Review Of 'exclusivist Republicanism And The Non-monarchical Republic'

James Hankins, 'Exclusivist Republicanism and the Non-Monarchical Republic,' Political Theory, 38 (2010), pp. 452-82.

This article sets out Hankins argument which stems from defining a Republic (Respublica). The argument that has been formulated by Hankins shows the importance of the differences between the pre-modern and modern attitudes, in regards to Exclusivism and what it meant.

The first indications of vagueness and a sense of a lack of specificity are in the argument of Hankins. It is the first sign of weakness in regards to the validation of his argument. His knowledge of theorists and their relevant thoughts throughout this article, especially in explaining the word 'republic' (Respublica) through History, show that he does have a firm understanding of the key issues that are apparent.

Hankins begins his discussion over Exclusivism in a methodical manner. Firstly he defines what he means by Exclusivism. In a pure sense he describes it as an understanding of a government which rules for the will of the people and denies any legitimacy to Non-elective Monarchical rule and any hereditary privileges a person may receive.

In referring to theorists of the Renaissance period in Italy, Hankins writes that Machiavelli popularised the term, Exclusivism, with the meaning, popular or oligarchic government (rule by a plurality of people). Machiavelli unlike other Italian humanists deters from classing a Respublica as a form of Non-Monarchical government. This was important due to the fact that this definition was what led to the later rising of Exclusivism in subsequent centuries. Hankins adds that alongside this new rise of Exclusivism, classing Monarchy as an illegitimate form of government was becoming evident, mainly due to the phrase 'the Republic' being used by countries and states in their official titles.

Hankins offers a very strong and very clear view of how the Republics of the pre-modern era managed their relations with other states and countries. He argues that the pre-modern republics preferred other republics when considering alliances. Hankins does not associate this argument with the pre-modern republic alliance model that he is showing when explaining the 'rise' of Exclusivism. He claims that these republics did not denounce any type of Kingdom or Princely rule as illegitimate. Hankins gives no indication for any economic, political, or any other social developments in referring to the alliances formed through a Republic's preference. An interesting point made by Hankins however, is that Cicero and other Roman theorists gave validity to their political thoughts by feeling the need to define a Republic. This argument is shown with little evidence by Hankins; it is an argument made of coincidence as the governmental environment surrounding Cicero and other Roman theorists was primarily that of a developing Republic in all senses of the word. Therefore, Hankins argument lacks academic and historical power.

Hankins next step towards defining the existence of Exclusivism is by showing the different attitudes shown by the modern Exclusivists. These attitudes were that communal governments are superior to Monarchical regimes in any place and at any time, rather than the pre-modern conception that constitutions are subject to the social, economic, and cultural environments, even climate is said to have had a part in deciding the best possible form of government for the people. Hankins gives a reason why this occurred. He writes that in the pre-modern times, medieval scholars were writing in times when Kingship was the preferred style of government and therefore they had sympathies to such rule, somewhat flawing their arguments over Exclusivism and Republics.

Once again, Hankins is writing of pure coincidence rather than proven fact. The remarks that the medieval scholars have sympathies towards King-ships are underpinned by Hankins, just because of the fact they live in the time and place. Never the less, according to Hankins, an issue over 'True Exclusivism' and not showing Exclusivist tendencies becomes evident.

Hankins goes on to compare and contrast different theorists and their support of Exclusivism, and the notion of 'True Republics'. Michele Savaronola, of which Hankins writes, offers a remarkably contrasting view on 'True Republics' as set out by Exclusivists. Savaronola's view is that there can only be a 'True Republic' when there is a Prince. This is in contrast to the work of Ptolemy and Bruni, theorists that Hankins examines closely. They portray Exclusivism as a mode of 'True Republicanism' by deeming illegitimate, any kind of Kingship or Princely rule.

Upon examining Ptolemy and Bruni, Hankins discovers that these theorists, considered to be the closest to Exclusivist principles in their time, were actually contradictory in order to safe guard their self-interests. Hankins shows that Ptolemy especially, although advocating Exclusivist principles, in fact supports a Monarchical structure in the ecclesiastical institutions. It is interesting to note the Hankins only refers to pre-modern scholars and theorists in support of 'absolute' and 'pure' Exclusivism, other than a modern reference of Milton in the conclusion of this Article, and it is only in this regard that we see Hankins showing support for 'pure' and 'true' Exclusivism.

With Milton writing after the renaissance, it leads you to believe that there were limited influences stemming from the ancient societies and theories of Aristotle. The influences evident in Milton's work were born in the renaissance itself. Milton's idea was that Monarchy's were 'heathenish tantamount to idolatry, and therefore illegitimate'. Hankins also refers to Milton in reference to his own definition of Exclusivism given in the introductory paragraphs. Hankins concludes by writing that in the nineteenth century, the ancient societal use of the word 'Republic', in reference to the mixing government models of Aristotle and Polybius, derogated in favour of a definition of a government ruling for the people.

The method, in which Hankins has approached this situation with, falls short of really defining how Exclusivism is prevalent in society throughout history, as was his chief objective for this article. Hankins starts the article by defining the developments of a 'Republic' and the constitutional make up of such an entity; however his incorporation of Exclusivism is negligent. Exclusivism, when considering Aristotle's and Polybius' model for perfect government does not exist in a 'pure' sense. Hankins writes, however, that it is a return to the ancient societal constitutions, even after discussing the importance of Aristotle and Polybius' models, that 'pure' Exclusivism is found. This is rather contradictory and hypocritical after agreeing with such models and regarding them as effective and stable forms of government.

Throughout this article Hankins creates new boundaries in regards to the incorporation of Exclusivism as part of a Republic, whether it be in a general sense or in a 'pure' and 'true' definition. The article offers many insights into where research can develop, and how throughout History, a return to the study of ancient societies has helped forge governments. In order to develop the understanding of Exclusivism in a modern sense, more effort and emphasis needs to be put upon examining the Italian renaissance itself and the models of government which were formed that would influence modern ways of thinking and what was a true definition of Exclusivism within a Republic.