Escalation of tension

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First, many people in Britain felt that Germany was only moving troops into its own territory - Lord Lothian said the Germans were 'only going into their own back garden' - so it was not worth a war. Second, the timing suited Hitler: Britain, France and the League were distracted by Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia, and France, which had a caretaker government before an election, would not act without British support.

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Source A opposes the Munich Agreement because Churchill calls it 'a total and unmitigated defeat', the opposite of Chamberlain's claim that he had brought back 'peace with honour'. He describes Czechoslovakia as 'abandoned, broken', meaning that Britain and France had deserted it, and he warns that this is 'only the beginning of the reckoning', suggesting that Hitler would make further demands. My knowledge supports this. Under the agreement Czechoslovakia had to hand the Sudetenland to Germany from 1 October 1938, losing about 3 million people, its strong border fortifications and much of its industry, and it was not even invited to the conference. Churchill had been warning about Hitler and German rearmament for years, but he was a backbencher without office, and most MPs and the public were relieved that war had been avoided. His speech was meant to persuade Parliament that appeasement was dangerous. He was proved right in March 1939 when Hitler took the rest of Czechoslovakia.

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Source B is useful because it shows how many Germans in the Rhineland reacted to the arrival of German troops on 7 March 1936. The crowds lining the streets of Cologne are cheering and some are giving the Nazi salute, which suggests that the remilitarisation was popular. My knowledge supports this: most Germans saw the demilitarised zone as one of the humiliations of the Treaty of Versailles, and in the plebiscite of 29 March 1936 about 99% approved of Hitler's action. However, the provenance limits the source. It was published in German newspapers, which were controlled by Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry, so the photograph was chosen to show a united nation welcoming its army. It cannot show people who disapproved or stayed at home, and it tells us nothing about reactions outside Germany, where the crisis was decided.

Source C is useful because it explains why France, the country most threatened, did not react with force. The officer says the General Staff would not move without full mobilisation, that the government would not call up a million men 'seven weeks before an election', and that 'London... will not support us'. This fits what I know. France had only a caretaker government before the elections of April-May 1936, its generals overestimated German strength and thought in terms of defence behind the Maginot Line, and Britain was unwilling to act because many people felt that Germany was only going into 'its own back garden'. France did protest to the League, which condemned Germany but took no action. The provenance is a strength: it is a private diary written the day after, by an officer who knew how the army was thinking, so he has no reason to mislead. On the other hand, he is bitter about his leaders and it is only one person's opinion; his claim that France 'still' had the larger army is true, but it does not explain how risky an attack would have seemed at the time.

Overall, Source C is more useful because it explains the key reaction - French inaction - and the reasons for it, while Source B mainly shows the popularity of the move in Germany through a propaganda image. Together they are useful for showing the contrast between German enthusiasm and French paralysis, but an historian would also need evidence of British and League reactions, and of Hitler's own nervousness, to understand the full picture.

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In some ways the Munich Agreement was a success for Britain. Its main achievement was to avoid war in September 1938, when Europe seemed on the brink of conflict. The British public was desperate for peace: trenches had been dug and gas masks issued, and when Chamberlain returned claiming 'peace for our time' he was greeted by cheering crowds. Many historians argue that Britain was not ready to fight in 1938. The RAF had few modern fighters, as Hurricanes and Spitfires were only beginning to enter service, and the radar chain that would win the Battle of Britain was incomplete. The year gained at Munich allowed rapid rearmament: British aircraft production rose from about 2,800 in 1938 to about 7,900 in 1939. The Dominions had made it clear that they would not fight over the Sudetenland, but in 1939 they joined Britain. Above all, when Hitler occupied Prague in March 1939, he proved that he could not be trusted, so in September 1939 Britain went to war united and convinced that it had done everything possible for peace.

However, there are strong arguments that Munich was a failure. Czechoslovakia was sacrificed. It lost the Sudetenland, with about 3 million people, its border fortifications and much of its industry, and six months later Germany took the rest of the Czech lands. This mattered to Britain, because Czechoslovakia had a well-equipped army of about 35 divisions and the Skoda armaments works, which fell into German hands; Czech tanks were used by the Germans in 1939 and 1940. Germany too used the year to rearm, so it is not clear that Britain gained more than Hitler from the delay.

Munich also damaged Britain's position diplomatically. The USSR, which had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, was not invited to the conference, and Stalin concluded that Britain and France could not be trusted and might want to turn Hitler eastwards. This helped lead to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, which left Britain without the one ally that could have threatened Germany from the east. Hitler himself was encouraged: in August 1939 he reportedly told his generals that his enemies were 'little worms' whom he had seen at Munich, and he expected them to back down again over Poland. Critics at the time, such as Churchill, who called it 'a total and unmitigated defeat', and Duff Cooper, who resigned from the Cabinet, believed Britain had lost a chance to stand up to Hitler with a strong ally beside it.

Overall, I only partly agree with the statement. Munich was a short-term success, because it avoided a war for which Britain was not prepared and gained time for rearmament, and it gave Britain the moral case it needed in 1939. But it was not a success in what it set out to achieve, lasting peace, and it was a long-term failure because it destroyed Czechoslovakia, strengthened Germany, alienated the USSR and convinced Hitler that Britain would not fight. It is perhaps best seen as an understandable choice made in difficult circumstances, rather than a success.