The development of tension

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Mussolini moved Italian troops to the Brenner Pass on the Austrian border, and made it clear that Italy would defend Austria's independence, warning Hitler not to try to take over Austria.

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Source A criticises the Anglo-German Naval Agreement because it shows Britain shaking hands with Hitler while Hitler hides a battleship and a submarine behind his back. This suggests that Britain was being tricked into allowing Germany to rebuild its navy. The agreement, signed on 18 June 1935, allowed Germany a surface fleet of 35 per cent of the tonnage of the British navy and submarines of 45 per cent, even though the Treaty of Versailles had limited Germany to six battleships and banned submarines altogether. In the background, France and Mussolini look on angrily beside a torn banner labelled 'Stresa'. This shows that Britain made the agreement without consulting its partners, France and Italy, and that it broke the Stresa Front, formed in April 1935 to oppose German breaches of the treaties. The caption, 'The Stresa Front - two months old', mocks how quickly Britain abandoned the front: only two months after promising to resist breaches of treaties, it accepted one. The provenance explains the criticism: it was published in a French newspaper in June 1935, the month of the agreement, and France, which feared German rearmament most, felt betrayed by its closest ally.

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Source B is very useful because it shows two of Hitler's most important long-term aims in his own words. First, he insists that 'German-Austria must return to the great German mother country', because 'one blood demands one Reich'. This shows his aim of uniting all German speakers in a Greater Germany, which meant breaking the Treaties of Versailles and St Germain, both of which banned the union of Germany and Austria. Second, he says Germany must 'turn our gaze toward the land in the east', meaning 'Russia and her vassal border states'. This is his aim of Lebensraum, living space for Germans in eastern Europe. The provenance makes it valuable. Hitler wrote it himself in the mid-1920s, beginning in prison after the Munich Putsch, when he had no power and no need to hide his views, so it is a frank statement of his ideology. Historians debate whether Mein Kampf was a precise plan, but his later actions match it closely: he carried out the Anschluss with Austria in 1938 and invaded Poland in 1939 and the USSR in 1941. However, it was written years before he came to power, so it does not show how he would pursue these aims in practice.

Source C seems to show completely different aims. In May 1933 Hitler told the Reichstag that Germany wanted peace, had no wish to attack anyone and was ready to give up all offensive weapons if others did the same. On its own, this would suggest that his aims were peaceful. The provenance explains why he said this. It was a public speech, made four months after he became Chancellor and reported around the world. At that time Germany was still weak, its army limited to 100,000 men, and Hitler was rearming in secret, so he needed to reassure other countries and avoid intervention. The speech is therefore not reliable evidence of his real intentions: only five months later, in October 1933, he took Germany out of the Disarmament Conference and the League, and in March 1935 he announced conscription. Nevertheless, it is useful, because it shows his tactics. His demand that Germany 'must be treated as an equal' was the argument he used to justify rearmament, and it helps to explain why many people in Britain thought his demands were reasonable.

Overall, Source B is more useful for studying Hitler's real, long-term aims, because it was written frankly and his actions later matched it. Source C is useful in a different way: it shows how Hitler presented his aims in public in order to deceive other powers while Germany was weak. Together they are very useful, because the contrast between them reveals the gap between what Hitler wanted and what he said in 1933.

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The Dollfuss Affair of July 1934 does suggest that Hitler was not yet strong enough to challenge the other powers, because he backed down when Mussolini threatened force. However, I only partly agree with the statement. The affair showed Hitler's caution rather than simple weakness, it showed the strength of Italy rather than of 'the other powers' in general, and within a year Hitler was successfully challenging the peace settlement.

There is clear evidence for the statement. On 25 July 1934 Austrian Nazis broke into the Chancellery in Vienna and shot the Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, hoping to seize power and unite Austria with Germany. The coup failed, and Mussolini, who saw an independent Austria as a buffer protecting Italy, moved troops to the Brenner Pass and made it clear that Italy would defend Austria. Hitler immediately backed down. He denied any involvement, disowned the Austrian Nazis and sent Franz von Papen to Vienna to repair relations. Hitler's position was weak. Germany's army was still close to the 100,000 men allowed by Versailles, and rearmament had only just begun in secret. At home he was still consolidating his power: the Night of the Long Knives had taken place only a month earlier, and President Hindenburg died in August 1934. Hitler could not risk a war with Italy, and Anschluss had to wait until 1938, when Mussolini had become his ally.

However, the affair can also be seen as showing Hitler's caution and skill rather than weakness. Hitler preferred to avoid risks until Germany was rearmed, and he was willing to retreat when necessary. Historians also debate how far Hitler planned or approved the coup; if it was mainly the work of Austrian Nazis, his retreat was from an embarrassment rather than a defeat.

More importantly, the affair showed the strength of Italy, not of the other powers as a whole. Britain and France did nothing beyond diplomatic statements supporting Austrian independence. Mussolini was the only leader prepared to threaten force. This suggests that Hitler could be stopped by determination, but that most of the powers lacked it.

Events before and after the affair show that Hitler could challenge the other powers successfully. In October 1933 he took Germany out of the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, and nothing happened. In March 1935 he announced the existence of the Luftwaffe and the introduction of conscription, openly breaking Versailles. The response was protests, the League's condemnation and the Stresa Front of April 1935, but no action, and in June 1935 Britain undermined the front by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, accepting German naval rearmament.

In conclusion, the Dollfuss Affair showed that in 1934 Hitler was not strong enough to challenge a determined great power that was ready to use force. But it did not show that he could not challenge the other powers at all. Where they were divided and unwilling to act, as over rearmament, he could break the peace settlement without risk. The real lesson of 1934 was that firmness could stop Hitler - a lesson Britain and France failed to learn.