Diplomacy outside the League

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A is Kellogg's proposal that the pact should be open to all nations, not just France and the USA. B is Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

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Source A supports the Kellogg-Briand Pact because it presents it as a historic step towards peace. It reminds readers that 'ten years ago the world's youth lay dead in the fields of France', and contrasts this with the declaration in Paris that 'war is no longer a lawful way to settle their quarrels'. This reflects the terms of the pact, signed in Paris in August 1928, in which the signatories renounced war 'as an instrument of national policy' and agreed to settle disputes by peaceful means. The leaflet is also proud that 'America stands side by side with Europe in the cause of peace'. This was significant because the USA had refused to join the League of Nations, and the pact, proposed by the American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg together with Briand, allowed the USA to work for peace without taking on any binding commitments. The provenance confirms its support: it was published by an American peace society, part of a strong movement in the USA to 'outlaw' war, and its purpose was to persuade readers to 'write to your senator' so that the Senate would ratify the treaty. This campaign was successful, as the Senate approved the pact by 85 votes to 1 in January 1929.

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Source B is useful because it shows the optimistic reaction to Locarno in Britain and western Europe. Chamberlain called the treaties 'the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace', suggesting that the bitterness left by the war and the Treaty of Versailles had finally been overcome. This reflects the 'spirit of Locarno': for the first time since the war, Germany had negotiated as an equal and freely accepted its borders with France and Belgium, and it was agreed that Germany would join the League of Nations. The provenance makes it valuable as evidence of the official British view, since Chamberlain was the Foreign Secretary who negotiated the treaties. However, it also limits its reliability. Chamberlain had a strong personal and political interest in presenting Locarno as a historic success, and he received the Nobel Peace Prize for it. His statement says nothing about the weaknesses of the treaties, and with hindsight it was far too optimistic, since Hitler broke Locarno in 1936.

Source C is useful because it shows a very different reaction from eastern Europe. The Polish official points out that 'Germany accepted the Rhine frontier and refused to accept the Vistula', and that 'Britain guarantees Strasbourg but not Danzig'. This is accurate: the Rhineland Pact guaranteed only Germany's western borders, while Germany signed only arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Britain refused to make any commitment in the east. The official fears that Germany will try to change the frontier 'by pressure and propaganda, and one day perhaps by force', which matches Stresemann's aim of recovering Danzig and the Polish Corridor. The provenance increases its value: a private memorandum is likely to reveal genuine Polish fears rather than polite public statements. As a Polish official, he represents the country with most to lose, so he may overlook the value of the French treaty promising help to Poland, but his fears proved well founded.

Overall, the two sources are very useful together because they show the contrasting reactions to Locarno: optimism and relief in the West, and anxiety in the East. Source B is limited by its author's interest in the treaties' success, while Source C, though a national view, was more far-sighted. An historian would also need evidence of German reactions, which ranged from Stresemann's hopes to nationalist fury.

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In the 1920s, peace was kept partly by the League of Nations and partly by agreements made directly between governments, such as the Locarno treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. I will argue that diplomacy outside the League did more to keep the peace, because it dealt with the relationships between the great powers on which European peace really depended, although the two often worked together.

The League made a real contribution. It settled several disputes that might have led to war: the Aaland Islands between Sweden and Finland in 1921, Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland in 1921, and the Greek invasion of Bulgaria in 1925, when it ordered a ceasefire and a Greek withdrawal. Its agencies also reduced the causes of conflict: Nansen's Refugees Committee returned about 400,000 prisoners of war, and League loans rescued the economies of Austria and Hungary. However, the League failed when great powers were involved. Poland kept Vilna after seizing it in 1920, Mussolini was rewarded after occupying Corfu in 1923, and the League did nothing when France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr in 1923. It also made little progress on disarmament.

Diplomacy outside the League dealt with exactly these great-power problems. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 limited battleship fleets and prevented a naval arms race between the USA, Britain and Japan. The Dawes Plan of 1924 ended the Ruhr crisis by rescheduling reparations and providing American loans, which the League could not have done because the USA was not a member. Most importantly, the Locarno treaties of 1925 reconciled France and Germany. Germany freely accepted its western borders, Britain and Italy guaranteed them, and the 'spirit of Locarno' led to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the Young Plan of 1929 and the early withdrawal of Allied troops from the Rhineland. These agreements involved the USA and Germany, two great powers that were outside the League for some or all of the decade.

However, this diplomacy had limits too. Locarno left Germany's eastern borders unguaranteed, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had no means of enforcement. The two forms of peacekeeping were also linked: Locarno led to Germany joining the League in 1926 with a permanent seat on the Council, which strengthened the League, and the Locarno treaties gave the League Council the task of judging violations.

In conclusion, I largely agree with the statement. The League settled disputes between smaller states and did valuable humanitarian work, but the greatest threat to peace in the 1920s was the hostility between France and Germany and the economic chaos of the early 1920s. These were tackled by the Dawes Plan and Locarno, not by the League. The League worked best when this diplomacy had created a co-operative atmosphere, so diplomacy outside the League did more to keep the peace.