The end of French colonial rule

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Diem knew that Ho Chi Minh, the hero of the war against France, would probably win a national vote, especially as the North had more people than the South. He also argued that his government had never accepted the Geneva Agreement and that elections could not be free in the communist North.

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Source A shows opposition to Diem because a Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, chose to burn himself to death in a public street in Saigon. This was a deliberate protest against Diem's government, and the other monks watching show that it was planned by the Buddhist movement rather than a private act. My knowledge explains why the Buddhists opposed Diem so strongly. Although most South Vietnamese were Buddhists, Diem was a Catholic who gave the best jobs to Catholics, and his brother was the Catholic Archbishop of Hue. In May 1963 troops fired on Buddhists in Hue who were protesting against a ban on flying Buddhist flags, killing several people. The provenance also matters: the photograph was taken by an American journalist whom the monks had told in advance, which shows they wanted the world, and especially the USA, to see their opposition. It worked - the picture shocked Americans and helped to turn the Kennedy government against Diem, who was overthrown in November 1963.

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Source B is useful because it explains how French miscalculations led to defeat. The officer says the French believed the Viet Minh had no heavy artillery and 'could never haul it over the mountains'. This is accurate: General Navarre placed the base in a valley surrounded by hills in Operation Castor in November 1953, believing it could be safely supplied by air. The source then identifies the turning point: Viet Minh guns opened fire on 13 March, when the strongpoint Beatrice was attacked, and soon turned the airstrip into 'a field of craters'. After that, as B says, everything had to be dropped by parachute and much of it fell into Viet Minh hands. The provenance adds value because the author was there and saw this for himself. However, he wrote ten years later, and as a defeated officer he may prefer to blame poor intelligence and planning rather than the fighting of his own men. He also says nothing about the Viet Minh effort that made their artillery possible.

Source C fills that gap. It describes porters pushing bicycles loaded with rice along mountain tracks and gunners hauling guns up the slopes 'inch by inch'. This matches what we know: Giap surrounded the valley with about 50,000 troops supplied by tens of thousands of porters, and the guns were dug into the hillsides where French artillery could not reach them - so effectively that the French artillery commander, Piroth, killed himself. The provenance limits its value, though. It is a Viet Minh newspaper written in the triumph of victory, so it is propaganda about the 'heroic people' and 'the will of a united people'. It leaves out the Chinese guns and advisers that made the artillery possible and the very heavy Viet Minh losses. Even so, it is useful as evidence of how the Viet Minh presented their victory as a triumph of national unity.

Overall, the two sources are most useful together. Source B explains the French mistakes, and Source C explains the Viet Minh achievement that exploited them; one is a defeated soldier's hindsight and the other victorious propaganda, so each must be treated with care. Together they show the central reason for the defeat - the French chose a position they could not hold once Giap's artillery closed the airstrip - although an historian would also need other evidence about Chinese aid and the American refusal to intervene.

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Ngo Dinh Diem ruled South Vietnam from 1954 until he was overthrown and killed in November 1963. His treatment of the Buddhists caused the crisis that brought him down, but opposition to his government had been growing for years before 1963, especially in the countryside, for other reasons.

Diem's treatment of the Buddhists was certainly an important cause of opposition. Most South Vietnamese were Buddhists, but Diem was a devout Catholic who gave the best jobs in the army and civil service to Catholics, who made up only about a tenth of the population. His brother Thuc was the Catholic Archbishop of Hue. Resentment exploded in May 1963, when a ban on flying Buddhist flags was enforced in Hue on the Buddha's birthday, and troops fired on protesters, killing about nine people. Protests spread, and on 11 June the monk Thich Quang Duc burned himself to death in Saigon. Madame Nhu's mocking remarks about a 'barbecue' and Nhu's raids on the pagodas in August turned students and even government officials against the regime. Above all, the crisis convinced the USA that Diem could not win the war, which encouraged the generals to overthrow him in November 1963.

However, the Buddhist crisis came late in Diem's rule. Much of the earlier opposition came from his repression. From 1955 the 'Denounce the Communists' campaign sent tens of thousands of people to prison camps, and Law 10/59 allowed military courts to sentence opponents to death. Former Viet Minh in the South, facing destruction, turned to armed resistance from 1957. Diem also arrested non-communist critics, such as the politicians who signed the Caravelle Manifesto in 1960.

The most widespread opposition came from the peasants, who were the majority of the population. In 1956 Diem abolished elected village councils and appointed officials, often outsiders. Landlords returned to areas where the Viet Minh had given land to peasants and demanded rents again, while Diem's own land reform achieved little. The Agrovilles of 1959 and the Strategic Hamlets of 1962 forced peasants to move into fortified villages. These grievances drove peasants to support the National Liberation Front, founded in December 1960, which by 1963 controlled or influenced large parts of the countryside.

Opposition was also fuelled by nepotism and corruption. Diem's brothers held huge power: Nhu ran the secret police, Can ran central Vietnam. His dependence on American aid and advisers allowed his enemies to portray him as a puppet of the USA, which undermined his claim to be a nationalist, especially after he refused the 1956 elections. Finally, opposition was organised and armed by the communists. North Vietnam's decision in 1959 to support armed struggle, the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the creation of the NLF turned grievances into a full-scale revolt.

In conclusion, I disagree with the statement. Diem's treatment of the Buddhists was the immediate cause of his downfall, because it turned the cities and the USA against him in 1963. But the main reason for opposition to his government was his treatment of the peasants, through repression, land policy and forced resettlement, which created the mass support for the Vietcong long before the Buddhist crisis began. The Buddhist crisis was really one more example of the favouritism and brutality that had already alienated most of his people.