The Rise Of The Far Right Since The 1980s

Since the 1980s, there has been a drastic rise in the number of niche parties (Spies and Franzmann, 2011: p.1044) on the political stage in many European countries. Among the most prolific of these are those belonging to the populist radical right party family (Rydgren, 2005: p.413), ranging from Jean-Marie Le Pen s breakthrough Front Nationale through to the recent threat of UKIP success in Britain (Seth-Smith, 2013). This essay seeks to address the main reasons for this rise, identifying the interplay and importance of two factors the emergence of a new master frame (Rydgren, 2005: p.416) that has helped to de-stigmatise populist radical right wing politics from its association with the old right of Nazism and Fascism (Rydgren, 2005: p.413), and the presence of political opportunity structures that contextualise the ability of populist radical right parties to compete for votes (Spies & Franzmann, 2011: p.1046). The development of the new master frame of populist radical right parties will be analysed in parallel with the political opportunity structures that both effect, and are affected by the rhetorical impact of PRRPs within domestic and transnational contexts.

There exist many different ways of classifying far right parties within the literature, which can lead to a lack of conceptual clarity (van Spanje, 2011: pp.295-296) when it comes to which parties to analyse. In light of this, this essay uses Mudde s term Populist Radical Right Parties (2007, 2013) to group together parties that share a core ideology that includes the combination of (at least) nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2013: p.3). This essay will begin by outlining the way in which nativism, authoritarianism fit into the master frame (Rydgren, 2005: pp.413-414) characteristic of these parties. A frame in this sense, is an interprerative schemata that acts as a way of reducing into simple terms the complexities of social, economic and political phenomena and relations (Snow and Benford, 1992 cited in Rydgren, 2005: p.426). Framing is here viewed as a discursive practice in that it shapes and places limits on the way in which knowledge of phenomena is produced, discussed and reasoned (Hall, 2001: p.72.).

One way in which Rydgren distinguishes between the old frame of the far right which lost resonance after the Second World War experience of fascism (Arzheimer, 2009: p.259) and the new frame that emerged from the French intellectual Nouvelle Droite (New Right), is through discussion of the emergence of the concept of ethnopluralism (Rydgren, 2007: p.427). Ethnopluralism states a belief in the differences (but not inferiority) and the incompatibility between different ethnic groups, and the need to preserve unique national characters by keeping them separate (Rydgren, 2005: p.427). The recasting of biological racism to cultural racism (Rydgren, 2007: p.478) is of utmost importance to the rise of populist radical right parties as it permits PRRP s to take advantage of latent xenophobic and racist public attitudes without being stigmatised as being racists (Rydgren, 2005: p.428). As an ideology, nativism holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ( the nation ) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state. (Mudde, 2007: p.19).

The second integral factor to the rise of the PRRPs and the master frame as conceptual schema refers to anti-establishment populism. The prevalence of anti-establishment, but not anti-democratic, values within the master frame of the new PRRP s is central to their distinction from old right parties, and by extension their success, as the majority of Western European voters are pro-democracy, and perceive parties with anti-democratic values to be illegitimate (Rydgren, 2003: p.51). Populist radical right wing parties rhetorically place themselves in opposition to a constructed image of the mainstream political class and parties as homogenous and indistinct from each other (Rydgren, 2005: p.427), exploiting pre-existing sensibilities in regards to the way mainstream political parties are perceived to have converged (Kitschelt, 2002 cited in Spies and Franzmann, 2011: p.1048 and Rydgren, 2005: p.422), allowing them to be seen as a party offering a real alternative, which is usually bolstered by their lack of an incumbency record against which they can be criticised (Hainsworth, 2007:p.108). Additionally, parties such as the Danish People s Party have been careful not to associate themselves with racist or anti-democratic groups (Rydgren, 2007: p.487) so as to be in a position to plausibly defend themselves against charges of racism or anti-democratic values. The electoral breakthrough of the French Front Nationale in 1984 (Rydgren, 2005: p.416) using the masterframe of ethnopluralism and anti-establishment populism provided a model that could be diffused across national borders, hence the similarities between PRR parties within different political systems(Rydgren, 2005: p.415), and is therefore central to the rise of PRRPs in Europe.

This essay will now go on to discuss the way in which the master frame, encompassing the tenets of ethnopluralism and anti-establishment populism that have been discussed so far, interacts with both pre-existing political opportunity structures and participates in the creation of new political opportunity structures. It will argue that this interaction opens political space for PRRPs to emerge by exploiting and exacerbating socio-political cleavages and in turn allows PRRPs to position themselves as owning newly politicised issues such as immigration (Rydgren, 2007: p.492). It will in turn argue that this occurs through a myriad of processes that shape the political context on both a transnational and domestic level, and that these factors are reinforced and entrenched through processes of legitimisation, adoption by the mainstream (be it the media or mainstream parties), and increased salience of an issue on a national and transnational level.

The definition of political opportunity structures used in this essay follows Tarrow 1998 that they are consistent but not necessary formal, permanent, or national resources that are external to the party or movement in question. (cited in Rydgren, 2007: p.476). The perceived increases in immigration in many European nations (Mudde, 2007: pp.210-212) since the 1980s through to the 2000 s has resulted in a political opportunity structure that allows PRRPs to increase the salience of the immigration issue through recourse to rhetoric grounded based on the perceived challenge that immigrant ethnic groups pose to the integrity and stability of national identity. In constructing ethnic difference and incompatibility in a way that is plausibly defensible from charges of racisms, PRRPs place themselves in a position to take advantage of political opportunity structures that concern the perception of a myriad of threats facing a native population, as well as mobilising underlying xenophobic and racist sentiment (Werts et al, 2012: p.18 and Rydgren, 2003: p.49).The notion of incompatibility is manifest within the literature in the discussion of immigrant values vs. traditional values of the native population, and has been shown to be an important factor for support of PRRPs, for example in the form of support for the British National Party (Rhodes, 2011: p.108), the Danish People s Party (Rydgren, 2007: p.482) and the Front National s growth since 1982 and large successes in the first round of the 2002 presidential election (Hainsworth, 2007: pp.101-102). PRRPs have in many cases succeeded in adopting policy lines that soften their image as regards immigration, making them appear reasonable and less associated with old right policies of simply removing all immigrants, as was the case with the Front National when it moved towards a policy of helping immigrants to return to their home countries within a framework of development co-operation (Hainsworth, 2007: p.106).

Emphasis on the immigration issue is bound up in the rise and fall of socio-economic and socio-political cleavages and the political opportunity structures these represent in regards to the emergence of niches in the political arena and the politicisation of new issues (Rydgren, 2005: p.418). Ignazi argues that the structural conditions of post-industrial society has seen to the decline in socio-economic cleavages and the rise in salience of issues such as immigration, morality and national pride (1996: p.557) in response to the loss of bonds of family, kinship and (small) community (Ignazi, 1996: p.557) people want to hold on to what they have in the face of perceived threats of globalisation (Mudde 2007: p.223), manifest in concerns around immigration, and seek solace in the simple messages of the populist radical right (Mudde, 2007: p.223). The rise of socio-political cleavages and previously non-politicised issues like immigration, and the demise of socio-economic dimensions that characterised working class voting preferences in the industrial age (Rydgren, 2007: p.490), destabilises the political arena and allows for new issues to come to the fore which is of advantage to PRRPs employing the newly formulated master frame. The frame is capable of providing both a reason for these perceived insecurities and threats, such as resource allocation going towards ethnic minorities and not natives, identified by Rhodes as a factor in BNP support in the U.K (2011: pp.111-113), and positions PRRPs as having the solution (Rydgren, 2005: p.426).

Due to the decrease in voter trust in mainstream political institutions and discontentment with parties that has been seen across Europe (Rydgren, 2005: p.422), PRRPs are able to capitalise on being seen to have solutions to new issues. PRRPs, through their ability to respond quickly to growing niches or newly politicised issues through employment of the master frame, are able to benefit from political opportunity structures in a way that mainstream parties are not due to constraints such as ideological commitment and identification which means there is a time lag between the voters and the parties movements within the political space (Rydgren, 2003: p.50) when a newly politicised issue emerges. Opportunity structures exist that enable the issue of immigration to be tied in with other political issues that further enables PRRPs to maintain the prominence of the issue within the political field for example ownership of the immigration issue is seen as central to the rise of PRRPs as it acts as the policy through which other policies flow (Hainsworth, 2007: p.106).. The perceived security crisis and the perception of a security threat from a particular ethnic group in the post-9/11 climate can provide an opportunity for PRRPs to re-politicise the immigrant question, framed in security terms (Hirsch-Hoeffler et al, 2010: pp.681-682) and gain support. Further, the issue of European un ion membership and the Eurozone crisis can similarly be seen as a political opportunity structure to be mobilised by PRRPs, in the form of Euroscepticism (Mudde, 2013: p.7, p.12 & p.15), in light of the facilitating role it plays in the proliferation of immigration in Europe and the concerns about continental interconnectedness that the Eurozone crisis has engendered.

Further to this, the politicization of new issues (especially the immigration question) is of great importance, not least because it may grant [PRR] parties increased media coverage (Rydgren, 2005: p.422). The attention given to these issues is further increased within and by the media where the perspectives on issues that PRRPs can claim ownership of are shared and supported by tabloid papers and news outlets (Mudde, 2007: pp.248-249). This tabloidization of discourse represents a favourable discursive political opportunity structure (Mudde, 2013: p.15) and helps to maintain the political salience of issues close to the heart of PRRPs, and thus its salience in the mind of the electorate which can lead to increased support for PRRPs. Once an issue such as immigration reaches the popular consciousness, mainstream parties are forced to confront it, as politicians react not just to the indirect threat posed by electoral competition from the far right but also to more direct evidence of voter and media concern about real or perceived problems (Bale et al, 2010: p.411). The perceived movement of the electorate towards the PRRP position on a socio-political issue can have a significant impact on the positioning of both mainstream left and right parties, and consequently on the legitimisation of PRRP issues in political discourse (Spies & Franzmann, 2011: p.1049). Bale et al outline the challenges posed by PRRPs and responses from social democrat parties a party will hold its position...defuse a new political issue...adopt the RRP stance (2010: pp.412-414) but the authors acknowledge that often the actual strategies employed by these parties involve a mixture of the three (2010: p.412). The uptake of PRRP positions and rhetoric by mainstream parties (largely on the right)(Mudde, 2013: p.8) functions to legitimise to some extent, PRRP positions (Rydgren, 2005: p.424) Once the conceptual schema of the masterframe succeeds in becoming prevalent in the mind of the electorate, and legitimised by mainstream parties and tabloid media, these structures are self-reinforcing and function to exacerbate and entrench concerns around issues such as immigration that have been newly politicised by PRRPs, explaining their rise.

The analysis presented by this essay emphasises the importance of both the creation of a general new radical right masterframe that distinguishes PRRPs from their old right and fascist predecessors which can be employed by nascent radical right parties within specific contexts, and the importance of analysing the variable and contextually determined political opportunity structures that present themselves to parties as opportunities to reconfigure political space, take ownership of issues and raise them to the positions of a salient discourse within a polity. In utilising the masterframe that denigrates mainstream parties, enables de-stigmatisation and mobilisation of nascent xenophobic attitudes and positions PRRPs as holding solutions to the problems that they, in part, politicise.

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