International Humanitariam Law In Pratice

Introduction: Firstly, the law applicable in this case ranges from the customary practices of warfare adopted over a period of time, to a number of IHL treaties among which include the; Hague Draft Rules (less bind as opposed to Conventions), the 1949 Geneva Conventions, II, III and IV and Additional Protocols1 and 2 (here after AP1 and AP2 respectively), the Convention on Rights of Child 1989, (here after CRC), the Rome statute, 1999 second Protocol to the 1954 Cultural Property convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocol No. 13th although case law may be useful in a few cases. The discussions shall take into consideration of varied levels of protection granted to the different persons such as, prisoners of war, children, civilians and their property. The laws relating to most of which are available from some of the treaties mentioned above. Similarly in ensuring the effective enforcement of the above protection, all military actions are seen in the context of other regulatory principles. This accounts principles like distinction , proportionality and humanity. The above principles are construed in relation to the lawful military objectives but codified in several IHL treaties which Roberts. A and Guelef. R. have taken a great deal of time to demonstrate. Distinction essentially imposes an obligation on the combatants to use proper identity in distinguishing themselves and their objects from those of protected civilians but also accurately and discriminatively directing all their military attacks only to those distinguished combatants or their property respectively. Therefore when justifying attacks, the importance of proportionality to intended targets should neither be overlooked. Accordingly the military actions should strictly aim at lawful military targets. Through precisely, discriminatively and more so proportionately limiting such attacks to only lawful military targets but also treating victims in humanly. "The fact that the types of targets targeted must be legitimate military targets is in keeping with the ius in bello, the laws of warfare." Nevertheless mindful as to whether such an attack can be perceived as necessary shall ordinarily and typically depends upon the uniqueness of circumstances in the battlefield which may admittedly differ from time to time. Finally in the context of the parties, on one hand is Rutaritania while Xenia on the other whose combatants are presumably engaged in military action in some parts of the question and therefore (Internationalised conflict). Imperatively important, the two parties involved in this conflict have notably ratified and become signatories to relevant IHL treaties as already listed and thence applicable in this case, save for Protocol No. 13 of ECHR of which Xenin is apparently not a party, therefore it is academically arguable that Xenin could consider declaring a state of emergence on Pafney under Art 15 on the contrary if it was member to said protocol this right in addition to death sentences would be constrained. Secondly are cases where the Yelmandran Liberation Front (hereafter YLF) as belligerents or insurgents in Pafney (part of the Xenia state) are involved in hostilities with state soldiers (King's regiments). Regarding law applicable Moir. Lindsay uses AP2 to demonstrate the discontent expressed by states to the non-membership of belligerent groups to IHL treaties. And yet these take part in armed hostilities during non-international armed conflicts but irrespective of the status, the mention earlier principles shall be relevant as illustrated in the proceeding discussions. All in all, the presence of YLF accounts for the relevance of AP2 and common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions this question which will be more applicable for those parts of the question conflict shifts to be of (non-international character). Like where the Kings' regiments are dealing with YLF belligerents. And finally it is worth mentioning (even though seemingly a trivial issue for purposes of this discussion) that the position of the general Xutor yet mirrors other interesting issues under AP1 that relate to liability and concepts of command responsibility and war crimes during armed conflicts. Notably, Amabelle C. Asuncion labours to illustrate this using of cases before International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Prosecutor v. Krstic and Prosecutor v. Blagojevic. Legality of air force attacks on airports, trains junctions and power stations: First and foremost, much as aerial warfare is among the permissible methods of the under IHL. It is fundamentally important that the air forces operating military aircrafts to understand the practicability of relevant IHL rules as basis of liability for these aerial attacks. And therefore they ought to comply with their respective obligations throughout the course conducting the aerial warfare. To begin with the illegality of indiscriminate aerial booming on civilian objects among these the list would entail; airports and trains junctions and generating stations to mention but few. Universal and general aerial invasion with increase the chances of targeting the non military objects an act which amounts to the prohibited attacks since such attacks are indiscriminate in nature and accordingly contrary to AP1. More over Roscini. Marco has rightly stressed that such attacks are unlawful since these would be contrary to the principle of distinction. According to which the law of armed conflict not requires attackers to distinguish themselves from civilians but equally important to ensure that all attacks are accurately, discriminatively and proportionally directed only [and only] to lawful military targets irrespective of where such attacks are conducted. The above view is elaborately explained in the journal on aerial warfare by Roscini. Marco. In essence, the distinctiveness principle could on one hand imply, all Xenian military aircrafts [drones inclusive] as operated by ought to use genuine and distinctive military symbols as indicted by Roberts. A and Guelef. R., to distinguish themselves from other private or civilian aircrafts an idea the has been illustratively exemplified by Sivakumaran. S. Dieter. Fleck, in his book examines how the omission to comply with the above to identity obligation by military aerial vehicles, might lead to tragic errors and consequently exposing to civilians aircrafts to military attacks. Accordingly, on one hand instruction 1 with regards to the principle distinction may be construed by way of military identity of Xenian aircrafts and drones under the 1923 Hague rules. While on the other hand, distinctiveness with is perceivable with respect to the accuracy, discrimination and proportionality of the intended military attacks to lawful military targets. Thus under instruction one the attacks ought to be precise and discriminative through targeting on the intended military objects lawful as per Hague rules Geneva Convention IV and AP1. Further still, as earlier mentioned, the determination of whether the items singled out are actually military objects, all depends upon the circumstances of each case. Ideally such circumstances would variably differ in each case. Even though rationally, aerial bombardment of airports, train junctions among other civilian objects can only to be justifiable in rear cases. Accordingly, Roger. AVP suggests that this is more so the case after sufficient evidence that Yalemadain combatants are using the airport as military bases for their operations. Evidence of such actions would normally include; presence of ammunition storage at airports, use of civilian trains junctions to coordinate the transportation of firearms or combatants, and consequently such protection is neither absolute nor completely waivered although even in cases where the Yalemadaim combatant operate their military control bases aircrafts in close proximity with civilian airports although Redsell. Georgina suggests care must be taken to ensure precision and proportionate to lawful targets. Otherwise any attacks that fail to discriminate the civilian airport are not justified and therefore unlawful. And therefore in such a situation operators of Xenian military aircrafts must evaluate both the feasibility of the attacks distinguishing the protected civilian population and their objects from the lawful combatants and military objects prior proceeding with the attack. Overlooking this will be result into liability Sivakumaran. S. Related to the bombing of purely civilian airports, trains junctions or power stations (during conflict of international nature) is the alleged permission to plundering valuable properties civilians in tribes in Pefiny as yet another unlawful act that deserves reconsideration. Being mindful that such valuable property might have cultural and historical heritage perhaps an account of why highly it is valued and surely protected under the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Cultural Property convention. Therefore is indeed appreciable that neither the aerial bombardment of the above civilian objects that is (airports, train junctions and power stations) nor the seizure of their valuables is lawful. Since by virtue of their ordinary uses these serve civilian purposes or by nature locality they are largely associable with civilian population and thus attacking them is deemed contrary to law of armed conflict. Unless there is sufficient rebuttal evidential to the contrary for example acts of perfidiously to masquerading the typically known military targets using ordinarily civilian objects. Related to the above, it logically arguable that such permission to seize privately owned property more so with valuables of civilians in Pefiney or will escalate the conflict between YLF and the regiments as notably observed by Den Herik L. Van and De-Jong D. D. Interestingly the scholars have further developed their arguments by asserting that 'seizure' is one of the prohibited acts and constitutes one of the punishable offences of war crimes committed again civilian property. "These include destruction, appropriation and seizure of property on the one hand, and pillage on the other hand. The terms plunder, "spoliation", and looting that are also used in international jurisprudence are generally interchangeable with pillage." But it worthy emphasizing that the above outlined acts are apparently codified and deemed punishable under war crimes of the Rome Statute. Literature largely suggests that most attacks on places like airports train junctions or an electricity station is most likely to compromise the civilian or their property. No wander in most cases airports have been boomed those culpable states have been criticised for violating laws of ius in bello. Unlike Tania Van Laer whose examples are more apparent on devastation of energy sources and perhaps power stations, Green. C. Leslie demonstrates the airport protection citing disapproval with America's invasions on Baghdad airport in 2003 destroying a number of civilian aircrafts on the ground. Similarly Astrid Wiik also condemns the violation IHL treaties following the disproportionate attacks on Hariri International airport, the seaport, roads and bridges on 13th of July 2006, yet these were undeniably civilian objects. While Kurt G. S, in addition to outlining the list of irreplaceable cultural valuables destroyed during world wars, he rightly relies on Nuremburg trials condemns the spirit of revenge during such wars upon which military goals and were indirectly inclined a similar view could be traced from the tenor of Francisco. J. Contreras and Ignacio de la Rasilla's expositions. As such, it is better suggesting, even though not the best option, that no bombardment should be made legitimate unless Xenian military intelligence confirms that either airport is completely used for shielding Yalemadrain belligerents or that train junctions in question are either being used by military typically personnel to transport ammunition or cross to another geographic locality at the point of attacks, then Byron, C. interestingly asserts the dual use makes object to be categorically classified as 'dual objects' and probability to attacks is undeniably yes. But even then, such attack would call for extreme care and exercise of military competence to minimise higher risks of collateral damage to civilians. But it is better emphasizing again that in absence of sufficiently reliably evidence linking the airport, train junctions and energy stations, they are deemed purely a civilian objective and therefore ought not to be attacked. Accordingly, it is therefore unsurprising that Roberts. A and Guelef. R disagrees with aerial attacks on airports and trains on the basis of their customary civilian usage by nature. Especially in cases where such attacks are likely to result into prohibited indiscriminate attacks and consequently leading to unnecessary suffering of civilian population or destruction their property. And yet such acts of destruction and unnecessary suffering are prohibited. This view was further stressed in the ICJ opinion on use of Nuclear weapons case same approach had been adopted in customs of war in the Martine's clause. As earlier noted the protection of civilians from military attacks is derived from above IHL treaties.