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How Hitler became Chancellor, 1932-33

Practise 18 exam-style questions on How Hitler became Chancellor, 1932-33 for Edexcel GCSE History (Weimar and Nazi Germany 1918-39). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 18 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
  • Instant marking
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18 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Source A: From a despatch sent by Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Ambassador in Berlin, to the British Foreign Secretary, 14 June 1932, two weeks after Franz von Papen became Chancellor. Rumbold had discussed the new government with other ambassadors and with members of his staff who had contacts in banking and business. General Kurt von Schleicher was the Defence Minister in Papen's government. The despatch was published by the British government in 1948.

It would appear that Count Westarp [a conservative politician] was at first thought of as Dr. Brüning's successor, but, chiefly owing to Hugenberg's opposition, this suggestion was not pursued. The President then thought of Dr. Bracht, the Lord Mayor of Essen, who is highly esteemed in all quarters, but the approaches to him broke down. It was only then that Herr von Papen was entrusted with the chancellorship, mainly in the hope that he would bring over the right wing of the Centre party to the support of the Government. But the Catholic Church once again proved too strong, and this particular manoeuvre proved a fiasco. ... One good judge, in fact, considers that the present Cabinet is a Cabinet of mutual deception. Herr von Papen thinks that he has scored off General Schleicher and Hitler, General Schleicher thinks he has scored off Hitler, and Hitler, for his part, believes that he has scored off both. ... Bavaria is up in arms at the idea that the ban on Hitler's storm troops is about to be lifted. ...

Business circles seem to be bewildered. Some business men having no notion what the Government will do, fear that it will be something stupid, which will further depress trade and possibly endanger the currency. Others, however, including a prominent banker of Democratic views, having recovered from the first shock, now realise that the Cabinet contains some good men, who having the support of Hitler are likely for some time to play a prominent part.

Give two things you can infer from Source A about von Papen's government in June 1932.

Set out your answer under these headings, once for each inference:
What I can infer:
Details in the source that tell me this:

Model answer

What I can infer: Papen was not Hindenburg's first choice; he was appointed because more suitable candidates could not be found.
Details in the source that tell me this: Westarp and Bracht were considered first, and 'It was only then that Herr von Papen was entrusted with the chancellorship'.

What I can infer: The new government depended on Hitler and was prepared to do things that would please the Nazis.
Details in the source that tell me this: Its ministers were expected to last because they had 'the support of Hitler', and 'the ban on Hitler's storm troops is about to be lifted'.

Explanation

Top answers make two different inferences about Papen's government, such as that it was weak or that it relied on Hitler, and support each with a short, matching detail. A common mistake is to copy a phrase such as 'a Cabinet of mutual deception' without explaining what it suggests. Another is to use own knowledge, for example the date the SA ban was lifted, instead of inferring from the source.

Mark scheme
  1. 1 mark

    A valid inference about von Papen's government in June 1932, e.g. Papen was not Hindenburg's first choice as Chancellor / the government had very little support among the parties in the Reichstag / the leading figures in and around the government did not trust each other and each hoped to use the others / the government depended on Hitler's support / the government was ready to do things that pleased the Nazis, such as lifting the ban on the SA / the government's policies alarmed some of the German states / many business people were uncertain about the new government at first.

    Award 1 mark for each valid inference up to a maximum of two inferences. The second mark for each example should be awarded for supporting detail selected from the source. e.g. Papen was not Hindenburg's first choice as Chancellor (1). Westarp and Bracht were considered first and Papen was chosen 'only then' (1). The government had little support in the Reichstag (1). The plan to win over 'the right wing of the Centre party' 'proved a fiasco' (1). The men around the government did not trust each other and each hoped to use the others (1). It was 'a Cabinet of mutual deception', in which Papen, Schleicher and Hitler each thought he had 'scored off' the others (1). The government relied on Hitler's support (1). Its ministers were thought likely to stay in power because they had 'the support of Hitler' (1). The new government was willing to please the Nazis (1). The 'ban on Hitler's storm troops is about to be lifted' (1). The government's plans caused alarm in some German states (1). 'Bavaria is up in arms' (1). Business people were unsure what the new government would do (1). 'Business circles seem to be bewildered' and some feared 'something stupid' (1). An inference must go beyond what the source says: 'Bavaria was up in arms' or 'it was a Cabinet of mutual deception' only repeats the source and earns no mark. The inference must come from Source A: own knowledge (e.g. that the ban on the SA was lifted in June 1932, or that the cabinet was called the 'cabinet of barons') is not an inference from the source. Accept other appropriate alternatives.

  2. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the first inference, e.g. 'It was only then that Herr von Papen was entrusted with the chancellorship' / 'this particular manoeuvre proved a fiasco' / 'a Cabinet of mutual deception' / 'having the support of Hitler' / 'the ban on Hitler's storm troops is about to be lifted' / 'Bavaria is up in arms' / 'Business circles seem to be bewildered'.

    Award only if the first inference has been credited and the detail genuinely supports it (a short quotation or a close reference to Source A). A detail that does not support the inference given, or information from own knowledge, earns no mark.

  3. 1 mark

    A second valid inference about von Papen's government in June 1932, different from the first (see the examples under the first inference).

    The second inference must be a different point, not the first one reworded (e.g. 'Papen was second choice' and 'others were asked before Papen' are the same inference). Apply the same rules: no credit for paraphrase or own knowledge.

  4. 1 mark

    Supporting detail selected from Source A that supports the second inference.

    Award only if the second inference has been credited and the detail from Source A supports it.

Question 2

4 marks

Source B: From the evidence given by Hermann Göring at the Nuremberg war crimes trial, 13 March 1946. Göring, one of the leading Nazis on trial, was answering questions from his own lawyer. Here he describes the Nazis' attitude to von Papen's government in the summer of 1932. Göring was elected President of the Reichstag on 30 August 1932. The official English record of the trial was published in 1947.

Herr Von Papen at that time tried to make that possible and, in order to get a parliamentary basis, he asked the National Socialists, the strongest party at that time, to establish such a basis together with the other parties. ... I remember that I told Herr Von Papen at that time that Hitler could become any number of things, but never Vice. If he were to be made anything, he would naturally have to be in the highest position and it would be completely unbearable and unthinkable to place our Fuehrer in any sort of second position. We would then have had to play the role of governing, but possibly not all according to our lights, and Hitler as a representative of the strongest party would have had to be responsible for these things. This we declined categorically. ... I told him then, after this gesture had come to nought, that we would not only not support him, but would also oppose his Cabinet in the Reichstag to the utmost, just as we would consistently fight every succeeding cabinet which did not give us a leading influence in the Chancellery.

Source C: From the diary of Joseph Goebbels, the head of Nazi propaganda and leader of the Nazi Party in Berlin, entries for December 1932 (translated for this course). Goebbels published his diaries for 1932-33 as a book in 1934, when he was Hitler's Minister of Propaganda.

6 December 1932. ... The situation in the Reich is catastrophic. In Thuringia we have suffered losses of nearly 40 per cent since 31 July. We must work more and negotiate less.

7 December 1932. ... Here and there people are still discussing the idea of taking power in Prussia. I think that is quite wrong. Either we must get the whole power, or else we must carry on with the sharpest opposition.

8 December 1932. In the organisation there is deep depression. Money worries make any purposeful work impossible. Rumours are going round that Strasser is planning a palace revolution. ...

23 December 1932. ... The year 1932 was one long run of bad luck. It ought to be smashed to pieces. ... The past was hard, and the future is dark and gloomy; all prospects and hopes have completely vanished.

Interpretation 1: From All or Nothing: Hitler's Path to the Chancellery by Jasper Mountford (fictional), published in 1977.

Hitler's refusal to accept anything less than the chancellorship was the shrewdest decision of his career. Had he become Vice-Chancellor in August 1932, he would have shared the blame for the Depression, and a movement built on attacking 'the system' would have lost its appeal. By saying no, he kept his followers' faith that he alone could save Germany. He also made it almost impossible for anyone else to govern, since no government could survive in the Reichstag against the Nazis and the Communists together. In the end the President's advisers had to come to him on his own terms. Hitler's stubbornness was not a gamble that failed but the strategy that won.

Interpretation 2: From The Party in Crisis: The Nazis in the Winter of 1932 by Katharine Elswick (fictional), published in 2012.

Hitler's insistence on 'all or nothing' was a gamble that nearly ruined his party. When he turned down a share of power in August 1932, many supporters who had expected victory within weeks lost heart, and the SA grew restless. In November the voters punished him. Gregor Strasser, the head of the party organisation, argued that the Nazis should accept a share of power while they still could; when Hitler refused, Strasser resigned all his party posts in December. By Christmas the Nazi leaders themselves feared the movement was finished. Hitler was rescued not by his own strategy but by the intrigues of Papen and the President's circle a few weeks later.

Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views about Hitler's decision in 1932 to accept nothing less than the chancellorship. You may use Sources B and C to help explain your answer.

Model answer

One reason is that the authors have given weight to different sources. The author of Interpretation 1 may have relied on evidence like Source B, in which Göring says Hitler 'could become any number of things, but never Vice', because a 'second position' would have made him 'responsible' for policies the Nazis did not control, and that they would fight 'every succeeding cabinet'. This supports Interpretation 1's view that refusing the vice-chancellorship stopped Hitler sharing 'the blame' and was 'the strategy that won'.

The author of Interpretation 2 may have relied on evidence like Source C. In December 1932 Goebbels recorded losses of 'nearly 40 per cent' in Thuringia, 'deep depression' and 'Money worries', and wrote that 'all prospects and hopes have completely vanished'. This supports Interpretation 2's view that the 'all or nothing' gamble 'nearly ruined his party' and that by Christmas the leaders feared the movement was finished.

Explanation

Top answers give one clear reason, such as different sources or a different timescale (judging the decision by its final result or by its effects in late 1932), and support it with specific details matched from the sources to the interpretations. Weaker answers simply assert that the historians used different evidence, or repeat the difference between the views without explaining why it exists.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO4: 4 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): An explanation of a reason for difference is given, analysing the interpretations. The explanation is substantiated effectively.
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple valid explanation is offered but displaying only limited analysis. Support for the explanation is based on simple undeveloped comment or on the selection of details from the provided material or own knowledge, with only implied linkage to the explanation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The interpretations may differ because the authors have given weight to different sources. For example, Source B, in which Göring says that Hitler 'could become any number of things, but never Vice', that accepting a 'second position' would have made Hitler 'responsible' for policies not 'according to our lights', and that the Nazis would 'consistently fight every succeeding cabinet', gives some support to Interpretation 1, which argues that refusing the vice-chancellorship stopped Hitler sharing 'the blame', kept the movement's appeal and made it 'almost impossible for anyone else to govern'; Source C, in which Goebbels records losses of 'nearly 40 per cent' in Thuringia, 'deep depression' in the organisation, 'Money worries', rumours of a Strasser 'palace revolution' and that 'all prospects and hopes have completely vanished', gives some support to Interpretation 2, which argues that the 'all or nothing' gamble 'nearly ruined his party', that Strasser resigned and that 'By Christmas the Nazi leaders themselves feared the movement was finished'. They may differ because of a different focus or timescale: Interpretation 1 judges the decision by its final outcome (Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933 on his own terms), while Interpretation 2 judges it by its effects in the autumn and winter of 1932. They may differ in emphasis about causes: Interpretation 1 credits Hitler's own strategy, while Interpretation 2 credits Papen and the President's circle. Answers must explain the reason and support it from the interpretations (and, where used, from the sources). Credit at Level 1 a reason that is asserted with little support, e.g. 'they used different sources'. Do not credit reasons based only on the dates of publication or the titles of the books, or answers that simply repeat the difference between the views.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why Hindenburg won the presidential election of 1932.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the support of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Centre Party
- Hindenburg's reputation as a war hero

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

Hindenburg won the presidential election of 1932 because a wide coalition of parties united behind him to stop Hitler, because of his great personal prestige, and because his opponents were divided.

One reason was the support of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Centre Party. In 1925 these parties had opposed Hindenburg, but by 1932 they saw him as the only candidate who could defeat Hitler. The SPD decided not to put up its own candidate and urged its supporters to vote for him, while Chancellor Brüning of the Centre Party campaigned for him across Germany. Their organisations, including the Iron Front, brought millions of working-class and Catholic voters to the polls for a conservative field marshal. Without these votes Hindenburg could not have won: he received 18.7 million votes in the first round, far more than any candidate of the right could expect.

A second reason was Hindenburg's reputation as a war hero. As the victor of Tannenberg in 1914 and commander of the German army in the First World War, he was respected by older and conservative Germans, and as President since 1925 he seemed a symbol of stability above the quarrels of the parties. Many people who disliked the Republic still trusted him, while many who feared the Nazis saw him as a safe pair of hands.

Thirdly, his opponents were divided. The nationalist right did not unite behind Hitler: the DNVP and the Stahlhelm put up their own candidate, Theodor Duesterberg, who won about 2.6 million votes in the first round. The Communists stood Ernst Thälmann, who won almost 5 million. This split the votes against Hindenburg, who won 49.5 per cent in the first round, just short of an absolute majority, and then 53 per cent in the second round, when only a relative majority was needed.

Finally, Hitler was in some ways a weak candidate for President. He had only become a German citizen in February 1932, through a government post in the state of Brunswick, where the Nazis shared in power, and many voters were alarmed by the violence of the SA and by the idea of a party leader as head of state. Even though Hitler campaigned energetically, flying from city to city in the second round and raising his vote to 13.4 million (36.8 per cent), most Germans still voted against him.

Together, the support of the democratic parties, Hindenburg's prestige and the divisions among his opponents explain why the 84-year-old President was re-elected.

Explanation

Top answers explain why each factor won votes for Hindenburg, for example that the SPD and Centre brought him millions of voters who had opposed him in 1925, and they go beyond the stimulus points with aspects such as the split on the right (Duesterberg), the Communist candidate or Hitler's weaknesses. A common mistake is to describe the campaign or Hindenburg's career without linking it to the result. Another is to confuse this election with the Reichstag elections of 1932, or to claim that the Nazis already controlled the radio.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The SPD and the Centre Party: in 1925 they had backed Wilhelm Marx against Hindenburg, but in 1932 they supported him as the only candidate who could stop Hitler; the SPD put up no candidate of its own and told its voters to choose Hindenburg; Chancellor Brüning (Centre) campaigned for him, and the Iron Front and the smaller middle-class parties that backed him (e.g. the BVP, DVP and State Party) brought out working-class, Catholic and liberal voters, so Hindenburg won with the votes of people who had opposed him seven years earlier. Hindenburg's reputation: the victor of Tannenberg (1914) and wartime commander, President since 1925, seen as a symbol of stability standing above the parties, respected by older, conservative, Protestant and many women voters; he made only one radio address in the campaign, so his prestige did much of the work. Divisions among his opponents: the nationalist right split, with the DNVP and the Stahlhelm standing Theodor Duesterberg (about 2.6 million votes, 6.8 per cent) instead of backing Hitler; the KPD stood Ernst Thälmann (about 5 million, 13.2 per cent, in the first round), so the votes against Hindenburg were divided. Hitler's weaknesses as a candidate: he only became a German citizen in February 1932 (through a government post in Brunswick, where the Nazis shared in the state government); many voters feared the violence of the SA and a party leader as head of state; the Nazi campaign alarmed the middle classes and the SPD. The rules: Hindenburg won 49.5 per cent in the first round on 13 March (accept 'just under 50 per cent' or the rounded 49.6 found in some books; he was short of an absolute majority by about 170,000 votes) and 53 per cent in the second round on 10 April (when only the most votes were needed; Hitler 36.8 per cent, Thälmann 10.2 per cent). Answers that explain three or more aspects of content, linked to why Hindenburg won, can reach Level 4. Do not credit: claims that Hindenburg was the Nazi or nationalist candidate in 1932 (that was 1925); claims that Hitler won the first round or that Hindenburg won outright on 13 March; claims that the Nazis controlled the radio or the newspapers during the campaign (they were not in power until 1933); material on the July 1932 Reichstag election unless clearly linked to the presidential election.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

Interpretation 1: From Field Marshal and President: Hindenburg, 1925-34 by Cedric Norbury (fictional), published in 1968.

Hindenburg did not want Hitler as Chancellor. He refused him twice in 1932, in August and again in November, and he made it clear that he did not trust the leader of such a violent and intolerant party. By January 1933, however, the President was 85 years old and increasingly dependent on a small circle of advisers: his son Oskar, his State Secretary Otto Meissner and, above all, Franz von Papen, whom he trusted completely. It was Papen who arranged the deal with Hitler and who persuaded the old man that a cabinet with only three Nazis in it could easily be controlled. Hindenburg gave way reluctantly, worn down by months of crisis. He was not the author of the decision but the last, tired obstacle to be removed.

Interpretation 2: From The President's Choice: Hindenburg and the End of Weimar by Delia Ashworth (fictional), published in 2015.

The idea that Hindenburg was a confused old man pushed into appointing Hitler does not fit the evidence. Hindenburg was a monarchist who had never accepted parliamentary democracy, and from 1930 he used his emergency powers under Article 48 to govern without the Reichstag. At the end of May 1932 he forced out a Chancellor whom the Reichstag had not voted against, and then appointed Papen, a man with almost no support there at all. His objection to Hitler was never that Hitler would destroy democracy, but that he wanted power for his party alone. Once Papen offered a cabinet in which conservatives held most of the posts, Hindenburg's objections disappeared. The decision of 30 January 1933 was his own.

How far do you agree with Interpretation 2 about Hindenburg's role in Hitler becoming Chancellor? Explain your answer, using both interpretations and your knowledge of the historical context.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

Interpretation 2 argues that Hitler's appointment was Hindenburg's 'own' decision, made by a President who had 'never accepted parliamentary democracy' and objected to Hitler only because 'he wanted power for his party alone'. Interpretation 1 instead presents Hindenburg as a reluctant old man, 'worn down by months of crisis', who was talked round by Papen and his advisers. I largely agree with Interpretation 2, although Interpretation 1 is right about how the final deal was made.

Interpretation 2 is convincing about Hindenburg's record. From 1930 he governed more and more through Article 48: there were 66 emergency decrees in 1932, while the Reichstag passed only a few laws. He chose Papen in June 1932, although Papen had almost no support in the Reichstag, and he signed the orders dissolving the Reichstag twice and removing the elected government of Prussia in July 1932. This shows that he had already moved Germany away from parliamentary government before Hitler arrived.

Interpretation 2 is also right about the nature of his objection. In August 1932 he refused Hitler because Hitler demanded the whole power of government for his party, and in November he refused him because he feared a party dictatorship. Once Papen offered a cabinet with only three Nazis and conservatives such as Hugenberg, Neurath and Blomberg in the key posts, these objections fell away. As President he alone had the power to appoint the Chancellor.

However, Interpretation 1 is right that others did much of the work. Hindenburg was 85, and Papen, whom he trusted, met Hitler secretly in Cologne on 4 January 1933 and negotiated the deal. Oskar von Hindenburg met Hitler at Ribbentrop's house on 22 January, and Meissner later said that the President was 'extremely hesitant' until the end and wanted Papen back. By stressing words like 'reluctantly' and 'tired obstacle', Interpretation 1 makes Hindenburg sound like a victim, but it leaves out his own anti-democratic choices since 1930, which Interpretation 2 selects.

Overall, I mostly agree with Interpretation 2. Papen and Hindenburg's circle arranged the deal, as Interpretation 1 says, but it only succeeded because Hindenburg already preferred authoritarian rule and his objections were to Nazi power alone, not to the destruction of democracy. Judged by who had the power to decide and by what he chose to accept, the decision of 30 January was his own.

Explanation

Top answers test Interpretation 2's claims with precise knowledge (Article 48 decrees, the appointment of Papen, the refusals of August and November 1932, the composition of the cabinet) and use Interpretation 1's points about Papen and Hindenburg's age to challenge it, reaching a clear judgement with stated criteria. Strong answers also comment on how the views are conveyed, such as Interpretation 1's sympathetic language. Weaker answers write a general essay on how Hitler became Chancellor without focusing on Hindenburg's role, or simply say they 'partly agree'.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks). AO4: 16 marks.
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation reviewing the alternative views in coming to a substantiated judgement. Precise analysis of the interpretations is shown, indicating how the differences of view are conveyed and deploying this material to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is precisely selected to support the evaluation. An overall judgment is justified and the line of reasoning is coherent, sustained and logically structured.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): Answer provides an explained evaluation, agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation. Good analysis of the interpretations is shown indicating difference of view and deploying this to support the evaluation. Relevant contextual knowledge is used directly to support the evaluation. An overall judgement is given with some justification and a line of reasoning is generally sustained.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): Answer offers valid evaluative comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Some analysis is shown in selecting and including details from both interpretations to support this comment. Some relevant contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation. An overall judgement is given but its justification is insecure or undeveloped and a line of reasoning is not sustained.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): Answer offers simple valid comment to agree with or counter the interpretation. Limited analysis of one interpretation is shown by selection and inclusion of some detail in the form of simple paraphrase or direct quotation. Generalised contextual knowledge is included and linked to the evaluation.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Interpretation 2 argues that Hindenburg was responsible for Hitler's appointment: he disliked democracy, ruled by decree, chose Papen and objected only to Hitler's demand for total power. Points from the interpretations and own knowledge that support Interpretation 2: Hindenburg used Article 48 emergency decrees increasingly (often given as 44 decrees in 1931 and 66 in 1932, while the Reichstag passed only a handful of laws in 1932); he appointed Papen's 'cabinet of barons' on 1 June 1932 and agreed to dissolve the Reichstag twice (June and September 1932) and to the removal of the Prussian government (20 July 1932); at the meeting of 13 August 1932 he refused because Hitler demanded the whole power of government for his party (the official statement issued that day said Hitler had demanded full power), and in November he refused because he feared a Hitler-led presidential cabinet would become a party dictatorship, not because he wanted to save democracy; in January 1933 he accepted Hitler once Papen was Vice-Chancellor and conservatives (e.g. Hugenberg, Neurath, Blomberg, Schwerin von Krosigk) held most posts, with only three Nazis in the cabinet; he wanted a right-wing government with mass support; he was President with the constitutional power to appoint the Chancellor, so the final decision was legally his. Points that counter it (including Interpretation 1): Hindenburg refused Hitler on 13 August and again in November 1932 and kept him out for six months after the Nazis became the largest party; he distrusted Hitler and the SA's violence; he was 85 and relied on Oskar von Hindenburg, Meissner and Papen; Papen met Hitler in Cologne (4 January 1933) and arranged the deal, and the meeting with Oskar at Ribbentrop's house (22 January) was part of the persuasion; Meissner later claimed Hindenburg was 'extremely hesitant' until the end and wanted Papen back, and was won over by the argument that conservatives would restrict Hitler and by fear of civil war. How the views are conveyed: Interpretation 1 uses sympathetic language ('reluctantly', 'worn down', 'tired obstacle') and stresses others' actions; Interpretation 2 uses decisive language ('His objection... was never', 'his own') and selects his anti-democratic record, which Interpretation 1 omits. A substantiated judgement might argue that both are partly right: the deal was made by Papen and his circle, but it worked only because Hindenburg already preferred authoritarian government and his objections were to Nazi power alone, not to ending democracy. Do not credit material on Brüning's policies or Schleicher's government except as brief context; no answer needs them. Do not credit claims that Hindenburg was a Nazi or that he appointed Hitler after a Nazi majority in the Reichstag.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): No credit may be given for contextual knowledge unless it is linked to evaluation of the interpretations. In all levels, the second sentence relates to analysis and while the rest relate to evaluation. The following rules will apply: In Level 1, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis without evidence of evaluation should be awarded 1 mark. In other levels, answers that meet the requirements only in relation to analysis (but that also fully meet the descriptors for evaluation of the level below) should be awarded no more than the bottom mark in the level.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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