Did The British Public Support The Policy Of Appeasement?

The British public opinion of appeasement was one that varied throughout the 1930 s. Appeasement is typically associated with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his efforts to pacify an aggressive Germany in an attempt to avoid a second world war. In the early 1930 s, public opinion exceedingly supported appeasement, which is seen through the Oxford un ion King and Country debate, the East-Fulham by-election and the League of Nations Peace Ballot. It was clear that there was an overall consensus to avoid rearmament and preserve peace, thus supporting Chamberlain s policy of appeasement. However, this was only to a limited extent as, when the outbreak of war drew closer, opinions began to shift which was particularly evident after the Munich conference in 1938 with by-elections in Oxford City, Dartford and Bridgwater. This essay will strive to highlight the fluidity of public opinion on appeasement in the 1930 s.

The historiography surrounding public opinion in regard to appeasement is extensive. James Levy draws attention to the fact that whilst Britain was pursuing the policy of appeasement, she was also rearming. Norrin Ripsman argues a similar line and, like Levy, agrees that appeasement allows time to level the military playing field between Britain and Germany, rather than it being a strategy fuelled by fear and moral corruption . This is significant as one reason why the public supported appeasement was because it allowed Britain time to rearm. Daniel Hucker and Robert Eatwell bring attention to the Munich agreement and its importance in changing public opinion. Eatwell believes that it is symbolic of foreign policy failure and served drastic consequences to the National Government. Furthermore, Hucker argues that it was the fault of the Munich agreement that the public became less enamoured with the policy of appeasement. This is significant as it explains the shift in public opinion following the Munich agreement, as the public grew suspicious of Hitler s foreign policy aims.

The public opinion on appeasement changed throughout the 1930 s. In the early 1930 s, public opinion overwhelmingly supported Chamberlain s policy of appeasement. This is evident with the notorious Oxford un ion King and Country debate in February 1933. The university undergraduate debating society ruled that this house would not in any circumstances fight for King and Country which suggests a sense of pacifism among the ruling classes. Following on from this, in October 1933, the constituency of East-Fulham experienced a by-election after the death of the incumbent Conservative MP, Sir Kenyon Vaughan-Morgan. In the previous election, Vaughan-Morgan had a comfortable majority of 42%. The by-election was seen as a test of growing pacifism, as at this time, the National Government were focusing on rearmament, and so it became known as the peace election . The Labour candidate, George Lansbury, ran an anti-rearmament campaign and proclaimed that he would close every recruiting station and disband the army . The East Fulham by-election was significant in depicting public opinion as the results showed a 15% majority for the Labour party. A. J. P. Taylor has argued that the election had little to do with foreign policy and instead suggested that electors voted on issues such as the means test, unemployment and housing conditions. However, its significance should not be understated, as in the previous eight by-elections, the average swing against the National Government was 12.6%, whereas in East Fulham it was 26.5%. This shows that public opinion in the early 1930 s was supportive of disarmament and non-military solutions and so would be in favour of Chamberlain s policy of appeasement. A third event that significantly depicted public opinion was the League of Nations Peace Ballot in 1934. The National Declaration Conference stated that the only objective of the ballot was to show the support for a successful peace policy through the League of Nations. This is precisely what the results depicted as a staggering 11 and a half million people voted, and they voted overwhelmingly in support of the League. Thus, this shows how public opinion supported Chamberlain s policy of appeasement, as people favoured peaceful solutions compared to military alternatives. For instance, questions 5a and 5b showed that 10,027,608 people were in support of implementing economic and non-military means on an aggressive nation, compared to 6,784,368 who believed military measures would be necessary. Therefore, public opinion in the early to mid 1930 s was supportive of the idea of disarmament and finding peaceful or economic solutions, and therefore supported Chamberlain s policy of appeasement to avoid a war and military conflict. In 1938, after Chamberlain s visit to Germany to sign the Munich agreement, and after famously declaring peace for our time , there was widespread approval of appeasement as people remained desperate to avoid another war. For instance, on his return, Chamberlain received 20,000 letters and telegrams thanking him for averting war and in a British poll taken immediately after the Munich agreement, 57% agreed they were satisfied with his leadership. The Daily Mail asserted that Chamberlain was now an undisputed leader who the public trust and are extremely grateful for. Similarly, The Daily Express stated that Chamberlain was right and the likes of critics such as Churchill and Duff Cooper were wrong. Public opinion was so fiercely pro-appeasement and anti-rearmament, because the horrors of the First World War were still remembered and, in fact, visible through the disabled veterans in society. There was also a sense that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh on Germany and therefore she should be allowed some concessions. For instance, in 1938, one of Churchill s constituents wrote him a letter urging him to understand how badly the Germans had suffered since the First World War. Therefore, there is clear, widespread support for Chamberlain s policy of appeasement in order to avoid another war throughout the early and mid 1930 s.

Although there was some evidence that public opinion was relieved following the Munich agreement, opinions were fluid and the Foreign Office realised there was less support for Munich than initially thought. There was growing scepticism of Hitler s foreign policy plans and increasing concern over Chamberlain s leadership. For instance, in seven by-elections between October and November in 1938, the government suffered badly. This was particularly significant in Oxford City, Dartford and Bridgwater. Oxford City had been a safe Conservative seat since 1885. The election was fought predominantly on appeasement with Roy Harrod, a Christ Church economist, stating that foreign policy transcends all others in importance. The candidates included Quinton Hogg, a strong supporter of the National Government and A.D. Lindsay, a fierce opponent of appeasement. The results depicted only a small victory for Hogg as he won with only a 3434 majority in a Conservative stronghold. This shows growing division and opposition with the policy of appeasement. The second contest was held in Dartford, and it was here the Conservatives suffered their first defeat. The victorious Labour Party candidate, J. L. Adamson, stated that the primary issue in the election was again foreign policy. Adamson s victory had highlighted the growing protests against appeasement and the direction of Chamberlain s foreign policy. The by-election at Bridgwater also emphasised the developing objections to appeasement as it was typically a safe Conservative seat, however, the Liberal candidate, Vernon Bartlett, finished victorious. Again, the election had been fought on predominantly foreign policy grounds as Bartlett constantly attacked Chamberlain s weak and vacillating foreign policy . Therefore, despite initial thoughts that the Munich agreement was received positively, there were numerous protest votes against the government s foreign policy. Furthermore, opinion polls taken after the Munich agreement in 1938-39, also showed the increasing opposition to appeasement. For instance, when asked whether they believe if Hitler will not make any more territorial gains, 93% said they did not believe him. Furthermore, when asked about the public s view on the policy of appeasement, only 28% believed it was a policy that would gain lasting peace in Europe, whilst 46% agreed it would give Britain time to rearm but would not stop a future war. 24% also believed appeasement was whetting the appetite of the dictators. For some, Munich also symbolised great shame with the Manchester Guardian calling it the funeral of British honour . Additionally, the British public developed a sense of responsibility to maintain the stability of world order. Thus, the extent to which the public opinion agreed with appeasement was limited as, although it was overwhelmingly supported in the early 1930 s, as Hitler made more ambitious territorial gains in Europe, the attitude towards appeasement quickly changed to one of concern.

To conclude, the extent to which British public opinion was in favour of the policy of appeasement was limited as it changed throughout the 1930 s as Britain approached war. There was considerably more support in the early and mid 1930 s which can be seen in the Oxford un ion King and Country debate, the East Fulham by-election and the League of Nations Peace Ballot. However, as war approached, and Hitler became more aggressive, public opinion changed to be less supportive. This can be witnessed particularly after the Munich agreement in by-elections such as Oxford City, Dartford and Bridgwater. Therefore, the extent to which public opinion supports the policy of appeasement was limited.