in 1966 that North Vietnam had some 300,000 people working on its supply routes); traffic moved mainly at night and was camouflaged; bicycles and porters carried loads where trucks could not go. Air defences: anti-aircraft guns along the Trail made bombing costly. Supplies from allies: Soviet and Chinese trucks and fuel; by the late 1960s and early 1970s there were fuel pipelines and roads that could take heavy trucks. The neutrality of Laos and Cambodia: the Geneva agreement of 1962 made Laos neutral, so the USA would not openly send ground troops there; Johnson rejected plans for American ground operations in Laos for fear of widening the war (and of China); Congress banned American ground troops in Laos (December 1969) and in Cambodia (Cooper-Church, 1970-71); Cambodia's neutrality also protected communist bases and the supply route through the port of Sihanoukville until 1970; the 1970 incursion into Cambodia was temporary, and the South Vietnamese attack on the Trail in Laos in 1971 (Lam Son 719) failed with heavy losses. The failure of bombing: the USA dropped more than two million tons of bombs on Laos (accept 2-3 million tons), much of it on the Trail, especially in Operation Commando Hunt (1968-72) after bombing of the North stopped in 1968, but reports of trucks destroyed were exaggerated and traffic continued; electronic sensors (Igloo White) and the planned 'McNamara Line' barrier (1967-68) did not stop infiltration. Small needs: the communist forces in the South needed relatively small amounts of supplies from the North, and McNamara's 1966 memorandum found that the road network would remain adequate even if its capacity were cut by a third. Answers that describe the Trail without explaining why it could not be cut should not go beyond Level 2. Do not credit claims that the Trail was a single road, that it ran only through North Vietnam, or that American ground forces occupied it.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From Fighting with One Hand: Washington's Limits on the Vietnam War by Bernard Tollesby (fictional), published in 1982.

America's soldiers and airmen were never allowed to win in Vietnam. Afraid of a war with China and the Soviet Union, Presidents Johnson and Nixon fought under rules that gave the enemy every advantage. For years the bombing of North Vietnam was increased only slowly, and important targets around Hanoi and Haiphong were kept off limits. The port of Haiphong, through which Soviet supplies arrived, was not mined until 1972. No American ground forces were allowed to invade North Vietnam or to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, so the enemy could always retreat to sanctuaries across the border. When Nixon finally sent B-52 bombers against Hanoi in December 1972, North Vietnam returned to the peace talks within weeks.

Interpretation 2: From Firepower Is Not Enough: The US Army and Counter-insurgency in Vietnam by Rachel Hartsholme (fictional), published in 2008.

The American armed forces failed in Vietnam not because their hands were tied but because they fought the wrong kind of war. The US Army had been trained to fight Soviet tanks in Europe, and in Vietnam it relied on what it knew best: big operations, helicopters, artillery and air power. Commanders measured progress by the body count, while the Vietcong's political organisation in the villages survived. Huge amounts of firepower drove millions of villagers from their homes and made new recruits for the enemy. Even where there were few limits, as in Laos, where American aircraft dropped more than two million tons of bombs, much of it on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the bombing could not stop the flow of men and supplies. More freedom to bomb would not have solved a problem that was political as much as military.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the failure of American military methods in Vietnam? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that the American armed forces failed 'not because their hands were tied but because they fought the wrong kind of war'. Interpretation 1 argues the opposite: that American forces 'were never allowed to win' because of limits set by politicians. I largely agree with Interpretation 2, although the restrictions described in Interpretation 1 did make the war harder to win.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about American methods on the ground. General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition relied on search and destroy missions, helicopters, artillery and air power, and success was measured by the body count. But the communists usually decided when and where to fight, and they could replace their losses. McNamara admitted in 1966 that the enemy could 'more than replace' its dead through infiltration and recruitment. Meanwhile, as Interpretation 2 says, the Vietcong's political organisation in the villages survived. American firepower, free-fire zones and forced removals created millions of refugees, and the My Lai massacre showed how the war could turn soldiers against civilians. These methods made new enemies faster than they killed old ones.

Interpretation 2 is also right that bombing failed even with few limits. In Laos the USA dropped more than two million tons of bombs, much of it on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, yet men and supplies kept moving south.

However, Interpretation 1 is right that political limits gave the enemy advantages. Johnson increased the bombing of North Vietnam slowly, which gave Hanoi time to build air defences with Soviet missiles, and targets around Hanoi and Haiphong were often off limits. Haiphong was not mined until 1972. Because Johnson feared a war with China like the Korean War, the USA never invaded the North, and American ground troops were kept out of Laos and Cambodia, leaving the enemy safe sanctuaries. Interpretation 1 can also point to December 1972, when heavy bombing of Hanoi was followed within weeks by the Paris Peace Agreement.

Yet this evidence is weaker than it looks. The 1972 bombing helped to end American involvement, but it did not win the war: North Vietnamese troops stayed in the South, and South Vietnam fell in 1975. Even without limits, bombing could not create a South Vietnamese government that villagers supported.

The interpretations are conveyed very differently. Interpretation 1 uses phrases such as 'never allowed to win' and 'every advantage' to blame politicians, while Interpretation 2 stresses that the problem was 'political as much as military'.

Overall, I mostly agree with Interpretation 2. Judged by what happened where there were few limits, such as on the Trail, the main problem was the American way of fighting, not the restrictions placed on it.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2 against precise evidence about attrition, the body count, refugees and the bombing of the Trail, and use Interpretation 1 and own knowledge (graduated bombing, sanctuaries, Haiphong, Linebacker II) as the counter-argument. They reach a clear judgement with a criterion, such as what happened where limits were lifted, and comment on how each view is conveyed. Weaker answers describe American tactics without using the interpretations.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that American military methods failed because they were the wrong methods for a guerrilla and political war, not because of political limits. Points that support Interpretation 2: the US Army was organised and trained for a conventional war in Europe; Westmoreland's strategy of attrition and search and destroy (1965-68) relied on firepower and helicopter mobility and measured success by the body count, which was often inflated; the communists usually chose when and where to fight and could replace their losses (as McNamara reported in 1966 and US reviews agreed in 1969); the Vietcong's political organisation survived in the villages; firepower, free-fire zones and forced removals created millions of refugees and alienated villagers (My Lai, 1968); one-year tours and six-month commands prevented learning; pacification was neglected until CORDS (1967); bombing of the Trail in Laos (over two million tons of bombs on Laos; Commando Hunt, 1968-72) and Rolling Thunder (1965-68) failed to stop infiltration; the later shift under Abrams towards protecting villages suggests the military itself saw that methods needed to change. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): Johnson's 'graduated pressure' increased the bombing slowly and gave Hanoi time to build air defences; targets near Hanoi and Haiphong and the Chinese border were restricted for long periods; Haiphong was not mined until May 1972; there was no invasion of the North, for fear of Chinese intervention as in Korea; ground operations in Laos and Cambodia were ruled out until 1970-71, and Congress then banned US ground troops there, so sanctuaries and the Trail stayed open; there was no large call-up of the reserves; Linebacker (1972) helped defeat the Easter Offensive, and Linebacker II (December 1972) was followed by the return of North Vietnam to the talks and the Paris Agreement (January 1973). A substantiated judgement might argue that Interpretation 2 is more convincing because even the unrestricted bombing of the Trail failed and the war depended on the villages, while Interpretation 1 is right that limits made the task harder; or that Interpretation 1's evidence from 1972 shows that force could work but only for limited aims; criteria might include what happened where limits were lifted. Credit comments on how the views are conveyed, e.g. Interpretation 1's 'never allowed to win' and 'every advantage' against Interpretation 2's 'the wrong kind of war' and 'political as much as military'. Do not credit general accounts of the war not linked to the interpretations.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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