Source B: from the memoirs of a US Navy officer who helped to plan the Inchon landing, published in 1960. (Written for practice.)
'Inchon had every problem a landing from the sea could face. The tide rose and fell by over thirty feet, so the main force had a few hours on a single evening to get ashore. One sunken ship could block the channel. Instead of beaches there were sea walls. At the Tokyo conference MacArthur did not answer our objections one by one. He talked for nearly an hour about history and destiny, and when he finished, nobody wanted to argue.'
Source C: from General MacArthur's memoirs, Reminiscences, published in 1964. MacArthur describes the conference in Tokyo on 23 August 1950 at which senior army and navy commanders raised objections to his plan. He writes that he argued that the very difficulties they listed would guarantee surprise, because the North Koreans would think nobody would attempt such a landing, and that capturing Inchon and Seoul would cut the enemy's supply lines and win the campaign quickly. He presents the success of the landings as proof that he had been right.
How useful are Sources B and C to an historian studying the decision to land at Inchon in 1950?
Explain your answer using Sources B and C and your contextual knowledge.
Model answer
Source B is useful because it shows why so many senior commanders opposed the landing. The officer lists the dangers: tides that rose and fell by over thirty feet, a channel that one sunken ship could block, and sea walls instead of beaches. This fits what I know: Inchon's tides were among the largest in the world, so the Marines had to take the island of Wolmi-do on the morning tide and wait until the evening tide for the main landing. The provenance adds to its value, because he helped to plan the operation and so knew the risks at first hand. It is also useful for showing how the decision was made: he says MacArthur did not answer the objections but overwhelmed the meeting with a speech about 'history and destiny'. However, it was written in 1960, after the landing had succeeded and after MacArthur's dismissal, so the officer may exaggerate the dangers to make the planners' achievement look greater, or be less respectful of MacArthur than he was at the time.
Source C is useful for a different reason: it gives MacArthur's own explanation of why he insisted on Inchon. He argued that the difficulties would ensure surprise, and that taking Seoul would cut the North Korean supply lines. My knowledge shows this reasoning was sound: the landing on 15 September 1950 took the North Koreans completely by surprise, Seoul was recaptured by 28 September and the North Korean army around Pusan collapsed. However, the provenance limits its usefulness. MacArthur wrote his memoirs in 1964, thirteen years after Truman sacked him, and wanted to defend his reputation. He presents himself as a genius proved right, and naturally does not mention that he later ignored Chinese warnings with disastrous results.
Overall, the sources are most useful together. Source B shows the genuine risks and the doubts of the planners, while Source C explains the strategic thinking behind the decision. Source C is the more one-sided, but it is the best evidence of MacArthur's motives; Source B balances it by showing that the decision was a gamble that MacArthur pushed through by force of personality.
