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Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The birth of the state of Israel, 1945-63
Unit 2
Key topic 2: The escalating conflict, 1964-73
Unit 3
Key topic 3: Attempts at a solution, 1974-95
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The Palestinian issue, 1974-93

Practise 30 exam-style questions on The Palestinian issue, 1974-93 for Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 30 questions
  • 4–8 marks each
  • Instant marking
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one consequence of the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador in London (June 1982).

Model answer

One consequence of the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov was that it gave Israel the reason it used to invade Lebanon. On 3 June 1982 gunmen shot and badly injured Argov in London. They belonged to the Abu Nidal Organisation, a Palestinian group that was hostile to Arafat's PLO. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Begin held the PLO responsible, and on 4 June Israeli aircraft bombed PLO targets in Beirut and southern Lebanon. The PLO replied by firing rockets and shells into northern Israel, which ended the ceasefire that had held on the border since July 1981. On 6 June Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee, saying that it aimed to push the PLO 40 km back from the border. Defence Minister Ariel Sharon had been planning a large operation for months, so the shooting acted as the trigger for a war that led to the siege of Beirut.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 2 because it explains one result (the shooting became the trigger for the invasion) and supports it with accurate detail (the Abu Nidal group, the air strikes of 4 June, Operation Peace for Galilee on 6 June). A common mistake is to say that the PLO carried out the attack; another is to describe the whole war without showing how the shooting led to it.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a consequence. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the explanation, showing good knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a consequence. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers must explain a result of the shooting of Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, outside the Dorchester Hotel in London on 3 June 1982 by gunmen of the Abu Nidal Organisation, a Palestinian group that was hostile to Arafat's PLO and was backed by Iraq. Argov survived but was badly injured. Valid consequences include: (1) Israeli air strikes on PLO targets in Lebanon: although Israeli intelligence pointed to Abu Nidal's group, Prime Minister Begin held the PLO responsible, and on 4 June Israeli aircraft bombed PLO targets in Beirut and southern Lebanon; the PLO replied with rocket and artillery fire on northern Israel, ending the ceasefire of July 1981. (2) The invasion of Lebanon: on 6 June 1982 Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee, with the stated aim of pushing the PLO about 40 km (25 miles) from the border; the shooting was the trigger rather than the underlying cause, since Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and the army had prepared plans for a large operation from 1981 (Sharon himself later described it as only the spark). Credit consequences of the invasion (e.g. the siege of Beirut, the PLO's departure) only where the answer links them to the shooting through the invasion. (3) The UN Security Council called for an end to all military activity in Lebanon and across the Israel-Lebanon border (Resolution 508, 5 June 1982). (4) In Britain the attackers were arrested, convicted and imprisoned. Level 2 needs a consequence explained with specific supporting information. A general statement such as 'it caused a war' is Level 1. Do not credit the claim that the attack was carried out by Arafat's PLO, or that Argov was killed in 1982 (he died in 2003).

Question 2

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in the PLO's international standing in the years 1974-76.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the PLO's observer status at the UN (November 1974)
- the US pledge not to negotiate with the PLO (September 1975)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

In June 1974 the Palestinian National Council adopted the Ten Point Programme. It accepted a Palestinian 'national authority' on any part of Palestine that was liberated, which suggested that the PLO might use diplomacy as well as armed struggle. This opened the door to international recognition, although the PFLP and other hardline groups rejected it and formed the Rejection Front.

The PLO's diplomatic breakthrough came in October 1974. On 14 October the UN General Assembly invited it to take part in its debate on Palestine, and at the Rabat summit later that month the Arab states recognised the PLO as 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people', ending King Hussein's claim to speak for them. With full Arab backing, Arafat arrived as the recognised voice of the Palestinians and on 13 November addressed the Assembly, saying that he had come with 'an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun'.

This led directly to recognition at the UN. On 22 November the Assembly recognised the Palestinians' right to self-determination and independence and gave the PLO observer status. Many more countries now recognised the PLO and allowed it to open offices.

However, the PLO's rise provoked strong opposition. Israel regarded it as a terrorist organisation committed to Israel's destruction and refused to deal with it. In September 1975, alongside the Sinai II agreement, the USA promised Israel that it would not recognise or negotiate with the PLO until the PLO recognised Israel's right to exist and accepted Resolutions 242 and 338. When the General Assembly passed Resolution 3379 in November 1975, describing Zionism as a form of racism, Israel and the USA saw it as proof that the UN was biased.

As a result, the PLO's gains had limits. In January 1976 it took part in a Security Council debate, but the USA vetoed a draft resolution supporting a Palestinian state. Meanwhile the PLO was being drawn into the Lebanese Civil War. The outcome by 1976 was that most of the world accepted the PLO as the voice of the Palestinians, but it remained shut out of the US-led peace process.

Explanation

A top-level narrative follows the developments in order from the Ten Point Programme to the US veto of January 1976 and shows how each led to the next (the UN invitation and Rabat brought Arafat to the UN as the recognised voice of the Palestinians; the PLO's success provoked the US pledge). It keeps the order right: the UN invitation (14 October 1974) came before Rabat. It ends with a clear outcome: recognition by most of the world but exclusion from US-led diplomacy. Weaker answers describe Arafat's speech alone, or drift into the Lebanese Civil War without linking it to the PLO's standing.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The narrative should show how the PLO's international standing rose in 1974-76, and the limits of that rise, with the links between events. Key developments, in sequence: after the Yom Kippur War (1973) the Palestinian National Council adopted the Ten Point Programme (June 1974), accepting a 'national authority' on any part of Palestine that was liberated; this opened the way to diplomacy, but the PFLP and other groups formed the Rejection Front against it. The UN General Assembly invited the PLO to take part in its debate on Palestine (Resolution 3210, 14 October 1974). The Arab summit at Rabat (26-29 October 1974) recognised the PLO as 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people', sidelining Jordan. Arafat addressed the General Assembly (13 November 1974), saying he had come with 'an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun'. On 22 November 1974 Resolution 3236 recognised Palestinian rights to self-determination, independence and return, and Resolution 3237 gave the PLO observer status. More states recognised the PLO and allowed it to open offices. Israel refused to deal with the PLO, which it saw as a terrorist organisation committed to its destruction; in September 1975, alongside the Sinai II agreement between Egypt and Israel, the USA pledged to Israel that it would not recognise or negotiate with the PLO until the PLO recognised Israel's right to exist and accepted Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The General Assembly passed Resolution 3379 (10 November 1975), describing Zionism as a form of racism, which Israel and the USA condemned (it was revoked in 1991). The Security Council first invited the PLO to take part in a debate in December 1975 (over Israeli air raids on Lebanon), and in January 1976 the PLO took part in its debate on the Palestinian question, but the USA vetoed a draft resolution supporting Palestinian statehood. Meanwhile the PLO was drawn into the Lebanese Civil War (from April 1975), which damaged its image and stretched its forces. Outcome: by 1976 the PLO was recognised by the Arab states, most UN members and many other countries as the representative of the Palestinians, but Israel and the USA refused to deal with it, so it was kept out of the US-led peace process. Linking language should show how one development led to the next (e.g. 'because of Rabat, the PLO arrived at the UN as the recognised voice of the Palestinians'). Answers that use only the two stimulus points without a third aspect of content cannot reach Level 3. Do not credit events after 1976 except as a brief concluding comment (e.g. Camp David, 1978, or Arafat's renunciation of terrorism, 1988), the claim that the PLO became a UN member state, or the claim that the UN invited the PLO because of the Rabat decision (the invitation of 14 October came first; Rabat strengthened the PLO's position when Arafat arrived).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

8 marks

Explain the importance of US mediation for the ending of the siege of Beirut (1982).

Model answer

US mediation was very important for the ending of the siege of Beirut because it provided the terms and guarantees that allowed the PLO to leave without a final battle for the city. From mid-June 1982 Israeli forces surrounded West Beirut, where the PLO leadership and thousands of fighters were trapped among hundreds of thousands of civilians. Israel wanted the PLO out but did not want the heavy losses that street fighting would bring.

President Reagan's special envoy, Philip Habib, who had arranged the ceasefire of July 1981, led the negotiations. Because the USA had promised Israel not to negotiate with the PLO, he worked through Lebanese leaders and Saudi Arabia, shuttling between the sides to settle how the PLO would leave, where its fighters would go and who would protect them. Finding Arab states willing to accept the fighters took weeks, but by August Syria, Tunisia and others had agreed.

The USA also restrained Israel. It opposed an assault on West Beirut, and on 12 August, after a day of very heavy bombing, Reagan protested strongly to Begin. The bombing stopped and an agreement was reached within days.

The USA then helped to carry out the agreement. US Marines, with French and Italian troops, formed a Multinational Force to supervise the evacuation, and the USA gave assurances for the safety of the Palestinian civilians who remained. Between 21 August and 1 September about 11,000-14,000 fighters left, and Arafat moved to Tunis.

However, US mediation was not the only factor. Israel's bombardment was the main reason the PLO agreed to leave, and Arafat also wanted to spare Beirut's civilians. The US guarantees also proved weak: the Multinational Force left early, and soon afterwards Phalangist militiamen killed many civilians in the Sabra and Shatila camps. Overall, US mediation was essential to the way the siege ended, but Israeli military pressure forced the PLO to accept the terms.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 3 because it explains how US mediation ended the siege (Habib's indirect negotiations, the restraint of Israel, the Multinational Force and the guarantees) and weighs this against Israeli military pressure. Weaker answers describe the siege without explaining the US role, or claim that the USA negotiated directly with Arafat.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how the USA, mainly through President Reagan's special envoy Philip Habib, helped to end the siege of West Beirut (mid-June to August 1982). (1) Habib's role: Habib had already arranged the ceasefire of July 1981. Because the USA had promised Israel in 1975 not to negotiate with the PLO, he worked through intermediaries, such as Lebanese leaders and Saudi Arabia, shuttling between the parties to agree how the PLO would leave, where its fighters would go and who would guarantee their safety. (2) Finding destinations: Arab states were reluctant to accept PLO fighters; agreements were eventually reached for them to go to Tunisia, Syria (which agreed in early August), Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and other states. (3) Restraining Israel: the USA opposed an Israeli assault on West Beirut; on 12 August, after a day of very heavy bombing, Reagan protested strongly to Begin by telephone and the bombing stopped; the Israeli cabinet limited Sharon's authority. (4) The agreement (about 18-19 August) and the Multinational Force: US Marines, with French and Italian troops, supervised the evacuation (21 August-1 September 1982) of about 11,000-14,000 fighters (sources vary); the USA gave assurances for the safety of the Palestinian civilians who remained. (5) Limits and consequences: Israel's military pressure (the siege and bombardment) was the main reason the PLO agreed to leave; Arafat also wanted to spare Beirut's civilians; Lebanese leaders pressed the PLO to go. The Multinational Force left in early September, earlier than planned; after Bashir Gemayel's assassination and the Sabra and Shatila massacre (16-18 September) it returned, and US Secretary of State George Shultz later accepted that the USA bore some responsibility. The Reagan Plan (1 September 1982), for Palestinian self-government linked with Jordan, was rejected by Begin. A judgement might be that US mediation was very important because it provided the terms and guarantees that made a negotiated departure possible, but that Israeli military pressure forced the PLO to accept them. Level 3 needs analysis of how US mediation ended the siege. Do not credit the claim that US forces fought against Israel or the PLO, or that the USA negotiated directly with Arafat.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

8 marks

Explain the importance of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising for the First Intifada in the years 1988-90.

Model answer

The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was very important for the First Intifada because it turned a spontaneous outburst of anger into an organised, sustained campaign. When protests broke out in December 1987, even local activists were taken by surprise. Within weeks, however, activists from Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and the Communist Party formed the UNLU, which worked with the PLO leadership in Tunis but was based inside the territories.

Its most important tool was its leaflets. From January 1988 the UNLU issued numbered communiqués that told Palestinians which days to strike, when shops should open, which Israeli goods to boycott and when to stop paying taxes. Because large numbers of people followed them, the uprising involved whole communities rather than just young stone-throwers. For example, in 1989 the town of Beit Sahour refused to pay taxes, despite a long curfew.

The UNLU also built an alternative system of local organisation. Popular committees distributed food, provided medical care and ran classes when Israel closed schools. This helped communities to survive curfews and strikes for months at a time.

The UNLU's methods and aims also mattered. It urged mass civil resistance and avoided the use of firearms, which helped to win sympathy abroad. Its leaflets called for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza alongside Israel, which encouraged the PLO to move towards accepting two states.

However, the UNLU's importance declined over time. Hamas refused to join it and called its own strikes, and from 1989 violence grew, including the killing of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. Israel's mass arrests, especially in March 1990, removed many of its members, and people were exhausted by economic hardship. Overall, the UNLU was the most important organising force of the Intifada in 1988-89, but by 1990 it could no longer control the uprising.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 3 because it explains how the UNLU shaped the Intifada (leaflets, popular committees, methods and aims) with specific examples, and analyses how its importance declined by 1990. Weaker answers describe the Intifada in general without focusing on the UNLU, or confuse it with Hamas.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) shaped the uprising. The UNLU was formed in the weeks after the outbreak of December 1987 by local activists of four groups, Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and the Palestine Communist Party; it worked with the PLO leadership in Tunis (e.g. Abu Jihad) but was based inside the territories. (1) Organisation: from January 1988 it issued numbered leaflets (communiqués) setting strike days, shop opening hours, boycotts of Israeli goods, calls for Palestinian police and tax officials to resign, and refusal to pay taxes (e.g. Beit Sahour, 1989); this turned spontaneous riots into a sustained campaign involving whole communities. (2) Popular committees: it encouraged local committees for food distribution, medical care, guarding neighbourhoods and teaching when Israel closed schools; women's, student and labour organisations took part. (3) Methods and aims: it urged mass civil resistance and avoided the use of firearms, which helped to win sympathy abroad; its leaflets called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and an independent Palestinian state there, encouraging the PLO towards a two-state position in 1988. (4) Survival: its rotating membership of little-known younger activists allowed it to replace leaders who were arrested. (5) Limits: it did not control everything: Hamas refused to join it and called its own strikes; violence grew, including the killing of suspected collaborators; Israel's mass arrests (the last major sweep of UNLU members was in March 1990), economic exhaustion and Palestinian divisions weakened it; by 1990 its authority had declined, and more senior figures linked to the PLO took over. A judgement might be that the UNLU was very important because it gave the Intifada organisation, discipline and political aims, especially in 1988-89, but that its authority faded as repression, exhaustion and the rise of Hamas took their toll. Level 3 needs analysis of the UNLU's importance, not a general account of the Intifada. Do not credit the claim that the UNLU was the same as Hamas, or that it started the Intifada (it formed after the outbreak).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

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