What Would You Understand To Be The Root Causes Of 'africa's Development Impasse'?

Africa is by far the least economically developed of the globe's continents. Although there are a few exceptions to the norm (exp Botswana), most African nations "fall in the 'least development countries' (LDCs) category", something no other continent can claim (Kornegay and Landsberg, 2009, p.172). Consequently, this research aims to discover what caused such a development impasse on the African continent by observing the role, and legacy of, imperialism, the role of developing nations, the responsibility of national governance and the lack of a pan-African leader.

Colonialism was merciless in Africa, virtually every corner of the continent was annexed by one of the western European powers in what would be termed the 'scramble for Africa' in the late 19th century. What was clear from the early era of African colonialism was the lack of European assistance in help with development and/or aid. Indeed, western parliaments insisted on self-sufficiency for their new colonies, in a matter of speaking "Africa had to pay for its own subjugation" (Young, 2004, p.26). Although this was not necessarily a unique situation, it was most definitely pronounced considering "the imposition of head taxes...and...forced labour" which continued into the 20th century (Young, 2004, p.26). The situation in Africa would however change in the 20th century, as the west's view on self sufficiency dramatically altered.

Subjugation by the west would be replaced by a period of developmentalism on the African continent. Indeed, "management of the economy...was solidly implanted in state reason well before the imperial flags were lowered" and as a consequence of this, western aid began to transfer to Africa (Young, 2004, p.28). However, this turn of events inadvertently caused another. In the absence of imperial rule, the African colonies were plunged into a bizarre hyper-nationalism that consumed the continent for several decades, and still lingers on to this day (see Zimbabwe). "Strong proclamations of a sense of self, as independent nations" were common place and were often said in defiance against their former imperialist occupiers (Cornelissen, 2009, p.8). This began a process akin to a 'land-grab' of literally everything, the post-colonial state was equated with freedom from imperialism and consequently state control was used as the vehicle to deconstruct it. Politically, dictatorships became the norm but economically too, state-controlled monopolisation was equally common, giving the political elite "the appearance of unchallenged strength" (Young, 2004, p. 36). This however, left their economies in a bad state of repair, whereby the west soon felt the need to become involved again.

The 1980s were a particularly poignant period in the history of African development. Freed from imperialism, but desperately poor, the region had the "additional burdens of deepening internal crises, structural adjustment(s) and growing external dependence" (Cornelissen, 2009, p.8). Considering this mêlée of economic and political issues, western leaders decided to act in aid of the continent but there would be conditions attached, this process became known as 'The Washington consensus'. Overwhelmed by huge state debts, the majority of African states "had little option but to accept...the 'structural adjustment' programmes proposed" by the west's aid conditions (Young, 2004, p. 38). This programme for economic aid has largely continued to inform the west's aid operations in present day Africa but its success is somewhat limited. Indeed, this could not be more obvious than in the situation with South African business which has "been able to gain significant access to markets in the continent" (Alden and Le Pere, 2009, p.156). This demonstrates the problems associated with aid conditionality and the continued issue of colonialism, which still informs the paternalistic mantra of the western powers. Political aid is not however echoed by the emerging markets of the present day, who have a substantial economic interests in their fellow colonised and subjugated brethren.

The west's interference in Africa was matched in Asia, but whereas Africa fell into steep economic decline in the 1980s, the Asian markets began to develop rapidly. These nations have substantial interest in their African counterparts and have commonality in that they have a "shared history of external Western subjugation" (Schoeman, 2011, p.35). This shared sense of identity is matched by a shared desire for economic cooperation and as such; trade between the two is "growing exponentially" (Schoeman, 2011, p.38). This has resulted in a massive change of fortunes for the African economy, whose "development prospects now appear brighter than at any time since the decade of independence" (Andreasson, 2011, p.1166). The new southern partnership, between Africa and the developing world is consolidated by "reciprocal benefits, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of partners" in other words, trade relations are not conditional (Schoeman, 2011, p. 37). Consequently, one could argue that African trade with the global south is preferable to that with the west as it is free from imperialist/paternalistic baggage and is seen as mutually beneficial.

Despite this new African era, there is reason to remain sceptical for Africa's development prospects, as general practice in international political economy implies conditionality as a necessary evil. This comes from the general mantra "that political institutions and outcomes are shaped by economic conditions, and vice versa", in other words a strong political interior is a pre-requisite for a strong economy (Adam and Dercon, 2009, p.178). Unfortunately for Africa, history affirms this theory, as in the 1980s' period of "development assistance" Africa remained poor whilst the same treatment posited high returns for Asia (Adam and Dercon, 2009, p.176). Consequently, one must ask whether the assistance of the emerging markets in Africa's tenuous development is actually beneficial and whether the West's insistence on conditionality is something of a blessing in disguise? Indeed, it could be argued that the BRICs are actually organising in Africa in a manner some might call new imperialism. This position is somewhat solidified by the fact that Africa's exports to the global south are almost entirely the same as what they trade with the western powers, natural resources. Indeed "67 per cent" of African exports to the south consist of primary products, which is virtually identical to what they trade with the EU (Schoeman, 2011, p. 38). These statistics beg to differ with the BRIC's argument for mutual assistance, and could in fact point to continued subjugation for Africa.

Africa's natural resource wealth encourages further developmental scepticism as it has provided the continent with few returns, despite strong export potential. Indeed, "Africa has 60 percent of the world's uncultivated, arable land" and Asian countries such as "China, Korea, Saudi Arabia and Qatar" have substantial interests in this area (Schoeman, 2011, p.41). This suggests that Africa always had the potential to become a vibrant energy-exporting economy but was held back by the west and its conditionality, as it is presently exporting said goods to the developing southern economies. However, it can also be argued that African governments may be responsible themselves for the impasse, as for example "the Ajaokuta integrated steel project in Nigeria" produced little exported steel but "swallowed up several billion dollars in capital, mostly borrowed abroad" (Young, 2004, p.39). Fundamentally, Africa has always had the global potential to be a major energy export market but that hasn't happened until now. Although the aforementioned hyper-nationalism that enveloped Africa as a result of post-colonialism had a big part to play in its energy development impasse, the central fact is it was not the western powers that physically mismanaged the economy, it was the African nations themselves. The sincere lack of domestic African political development is replicated in continental leadership.

A collective continental voice is imperative if Africa is to prevent itself from being subjugated by the old and new global powers in the current century, but without a current common African position this is unlikely. Instead, multi-national agreements between African states tend to deteriorate "into 'the one and the many' to the detriment of the continent's collective interest" (Kornegay and Landsberg, 2009, p.175). Much emphasis has been placed upon South Africa as a regional leader but as scholars have pointed out, it is in fact only a diplomatic power, and even that is tenuously linked to its post-apartheid status with the west. Indeed, scholars have argued that South Africa is "accorded much greater significance due to aggregate economic figures and its domestic development level" which ignores its well-known social problems, preventing it from being a respected regional hegemon (Alden and Le Pere, 2009, p.149). Even on a southern African basis its hegemonic status can be questioned, as it is "doing 'very little' to promote development in Southern Africa" (Andreasson, 2011, p.1175). Therefore, if South Africa's sub-continental leadership is debatable, it can hardly be considered a continent-wide leader. The alternatives of Egypt and Nigeria suffer from many of the same problems associated with South Africa and for the time being have smaller economies than it, but with burgeoning growth rates both have the potential to become future economic leaders for the continent. Until then however, Africa is in a state of limbo, stuck with South Africa unable to provide continent-wide leadership but remaining the largest economy.

The issue of not being able to find a continental leader could benefit "powerful countries like BRIC at the expense of marginalised countries" and thus trap Africa into a position of ultimate global subservience (Andreasson, 2011, p.1172). One can easily point to the issue of there being "no guidelines forthcoming from the AU to deal with what clearly is a scramble for minerals and energy access by external actors" as an example of continental disunity (Kornegay and Landsberg, 2009, p.177). Without supranational leadership, African states are set at a strategic disadvantage with any potential external trading partners. This has resulted in the phenomenon of external nations holding conferences with multiple African states, such as China's FOCAC (the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). Although these forums are evidently economically beneficial, "overlapping membership of several alliances has diluted...incentives toward collective...action on the continent" meaning that these large-scale economic conferences fail to deliver on the important political aspects of development (Cornelissen, 2009, p. 20). But more than this, it allows the powerful nations of the world to pick and choose which African nations they want to trade with. This scenario unravels the benefit of being the 'swing continent' in international relations because such agreements tend to lack "any substantive African input into their drafting" allowing the larger economies of the world significant leverage over Africa (Kornegay and Landsberg, 2009, p.176). Therefore, the lack of a strong pan-African forum to establish a collective voice for the continent is doing significant damage to its development prospects. Without such an institution economically powerful nations can divide and rule the continent to their own strategic advantage, potentially plunging Africa into a new era of dependency.

As a result of the evidence provided, it is extremely difficult to establish a central reason for Africa's development impasse. From its inception colonialism was very much exploitative, and it left Africa craving nationalism as a direct response to its subjugation. Consequently, the post-colonial African state became the embodiment of freedom which in turn created an ironic display of dictatorships and monopolistic dynasties the continent over. Admittedly this happened a long time ago, the problem is however, that the imperialist past of the west informs their current behaviour towards Africa, as seen in the paternalistic manner in which they demand structural changes in exchange for aid. Although, political economy asserts the interconnectivity of politics and economics, the west's ventures in Africa have yielded little by way of results. Problematically, in the new world order the BRIC nations are of increasing economic importance, who have the potential to divide and rule Africa, particularly as a result of a lack of strong supranational leadership and/or hegemonic power to speak for the entire region. Therefore, there is no central reason for Africa's development impasse, it is the result of a myriad of problems, both internal and external. Until the motives of the developing economies are revealed and Africa learns to come to terms with its past, in turn becoming a more cohesive body, it may well remain underdeveloped and impoverished, ripe for the taking in the new world order.

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