Question 1
4 marksSource B: From Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-66, 'Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation', 4 August 1966. It was a secret report by the CIA and the other American intelligence agencies for President Johnson and his advisers. In June 1966 the USA had begun bombing North Vietnam's oil stores, and China had responded with mass demonstrations all over the country in support of North Vietnam. 'Peking' is the Chinese capital, Beijing; 'NVN' is North Vietnam.
These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to reiterate the Chinese view that the war must be continued to final victory. At the same time, the Chinese seem likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and, for the first time, they may move some infantry troops into North Vietnam as a precautionary step against the contingency of invasion.
We do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded or if the collapse of the Communist regime seemed likely. But we continue to believe that, at present levels of US action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to the war, nor its air force to deliberate and sustained action against US forces.
Source C: From a top secret summary of the answers that American government departments, the CIA and the US commanders and embassy in Saigon gave to a list of questions about the war set by President Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, in January 1969. The summary was written by Kissinger's staff and sent to the Vice-President and Nixon's senior ministers on 22 March 1969. Here it gives points on which the departments generally agreed. 'Peking' is Beijing; 'NVN/VC' means North Vietnam and the Vietcong.
(4) The enemy have suffered some reverse but they have not changed their essential objectives and they have sufficient strength to pursue these objectives. We are not attriting enemy forces faster than they can recruit or infiltrate. Soviet and Chinese supplies have enabled the enemy to carry on despite our operations. ...
Neither Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to do so, although their military and economic assistance give them important leverage. CIA notes that "in competing for influence Peking and Moscow tend to cancel out each other." For its own reasons, Hanoi's tendency in the last year has been in the Soviet direction. However, the Hanoi leadership is attempting to chart its own independent course, despite its reliance on its allies for supplies. ...
It is generally agreed that the NVN/VC manpower pool is sufficiently large to meet the enemy's replenishment needs over an extended period of time within the framework of current rules of engagement.
Interpretation 1: From Arsenal of the Revolution: Moscow, Peking and Hanoi's War by Martin Ledsworth (fictional), published in 1978.
North Vietnam could not have fought the USA for long without the Soviet Union and China. It was a poor country of farmers with almost no heavy industry. Its surface-to-air missiles, MiG fighters, radar and many of its anti-aircraft guns came from the Soviet Union, which also supplied trucks, fuel and, later, tanks. China sent rifles, ammunition, food and uniforms, and in the late 1960s, according to Chinese figures, some 320,000 Chinese engineering, railway and anti-aircraft troops served in the North, repairing bomb damage and freeing North Vietnamese soldiers to go south. Just as important, the Chinese presence warned Washington that an invasion of the North might bring another Korean War. Hanoi's allies made it possible for North Vietnam to survive the bombing and to keep its armies in the South supplied.
Interpretation 2: From A War of Their Own: North Vietnam and its Allies, 1965-75 by Yvonne Castlerigg (fictional), published in 2016.
Soviet and Chinese aid mattered, but it did not win the war. It was the North Vietnamese and their supporters in the South who did the fighting and the dying. Hanoi's leaders mobilised the whole population: men served for as long as the war lasted, women and teenagers kept the roads and bridges open, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers walked south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hanoi was also careful never to become a puppet of either ally. The quarrel between Moscow and Peking allowed it to take help from both while making its own decisions, sometimes against their advice: Moscow wanted Hanoi to negotiate, while Peking opposed the peace talks in Paris. What kept North Vietnam fighting was a determination to unite the country, whatever the cost.
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the importance of Soviet and Chinese support to North Vietnam's war effort. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.
Model answer
The interpretations may differ because their authors have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 could be based on evidence like Source B. The CIA reported that China had made 'pledges of complete support for Hanoi', was likely to send 'more manpower for logistical and engineering functions', and 'would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded'. This matches Interpretation 1's view that Chinese troops repaired bomb damage, freed North Vietnamese soldiers to go south and warned Washington that an invasion 'might bring another Korean War'. Interpretation 2 is closer to Source C. Although Source C admits that 'Soviet and Chinese supplies have enabled the enemy to carry on', it stresses that 'the Hanoi leadership is attempting to chart its own independent course', that Moscow and Peking 'tend to cancel out each other', and that North Vietnam's 'manpower pool' could replace its losses. This supports Interpretation 2's view that the North Vietnamese 'did the fighting and the dying' and made 'its own decisions'.
Explanation
Top answers give one clear reason, such as the different sources the historians relied on, and support it by matching specific details in the sources to specific details in the interpretations. Source C contains evidence for both views, so strong answers pick the details carefully. Simply saying that a historian 'used Source B', or repeating the difference of view, scores little; reasons based on the date of publication or an assumed bias are not valid.
Mark scheme
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4 marks
Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
0 marks: No rewardable material.Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B gives some support to Interpretation 1: it shows China's 'pledges of complete support for Hanoi', that China was likely to send 'more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam' and perhaps infantry against 'invasion', and that Peking 'would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded'; this matches Interpretation 1's Chinese troops 'repairing bomb damage and freeing North Vietnamese soldiers to go south' and its point that the Chinese presence warned Washington of 'another Korean War'. Source C also gives some support to Interpretation 1 ('Soviet and Chinese supplies have enabled the enemy to carry on despite our operations'; aid gave them 'important leverage'), but much of it supports Interpretation 2: Hanoi 'is attempting to chart its own independent course'; neither ally had 'exerted heavy pressure'; Peking and Moscow 'tend to cancel out each other' (Interpretation 2's 'quarrel between Moscow and Peking'); the enemy had 'not changed their essential objectives'; and the 'manpower pool is sufficiently large' to replace losses, which matches Interpretation 2's stress on the North Vietnamese who 'did the fighting and the dying'. A student may note that a historian who used only American intelligence on China, like Source B, might stress outside help, while the evidence in Source C of Hanoi's independence and manpower points the other way. The interpretations may also differ because of a different focus: Interpretation 1 looks at what North Vietnam lacked (weapons, industry, air defence) and at deterrence, while Interpretation 2 looks at people, will and decision-making. Or because of a different emphasis on time: Interpretation 1 stresses the late 1960s, when Chinese troops were in the North, while Interpretation 2 takes the whole war. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without matching details, or that only describe the difference, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or an assertion that a historian is biased.