Easing of tension

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A is Helsinki and B is Moscow.

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Source A suggests that détente ignored human rights because Brezhnev signs a document labelled 'Détente' with one hand while locking a prison door with the other. This suggests that agreements with the West did nothing to stop repression inside the USSR. SALT 1 and the other agreements signed at the Moscow summit in May 1972 dealt with arms and trade, not with human rights. The sign 'Let my people go' refers to Soviet Jews who were refused permission to emigrate, known as refuseniks; in August 1972 the USSR even introduced a heavy tax on emigrants to repay the cost of their education. 'Freedom to write' and the books stamped 'Banned' refer to censorship and the persecution of writers such as Solzhenitsyn, who had been expelled from the Writers' Union in 1969. The caption 'Friendly relations' is ironic, suggesting the West was being friendly to an oppressive government. The provenance supports this: it comes from an American newspaper in 1972, when many Americans were criticising Nixon and Kissinger for ignoring human rights, and Senator Henry Jackson proposed linking trade with the USSR to freedom of emigration.

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Source B is useful because it gives a wide range of reasons why the USA wanted détente. The author mentions half a million men in Vietnam, pressure on the dollar, universities in revolt, a Congress unwilling to pay for an endless arms race and Soviet nuclear parity. This fits my knowledge: the USA had over 500,000 troops in Vietnam in 1968-69, inflation and a weak dollar led Nixon to end the dollar's link with gold in 1971, and the anti-war movement was at its height, with four students shot dead at Kent State University in 1970. The idea of 'managing' the arms race explains why Nixon agreed to the SALT talks in 1969, and 'talk to both' describes triangular diplomacy, which exploited the split between the USSR and China after their border clashes of 1969. The provenance adds to its value, because a member of the National Security Council staff worked closely with Nixon and Kissinger and would have known their thinking. However, the memoirs were written in 1983, with hindsight, and may make the policy sound more carefully planned than it really was. Memoirs can also be written to defend the author's own reputation.

Source C is useful because it gives precise evidence for one of the most important reasons for détente: Soviet nuclear parity. It shows the USSR's ICBMs rising from about 200 in 1964 to about 1,050 in 1969, equal to the USA's, and to about 1,550 by 1972, while American numbers stayed at about 1,050 from 1967. This confirms Source B's claim that 'the Russians now had as many missiles as we did'. Parity meant that mutually assured destruction was now a reality and that the USA could no longer hope to stay ahead, so limiting the arms race made sense. As Western estimates based on intelligence, the figures are approximate but broadly reliable. However, the graph shows only ICBM launchers. It does not show warheads, where the USA was still ahead because it was fitting missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs), or submarines and bombers, so it exaggerates Soviet strength. It also shows only one reason for détente.

Overall, Source B is more useful because it explains several reasons why the USA wanted détente, and Source C supports one of them with hard evidence. Together they are very useful, but neither mentions some important motives, such as Nixon's hope that the USSR would help to end the Vietnam War (linkage) or his wish for foreign-policy successes before the 1972 election.

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Richard Nixon, President of the USA from 1969, and Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet Union from 1964, signed SALT 1 together at the Moscow summit in May 1972, the high point of early détente. Both played essential parts. I think Nixon was slightly more important, because his opening to China set the pace and timing of détente, but Nixon could have achieved nothing without Brezhnev's willingness to negotiate, so the difference between them was small.

Nixon's contribution was very significant. In his inaugural address in January 1969 he announced 'an era of negotiation'. With his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, he followed a policy of realpolitik, dealing with the communist powers according to America's national interests rather than ideology. He agreed to the SALT talks, which began in November 1969, and used linkage to try to win Soviet help over Vietnam. His anti-communist record, going back to his 'Kitchen Debate' with Khrushchev in 1959, meant that critics could not accuse him of being soft, which made détente politically possible in the USA.

Nixon's most important move was his opening to China. Seeing the split between China and the USSR after their border clashes of 1969, he and Kissinger began contacts with Beijing. After Kissinger's secret visit in July 1971, Nixon visited China in February 1972. This triangular diplomacy alarmed the Soviet leaders, and only three months later Nixon became the first serving US President to visit Moscow, where SALT 1 and the Basic Principles were signed. In this sense Nixon was the driving force behind the timing of détente. However, much of the detailed work was done by Kissinger, Nixon was partly motivated by the 1972 election, and he continued to use force in Vietnam, invading Cambodia in 1970 and mining Haiphong in 1972.

Brezhnev's contribution was also essential. Under his leadership the USSR built up its nuclear forces until it had caught up with the USA by about 1969-70. This parity was what made détente possible, because the USSR could negotiate as an equal. Brezhnev agreed to the SALT talks and responded positively to West Germany's Ostpolitik: the Moscow Treaty of August 1970 accepted Europe's post-war borders, and in 1971 the USSR signed the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin. In March 1971 his Peace Programme called for an end to the arms race and a European security conference. Most importantly, when Nixon mined North Vietnam's ports in May 1972, some Soviet leaders wanted to cancel the summit, but Brezhnev insisted it should go ahead. Without that decision, SALT 1 would not have been signed in 1972.

It is also important to remember that neither leader acted alone. Brandt's Ostpolitik eased tension in Europe, and powerful pressures pushed both superpowers towards détente: the cost of the arms race, nuclear parity, the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet split. Talks on limiting strategic arms had already been planned under President Johnson in 1968, which suggests that détente did not depend only on Nixon and Brezhnev.

In conclusion, both leaders were necessary. Brezhnev made détente possible by reaching parity and choosing to negotiate, and his decision to go ahead with the Moscow summit was crucial. But Nixon's bold opening to China changed the balance of the Cold War and created the urgency that brought the USSR to the table in 1972. I therefore agree with the statement to some extent: Nixon was slightly more important in shaping when and how détente happened, but Brezhnev was almost equally important in making it possible.