The US involvement

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A is Laos and B is Thailand.

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Source A supports the Strategic Hamlets programme because it shows a smiling peasant family living safely inside a fortified village, protected by a bamboo fence, a moat and a militiaman in a watchtower. This reflects the programme's aim: from 1962 the government, led by Diem's brother Nhu, moved peasants into defended hamlets to separate them from the Vietcong. The thin, hungry guerrilla outside the fence shows what the programme was meant to achieve - cutting the Vietcong off from the food, recruits and information they got from the villagers, as the British had done with their 'New Villages' in Malaya. The new school and clinic show the government's promise to improve peasants' lives and win their loyalty. The provenance confirms its support: it is a South Vietnamese government poster, so it is propaganda designed to persuade peasants to accept moving into the hamlets. In reality many were forced to move and the promised services often never arrived, but the poster presents only the positive side.

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Source B is useful because it shows that the Domino Theory was still at the heart of US policy in 1963. Kennedy says firmly, 'I believe it. I believe it', and explains his fear that if South Vietnam fell, China would gain 'an improved geographic position' for attacking Malaya and communism would look like 'the wave of the future' in Asia. This fits my knowledge: Kennedy had called Vietnam 'the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia' as early as 1956, and as President he increased the number of US advisers from about 900 to about 16,000. The provenance is valuable, because these are the President's own words. However, it was a public television interview given in September 1963, in the middle of the Buddhist crisis, so Kennedy may have stressed the theory to justify US involvement to Americans and to signal to Hanoi and Saigon that the USA would not simply withdraw. It shows what he said publicly, not necessarily all his private reasons.

Source C is useful because it suggests other reasons behind the theory. The official argues that US leaders ignored Vietnamese nationalism and Vietnam's long history of resisting China, and that the theory was 'as much about elections at home as about Asia', because no politician wanted to be blamed for 'losing' Vietnam as Truman had been blamed for 'losing' China. This is supported by my knowledge: after 1949 Republicans and Senator McCarthy attacked Truman's government over China, and Kennedy himself was criticised after the Bay of Pigs and his acceptance of a neutral Laos. The provenance gives C insider knowledge of how policy was made. But it was written in 1995, long after the USA had lost the war and after communist Vietnam had fought a war against China in 1979, so the author is writing with hindsight and perhaps regret, and it is only one official's opinion.

Overall, both sources are useful and they work well together. Source B shows that the Domino Theory was genuinely believed and was the main public justification for US policy, even in 1963. Source C suggests that the theory was reinforced by fear of the political cost of 'losing' Vietnam. I think B is more useful as direct evidence of the theory's importance, because it comes from the President at the time, while C is useful for showing its weaknesses and the domestic pressures behind it.

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The Strategic Hamlets programme, launched in 1962 and run by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu with American money, aimed to cut the Vietcong off from the peasants and to win the peasants' loyalty. Judged against these aims, it was a failure, and in many ways it made the situation worse. However, it was not a complete failure in every respect, and the idea behind it was not hopeless.

The main evidence for failure is that it did not separate the Vietcong from the peasants. Peasants were forced to leave their homes and fields, and many had to abandon the graves of their ancestors, which caused deep resentment in a society where ancestor worship was central. They were made to dig moats and build fences, often unpaid, while their crops suffered. Corrupt officials stole money and materials, and the schools, clinics and elected councils promised by the government often never appeared. As a result, the programme turned many peasants against the government and towards the Vietcong.

The programme was also badly carried out. Nhu pushed it forward far too fast and claimed that thousands of hamlets had been completed, but many existed only on paper or were poorly defended. Vietcong supporters were often already living inside the hamlets, and the Vietcong attacked weaker hamlets, captured the militia's weapons and recruited young men from resentful families. By 1963 the Vietcong were stronger in many areas than before the programme began, and when Diem and Nhu were overthrown in November 1963 the programme collapsed, with peasants tearing down many of the hamlets themselves.

However, there is some evidence that the programme was not a complete failure. In 1962, in some areas, the Vietcong were temporarily disrupted, and American officials believed the programme was working. Vietcong leaders treated it as a serious threat and made destroying the hamlets a priority, which suggests that it worried them. Where hamlets were built carefully in areas that were already secure, they did provide some protection, and some villagers received weapons and services.

It is also important that the idea itself had worked elsewhere. The British had used similar 'New Villages' successfully against communist guerrillas in Malaya, and the British expert Robert Thompson advised that hamlets should spread slowly from secure areas. The failure in Vietnam was largely a failure of execution - the speed, corruption and force with which it was carried out - and of conditions that were very different from Malaya, where the guerrillas came mainly from the Chinese minority and could be isolated more easily.

In conclusion, I largely agree with the statement. The programme had some limited and temporary successes, and the concept was not doomed from the start, so 'complete' failure is a slight exaggeration. But it failed in its central aim of separating the Vietcong from the peasants, and worse, it actually strengthened the Vietcong by giving peasants new reasons to hate the government. A programme that ended up helping the enemy it was designed to defeat must be judged an almost complete failure.