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Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The development of the civil rights movement, 1954-60
Unit 2
Key topic 2: Protest, progress and radicalism, 1960-75
Unit 3
Key topic 3: US involvement in the Vietnam War, 1954-75
Unit 4
Key topic 4: Reactions to, and the end of, US involvement in Vietnam, 1964-75
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Support for the war

Practise 18 exam-style questions on Support for the war for Edexcel GCSE History (The USA 1954-75: conflict at home and abroad). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
  • Instant marking
  • No sign-up needed
18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source B: From a news conference given by President Johnson on 17 November 1967, broadcast live on radio and television. He had just held meetings with General Westmoreland, the commander of US forces in Vietnam, and Ellsworth Bunker, the US Ambassador in South Vietnam, who had been called back to Washington.

We are making progress. We are pleased with the results that we are getting.

We are inflicting greater losses than we are taking. ...

The fact that the population under free control has constantly risen, and that under Communist control has constantly gone down, is a very encouraging sign.

The improvement that has been made by the South Vietnamese themselves in putting in reforms, in announcing other programs, and in improving their own Army, is a matter of great satisfaction to Ambassador Bunker and to General Westmoreland. ...

But overall, we are making progress. We are satisfied with that progress. Our allies are pleased with that progress. ...

We keep our commitments. Our people are going to support the men who are there. The men there are going to bring us an honorable peace.

Source C: A resolution written for this course, based on resolutions in support of the war passed by local branches of trade unions and veterans' organisations in the USA in 1965-67.

Resolved, that the members of this branch declare our full support for the brave men of our armed forces who are fighting Communist aggression in Vietnam. Many of us served in the Second World War and in Korea, and we know that freedom must be defended wherever it is attacked. We condemn the draft-card burners and the marchers who carry the flag of the enemy. We call on the President to use whatever force is necessary to win this war quickly and to bring our boys home in victory. We pledge to give blood for the wounded and to send parcels to the men from our town who are serving overseas.

Interpretation 1: From Selling the War: Washington and American Opinion, 1964-1968 by Geoffrey Tollerton (fictional), published in 1981.

Much of the support for the war in its early years was created in Washington. The public first learned of the Gulf of Tonkin incident through the government's own account, which presented the attacks as unprovoked and played down what was uncertain. Reporters in Saigon depended heavily on the military's daily briefings for their news. In 1967, as doubts grew, the Johnson administration launched a campaign to persuade Americans that the war was being won: the President and General Westmoreland told the nation that the enemy was weakening and that real progress was being made. Many Americans believed them. When the Tet Offensive of 1968 exposed the gap between these claims and reality, support fell sharply.

Interpretation 2: From Hawks at Home: Popular Support for the Vietnam War by Miriam Coaley (fictional), published in 2015.

Support for the war did not need to be manufactured in Washington. It came from beliefs that millions of Americans already held. A generation that had fought in the Second World War and Korea saw communism as a real danger, and trade unions, veterans' groups and churches backed the war long before the government's campaign of 1967. Ordinary supporters were often more warlike than their leaders: many wanted the bombing increased and the war won quickly. Their support rested on patriotism, anti-communism and loyalty to the men who were fighting. In 1968 almost one voter in seven chose George Wallace, whose running mate wanted to escalate the war.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the role of the US government in creating support for the war in the years 1965-67. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 argues that much of the support for the war 'was created in Washington', and that in 1967 the government 'launched a campaign to persuade Americans that the war was being won'. This fits Source B, in which President Johnson tells a national television audience 'We are making progress' and 'We are inflicting greater losses than we are taking', and claims that the population under 'free control has constantly risen'. Interpretation 2, however, argues that support 'came from beliefs that millions of Americans already held' and that supporters were 'often more warlike than their leaders'. This matches Source C, in which veterans of 'the Second World War and ... Korea' condemn the protesters and call on the President to 'use whatever force is necessary to win this war quickly'. A historian who studied the government's statements would see support as something Washington created, while one who studied the views of unions and veterans would see it as coming from ordinary Americans.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason, such as the use of different evidence or a different focus (the government's campaign versus the beliefs of ordinary Americans), and support it by matching specific details in the sources to specific claims in each interpretation. Answers that simply repeat the difference between the views, or claim that a historian is biased, stay in Level 1.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B supports Interpretation 1: the President tells a national television audience 'We are making progress', 'We are inflicting greater losses than we are taking', that the population 'under free control has constantly risen', and that Westmoreland and Bunker are satisfied; this matches Interpretation 1's claim that in 1967 the administration 'launched a campaign to persuade Americans that the war was being won' and that the President and Westmoreland told the nation that 'real progress was being made'. Source C supports Interpretation 2: the branch members support the war because 'many of us served in the Second World War and in Korea', see the enemy as 'Communist aggression', condemn draft-card burners, and want the President to 'use whatever force is necessary to win this war quickly'; this matches Interpretation 2's view that support 'came from beliefs that millions of Americans already held', that unions and veterans backed the war, and that supporters were 'often more warlike than their leaders'. The interpretations may also differ because they focus on different people: Interpretation 1 concentrates on what the government and the media told the public (the Gulf of Tonkin, the Saigon briefings, the 1967 campaign), while Interpretation 2 concentrates on the beliefs of ordinary Americans and their organisations (veterans, unions, churches, Wallace voters). They may also differ because of hindsight about Tet: Interpretation 1 explains the collapse of support in 1968 as the result of exposed official claims, while Interpretation 2 points to the continuing strength of hawkish opinion in 1968. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or a bare assertion that an author is biased.

Question 2

4 marks

Source B: A photograph taken in the White House on 4 November 1969, the day after President Nixon's 'silent majority' speech, by Warren K. Leffler, a photographer for the magazine U.S. News & World Report.

It shows President Nixon sitting at his desk in the Oval Office, smiling. In front of him the desk is covered with tall stacks of telegrams that had been sent to him about his speech. An American flag stands behind him.

Source C: A memo written for this course, based on accounts by historians of how members of President Nixon's staff organised support for his speech of 3 November 1969.

Plans for the President's speech on Vietnam:
1. Party organisations and friendly groups across the country to be asked to make sure that telegrams of support reach the White House on the night of the speech and the next morning.
2. Count every telegram and letter. Give the totals to the press, and arrange for photographs of the President with the telegrams.
3. Prepare a strong reply to the television commentators who criticise the speech.

Interpretation 1: From The Forgotten Americans: Nixon and Middle America, 1968-1972 by Martin Ellastone (fictional), published in 1977.

The response to the 'silent majority' speech showed that Nixon had found something real. Tens of thousands of telegrams and letters poured into the White House, many of them from ordinary people who had never written to a President before. An instant poll suggested that three-quarters of those who had heard the speech approved of it. These were the Americans who worked, paid their taxes and sent their sons to war, and who were sick of being lectured by protesters and television commentators. They had always been there. Nixon simply gave them a voice and a name.

Interpretation 2: From Making a Majority: Nixon's Public Relations War at Home by Sylvia Kelmscott (fictional), published in 2017.

The 'silent majority' was as much made as discovered. Nixon's aides had prepared for the speech like a military operation. Supporters were asked in advance to send telegrams, the results were counted and handed to the press, and photographers were invited to record the President behind piles of messages. Within days the Vice-President was attacking the television networks for their critical comments, in a speech prepared in the White House. The response looked like a spontaneous outpouring from ordinary Americans. Much of it had been arranged by the White House.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about the support for President Nixon after his 'silent majority' speech (November 1969). You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

The interpretations may differ because the historians have given weight to different sources. Interpretation 1 argues that the response showed that Nixon 'had found something real', because 'tens of thousands of telegrams and letters poured into the White House' from ordinary people. A historian relying on evidence like Source B, the photograph of a smiling Nixon behind 'tall stacks of telegrams' the day after the speech, would reach this view, because the photograph seems to show an overwhelming, spontaneous response. Interpretation 2, however, argues that 'much of it had been arranged by the White House', with supporters 'asked in advance to send telegrams' and 'photographers ... invited'. This matches Source C, which shows plans for party groups to 'make sure that telegrams of support reach the White House', for the totals to be given to the press and for 'photographs of the President with the telegrams'. Source C suggests that the photograph in Source B was itself part of a publicity campaign, so a historian who studied the White House's planning would read the evidence very differently.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason, such as the use of different evidence, and support it by matching precise details from the sources to precise claims in each interpretation; the best notice that Source C changes how the photograph in Source B should be read. Answers that simply repeat the difference of view, or say that one historian is biased, stay in Level 1.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. Source B, the photograph of a smiling Nixon behind 'tall stacks of telegrams' the day after the speech, supports Interpretation 1's view that 'tens of thousands of telegrams and letters poured into the White House' and that Nixon had 'found something real'; a historian who took the photograph at face value would see it as evidence of a huge, genuine response. Source C, the memo based on historians' accounts of the White House's plans, supports Interpretation 2: supporters were to be asked to 'make sure that telegrams of support reach the White House', the totals given to the press and photographs arranged 'of the President with the telegrams'; this matches Interpretation 2's claims that supporters 'were asked in advance to send telegrams', that 'photographers were invited', and that the response 'had been arranged by the White House'. A student may point out that Source C changes how Source B can be read: the photograph was itself part of the publicity that Interpretation 2 describes. The interpretations may also differ because they focus on different evidence: Interpretation 1 relies on the scale of the response and an opinion poll (the instant poll of about 77 per cent approval), while Interpretation 2 focuses on the White House's methods (telegrams, photographs, Agnew's attack on the networks on 13 November 1969). They may differ because of access to evidence: internal White House papers on the planning became available to historians only years later, so a later historian could study how the response was organised. Level 2 needs one reason explained and supported with details from the interpretations (and, if used, matched details from the sources). Answers that only say 'Interpretation 1 used Source B' without matching details, or that repeat the difference of view, stay in Level 1. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication unless linked to the evidence available, or a bare assertion that an author is biased.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why many Americans supported US involvement in the war in Vietnam in the years 1964-68.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the domino theory
- support for American troops

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

In the years 1964-68 many Americans supported the war in Vietnam because they feared the spread of communism, trusted their government and felt a patriotic duty to support American soldiers once they were fighting.

The most important reason was the fear of communism. Americans had lived through the Cold War: China had become communist in 1949, American troops had fought communist forces in Korea, and in 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world close to nuclear war. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all argued that if South Vietnam fell to communism, other countries in South-East Asia would follow like a row of dominoes. Many Americans accepted this domino theory and believed that if communism was not stopped in Vietnam, America itself would eventually be threatened.

Secondly, most Americans trusted their President and government. In 1964 Johnson won a landslide victory with about 61 per cent of the vote. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the government presented the attacks on American ships as unprovoked aggression, and Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two votes against. When the country's leaders were so united, many people assumed they knew best. Official reports that the war was being won, such as General Westmoreland's speeches in 1967, encouraged this trust.

Thirdly, once American combat troops were sent in 1965, many people felt they must support 'our boys'. Families of servicemen, and veterans of the Second World War and Korea, believed that criticising the war let down the soldiers who were fighting it. Veterans' organisations such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars backed the war, parades were held in support of the troops, and powerful groups such as the AFL-CIO trade union federation also supported the government.

Fourthly, the anti-war movement itself pushed many Americans to support the war. Protesters who burned draft cards or carried Vietcong flags seemed unpatriotic to many older and working-class Americans. Their dislike of the protesters made them more loyal to the government.

Finally, much of the criticism of Johnson came from people who wanted a tougher war, not peace. In Gallup polls in 1966 and 1967 more Americans called themselves 'hawks', who wanted to step up the military effort, than 'doves'. In August 1965, only 24 per cent of Americans told Gallup that sending troops had been a mistake, and it was not until October 1967 that more people thought it was a mistake than not.

Therefore support for the war came mainly from fear of communism, reinforced by trust in the government and loyalty to the troops.

Explanation

Top answers explain why each factor led people to support the war, for example how the Cold War background made the domino theory convincing or why loyalty to the troops made criticism seem unpatriotic. They go beyond the stimulus points with knowledge such as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson's 1964 landslide, the role of unions and veterans or the evidence of opinion polls. A common weakness is to describe the war's events rather than explain the reasons for support.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Fear of communism and the domino theory: the Cold War background (the communist victory in China in 1949, the Korean War 1950-53, the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962) and anti-communist feeling from the McCarthy era made many Americans believe that communism must be stopped; Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson argued that if South Vietnam fell, other states in South-East Asia would follow (the domino theory) and that America's security, and its promises to allies (e.g. SEATO, 1954), were at stake. Trust in the President and government: in the mid-1960s most Americans trusted their leaders on foreign policy; Johnson won a landslide in 1964 (about 61 per cent of the vote); the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964) passed Congress almost unanimously (416-0 in the House, 88-2 in the Senate), and the attacks in the Gulf were presented as unprovoked aggression. Patriotism and support for the troops: once American soldiers were fighting (from March 1965), many Americans felt a duty to back them, including the families of servicemen and veterans of the Second World War and Korea; pro-war parades and rallies (e.g. 'support our boys' parades in 1965-67) and the work of veterans' organisations such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Organisations and leaders: the AFL-CIO union federation and its president, George Meany, backed the war; many church leaders (e.g. Cardinal Spellman) and politicians of both parties supported it. Official optimism and the media: government and military leaders claimed the war was being won (e.g. General Westmoreland's speeches in 1967), and early television and press coverage largely accepted official accounts. Dislike of the anti-war movement: many Americans saw protesters, draft-card burners and those who carried Vietcong flags as unpatriotic, which pushed them to support the government. Many 'supporters' wanted a stronger effort: in Gallup polls in 1966-67 more Americans described themselves as 'hawks' (wanting to step up the military effort) than 'doves'. Opinion polls: in August 1965 about 61 per cent told Gallup that sending troops was not a mistake, against 24 per cent who said it was; only in October 1967 did more say it was a mistake (47 per cent) than not (44 per cent). Answers that describe events of the war without explaining why people supported it should not go beyond Level 2. Do not credit claims that most Americans opposed the war from 1965, or material about the 'silent majority' or the 'hard hats' (1969-70) unless briefly linked to the period.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From The Cold War Congress: Capitol Hill and Vietnam, 1964-1970 by Robert Tanfield (fictional), published in 1981.

Congress paid for the war in Vietnam because most of its members believed in it. They had grown up with the lessons of the 1930s and of the Cold War: aggression must be stopped early, and communism must be contained. In August 1964 the House of Representatives voted 416-0 for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and only two Senators voted against it. When Johnson asked for extra money for the war in May 1965, he made the vote a test of support for his policy, and only ten members of Congress voted against it. As late as March 1966 the Senate refused, by 92 votes to 5, to repeal the Tonkin Resolution. Critics such as Senator Fulbright were listened to, but they were outnumbered. Congress was not tricked into the war. It shared the beliefs that led to it.

Interpretation 2: From Paying for a Doubtful War: Congress and Vietnam, 1964-1973 by Gillian Hesledon (fictional), published in 2012.

Congress went on paying for the war long after many of its members had stopped believing in it. To vote against money for the war was to be accused of abandoning American soldiers in the field, and few politicians were willing to take that risk. Many also believed that foreign policy belonged to the President, and feared being blamed if South Vietnam fell. Even in 1970, after the invasion of Cambodia, the Senate rejected by 55 votes to 39 a plan to bring all American troops home by the end of 1971. Instead, Congress chipped away at the war, banning American ground troops from Cambodia and repealing the Tonkin Resolution. Only when the last American troops and prisoners of war had come home in 1973 did Congress vote to cut off the money for American fighting in Indochina.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about the reasons why Congress continued to pay for the war in Vietnam in the years 1964-72? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that Congress 'went on paying for the war long after many of its members had stopped believing in it', because voting against the money looked like 'abandoning American soldiers in the field'. I agree with this for the years after 1966, but Interpretation 1 is more convincing about the early years of the war, when most members of Congress genuinely supported it.

Interpretation 1 is right that in 1964-66 Congress shared the beliefs behind the war. Most members had learned from the 1930s and the Cold War that aggression must be stopped early, and they accepted the domino theory. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed the House by 416 votes to 0, and only Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voted against it in the Senate. When Johnson asked for extra money in May 1965, only ten members of Congress voted against it, and in March 1966 the Senate refused by 92 votes to 5 to repeal the Tonkin Resolution. Many members were hawks who wanted the war fought harder: in 1967 Senator Stennis's subcommittee attacked the limits on the bombing of North Vietnam. This was conviction, not fear.

However, Interpretation 2 explains why Congress kept paying after doubts had spread. Fulbright's televised hearings in 1966 showed that leading members questioned the war, and after the Tet Offensive many more did so privately. Yet they went on voting the money, because no politician wanted to be accused of leaving soldiers without supplies, many believed that foreign policy belonged to the President, and Democrats remembered how they had been blamed for 'losing' China in 1949. Even after the invasion of Cambodia, the Senate rejected the McGovern-Hatfield amendment by 55 votes to 39. Instead, Congress limited the war in other ways, with the Cooper-Church Amendment and the repeal of the Tonkin Resolution. The strongest evidence for Interpretation 2 is the timing of the end: Congress cut off money for American fighting only in 1973, once the last troops and the prisoners of war had come home.

The interpretations differ because they look at different periods. Interpretation 1 stops in 1970 and concentrates on the votes of 1964-66, while Interpretation 2 looks at the whole war and at how members behaved once they had doubts.

Overall, I largely agree with Interpretation 2. Conviction explains why Congress backed the war at the start, but it cannot explain why Congress went on paying for a war that so many members had come to doubt. The fact that Congress stopped the money as soon as the troops and prisoners were home shows that the fear of abandoning the men in Vietnam was the main reason it continued.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2 with precise knowledge of how Congress voted, such as the Tonkin Resolution, the McGovern-Hatfield amendment and the Case-Church Amendment of 1973, and use Interpretation 1 to show that the early support was genuine. The best answers notice that the two views may fit different periods and reach a judgement about the whole of 1964-72. Weaker answers write about the anti-war movement in general without explaining Congress's decisions.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that Congress kept paying for the war not because its members believed in it but because they feared being blamed for abandoning the troops or losing South Vietnam, and deferred to the President. Points from the interpretations and own knowledge that support Interpretation 2: voting against money while troops were fighting was seen as abandoning them, and many members said that they voted for the men, not the policy; in the Cold War, foreign policy was seen as the President's job; politicians remembered the attacks on the Democrats for 'losing' China in 1949; Johnson made the May 1965 request a vote of confidence; doubts grew: Senator Fulbright's televised hearings (February 1966) questioned the war, and after the Tet Offensive (1968) many members privately doubted it; even after the invasion of Cambodia the Senate rejected the McGovern-Hatfield amendment (55-39, 1 September 1970), which would have brought all troops home by the end of 1971; instead Congress limited the war: the Cooper-Church Amendment barred US ground troops from Cambodia (passed in a later form at the end of 1970) and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed (Senate vote June 1970; law January 1971: accept either); only after the last troops and the prisoners of war came home (March 1973) did Congress cut off money for US combat in Indochina from 15 August 1973 (Case-Church), and in November 1973 it passed the War Powers Resolution. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): the Cold War consensus: the lessons of appeasement in the 1930s and containment; the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate (only Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voted against); only ten members of Congress opposed the extra money in May 1965; in March 1966 the Senate voted 92-5 to reject Morse's attempt to repeal the Tonkin Resolution; many members were 'hawks' who wanted the war fought harder (e.g. the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee under John Stennis attacked the limits on the bombing of North Vietnam in 1967); Southern Democrats and most Republicans backed the war throughout; Congress voted the money every year until 1973. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 1 stresses conviction ('Congress was not tricked into the war'); Interpretation 2 stresses reluctance and political fear ('long after many of its members had stopped believing in it', 'chipped away'). A substantiated judgement might argue that Interpretation 1 explains the years 1964-66 and Interpretation 2 the years 1967-72; or that Interpretation 2 is more convincing overall, because Congress kept paying after doubts had spread and stopped as soon as the troops and prisoners were home, which shows that fear of abandoning the troops was decisive. Credit any reasoned judgement supported from both interpretations and own knowledge. Do not credit a general account of the anti-war movement that is not linked to Congress.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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