Was There An Opportunity For Peace In The Cold War Immediately Following Stalin`s Death?

This essay seeks to address the credibility of the claim that there was, following Stalin s death in 1953, an opportunity for peace between the U.S.S.R and the allied Western Powers, particularly the U.S. It will do so by addressing three main points. Firstly, the perceived change to Soviet ideology on both a domestic and an international scale in the years immediately following the death of Stalin, and the process of de-stalinisation that took place domestically in Russia will be analysed alongside increased participation by the Soviets in conferences and the U.N. The essay will then analyse Soviet actions in the Eastern Bloc and Germany in regards to a manifestation of this perceived change in ideology and how, far from being a stark departure from the foreign policy of Stalin s later years, Soviet action reflected only increased pragmatism in regards to the goal of maintaining a unified Eastern Bloc. It will illustrate that the only opportunity for peace, centring on a unified Germany, was swiftly lost and that Soviet responses to the Berlin uprising in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956 helped to confirm Allied fears over the U.S.S.R s intentions for unification. Finally, the essay will focus on mutual antagonisms that emanated from both sides and served to reinforce their respective perceptions of the enemy, as well as on the eventual decline of relations due to the Soviet acquisition of Inter-continental ballistic missile delivery systems and the ensuing antagonism of Khrushchev. The essay will conclude that the opportunity for peace following Stalin s death was negligible and that the actions of both the U.S and U.S.S.R regarding Eastern Europe, continuation of the policy of containment, and the acquisition of weapons represent the fact that peace was unlikely ever to be achieved.

Historians often cite the internal ideological shift that took place within the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin as an opportunity for peace. McCauley states that the Soviet un ion had moved away from Stalin s two-camp theory whereby everyone who was not for the USSR was against it. It was now accepted that there were many roads to Socialism (McCauley, 1995: p.42). Indeed, it may be easy to perceive that the increased Soviet involvement in diplomatic initiatives and occasional concessions (Levering, 2005: p.58) signified an opportunity for peace, as the U.S.S.R became more involved in the U.N, gaining support from anti-colonialist African and Asian states, as well as playing a significant role in the 1954 Geneva conferences to discuss the future of Indo-China and Korea (Hanak, 1972: p.6). The U.S.S.R also took part in the 1954 conference to discuss holding all-German elections (Hanak, 1972: p.6), and perhaps the most significant concession of all made by the U.S.S.R was at the 1955 Geneva conference, where Molotov rescinded Soviet demands that Austria and Germany be treated together and led to the 1955 Austrian State Treaty which saw the occupying troops of the four powers leave the country (Hanak, p.7). Hanak states that these conferences showed the Soviet leaders as reasonable and polite men anxious for the peace of the world (1972: p.8). When coupled with the establishment by the Central Committee of a commission to investigate Stalin s crimes (Filtzer, 1993: p.15) and denouncement of Stalin by Khrushchev in his Secret Speech to the 20^th Party Conference in 1956 (McCauley, 1995: p.43), as well as the release of several million political prisoners (Filtzer, 1993: p.14) and exiled nationalities being allowed to return to their native lands (Leonhard, 1957: p.288), it would appear that the Stalinist mould was being broken and that serious negotiations could take place with the Soviets (McCauley, 1995: p.39)

However, there are significant problems that occur when taking these developments at face value. On the commission established to investigate Stalin s crimes, Filtzer cites its limited mandate and how it did not investigate the brutalities of forced collectivisation the hardships and repressions of the urban population during industrialisation the Show Trials of 1929-1931 and only dealt with crimes against top ranking officials, and not with the repression of ordinary citizens (1993: p.19). The commission represented a critique of Stalin the person, not of the Stalinist system. To this extent, there had been no significant shift from the system of Stalinism, only rhetoric that this system had been subject to abuse. In so far as the international face of post-Stalin Russia, Khrushchev s concern for world peace was genuine but only in so far as he felt it was in the interests of the Soviet State, citizens and the cause of world communism (Hanak, 1972: p.11). The concessions made by Khrushchev and his involvement of the U.S.S.R in conferences and the U.N followed the Marxist-Leninist policy of Peaceful Co-existence (Hanak, 1872: pp.9-10). Like Stalin, Khrushchev was committed to, and saw, the progress of world revolution as linked to the expanding geo-political and territorial influence of the Soviet Union (Gaddis, 1997: p.203), and so the aim of peaceful co-existence was to be cautious in encouraging national liberation movements that would keep up the pressure on, and undermine, the Western capitalist system (Hanak, 1972: pp.9-10).

The idea that Khrushchev s approach was a stark departure from the aggression of Stalin s foreign policy is inaccurate at best: Stalin was pragmatic in his dealings with China (so as not to ally too heavily and provoke confrontation with the West), and allowed for concessions in Hungary and Bulgaria by ordering competitive elections (Gati, 1984: p.217). Gati even states that Stalin advocated peaceful co-existence as early as the 1950s, and that, as well as being aggressive, he was also a cautious guardian of the Soviet Union s international interests (1984: pp.217). It can be concluded from the misrepresentation of Stalin s later foreign policy that Khrushchev s administration recognised, and supported, Stalin s idea that there was no way to avoid confrontations between the forces of Socialism and Imperialism (Gati, 1984: p.220). The caution Stalin pursued was merely extended under Khrushchev due to the recent advancements in nuclear technology making on-the-ground confrontation unfeasible and highly costly (Hanak, 1972: p.9) to achieve the same aims as Stalin. To this extent, the belief that the death of Stalin led to an increased opportunity for peace, seems decidedly misplaced. At best, the desire to reduce international tension was pursued in order to gain a breathing spell (Gati, 1984). This essay will now look deeper into the Soviet goal of Eastern Bloc unity as an example of maintaining Soviet geo-political and territorial influence, the concessions made to maintain it, and the brief opportunity of peace that Beria s German unification programme provided.

Gaddis highlights how a divided Germany was the most significant barrier to peace in the Cold War as both powers wanted unification, but only as it suited their cause (1997: p.124). The paranoia present on both sides over each other s intentions for a unified Germany led to the hardening of the presence of a divided Germany into an improbable but indefinite status quo (Gaddis, 1997: p.124) that became a focal point for the Cold War. Both parties feared a militarised Germany (Gaddis, 1997: p.134), with the West being pre-occupied with goals of deterring the Russians and reassuring the Europeans (Gaddis, 1997: p.131). Following the death of Stalin, a brief window of opportunity for peace was opened, as Deputy Premier Beria proposed the need for a unified and peaceful Germany regardless of its socialist status (Gaddis, 1997: p.129), however Beria was tried with treason and executed, which paved the way for continuation of Stalin s pre-1952 policy of restraint by his colleagues and denouncing rapid socialisation in favour of a modest approach (Gaddis, 1997: pp.130-131). The Berlin Uprising of 1953 occurred due to the imposition of the new course put forward by Soviet leaders after the failure of Ulbricht s rapid socialisation programme that included collectivising agriculture, taxing private industry heavily and led to food shortages and the flight of thousands of East Germans, to the extent that the Soviet un ion intervened to halt Ulbricht s policies (Ostermann, 1996: pp.62-64). The ensuing riots of over 500,000 people in 560 German towns (Ostermann, 1996: p.64) were finally halted after the Soviets entered with tanks to crush the rebellion (Gati, 1990: p.32). The actions of the Russians served to confirm in the mind of the West that the U.S.S.R was expansionist. Russian intervention and subsequent support of Ulbricht, motivated by the desire to not appear weak, cemented the continuation of a divided Germany and removed any chance of reunification (Gaddis, 1997: p.135). As a result of the Russian intervention, the West did not believe the Russians would ever allow fully free German elections at the 1954 conference in Geneva, and this was confirmed when Segrevich met Ulbricht to assure him that elections would only take place with his consent (McCauley, 1995: p.40).

In regards to Soviet goal for Eastern Bloc unity, Gati states that:

the modified post-Stalin Soviet approach to Eastern Europe comprised two basic propositions: (1) Continued commitment to the twin goals of bloc endurance and the maintenance of one-party communist regimes in Eastern Europe. (2) New willingness to make concessions as to assure the blocs endurance and the maintenance of one-party communist regimes. (1990: p.34)

To this extent, Soviet policy could be more outwardly pragmatic, and concessions were given, but only insofar as they did not affect the unity of the bloc, as had been the case towards the end of Stalin s life. For example, MacCauley highlights soviet restraint during the Polish uprising in 1956, whereby they did not intervene militarily to stop it and allowed a certain amount of nationalism and national communism under Gomulka, provided Poland remained a close Soviet ally (McCauley, 1995: pp. 46-47). He further highlights the attempts by Khrushchev at rapprochement with the Yugoslavs and Tito (1995: p.39) without fully reincorporating them into the bloc after their expulsion from the Cominform under Stalin (Yergin, 1990: p.382). As these concessions did not threaten unity, the Soviet un ion could pursue peaceful and pragmatic relations, unlike in Stalin s early years whereby he sought to smother resistance in his sphere, not compromise with it (Gaddis, 1997: p.203).

However, smothering did take place when necessary. The example of Hungary exemplifies the fact that the Kremlin would use force when necessary to maintain unity. Levening highlights that, in response to the leniency shown to Poland in 1956, students in Hungary staged protests in the October to demand Imre Nagy be permitted to overhaul Hugary s Stalinist system , to which the Soviets agreed. Once Nagy announced that Hungary would leave the Warsaw pact and permit the creation of opposition parties, however, the Soviets intervened militarily to crush the rebellion, declare martial law, and execute Nagy (2005: p.67). Clearly, when it suited the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R would make concessions, but if bloc unity was threatened, force was resorted to. To this extent, there was a continuation of foreign policy from the late-Stalin era to the Khrushchev era, as Gati highlights, the record of Soviet foreign policy indicates tactical adjustments rather than lasting developments (1984: p.225). The commitment to the same Stalinist goals, despite marginally increased flexibility in regards to the bloc, meant there was little opportunity for peace, despite the concessions made to Austria, Poland and the Yugoslavs under Khrushchev that have been highlighted. There had been no significant departure from the overall goal of maintaining unity and Soviet geo-political and territorial influence, something that, as this essay will now go on to analyse, ensured continual conflict with the U.S.

One of the major shortcomings of the Eisenhower administration was a continued commitment to the policy of containment in the post-Stalin era and a refusal to treat the new Khrushchev administration as a blank slate an opportunity to make peace (Gaddis, 1982: p.189). The strategy of containment, as Kennan and its other architects understood it, sought to prevent the Soviet un ion from controlling defeated, but still potentially dangerous, enemies (Gaddis, 1997: p.199), and was continued under Eisenhower and the staunch anti-communist Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Hanak highlights the nature of Dulles rhetoric, that communism was not only to be contained , it was to be rolled back and the peoples of Eastern Europe were to be liberated the U.S would not hesitate to go to the brink of war (1972: p.6). Under Eisenhower and Dulles, the U.S.S.R continued to represent the communist menace and not only the main obstacle to America s continued dominance but also the only long-range military and ideological threat to the survival of Western Civilisation (Bialer, 1980: p.233). This perception, that the threat to U.S interest and ideology presented by the U.S.S.R could only be counteracted by direct or indirect uses or threatened use of military force (Bialer, 1980: p.256) ensured peace was unachievable and that America was hostile in the eyes of the Russians, in the same way that Russia s actions in Eastern Europe ensured they were perceived by the West as expansionist and hostile, as stated earlier. So long as the U.S.S.R remained committed to the Eastern Bloc, and the U.S to

ringing Russia and China with a series of Alliances (NATO, SEATO), all led by the U.S, whilst simultaneously encouraging dissension and revolt within the communist bloc and discouraging non-alignment and neutralism outside it (Levering, 2005: p.59)

peace would be unattainable. The fact that Russia also enjoyed amicable relationships with Third World leaders that were perceived by the U.S to be directly opposed to their interests, such as Sukarno in Indonesia, Kim Il-Sung in North Korea, and Norodom Sihanouk from Cambodia (McCauley, 1995: p.45) further solidified the expansionist perception of the U.S.S.R. in the eyes of the West. The U.S had even refused to sign the 1954 Treaty concerning Indo-China and Korea in Geneva (Hanak, 1972: p.7) when the Russians had conceded to. The American attitude was one of belligerence and played a significant role to creating an atmosphere in the post-Stalin era that was anything but conducive to peace. This essay will now move on to the final reason that peace was unlikely in this era the development by Russia of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile weapon delivery systems.

On the 26^th August 1957, Russia successfully tested an ICBM (Hanak, 1972: p.30). This detonation meant that Russia, which had become a nuclear power in 1949 (Hanak, 1972: p.5), now had the capacity to launch weapons at the U.S, marking the beginning of escalation in the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that he had immunity from American retaliation that his predecessor never enjoyed (Gaddis, 1997: p.140), and became more and more self-assured and confident of his ability to use brinkmanship in order to push the West for concessions. Khrushchev reduced red Army troop numbers following the realisation of ICBM capacity, and filled the gap with nuclear weapons that were less costly than maintaining ground troops a move that was echoed by the U.S (Levering, 2005: p.59). The most obvious manifestation of Khrushchev s self-assurance is evident in his denouncement of the Potsdam obligations to Berlin undertaken by the U.S.S.R in 1945 (Hanak, 1972: pp.31-32). Khrushchev demanded the three Western powers withdraw from the city within six months. The West were willing to make concessions at first, but after these were rejected by Khrushchev at the 1959 Geneva conference, they were unwilling to make subsequent concessions (Hanak, pp.31-32). However, Khrushchev was equally unwilling to fulfil his threats and continued to push the ultimatum date back (Hanak, 1972: p.32). This period of escalation was marked by threats, often unsubstantiated, made by Khrushchev as to the nuclear capacity of the U.S.S.R, which led to the U.S believing in a missile gap that they set about eliminating (McCauley, 1995: p.56) by placing intermediate range missiles in Europe and stockpiling NATO nuclear weapons (Gaddis, 1997: p.139). At this point, the false claims and belligerence of Khrushchev confirmed U.S fears of the expansionist and hostile nature of the U.S.S.R, and placed peace all but out of reach. The final blow to any semblance of an opportunity for peace came in 1959, when an American U.2 plane was shot down in Russian airspace and its pilot captured (Gaddis, 1982: pp. 196). The incident destroyed the Paris Four Power Summit, at which Khrushchev had agreed to discuss his Berlin ultimatums (Gaddis, 1982: p.196), after he left following the refusal of Eisenhower to issue an apology for the incident (Wentworth, 2012).

This essay has shown how the foreign policy behaviour of the U.S.S.R in the post-Stalin era under Khrushchev may initially have appeared to be an opportunity for peace, as the U.S.S.R seemed to be moving towards a more open and participatory role in global conferences and bodies such as the U.N and allowing for concessions concerning the governments of the Eastern Bloc, but that this foreign policy approach was in fact motivated by the continuation of the Stalinist goals of increasing the geo-political and territorial goals influence of the U.S.S.R and a commitment to the late Stalinist-era policy of peaceful coexistence. Despite limited internal de-stalinisation, that did not address the problems inherent in the Stalinist system and only served to condemn Stalin s own abuses of power, the concessions made to the west did little more than serve to delay German rearmament and the consolidation of NATO (Gaddis, 1997: p.208). The concessions bought the U.S.S.R time and breathing space (Gati, 1984) until such a time as, due to the development of ICBM delivery capacity, the U.S.S.R could afford to act in a belligerent manner to gain concessions of their own, but they did not stop the Kremlin from using force when necessary to preserve unity of the Eastern Bloc. It has also shown how the problem of a divided Germany was engendered by the mutual suspicion on both sides of their opposing power, and was a particularly central issue to Soviet behaviour in Europe and the U.S continuation of the policy of containment. However, this essay does not argue that the blame for missing opportunities for peace ought to be shouldered entirely by the Russians or by Khrushchev. It has argued that the American continuation of the policy of containment and anti-communist rhetoric under Eisenhower and Dulles increased the paranoia of the Soviet Union, to the point where escalation of arms occurred and both powers engaged in tactics of brinkmanship. To conclude, there is only marginal credence to the belief that the post-Stalin era provided an opportunity to conclude the issue of Germany and Eastern Europe ensured that both sides would continue to act in a way that secured their mutual interests at the calculated risk of antagonising their opposite, which merely led to paranoia and the escalation of the Cold War.

Bibliography

Bialer, S. (1980). Stalin`s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Filtzer, D. (1993). The Khrushchev Era: De-Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR 1953-1964. Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press Limited.

Gaddis, J. L. (1982). Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Gaddis, J. L. (1997). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Gati, C. (1984). The Stalinist Legacy in Foreign Policy. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 35(3), 214-226.

Gati, C. (1990). The Bloc that Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hanak, H. (1972). Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin. London: Routledge.

Leonhard, W. (1957). Return to Stalinism in the USSR? International Affairs, 33(3), 280-288.

Levering, R. B. (The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History). 2005. Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, Inc.

McCauley, C. (1995). The Khrushchev Era 1953-1964. London and New York: Longman Group Limited.

Ostermann, C. F. (1996). Keeping the Pot Simmering: The United States and the East German Uprising. German Studies Review, 19(1), 61-89.

Yergin, D. (1990). Shattered Peace: Origins of the Cold War. New York: Penguin

Wentworth, M. (2012). US as World-Class Bully Retrieved 25/11/2012, from http://www.opednews.com/articles/US-as-World-Class-Bully-by-Mary-Wentworth-121116-949.html