'The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 did more than the Moroccan Crises to increase tension between the Great Powers.'
How far do you agree with this statement?
Explain your answer.
[16 marks] [SPaG 4 marks]
Model answer
Both the Moroccan Crises and the Bosnian Crisis increased tension between the Great Powers, but in different ways. The Moroccan Crises hardened the division between Germany and the Entente powers, especially Britain. The Bosnian Crisis, however, did more to increase tension, because it humiliated Russia, enraged Serbia and tied Germany to Austria-Hungary in the region where war eventually broke out.
The Moroccan Crises certainly made relations worse. In 1905 the Kaiser's visit to Tangier was an attempt to break the Entente Cordiale. It backfired at the Algeciras Conference in 1906, where Germany was supported only by Austria-Hungary, and it led Britain to begin secret military talks with France. British officials such as Eyre Crowe came to see Germany as a threat, and Germans began to fear 'encirclement', especially after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The Agadir Crisis of 1911 was even more dangerous. When Germany sent the gunboat Panther to Agadir and demanded the French Congo, Lloyd George warned in his Mansion House speech that Britain would not be pushed aside, and the Royal Navy was prepared for action. Germany backed down, but its humiliation led to a new Navy Law in 1912, while Britain planned to send an army to France and agreed naval arrangements with France in 1912. These crises therefore drew Britain into the confrontation with Germany and intensified the naval race.
However, the Bosnian Crisis created deeper and more dangerous tensions. When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908, it broke the Treaty of Berlin, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, felt tricked because he had expected Austrian support over the Straits in return. Serbia was furious, because many Bosnians were Serbs. The crisis ended in March 1909 only when Germany demanded that Russia accept the annexation, and Russia, still weak after its defeat by Japan, gave way. This 'diplomatic Tsushima' left Russia determined never to back down again; it rearmed, later adopting the 'Great Programme', and encouraged the Balkan League, which fought the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.
The crisis also turned Serbia into a bitter enemy of Austria-Hungary. Nationalist groups such as the Narodna Odbrana spread anti-Austrian propaganda, and in 1911 the secret Black Hand society was formed, whose members later helped plan the assassination at Sarajevo. Finally, the crisis bound Germany to Austria-Hungary more closely than before. Moltke promised Conrad in 1909 that Germany would mobilise if Russia came to Serbia's aid, even if Austria attacked first, and Bülow spoke of Germany's 'Nibelung loyalty'.
The key difference is that the Moroccan Crises were about colonies, where the Great Powers could compromise, as they did in 1906 and 1911. The Bosnian Crisis involved the vital interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans, where neither could easily give way, and it created exactly the pattern of July 1914: Austria-Hungary against Serbia, Russia backing Serbia, and Germany backing Austria.
In conclusion, I largely agree. The Moroccan Crises did more to divide Britain from Germany and to strengthen the Entente, and without them Britain might not have joined the war. But the Bosnian Crisis did more to increase tension between the Great Powers, because it left Russia humiliated and determined, Serbia hostile and Germany committed to Austria-Hungary, making the next Balkan crisis far more likely to end in war.
