Is It More Difficult For Candidate States To Accede To The Eu?

Abstract: The EU has, over time, enlarged from a union of 6 members to a community of 27 that looks likely to increase further (to 28) once Croatia's accession in finalised. The most recent enlargements of the EU, however, have been described as "long and difficult" (Swoboda, 2011) and have thus come in for trenchant criticism in some quarters. Consequently, this dissertation seeks to address this criticism by determining whether or not accession has indeed become a more difficult task for candidate countries. Evidence is provided by academic papers, speeches and monitoring reports in order to determine difficulty in accession. The research is divided into six distinct variables and mainly focuses on the 2004, 2007 and impending Croatian accession rounds.

Key words/phrases: enlargement, accession, conditionality, sponsor states, rhetorical entrapment, historicity, public opinion, acquis communitaire, big bang, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia.

Overview The EU's first enlargement of 1973 (to include the UK, Ireland and Denmark) began a process of expansion which has allowed it to burgeon from six to twenty seven member states, with seemingly more on the way. The problem however is that, arguably it has become "more and more difficult" (Phinnemore, 2009, p.249) for candidate states to join, or rather the criterion to join has become increasingly vast. To this extent, it can be observed that the EU has altered its approach to enlargement, especially considering the process by which the 'big bang' states of 2004 entered. Indeed, specific criterion were established for these candidate states whereby the EU stretched "the negotiations over time" resulting in the conspiracy theory of EU delaying tactics (Brücker, Schröder and Weise, 2004, p.13). There is an increasing academic interest in EU enlargement, particularly in recent years, because there has been speculation that the EU's continued desire for further enlargement is somewhat tenuous. Indeed, this is most easily illustrated by the fact that "according to its 2006 enlargement strategy, the EU will be 'cautious about assuming any new commitments'" and as a result, it will be of interest to observe why 'enlargement fatigue' has set in (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p.919). There are numerous competing arguments as to whether or not there is increased difficulty in attaining membership, with some arguing that expanding conditionality has made the process much harder, such as Phinnemore, who has said that new applicant states face "progressively more detailed and demanding criteria" (Phinnemore, 2010, p.291). Whilst others have argued that the new candidates are still in a process of transition and require greater EU assistance in developing into modern day democracies and markets. This is a view is shared by John Redmond, who said with regards to Turkish accession, that it is unfair to expect Turkey to "comply with all the copious entry criteria and conditions before it can join the EU" without assistance (Redmond, 2007, p.316). As a result, it is of academic interest to decipher whether or not it is increasingly difficult for candidate states to accede to the EU.

This dissertation question will focus on the issue of EU accession and how the process has developed, particularly in the post-millennium era of EU expansion. Whether it is more difficult to accede or not will be determined by a key set of variables, illustrated in the paragraph bellow. It will be of utmost importance that the research highlights how the EU has changed its practices in terms of accommodating candidates for accession, i.e. whether or not the EU assisted with the candidate states' transition. In turn, this will help the research discern the EU's motives in relation to contemporary enlargement, i.e. whether or not it is encouraging or discouraging further expansion. Additionally, it will be important to assess whether the EU has included increased hurdles for candidates desiring membership, in other words has the EU made the process more complicated? In answering these questions, the language and tone of EU prerogatives and speeches (made by EU leaders) must be assessed in order to determine the current trajectory of EU accession criteria. This dissertation will focus on the two most recent enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 and include the impending Croatian accession (expected in 2013). This is because, from these most recent of EU enlargements, we can observe a growing disinterest in continued EU expansion, epitomized by Gunter Verheugen, who "complained in September 2004 that the EU was 'exhausted' from enlargement" (Phinnemore, 2006, p.9). Consequently, the inclusion of the most recent enlargement rounds, as a basis for comparison, will be vital in terms of observing the shifting dynamics of enlargement. In answering this question six key variables will be assessed, these are; Narrative, Rhetoric, Conditionality, Member-State Preferences, Public Opinion and Institutional leadership. The majority of these variables come from Icener, Phinnemore and Papadimitriou's 2010 work, the only variable used that is not included in their work is rhetoric. Each of these variables will be assessed separately and will draw upon the experiences of the aforementioned enlargement rounds which will allow the analysis to discern either continuity or change in the EU's approach to enlargement and thus determine whether it is, indeed, more difficult for candidate states to accede to the EU.

Methodology The six variables that will be used in this essay are being used, in part, because of the fact that they have been administered in other notable studies of similar enquiry. This previous array of literature includes those collated by Phinnemore, Schimmelfennig and Garry, all of whom are noteworthy scholars in this field. However, what is specifically lacking in EU enlargement research are studies that link the numerous variables together, whilst many have looked at (for example) conditionality and public opinion, these have mainly been specifically focussed on the stated variable. For example Stephen Wood's 2002 document on 'Germany and the eastern enlargement of the EU' looks at one terminal variable and does not attempt to systemically link it to others in questioning the degree of difficulty in EU enlargement. Wood says that "referendums and popular initiatives" seem to be on the table for numerous other German policy fields but for European integration it seems that "the German public must (still) be saved from itself" especially with regard to eastern enlargement (Wood, 2002, p.35). Whereas this shows that the politics of European integration may not be affected by German public opinion, it does not fundamentally look at other variables which may impact upon the difficulty of accession. Therefore, it is a research field previously investigated but one which requires further enquiry, specifically to link the numerous research ideas together. This framework for analysis is not just being used in order to provide systemic linkage of the competing arguments surrounding enlargement dynamics however, it is being used as a consequence of its open-ended nature, i.e. it will not result in a fixed answer. In other words, each variable will be assessed independently and within its own relevant chapter, consequently the extent of said variable's impact upon accession criteria will be qualified. This prevents a zero-sum argument taking place and allows the research to enter into a lengthy discussion intricately analysing each variable and its effects before a general assessment of all the variables can take place. Therefore, it is unlikely a definitive answer will be concluded upon but the research will be meticulous in analysing the detail and will be fundamentally unbiased. In assessing the six variables it will be important to use sources in order to verify difficulty in a candidate state's accession. Both primary and secondary sources will be used for this, with primary sources being particularly relevant to any discussion concerning Croatia as it has yet to formally accede. Each variable will be analysed in the same continuous fashion within its own chapter: explanation of what the variable is, evidence and analysis of the variable's occurrence from 2004 to present, followed by a discussion of how it impact's upon the difficulty of accession and whether or not that difficulty is increasing. It is expected that the European Commission's progress reports, key speeches, European Council conclusions and member state legislation will be used as primary sources whilst analyses of these will be derived from secondary sources. In addition, academic papers regarding accession will be detailed and included, where necessary, in each variable's assessment. These source documents will be relevant to this study's research because they will allow it to track temporal change, and thus potentially show increased difficulty in accession. Consequently, this dissertation will continue with a short introduction to enlargement that will allow the reader to obtain an easy understanding of the concept, within the confines of this study's discussion. This will be followed by an analysis of each of the six variables which will follow the pattern intricately detailed in the paragraph above. Following this, there will be a discussion section that will link the six variables together before a conclusion at the end, to summarise the findings of this research.

A preamble to enlargement The EU's most recent enlargement was that of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Although it is easy to follow this enlargement round as the "culmination of a process of rapprochement and integration with the EU underway since the revolutionary events of late 1989" and thus as part of a conclusion to the big bang enlargement round of 2004, it is also possible to view it as part of an independent round (Phinnemore, 2010, p.293). Indeed the events of 2007 seem to actually show the beginning of a new process in European enlargement behaviour, one that is harder and less 'controlled' by narrative and rhetoric. This is potentially as a result of the 2004 enlargement being so dominated by the narrative and rhetoric of events. The narrative of the post-cold war period was established by the Commission in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, when they declared that "the Community...will take the decisions necessary to strengthen its cooperation with people's desiring liberty, democracy, and progress" (Sedelmeier and Wallace, p.432). The rhetoric of events, stems from Frank Schimmelfenig's argument regarding 'rhetorical entrapment' whereby EU leaders were unable to control the narrative of events because of their historic rhetoric. Indeed, this is best noted In June 1993 where "the European Council in Copenhagen explicitly established the accession of Central and Eastern European states as an EU objective" (Schimmelfenning, 2001, pp.59-60). Considering the impact of the 2004 enlargement, it can be observed that the Romanian/Bulgarian enlargement was always conditional, unlike the 2004 'big bang' round, the most recent members to join the EU were always in the process but were to be reminded at all times that "further delay or even derailment...could not be ruled out" (Phinnemore, 2009, p.243). Despite this, European leaders (the Commission and member state representatives) did their best to articulate the 2007 enlargement as the finality of a central and eastern enlargement that merged the 2004 and 2007 rounds into one. This was illustrated by Oli Rehn , Commissioner for Enlargement, who said, after the EU enlarged to include Romania and Bulgaria, that "(t)he fifth enlargement round was completed" despite the fact that it was technically the sixth (Phinnemore, 2009, p.241). Therefore, we can view the experience of 2007 as an attempt to end the post-cold war narrative that so dominated the central and eastern enlargement rounds and the beginning of a new process which would be more stringent and less promising, by virtue of rhetoric. In other words, the attempts to merge the 2007 enlargement with that of 2004, can be seen as an attempt to make accession criteria more stringent, as leaders' promises and the pace of events are to be sidelined in the wake of post-cold war Europe. Without the additional support of narrative and rhetoric, which appears to be waning, one can expect accession to be a more difficult process. This is especially pertinent considering the body which is enlarging (the EU) will no longer feel a pre-determined destiny to the conclusion of the process, making the conclusion of future accession negotiations less certain. Some academics argue that EU enlargement is equivalent to a high-cost game between the EU and the applicant state, whereby "the EU's preferred outcome is to admit a reformed country while the applicants' preferred outcome is to obtain membership without fulfiling the requirements" (Brücker, Schröder and Weise, 2004, p.7). The reason for this assessment is that reform is costly and applicant nations are generally reticent to incur the costs. The evidence for this was perhaps most noticeable with the candidacy of Romania and Bulgaria whereby the Commission (in May 2006) reported that, of Romania, numerous reforms were still needed from "social policies and employment including public health" to "money laundering and the fight against fraud and corruption" to name a few (Commission Report, 2006, p.6). Regarding the lack of advancement with the criteria, the Commission went as far as to say that it could "take appropriate measures such as excluding this state from the benefits of certain internal market legislation" (Commission Report, 2006, p.8). The reason for the EU being equally reticent in admitting ill-reformed candidate countries is that "the present EU members...benefit most from admitting substantially reformed candidates" and thus as an organisation, the EU demands reform as a pre-requisite to admittance into the union (Brücker, Schröder and Weise, 2004, p.5). With the apparent decline of narrative and rhetoric in shaping the outcome of future enlargements, can it therefore be expected that conditionality and the power of the Commission will be more significant, as evidenced by this overview? Perhaps, considering the theory that the EU is an insitiutional learner which 'learns' from its mistakes. If the enlargement process being hijacked by the narrative and rhetoric of events in the late 90s/early 00s is contrasted with the "intensification of the use of conditionality and monitoring" in contemporary accession negotiations, one can certainly make an argument for institutional EU learning (Braniff, 2009, p.549). Indeed, should the EU have institutionally learnt how best to 'handle' enlargement it can be discerned that the process is contemporarily more within the remit of conditionality and the Commission's verdict in determining an applicant's outcome, making the process no longer constrained by the outcome of events.

Variables

1. Institutional Leadership At the inception of European enlargement the Commission's involvement was very much subordinate to that of the Member states who dominated the first accession negotiations in 1973. Indeed, during this first enlargement, it was perfectly clear not only that "the Commission was not assured a leading role"(Harst, 2007, p.543) in the process but that "responsibility lay clearly in the hands of the Member States" (Harst, 2007, p.553). However, over time the Commission's role would increase exponentially, as it "did not simply sit back" and accept its secondary status to the member states, who in turn learned that the process of accession required a technocracy dedicated to it (Harst, 2007, p.544). Consequently, with successive enlargement rounds the process would become ever more reliant on the experience, skills and the dedication of the Commission. Considering the new era of Commission influence, whereby it holds "a central role in the preparation and implementation of enlargement policy" it is of importance to decipher any role the Commission may have played in making accession an increasingly difficult target to attain (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009, p.271). Regarding the role of the Commission in accession negotiations, it is clear that it has assumed a position "both as a 'policy entrepreneur'...and as the arbitrator of the 'rules of the game'" (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009, p.153). In other words, the Commission establishes the conditions an applicant must meet and in addition, assesses their compliance with said conditions. Quite frankly, because the member states do not have the time or dedication to plan the process, increasingly enlargement "gets pushed down to Commissioners or to their cabinets" for them to deal with, making it the key European body for this study (Peterson, 2008, p.768). As occurred in the aforementioned accession round of 1973, for the 2004 enlargement the Commission was able to "exploit its...political mandate" and make itself the arbiter in the negotiations (Sedelmeier and Wallace, p.433). With its position solidified there is clear evidence of the Commission abusing its remit in order to expand it, as was clearly evidenced in its drive for regional policy initiatives. Indeed, it has been noted that "key actors within the Commission employed informal conditionality in the pursuit of their policy objectives" in order to achieve an extension of their own competencies via the control of regional policy in the acquis (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004, p.533). Despite the fact that chapter 21 (regional policy) of the acquis offered the Commission "little by way of leverage to assert conditionality", the Commission still enforced it (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004, p.532). In addition to this, in order to aid the accession prospects of applicants, the Commission helped design regional governmental law, for example it "openly acknowledged its direct involvement in the design of Romania's Law on Regional Development adopted in July 1998" (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004, p.538). It can therefore be inferred that the Commission effectively created additions to the acquis that were not necessary, making it harder for candidates to join, all in the name of expanding their own competencies. However, it is not entirely fair to simply chastise the Commission as an institution that fiddles the rules of the game because of a single incident in the run-up to the 2004 enlargement. Despite the fact that it has manipulated the acquis for its own benefit, more than any other institution it can claim to stick to the letter of the acquis considering its extensive monitoring reports which are subject to approval by the Council. With this in mind, it is important to note that for the 2004 accession "the EU developed a pre-accession stra