Military developments in 1918 and their contribution to Germany's defeat

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Line A shows the furthest German advance in the Spring Offensive, reached by July 1918. B is Amiens.

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Source A shows that Allied tactics and technology were very effective because the German commander describes several methods working together. The attack came 'without any warning bombardment', which was possible because the Allies now used predicted fire, so the Germans had no warning, unlike the week-long bombardment before the Somme in 1916. Tanks 'in great numbers' advanced with infantry behind 'a wall of shells', a creeping barrage, and German batteries had been 'located and silenced', which shows how sound ranging and flash spotting allowed counter-battery fire. Low-flying aircraft attacked German troops. This matches the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, when over 400 tanks and hundreds of aircraft supported Australian and Canadian troops in a surprise attack that advanced about 7-8 miles in a day. The commander may stress the enemy's strength to excuse his defeat, but his report still shows the Allies had mastered combined-arms warfare.

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Source B is useful because it gives a German view of how the attack was carried out by someone who took part in it. Jünger describes the enormous bombardment before dawn, which fits what we know about the hurricane bombardment planned by Colonel Bruchmüller: on 21 March 1918 over 6,000 German guns fired gas and high-explosive shells for about five hours from 4.40 am. His description of men rushing forward through smoke and mist and quickly overrunning British positions shows how stormtroop tactics worked, and his comments on his men's excitement show that German morale was high at the start of the offensive. Because Jünger was a stormtroop company commander, he had first-hand knowledge. However, it is a memoir published in 1920, so it may be shaped by hindsight, and Storm of Steel presents war as a heroic experience, so it may glamorise the fighting. It also shows only one small part of a front that was about 50 miles long.

Source C is useful because it explains the attack from the British side and suggests why the line broke. The officer describes the thick fog, which really did hide the German advance on 21 March, and the Germans coming 'from the sides and behind', which shows infiltration tactics in action. His comments that the Fifth Army was 'far too few for the length of line' and that the defences 'were never finished' are supported by my knowledge: the Fifth Army under Gough had recently taken over extra line from the French and its defensive zones were incomplete. The retreat 'day after day' fits the German advance of up to about 40 miles. As a private letter written at the time by an officer in the retreat, it is valuable evidence. However, he was writing to his family, so he may have played down the danger, letters were censored, and he may have wanted to excuse the defeat by blaming fog and lack of men.

Overall, both sources are useful because they show the opening of the offensive from both sides. Source C is more useful for explaining why the British line broke, while Source B is more useful for showing how the Germans attacked and how confident they were. Together they explain why the British suffered about 38,000 casualties on the first day, about 21,000 of them taken prisoner.

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Ludendorff made serious mistakes in planning and directing the Spring Offensive, and these help to explain why it failed. However, I think the offensive failed mainly because the German army lacked the means to turn breakthroughs into victory and because the Allies were able to resist and recover, although Ludendorff's mistakes made these problems worse.

Ludendorff's biggest mistake was that he had no clear strategic goal. He concentrated on tactics, breaking through the enemy line, and hoped that a strategic result would follow. When Operation Michael began on 21 March 1918, the fastest progress was made by Hutier's Eighteenth Army in the south, and Ludendorff reinforced it rather than concentrating on capturing Amiens, the vital railway centre, or splitting the British from the French. When Michael stalled at Villers-Bretonneux in early April, he switched to Flanders (Georgette, 9 April), then to the Aisne (Blücher-Yorck, 27 May) and finally to the Marne (15 July). Each attack gained ground but none was decisive. Each also created a salient that lengthened the German front, and each used up more of the elite stormtroop divisions that Germany could not replace. This suggests Ludendorff wasted Germany's best chance of victory.

However, the German army had weaknesses that no commander could easily have overcome. Germany had almost no tanks, few lorries and little cavalry, so once the stormtroopers had broken through, there was nothing fast enough to exploit the gap. Supplies and guns could not keep up across the devastated Somme battlefield. The British naval blockade meant German soldiers were badly fed, so many stopped to loot Allied stores, as at Albert, and from June influenza spread through the army. These problems were caused by Germany's lack of resources rather than by Ludendorff's decisions.

Allied resistance was also very important. The British fought hard, as shown by Haig's 'Backs to the Wall' order of 11 April and the Australian recapture of Villers-Bretonneux. Crucially, the Allies created a unified command: at Doullens on 26 March Foch was appointed to co-ordinate the Allied armies, and he moved French reserves to support the British and kept enough reserves to counter-attack. On the Marne, Gouraud's defence in depth stopped the attack of 15 July, and Foch's counter-attack on 18 July forced the Germans to retreat. American troops also helped, fighting at Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood, and by July over a million Americans were in France, so the Allies could replace their losses while Germany could not.

In conclusion, I partly agree with the statement. Ludendorff's lack of a clear objective and his habit of switching attacks wasted Germany's limited strength and made failure more likely. But even a better plan would have struggled, because Germany lacked the tanks, transport and food to sustain an advance, while the Allies, under Foch's unified command and with American reinforcements, could resist and recover. The offensive therefore failed mainly because of German weakness and Allied strength, with Ludendorff's mistakes making a difficult situation worse.