Historic environment: the Spanish Armada (2027 exams)

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The Armada sailed in a tight crescent, or half-moon, formation. Its strongest warships were placed on the tips of the crescent and at the rear, protecting the weaker supply ships in the middle, so the English found it very hard to pick off individual ships.

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Drake's raid on Cadiz in April 1587 was important because it damaged the Armada before it had even been launched, delaying it by a year and creating problems that weakened it in 1588.

The immediate effect was the destruction of Spanish ships. Drake sailed into Cadiz harbour with a small fleet that included royal warships and destroyed around 30 ships that were being gathered for the invasion of England. He boasted that he had 'singed the King of Spain's beard'. This was a serious blow, because it meant that Philip II could not send the Armada in 1587 as he had hoped. The delay gave England an extra year to prepare its fleet, organise its militia and set up its beacons.

The raid also caused long-term supply problems. After Cadiz, Drake occupied Sagres near Cape St Vincent and destroyed a huge store of seasoned barrel staves, the wood used to make casks. As a result, many of the Armada's barrels in 1588 were made of unseasoned wood. Food went rotten and water leaked away, so the Spanish crews suffered from hunger and disease on the voyage, especially on the long journey home round Scotland and Ireland. Drake also captured a rich Portuguese treasure ship, the Sao Felipe, which cost Philip money and boosted English confidence.

The delay had another important consequence. In February 1588 the Marquis of Santa Cruz, Spain's most experienced admiral, died while the Armada was still being prepared. He was replaced by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who had little experience of war at sea. So the raid indirectly led to the Armada being commanded by a less experienced man.

The raid did not stop the invasion, because Philip rebuilt his fleet and sent an even larger one in 1588. However, its consequences were linked: the delay gave England time to prepare, the loss of the barrel staves left the Armada badly supplied, and the change of commander weakened its leadership. Together these made the raid an important step towards the Armada's defeat.

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The Battle of Gravelines on 29 July 1588 was important because it was the only time the English did serious damage to the Armada, and because, together with the wind that followed, it drove the Armada away from Parma and ended the invasion.

The battle was the result of the fireship attack the night before. The Spanish had cut their anchor cables and scattered, and at dawn the Armada was strung out along the coast off Gravelines, unable to re-form its crescent. For the first time the English could attack individual ships. They closed in to close range, using the speed of their ships to fire and then pull away, so the Spanish soldiers could not board them. The fighting went on for most of the day, until the English ran short of ammunition and a squall ended the battle.

The damage was serious. The Spanish galleons San Felipe and San Mateo were so badly damaged that they drifted onto the Flemish coast and were captured by the Dutch, and the Maria Juan sank. Many other ships were holed and lost many men, while no English ship was lost. This showed that the English tactics could work when the Spanish formation was broken.

The battle also decided the outcome of the invasion. As Figure 1 shows, after the battle the Armada was driven north-east towards the dangerous shallows of the Zeeland banks. The wind then shifted and blew it north into the North Sea. It could not sail back to Calais against the wind to meet Parma, so Philip II's plan was finished. The English followed it as far as the Firth of Forth before turning back.

Gravelines also made the voyage home more deadly. Ships with damaged hulls and wounded, hungry crews had to sail round Scotland and Ireland, and many of them were wrecked in the storms of September.

Gravelines was therefore the decisive battle of the campaign, because it ended any chance of the invasion succeeding, although most of the Armada escaped it and the greatest losses came later from the weather.

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The English commanders - Lord Howard of Effingham, with Drake, Hawkins and Frobisher - played an important part in defeating the Armada, especially in the decisions that broke it up at Calais. However, a study of the campaign suggests that their skill worked alongside the advantages of English ships, serious Spanish weaknesses and the weather, which caused most of the Spanish losses.

There is good evidence of the commanders' skill. As Figure 1 shows, when the Armada was sighted off the Lizard on 19 July the English fleet was in Plymouth, but it worked its way out of the harbour and got to windward of the Armada. This gave the English the advantage for the rest of the campaign, because they could choose when and where to fight and the Spanish could never force them to close and board. Howard kept the fleet together, consulted his council of war, and after the fight off Portland divided the fleet into four squadrons under himself, Drake, Hawkins and Frobisher. Off the Isle of Wight the English pushed the Armada away from the Solent, so it could not shelter there. Above all, the commanders took the key decision to send eight fireships into the anchored Armada at Calais on the night of 28 July. The Spanish cut their cables and scattered, and the next day at Gravelines the English closed in and attacked at close range, sinking or wrecking several ships. These were skilful decisions that turned the campaign.

However, their skill had limits. For a week the English attacked the Armada at long range but did little damage, and only two Spanish ships were lost before Calais, both by accident. Drake's decision to leave his place at the head of the fleet to capture the Rosario caused confusion. The English ran short of powder and shot, partly because Elizabeth was reluctant to spend money, and even at Gravelines they could not destroy the Armada.

Other factors were also crucial. The English ships, rebuilt by Hawkins, were faster and better armed than the Spanish ones. The Spanish had serious weaknesses. Philip's plan depended on joining the Duke of Parma's army, but there was no deep-water port, Parma was not ready, and Dutch flyboats blockaded his barges. Medina Sidonia had little naval experience and was bound by Philip's orders, and the fleet was badly supplied after Drake's raid on Cadiz. Finally, the weather played a huge part: after Gravelines the wind drove the Armada away from the Zeeland banks into the North Sea, and on the way home round Scotland and Ireland storms wrecked far more ships than the English had sunk.

These factors were connected. The commanders' skill only worked because they had fast, well-armed ships, and the fireship attack was possible because Philip's plan had left the Armada waiting off Calais. Overall, a study of the Armada supports the statement only partly. The commanders' skill was the main reason why the invasion failed, because it stopped the Armada joining Parma, but the destruction of the Armada was due much more to Spanish weaknesses and the weather.