Nixon's War

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Agent Orange stripped the leaves from huge areas of forest, removing the cover that the Vietcong used to hide. It also contained dioxin, which has been linked to cancers in people who were exposed and to birth defects in their children.

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Source A defends the decision because Nixon insists that 'this is not an invasion of Cambodia', which plays down the operation. He had promised to wind the war down through Vietnamisation, so he needed to avoid looking as if he was widening it. He argues that the areas being attacked were already 'occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces'. This was partly true: North Vietnam used bases, or 'sanctuaries', in eastern Cambodia, such as the 'Fishhook' and 'Parrot's Beak', close to Saigon, and the aim was to destroy them and the communist headquarters, protecting US troops as they withdrew. He also warns that if the USA acts like 'a pitiful, helpless giant', communism would threaten free nations, appealing to American pride and Cold War credibility. The provenance shows why he chose these words: it was a television address to win public support at the start of the operation, after the pro-American Lon Nol had overthrown Prince Sihanouk and North Vietnamese forces were advancing in Cambodia. Nixon clearly expected opposition, and he was right: protests broke out on campuses, and four students were killed at Kent State on 4 May 1970.

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Source B is useful because it explains the thinking behind Vietnamisation. Nixon says that the USA would keep its treaty commitments and provide military and economic aid, but would expect an Asian nation under threat 'to provide the soldiers for its own defence'. In Vietnam this meant exactly what Vietnamisation tried to do: the ARVN was expanded to over a million men and given modern weapons, while American troops went home. The nuclear shield shows that Nixon was not abandoning the policy of containment, only changing how it was carried out. The provenance adds to its usefulness. These are the President's own words, spoken in July 1969, just a month after he had announced the first withdrawal of 25,000 troops, so it shows his intentions at the very start of the policy. However, it is a general statement of principle for all of Asia, not a description of how the policy worked in Vietnam. As a public statement it also leaves out Nixon's political motives, such as the pressure of the anti-war movement and his wish to be re-elected.

Source C is useful because it shows how Vietnamisation was carried out in practice. US troop numbers fell from about 536,000 at the end of 1968 to about 335,000 at the end of 1970 and only about 24,000 at the end of 1972. As official Department of Defense figures, the numbers are reliable. The graph also shows that the withdrawal was gradual, taking four years, which fits my knowledge that more than 20,000 Americans died in Vietnam during Nixon's presidency. However, Source C shows only one half of Vietnamisation. It says nothing about the growth and performance of the ARVN, the increased reliance on American bombing, or the widening of the war into Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971.

Overall, both sources are useful, and they complement each other: Source B explains what Vietnamisation was meant to achieve, and Source C shows that American troops really did leave. However, neither source shows whether the policy succeeded in its main aim of making South Vietnam able to defend itself. Events such as the ARVN's costly retreat from Laos in 1971 and its dependence on US bombing in the Easter Offensive of 1972, and the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, suggest that it did not. So the sources are very useful for the American side of Vietnamisation, but an historian would need other evidence about the ARVN to judge the policy fully.

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The USA used chemical weapons in Vietnam on a huge scale. Under Operation Ranch Hand, from 1962 to 1971, about 20 million US gallons of herbicides, more than half of it Agent Orange, were sprayed over South Vietnam, and napalm was dropped in vast quantities. These weapons achieved some limited military aims, but I largely agree that they were a failure, because they did not help the USA win the war and they caused enormous harm, both to the people of Vietnam and to America's own cause.

Chemical weapons did have some military successes. Herbicides stripped the leaves from the jungle along roads, rivers and canals and around US bases, making it harder for the Vietcong to set ambushes in those areas, and they exposed some base camps to air attack. Spraying crops, sometimes with Agent Blue, destroyed rice that could have fed the Vietcong. Napalm was a powerful weapon in close air support: when US or ARVN troops were under attack, napalm strikes could destroy enemy positions, and CS gas was used to flush out tunnels. Military commanders at the time believed that defoliation saved American lives.

However, these successes did not change the course of the war. The Vietcong adapted by moving their camps, using tunnels and travelling at night, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail kept carrying men and supplies through Laos and Cambodia. Defoliation could not reach every part of the jungle, and the Vietcong's real strength was their support among the peasants, which chemicals could not destroy. By the time spraying ended in 1971, the USA was withdrawing from a war it had failed to win.

In fact, chemical weapons damaged the American cause. Crop destruction hit peasants far more than Vietcong fighters, causing hunger and driving people from their land into camps and cities. This turned many against the Americans and the Saigon government, undermining the aim of winning 'hearts and minds'. Chemical weapons also became a propaganda gift for North Vietnam and brought international condemnation. In the USA, students protested against Dow Chemical, which made napalm, and images such as Nick Ut's photograph of nine-year-old Kim Phuc running from a napalm attack in June 1972 shocked the world and strengthened opposition to the war.

The long-term harm was even greater. Agent Orange contained dioxin, which has been linked to cancers and to birth defects in the children of people exposed. The Vietnamese Red Cross has estimated that up to a million people were affected. American veterans suffered too, winning a 180-million-dollar settlement from the chemical companies in 1984. Large areas of forest and mangrove were destroyed, and former US bases such as Da Nang were still contaminated with dioxin decades later.

The clearest sign of failure is that the USA itself abandoned these weapons. The government restricted Agent Orange in 1970 after studies suggested it caused birth defects, ended spraying in 1971, and in 1975 President Ford renounced the first use of herbicides in war.

In conclusion, chemical weapons achieved some short-term tactical aims, such as clearing cover and supporting troops in battle. But they did not stop the Vietcong or the flow of supplies from the North, and they alienated the people the USA was trying to win over, damaged America's reputation and caused suffering that lasted for decades. Measured against the aim of winning the war, they were a failure, and their costs far outweighed any military gains.