War

Model answer

The grappling hooks at A caught in the enemy ship's rigging, so the burning fireship stuck to its target and the flames spread to the enemy's sails and wooden hull. The boat at B meant the crew could sail the fireship right up to the enemy, set it on fire and then escape.

Model answer

Line of battle tactics were important first because they made the most of a fleet's firepower. Warships of the 1660s carried their guns in rows along their sides, so their main weapon was the broadside. By sailing one behind another in a single line, every ship could fire its broadside at the enemy without masking or hitting its own side. These tactics had developed in the First Dutch War and were set out in the Duke of York's Fighting Instructions of 1665.

Secondly, the line gave admirals more control. Fleets in the Dutch Wars were huge, often 80 to 100 ships, and a disciplined line, directed by flag signals, was easier to command than a confused melee in which captains fought their own duels or tried to board the enemy. At Lowestoft in 1665 the English fleet's discipline and firepower helped it destroy about 17 Dutch ships.

Thirdly, the line changed the kind of ships navies built. Only large, strongly built ships with many heavy guns could stand in the line of battle, so both sides built bigger ships, such as the three-decker first-rates, and ships came to be rated by the number of guns they carried. Armed merchant ships became less useful in battle.

However, the line also made battles long and often indecisive, because fleets could pound each other for hours without either breaking. The Four Days' Battle in 1666 lasted four days, and Solebay in 1672 and the Texel in 1673 ended without a clear victory. Fleets manoeuvred to gain the weather gauge, the windward position, and fireships could still break up a line, as when the Royal James was burned at Solebay. The most important effect was that the line turned naval battles into disciplined artillery contests, which favoured the side with bigger ships and better-trained crews.

Model answer

Interpretation A is convincing that the secret Treaty of Dover and Charles's dealings with Louis XIV were central to the Third Dutch War, but it is exaggerated to say that it was 'not an English war at all', because Charles and many of his subjects had English reasons for fighting.

Some claims are well supported. In the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670, negotiated with help from his sister Henrietta Anne, Charles promised to announce his conversion to Catholicism when the time was right, in return for French money and the promise of French troops if needed. He also agreed to join Louis in a war against the Dutch, with a French subsidy to pay for it. The Catholic clause was kept secret even from most of his ministers, who signed a second, public treaty without it. The war certainly served Louis's ambition to conquer the Dutch Republic, and Charles's Declaration of Indulgence of 1672 seemed to show pro-Catholic aims. It is also true that Parliament helped end the war: it refused money until the Declaration was withdrawn, passed the Test Act in 1673 and pressed for peace, which came at Westminster in 1674.

However, the claim that the war was fought only for France and Rome is unconvincing. Charles never declared himself a Catholic during his reign; he was received into the Catholic Church only on his deathbed in 1685, and many historians think he used the Catholic clause to obtain money. There were English motives too: revenge for the humiliation of the Medway in 1667, rivalry with the Dutch over trade and colonies, the promise of Dutch territory such as Walcheren, and the hope of prizes. French subsidies also freed Charles from dependence on Parliament. At first many supported the war; Shaftesbury told Parliament in 1673 that the Dutch must be destroyed like Carthage.

Overall, Interpretation A, written from a Whig viewpoint that saw Charles as betraying Protestantism, is convincing about the importance of Dover but exaggerates by ignoring the English reasons for war.

Model answer

The Second Dutch War was a disaster for England in many ways: it brought heavy defeats, the humiliation of the Medway, huge costs and political crisis. But it was not a complete disaster, because England won some important victories and gained New York, which proved far more valuable than anyone realised at the time. I therefore agree only to a large extent.

The military failures were serious. After the victory at Lowestoft in 1665 was not followed up, an attack on the Dutch East India fleet at Bergen failed. In January 1666 France and Denmark joined the Dutch, and in the Four Days' Battle in June 1666 the English lost about ten ships, including the Royal Prince, and thousands of men. Worst of all, in June 1667, with the fleet laid up for lack of money, the Dutch took Sheerness, broke the chain across the Medway, seized the Royal Charles and burned three great ships. They blockaded the Thames and London panicked. It was the worst defeat in the navy's history.

The war was also a financial and political disaster. Parliament voted about 2.5 million pounds in 1664 and more later, yet seamen went unpaid, and the war's debts contributed to the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672. Combined with the Plague of 1665 and the Great Fire of 1666, the war drained the Crown's resources. Politically, the Earl of Clarendon was blamed, dismissed in August 1667 and forced into exile, and Parliament began investigating how the money had been spent, increasing mistrust of the court. The Treaty of Breda relaxed the Navigation Act in the Dutch favour and left Surinam to the Dutch.

However, there were successes. The victory at Lowestoft destroyed about 17 Dutch ships and killed their commander, Obdam. In July 1666 the English won the St James's Day Fight, and in August Robert Holmes burned about 150 Dutch merchant ships in the Vlie. Most importantly, England kept New Netherland, renamed New York. This gave England control of the whole coast from New England to Virginia, closed a centre of Dutch smuggling and became one of England's most important colonies. The Navigation system survived, and the English kept Cape Coast Castle in West Africa.

The war's lessons were also learned: Sheerness was fortified and the navy's administration was examined. Within a year England had joined the Dutch in the Triple Alliance of 1668, showing that the defeat did not leave England isolated.

Overall, the war was a disaster in the short term, especially because of the humiliation of the Medway and its financial and political consequences. But it was not a total disaster, because the gain of New York was of great long-term importance. The statement is largely true for 1667, but less true when the war is viewed over the longer term.