Outbreak of war

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A is Belgium and B is Liège.

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Source A is critical of Britain's decision because Bethmann Hollweg says that Britain's step was 'terrible to a degree' and that Britain was going to war 'just for a scrap of paper'. The 'scrap of paper' was the Treaty of London of 1839, in which the Great Powers, including Britain and Prussia, had guaranteed Belgium's neutrality. Germany had invaded Belgium on 4 August as part of the Schlieffen Plan, and Britain sent an ultimatum demanding that Germany respect Belgian neutrality. By calling the treaty a scrap of paper, the Chancellor suggests that Britain's reason for war was trivial.

He also calls Germany 'a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends' with Britain. German leaders had hoped that Britain would stay out of the war: on 29 July Bethmann Hollweg had asked Britain to remain neutral, and Grey had refused. So the Chancellor felt betrayed. The provenance adds to this: these were his words at the moment his policy failed, recorded by the British ambassador and published by the British government, which used the 'scrap of paper' phrase to show Germany's contempt for treaties.

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Source B is useful because it shows how seriously Austro-Hungarian officials took the threat of Slav nationalism. The diplomat says that since its victories against the Turks, Serbia has become 'dangerously confident' and its newspapers talk of 'liberating' Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia. This fits what I know: after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 Serbia almost doubled in size, and Serbian nationalist societies such as Narodna Odbrana, founded after the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, worked to unite the South Slavs, many of whom lived inside Austria-Hungary. The reference to Serbia being 'backed by Russia' reflects Russia's role as protector of the Slavs. The provenance adds to its usefulness: a diplomat in Belgrade could observe Serbian opinion directly, and it was written in 1913, before the July Crisis, so it shows Austrian fears as they were at the time. However, it is an official report written to persuade Vienna to 'act', so the diplomat may have exaggerated the danger. Its conclusion, that the empire 'must act while it still can', is useful in another way, because it shows the thinking of men like Conrad von Hötzendorf that led to the harsh ultimatum of July 1914.

Source C is useful because it shows that Slav nationalism inside the empire was more complicated than Source B suggests. The Croatian politician says that most Croats 'did not want to be ruled from Belgrade' but wanted equal rights within the Monarchy and an end to 'Hungarian domination'. This fits my knowledge that Croatia was governed through the Hungarian half of the empire and that many South Slavs wanted reform rather than union with Serbia. He also argues that by treating reform as treason, the government 'drove many young people into the arms of the Serbian nationalists', which suggests that Austro-Hungarian policy made the threat worse. Its provenance has strengths and weaknesses. As a politician in Zagreb he knew South Slav politics at first hand, but he was writing in 1925, after the empire had collapsed and Croatia had become part of the new kingdom later called Yugoslavia, so he may be explaining his past views with hindsight.

Overall, Source B is more useful for understanding how Austro-Hungarian leaders saw the threat, which explains their actions in 1914, while Source C is more useful for showing the reality inside the empire. Together they are most useful, because they suggest that the threat of Slav nationalism was real, but that it was increased by Austria-Hungary's own policies and by the fears of its leaders.

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Slav nationalism was the desire of the South Slav peoples, such as the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to unite in one state, led by Serbia. It was certainly a major cause of the crisis that led to war in 1914, because it created bitter hostility between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. However, I do not agree that it was the main reason for the outbreak of a general war. It explains why the war began in the Balkans, but not why it spread to the rest of Europe.

There is a strong case that Slav nationalism was crucial. Austria-Hungary was a multi-national empire in which Slavs made up nearly half the population, and its leaders feared that Serbian nationalism would tear it apart. Relations worsened after 1903, when a pro-Russian dynasty took power in Serbia, and during the Pig War from 1906. When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia in 1908, Serbian nationalists were furious, and societies such as Narodna Odbrana and the Black Hand worked to unite the South Slavs. Serbia almost doubled in size in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which alarmed Austria-Hungary even more. Finally, on 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were assassinated in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, and the Black Hand, a Serbian nationalist secret society, was linked to the plot. This began the July Crisis.

Slav nationalism also explains Russia's involvement. Russia saw itself as the protector of the Slavs, and Pan-Slavism made it determined not to abandon Serbia again after its humiliation over Bosnia in 1909. This is why Russia decided to back Serbia on 24-25 July and ordered general mobilisation on 30 July.

However, other factors were more important in turning a Balkan crisis into a world war. Austria-Hungary's leaders chose to use the assassination as an excuse to crush Serbia. At the Council of Ministers on 7 July they agreed to send demands designed to be rejected, and they declared war on 28 July even though Serbia had accepted most of the ultimatum. Germany's 'blank cheque' of 5-6 July gave Austria-Hungary the confidence to act, and Germany rejected Grey's proposal for a conference.

The alliance system and militarism explain why the war spread. Germany was bound to Austria-Hungary and France to Russia, so a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia drew in the Great Powers. The Schlieffen Plan meant that Germany answered Russian mobilisation by declaring war on France on 3 August and invading Belgium, so a war that began in the Balkans was immediately fought in western Europe.

Finally, Britain's entry had nothing to do with Slav nationalism. Britain went to war on 4 August because Germany invaded Belgium, whose neutrality was guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1839, and because of long-term Anglo-German rivalry, including the naval race and Germany's Weltpolitik, which had pushed Britain towards France and Russia.

In conclusion, Slav nationalism was the main long-term cause of the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and without it there would have been no crisis in 1914. But it was not the main reason for the outbreak of a general war. That was caused by the decisions of the Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary's determination to crush Serbia and Germany's support for it, and by the alliances and war plans that turned a local conflict into a European war.