The end of the Second World War

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X is Harry Truman, who became President of the USA when Roosevelt died in April 1945. Y is Clement Attlee, who replaced Churchill as British Prime Minister during the conference.

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Source A shows US confidence because Truman boasts that the atomic bomb is 'a harnessing of the basic power of the universe', presenting it as an extraordinary achievement of American science. He says the USA is 'prepared to obliterate' every productive enterprise in 'any city' in Japan and threatens 'a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth'. This is the language of a country that believes it has overwhelming power and can end the war on its own terms.

The context explains this confidence. The Manhattan Project had produced a working bomb, tested successfully on 16 July 1945, and the USA was the only country that had one. At Potsdam Truman had felt able to take a firmer line with Stalin, and he only hinted to him about 'a new weapon'. Because this was a public statement by the President, it was heard around the world, including in Moscow, so it was also a demonstration of American power to the USSR at a time when relations were already strained. Soon afterwards Stalin ordered a crash programme to build a Soviet bomb.

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Source B is useful because it is the actual text of the Yalta agreement on Poland, signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, so it tells an historian exactly what the Big Three agreed. It shows that the Soviet-backed Provisional Government already 'functioning in Poland', the Lublin government, was to be 'reorganized on a broader democratic basis' by including democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad, meaning the London Poles, and that it was pledged to hold 'free and unfettered elections as soon as possible'. The provenance makes it reliable for the terms. Its wording is also revealing: the government was to be reorganised rather than replaced, there was no timetable, and there was no way of checking that elections were free. This shows that it was a compromise reached because the Red Army already controlled Poland, and Admiral Leahy warned Roosevelt that it was so 'elastic' that the Russians could stretch it a long way. However, as an official document it does not show the arguments behind the agreement or how it was carried out.

Source C is useful because it shows how the Polish government-in-exile and its supporters reacted. It complains that no Pole was consulted, that half of Poland had been handed to the USSR, and that the Lublin government was a creation of Moscow. This is accurate: the Curzon Line gave the USSR almost half of pre-war Poland, and Stalin had recognised the Lublin Committee as Poland's government in January 1945. The provenance explains its anger. The London Poles had most to lose because their government was being pushed aside, and they remembered the Katyn massacre and the Red Army's failure to help the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. The article is emotional and one-sided, calling the Lublin ministers 'Stalin's agents'. Nevertheless, its distrust of Soviet promises proved justified: in March 1945 sixteen Polish underground leaders were arrested, the new government formed in June was dominated by communists, and the elections were delayed until 1947 and then rigged.

Overall, the two sources are most useful together. Source B shows what was promised and why the promise was weak, while Source C shows the Polish reaction and the reasons for doubting that the agreement would ever be kept. Source B is more reliable for the terms, but Source C better explains why Poland became the first great test of Soviet intentions after Yalta.

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The dropping of the atomic bomb in August 1945 certainly made relations between the USA and the USSR worse, because it increased Soviet suspicion and started an arms race. However, I do not think it was the main reason relations worsened in 1945. By the time the bombs were dropped, relations had already been damaged by disputes over Poland and eastern Europe, the change of American leader and the defeat of the common enemy. The bomb deepened existing tensions rather than creating them.

The atomic bomb did harm relations. The Manhattan Project had been kept secret from the USSR throughout the war, even though it was an ally. When the bomb was successfully tested on 16 July 1945, Truman became more confident in his dealings with Stalin at Potsdam, and on 24 July he told Stalin only that the USA had 'a new weapon of unusual destructive force'. Stalin, who knew about the bomb from Soviet spies, was not fooled. After Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August, Japan surrendered and the USA occupied it alone, refusing the USSR any role. Stalin suspected that the bombs had been dropped partly to intimidate the USSR, and in August 1945 he set up a special committee under Beria to build a Soviet bomb as quickly as possible. Some American leaders, such as Byrnes, hoped that the bomb would make the USSR more manageable, but at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945 the talks broke down. Even the Secretary of War, Stimson, warned Truman that holding the bomb 'rather ostentatiously on our hip' would increase Soviet distrust.

However, relations had been worsening for months before August 1945. The most important cause was Soviet policy in eastern Europe, especially Poland. At Yalta Stalin had agreed to reorganise Poland's communist-dominated government and hold free elections, but in March 1945 sixteen Polish underground leaders were arrested, and in Romania the Soviets imposed a pro-communist government. Western leaders saw these as broken promises. On 12 May Churchill warned Truman that an 'iron curtain' had come down in Europe.

The change of leaders also mattered. Roosevelt, who believed he could work with Stalin, died on 12 April 1945. Truman was more suspicious and spoke bluntly to Molotov about Poland on 23 April, and in May Lend-Lease aid to the USSR was suddenly cut back. At the same time, Germany's surrender on 8 May removed the common enemy that had held the alliance together, so disputes over Germany's future and reparations came to the fore. At Potsdam the Allies argued over Stalin's demand for reparations and over Poland's western border on the Oder-Neisse line. Underlying all of this were the ideological differences between capitalism and communism, which led each side to assume the worst about the other.

Overall, I disagree with the statement. The atomic bomb made relations worse by increasing Soviet suspicion, changing the balance of power and starting an arms race that would dominate the Cold War. But it came after relations had already been damaged by the dispute over Poland and eastern Europe, which I think was the main reason. The bomb added a dangerous new element to the tension, but it was Soviet control of eastern Europe, and the Western reaction to it, that first broke the trust of the wartime alliance.