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Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The birth of the state of Israel, 1945-63
Unit 2
Key topic 2: The escalating conflict, 1964-73
Unit 3
Key topic 3: Attempts at a solution, 1974-95
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Israel and Egypt, 1967-73

Practise 30 exam-style questions on Israel and Egypt, 1967-73 for Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

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  • 4–8 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one consequence of the death of President Nasser of Egypt (September 1970).

Model answer

One consequence of Nasser's death in September 1970 was a power struggle in Egypt that left Anwar Sadat free to change the country's direction. Sadat had been vice-president and became president in October 1970. Many of Nasser's powerful allies, led by Vice-President Ali Sabri, who was close to the Soviet Union, expected Sadat to be a weak leader whom they could control. However, Sadat moved first. In May 1971 he dismissed Sabri and arrested his supporters in what he called the 'Corrective Revolution'. This gave Sadat full control of Egypt's government. As a result, he could follow his own foreign policy: he extended the ceasefire with Israel, offered a peace initiative in February 1971 and opened contacts with the United States. In the longer run, this new direction led him to expel most Soviet military advisers in July 1972.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 2 because it explains one clear result of Nasser's death (a power struggle that Sadat won, which allowed him to change policy) and supports it with specific detail (Ali Sabri, the Corrective Revolution, the 1971 initiative). A common mistake is to describe Nasser's career rather than what happened after his death. Another is to say that Sadat expelled the Soviets straight away in 1970.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a consequence. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the explanation, showing good knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a consequence. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers must explain a result of Nasser's sudden death from a heart attack on 28 September 1970, the day after he had brokered an agreement in Cairo to end the fighting in Jordan between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas. Valid consequences include: (1) Anwar Sadat, the vice-president, became president (confirmed by a referendum on 15 October 1970); many expected him to be a weak, temporary leader, which led to a power struggle with Nasser's left-wing, pro-Soviet allies led by Vice-President Ali Sabri, whom Sadat dismissed and arrested in May 1971 (the 'Corrective Revolution'). (2) A change in Egypt's foreign policy over the following years: Sadat extended the August 1970 ceasefire, made his peace initiative of February 1971, opened contacts with the USA and in July 1972 expelled most Soviet military advisers. (3) The Arab world lost its most powerful leader: there was an outpouring of grief across the region (millions attended his funeral), and the leadership of Arab nationalism became contested, with Libya's Gaddafi claiming to be Nasser's heir. (4) Uncertainty for the Soviet Union, which feared losing its closest Arab ally and pressed Sadat to sign a Treaty of Friendship (May 1971). Level 2 needs a valid consequence explained with specific supporting information (e.g. Sadat, Ali Sabri, the Corrective Revolution). A general statement such as 'Egypt got a new leader' is Level 1 unless developed. Do not credit: the claim that Nasser was assassinated or died in the Yom Kippur War; the claim that Sadat immediately expelled the Soviets in 1970; dating his death to 1967 or 1973.

Question 2

8 marks

Explain the importance of Moshe Dayan for Israel's policies in the occupied territories in the years 1967-73.

Model answer

Moshe Dayan was very important for Israel's policies in the occupied territories because, as Minister of Defence from June 1967, he was in charge of the military government that ran them. Dayan believed that Israel should control the territories for security, but that its rule should be felt as little as possible in daily life. In the West Bank, local mayors and officials stayed in post, Jordanian law was largely kept, and many officials continued to be paid by Jordan.

The clearest example was his 'open bridges' policy. From 1967 Palestinians could cross the bridges over the River Jordan to Jordan and the Arab world, and farmers could sell their produce there. This kept the West Bank economy working and reduced unrest. At the same time Dayan tied the territories to Israel: workers from the West Bank and Gaza were allowed to work in Israel, and by the early 1970s tens of thousands did so. He also left the running of the Temple Mount to the Muslim religious authority, the Waqf, which helped to avoid a religious conflict in Jerusalem.

However, Dayan's light touch was combined with firm security control. He backed house demolitions and deportations, and he supported General Ariel Sharon's harsh campaign against armed groups in the Gaza Strip in 1970-71. Dayan also wanted Israel to create 'facts on the ground' in strategic places. He supported plans for Kiryat Arba near Hebron and the settlement of north-east Sinai, and his pressure helped to persuade the Labour Party to adopt the Galili Document in 1973, which approved the town of Yamit.

Dayan was not the only influence. The cabinet under Eshkol and Meir took the main decisions, the Allon Plan guided much early settlement, and settlers such as Rabbi Levinger in Hebron acted on their own. Overall, though, Dayan was very important because he set the pattern of the occupation: a light hand in daily life, firm security control and gradual settlement.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 3 because it explains how Dayan shaped particular policies (light-touch rule, open bridges, economic links, security measures, settlement) and weighs his role against the cabinet, the Allon Plan and the settlers. A common weakness is to write a biography of Dayan, or to focus on his military role in 1967 or 1973 without linking it to the territories.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how Moshe Dayan, Israel's Minister of Defence from June 1967 until 1974, shaped the way Israel ran and held the territories captured in 1967 (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan Heights; East Jerusalem was run as part of Israel). As defence minister he was responsible for the military government. (1) Light-touch rule: Dayan wanted Israel's control to be as little felt as possible in daily life; local mayors and officials stayed in post, Jordanian law and most of the school curriculum were kept in the West Bank, and many officials went on being paid by Jordan. (2) The 'open bridges' policy (from 1967): Palestinians could cross the Jordan River bridges to Jordan and the Arab world, and West Bank farmers could sell their produce there, which kept the economy going and kept links with Jordan. (3) Economic integration: workers from the West Bank and Gaza were allowed to work in Israel (tens of thousands by the early 1970s) and Israeli goods were sold in the territories, tying them to Israel's economy. (4) Holy places: after the capture of the Old City in June 1967 Dayan left the running of the Temple Mount (the Haram al-Sharif) to the Muslim religious authority, the Waqf, to reduce religious conflict. (5) Security: he backed tough measures against armed resistance, such as house demolitions, deportations and the campaign led by General Ariel Sharon in the Gaza Strip (1970-71); Dayan and Sharon ordered the removal of Bedouin from the Rafah area of Sinai (January 1972). (6) Settlement: Dayan favoured 'facts on the ground' in strategic areas, including the plans for Kiryat Arba near Hebron (1970) and the settlement of north-east Sinai; his demands helped to bring about the Labour Party's Galili Document (September 1973), which promised more settlement and approved the town of Yamit. Limits: decisions were taken by the cabinet under Eshkol and Meir; the Allon Plan, not Dayan, guided much early settlement; settlers such as Rabbi Levinger in Hebron (1968) acted on their own; Sharon decided many of the methods used in Gaza; and Palestinian resistance and international criticism also shaped policy. A judgement might be that Dayan was very important because he set the style of the occupation, a light hand in daily life combined with firm security control and gradual settlement, which lasted long after 1973. Level 3 needs analysis of how Dayan affected policy, not a biography. Do not credit: the claim that Dayan was prime minister in these years; the claim that Israel formally annexed the West Bank or Gaza; credit his role in the Yom Kippur War only if linked to the territories (e.g. the Bar-Lev Line in Sinai).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

8 marks

Explain the importance of Golda Meir for the deadlock between Israel and Egypt in the years 1969-73.

Model answer

Golda Meir was very important for the deadlock between Israel and Egypt because, as prime minister from March 1969, she took a firm line that peace must come before withdrawal. Meir insisted that Israel would give up land only in return for a full peace treaty, agreed in direct talks, and that Israel needed 'secure and recognised boundaries' rather than the vulnerable lines of 1967. Egypt, however, refused to negotiate directly or to recognise Israel, so there was little common ground.

This firm stance shaped Israel's response to the War of Attrition. Meir's government approved deep-penetration air raids on Egypt in early 1970 to put pressure on Nasser, but this brought Soviet missile crews and pilots into Egypt. Meir could also compromise when she had to. Although Israel rejected the Rogers Plan in December 1969, she accepted the American ceasefire plan in August 1970, even though the Gahal party left her government in protest.

Meir's approach mattered most when Sadat changed Egypt's position. In February 1971 Egypt said it was ready to make peace in return for full withdrawal. Meir's government welcomed this but refused to return to the 1967 lines, and the talks on reopening the canal failed. American officials blamed Israel's cool response. Relying on American Phantom jets and the Bar-Lev Line, Meir believed that time was on Israel's side. In February 1973 she accepted a general formula from Kissinger, but she did not take up Sadat's offers made through his adviser Hafez Ismail.

Meir was not acting alone. Her policy was shared by ministers such as Dayan and Allon and by most Israelis after the victory of 1967, and Egypt's refusal of direct talks, as well as American caution, also kept the deadlock in place. Even so, Meir was very important: her firm policy helped to maintain the stalemate that led Sadat to decide on war in 1973, and on 6 October she chose not to strike first so that Israel would keep American support.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 3 because it explains how Meir affected Israel's policy at key points (the War of Attrition, the 1970 ceasefire, Sadat's 1971 initiative, 1973) and shows that Egyptian and American policies, and Israeli opinion, also mattered. A common weakness is to write a biography of Meir, or to blame or praise her without precise evidence.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel from March 1969 to 1974, shaped Israel's policy towards Egypt and so contributed to the deadlock in which neither war nor diplomacy settled the conflict before October 1973. Answers should be balanced: Meir's policies were widely supported in Israel at the time, and Egypt's own positions also kept the deadlock in place. (1) Conditions for peace: Meir insisted on direct negotiations and a full peace treaty before any withdrawal, and on 'secure and recognised boundaries' rather than a return to the pre-June 1967 lines; Egypt, in line with the Khartoum resolution, refused direct talks and demanded full withdrawal first. (2) The War of Attrition: her government approved deep-penetration air raids on Egypt (January-April 1970) to pressure Nasser, which instead brought in Soviet missile crews and pilots. (3) The Rogers initiatives: Israel rejected the Rogers Plan (December 1969) but Meir accepted the US ceasefire plan in August 1970, even though the Gahal party left her government in protest; after Egypt moved missiles forward she suspended the Jarring talks for several months. (4) Sadat's initiative: her government's reply to Jarring (26 February 1971) welcomed Egypt's readiness for peace but refused to return to the 1967 lines, and the talks on an interim agreement to reopen the canal failed in 1971; US officials blamed Israel's cool response. (5) Reliance on strength: Meir relied on US arms (Phantom jets), the Bar-Lev Line and the belief that time was on Israel's side; in February 1973 she agreed in principle with Kissinger to explore a formula of Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai with Israeli security positions (accounts differ on how far she committed herself), but Israel responded only haltingly to the proposals that Sadat's adviser Hafez Ismail put to Kissinger (historians disagree about how far these were real peace offers), and new settlement plans (the Galili Document, September 1973) were adopted. (6) October 1973: on the morning of 6 October she approved a large call-up of reserves (the Chief of Staff's proposal of about 100,000-120,000 troops rather than Dayan's smaller one) but decided against a pre-emptive strike so that Israel would not be blamed and would keep US support, and after the war she accepted the ceasefire and direct military talks at Kilometre 101. Limits: Israeli policy was a cabinet decision shared by Dayan, Allon and Eban, with broad public support after 1967; Egypt's refusal of direct talks and recognition, Soviet backing for Egypt and US caution (Nixon and Kissinger did not press Israel before the 1972 and 1973 elections) also mattered. A judgement might be that Meir was very important because her firm stance helped to keep the stalemate that led Sadat to choose war, though she reflected a wide Israeli consensus. Level 3 needs analysis of how Meir's policy affected the deadlock, not a biography. Credit her part in the war of October 1973 only where it is linked to the end of the deadlock. Do not credit: the claim that Meir signed a peace treaty with Egypt or negotiated Camp David (1978); the claim that she was prime minister in 1967; one-sided condemnation or praise with no supporting detail.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key events of the Yom Kippur War, 6-25 October 1973.

You may use the following in your answer:
- Syria's attack on the Golan Heights (6 October 1973)
- Israel's counter-offensive across the canal (from 15 October 1973)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

At 2 pm on 6 October 1973, on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish year, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel; in the Arab world the conflict is known as the October War. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, overran most of the Bar-Lev Line and dug in under an umbrella of Soviet missiles. At the same time Syria attacked the Golan Heights, captured Mount Hermon and broke through in the south.

Israel was forced to deal with the nearer danger first. Its reserves halted the Syrians, and by 10 October they had been pushed back to the 1967 line. On 11 October Israel advanced into Syria towards Damascus. In Sinai, however, Israel's counter-attack on 8 October was beaten off by Egyptian infantry with anti-tank missiles. Both sides now needed fresh supplies. The Soviet Union began airlifting arms to Egypt and Syria, and from 14 October the USA flew weapons to Israel.

The turning point came on 14 October. To relieve pressure on Syria, Egypt sent its tanks forward beyond its missile cover, and they were defeated with heavy losses. Israel took advantage of a gap between Egypt's armies, and on 15-16 October forces under Ariel Sharon crossed the canal. After fierce fighting at the Chinese Farm to secure the crossing, Israeli tanks attacked Egyptian missile sites on the west bank, which let the Israeli air force operate more freely.

With Egypt in danger, the superpowers stepped in. After Kissinger visited Moscow, the UN passed Resolution 338 on 22 October, calling for a ceasefire. The ceasefire soon broke down, and Israeli forces surrounded Egypt's Third Army. Brezhnev threatened to send Soviet troops, and the USA put its forces on a higher state of alert. On 25 October Resolution 340 set up a UN force, and the ceasefire finally held.

The outcome was that Israel ended the war in a strong military position, 101 km from Cairo, but at a terrible cost of over 2,500 dead, while Egyptian and Syrian losses were far higher, and the war had shown that the superpowers would not allow either side a complete victory.

Explanation

A top-level narrative shows how each stage led to the next: the surprise attack, Israel's recovery on the Golan, Egypt's failed offensive of 14 October, the canal crossing, and the superpower crisis that ended the war. It goes beyond the stimulus points with own knowledge such as the Bar-Lev Line, the airlifts, Resolution 338 and the encirclement of the Third Army. Weaker answers describe one front only, or lose the sequence of events.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The narrative should show how the war moved from early Arab success to an Israeli counter-offensive and a superpower-imposed ceasefire, with the links between events. The war is called the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the October War or Ramadan War in the Arab world: credit any of these names. Key events, in sequence: at 2 pm on 6 October 1973 (Yom Kippur, and the tenth day of Ramadan) Egypt and Syria attacked by surprise. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal (Operation Badr), overran most of the Bar-Lev Line and held bridgeheads under a Soviet-supplied missile umbrella; Israeli counter-attacks, especially on 8 October, were beaten off by Egyptian anti-tank missiles. On the Golan Heights Syrian forces took Mount Hermon and broke through in the south, but Israeli reserves stopped them, and by 10 October the Syrians had been pushed back to the 1967 line; from 11 October Israel advanced into Syria to within about 30-40 km of Damascus, and Iraqi and Jordanian forces came to Syria's aid. Both superpowers resupplied their allies: the Soviet Union from about 10 October and the USA by airlift from 14 October (Operation Nickel Grass). On 14 October Egypt launched an armoured offensive beyond its missile cover, partly to relieve Syria; it failed with heavy losses. Israel then exploited a gap between Egypt's Second and Third Armies: on 15-16 October Israeli forces under Ariel Sharon crossed the canal near the Great Bitter Lake, fought the costly battle of the Chinese Farm (about 15-18 October) to secure the crossing, and destroyed Egyptian missile sites on the west bank. Arab oil producers began cutting oil supplies on 17 October (credit briefly). As Egypt's position worsened, the Soviet Union invited Kissinger to Moscow (20-21 October), and the superpowers agreed UN Security Council Resolution 338 (22 October), calling for a ceasefire within 12 hours and negotiations. The ceasefire broke down; Israeli forces advanced south and by 24 October encircled the Egyptian Third Army and the city of Suez. Brezhnev threatened to act alone, the USA raised its forces' state of alert (DEFCON 3, 24-25 October), and Resolution 340 (25 October) set up a new UN force; the ceasefire then held. Outcome: Israel ended the war about 101 km from Cairo and within about 30-40 km of Damascus, but at a cost of about 2,500-2,800 dead (figures vary); Arab losses were much higher (estimates range from about 8,000 to 18,500 dead); Egypt still held a strip of Sinai, and the war opened the way to negotiations. Answers need at least three aspects of content for Level 3. Do not credit: the claim that Israel struck first in 1973; the claim that Egypt recaptured all of Sinai or that Israel captured Cairo or Damascus; confusing events of 1973 with the Six Day War (1967).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

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