The Western Front

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In a creeping barrage, the artillery fired a curtain of shells just in front of the attacking infantry and moved it forward in stages as the soldiers advanced. This forced the defenders to stay under cover until the attackers were almost on top of their trenches, so the infantry were protected as they crossed no man's land.

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Source A supports the view that life on the Western Front was dangerous and uncomfortable because the two soldiers are trapped in a shell hole while shells burst all around them. This shows the constant danger from artillery, which caused most of the casualties on the Western Front. The hole is full of water, which shows how wet and miserable conditions were; soldiers often stood in water and mud for days, leading to problems such as trench foot. The younger soldier is grumbling, and Old Bill's famous reply, 'Well, if you knows of a better 'ole, go to it', is a joke that makes a serious point: there was nowhere safer or more comfortable to go.

The provenance strengthens this. Bairnsfather was a British officer who had served in the trenches and had been wounded at Ypres in 1915, so he drew from his own experience. His cartoons were very popular with soldiers because they recognised the truth in them. Published in a magazine at home, the cartoon also showed civilians something of the reality of trench life, although its gentle humour made it acceptable at a time of censorship. It suggests that soldiers coped with the danger and discomfort through grim humour.

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Source C is the more directly useful source for explaining why the first day went so badly. The German machine-gunner explains that when the shelling stopped, the Germans 'raced up the dugout steps' with their guns. This shows that the week-long British bombardment of about 1.5 million shells had failed to destroy the deep German dugouts, many of which were dug into the chalk on high ground. He also says that their wire 'was still standing in many places', which is accurate: many British shells were shrapnel or duds that could not cut thick wire. His description of the British coming 'at a walk, in long lines' reflects the fact that many soldiers were heavily laden and that some units were ordered to advance steadily, believing the defences had been destroyed. As an eyewitness who fought that day, he gives valuable evidence from the defenders' side. However, he wrote in 1936, twenty years later, so his memory may have been shaped by the legend that grew around the Somme, and he may exaggerate British clumsiness. He describes only his own sector; in the south, near Montauban, the British and French did capture their objectives.

Source B is useful in a different way. It shows what the Commander-in-Chief knew and thought the day after the attack. Haig was told that casualties were 'over 40,000', when the real figure for 1 July alone was about 57,000, so he did not yet know the full scale of the disaster. His view that this 'cannot be considered severe in view of the numbers engaged' shows his acceptance of heavy losses in a battle of attrition, and helps explain why the offensive continued for months. As his own diary, written at the time, it is good evidence of his attitude, though Haig knew his diary might be read and some entries were later revised. Its weakness is that it says nothing about why the attack failed.

Overall, Source C is more useful for explaining the causes of the disaster - the failed bombardment, the uncut wire and the surviving machine-gunners - while Source B is useful for understanding the attitude and limited information of the high command. Together they help an historian understand both why the first day failed and why the British carried on attacking.

Model answer

Sir Douglas Haig commanded the British forces on the Western Front from December 1915. In 1916 and 1917 his armies suffered enormous losses on the Somme and at Passchendaele, and for many years he was blamed for them. Haig must take some of the blame, because he continued offensives long after they had failed; but most of the losses were caused by the nature of the war itself, which made attacking costly for every army.

There is a strong case against Haig. He planned the Somme offensive hoping for a breakthrough, and he relied on a week-long bombardment to destroy the German defences. When it failed, the British suffered about 57,000 casualties on 1 July 1916. The next day he wrote in his diary that casualties of over 40,000 'cannot be considered severe in view of the numbers engaged', which seems to show a willingness to accept huge losses. He kept the battle going until November, with about 420,000 British casualties for an advance of about six miles. In 1917 he did the same at Passchendaele: after the drainage was destroyed and heavy rain fell, he continued attacking in deep mud long after it was clear that his armies could not reach the Belgian coast, and British and Empire casualties reached about 275,000. He was also too optimistic, repeatedly believing that German morale was close to breaking. Critics such as Lloyd George blamed him, and some later called him 'the Butcher of the Somme'.

However, the losses were not simply Haig's fault. Trench warfare and defensive weapons - machine guns, artillery, barbed wire and reserves brought up by rail - made any attack extremely costly. French and German commanders suffered losses just as terrible, as Verdun showed. To win, the Allies had to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, so there was no real alternative to attacking. Haig also had to support France: the Somme was fought partly to relieve Verdun, and Passchendaele partly to protect the French army after the mutinies of 1917. The British government, including Lloyd George's War Cabinet, approved both offensives. Other problems were beyond his control: the volunteers of the New Armies were inexperienced, many shells were faulty, and August 1917 was exceptionally wet.

Haig also deserves some credit. He supported new methods, such as tanks, the creeping barrage and air power, and the army improved, as at Messines and in Plumer's 'bite and hold' attacks in 1917. In 1918 he led the British army to victory in the Hundred Days. Many historians now argue that the British army went through a costly 'learning curve' rather than being led by unthinking generals.

In conclusion, Haig was partly to blame for the heavy losses, especially because he continued the Somme and Passchendaele offensives for too long and was too optimistic about breaking German morale. But the main reason for the losses was the nature of trench warfare, which made attacks costly for every army, combined with the need to support France and the inexperience of Britain's new armies. Haig made mistakes, but he was not the main cause of the losses.