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Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The birth of the state of Israel, 1945-63
Unit 2
Key topic 2: The escalating conflict, 1964-73
Unit 3
Key topic 3: Attempts at a solution, 1974-95
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The aftermath of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war

Practise 30 exam-style questions on The aftermath of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war for Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one consequence of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (December 1948).

Model answer

One consequence of Resolution 194 was that it gave the Palestinian refugees a lasting basis for their demand for a 'right of return', which made the refugee question very hard to settle. Paragraph 11 of the resolution, passed on 11 December 1948, said that refugees who wished to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be allowed to do so, and that those who chose not to should be compensated. Refugees and Arab governments cited it constantly. At the Lausanne Conference in 1949 the Arab states insisted that Israel accept the principle of return before peace could be discussed, while Israel, which saw the refugees as a security danger, would discuss them only as part of a peace settlement and offered to take back about 100,000. Neither side would move, so the conference failed, and the refugees remained in camps in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 2 because it explains one result (the resolution became the basis of the refugees' claim and blocked agreement) with specific detail (paragraph 11, December 1948, Lausanne, the offer of 100,000). A common mistake is to confuse Resolution 194 with Resolution 181, which recommended partition in 1947, or with Resolution 242 of 1967.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a consequence. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the explanation, showing good knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a consequence. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers must explain a result of Resolution 194, passed on 11 December 1948. Paragraph 11 said that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. The resolution also set up a UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (France, Turkey and the USA) and called for international control of Jerusalem. Valid consequences include: (1) It became the basis of the Palestinian refugees' demand for a 'right of return': refugees and Arab governments (which at first voted against the resolution as a whole) cited it constantly, and most Arab states refused to resettle or naturalise refugees in case this weakened the claim. (2) The Conciliation Commission held the Lausanne Conference (April-September 1949), where the Arab states insisted that Israel first accept return, while Israel insisted that refugees could be discussed only as part of a peace settlement and offered to take back about 100,000 if peace was made; the offer was rejected and no agreement was reached. (3) Israel, which saw the refugees as a security risk while the Arab states remained at war with it, did not allow a general return, so the resolution was not carried out and the refugees stayed in camps in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. (4) Because return did not happen, the UN turned to relief and works programmes, creating UNRWA in December 1949. (5) Its call for international control of Jerusalem was repeated in Resolution 303 (December 1949) and rejected by Israel and Jordan. Level 2 needs a valid consequence explained with specific supporting information (e.g. paragraph 11, the Lausanne Conference, UNRWA). A general statement such as 'the refugees wanted to go home' is Level 1. Do not credit: the claim that Resolution 194 created Israel or partitioned Palestine (that was Resolution 181, a recommendation of 1947); the claim that it was legally binding on Israel (a General Assembly resolution is a recommendation; but credit the point that Palestinians and many states see it as affirming a right of return under international law); confusing it with Resolution 242 (1967).

Question 2

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in the conflict along Israel's armistice lines in the years 1949-54.

You may use the following in your answer:
- infiltration from the West Bank and Gaza
- Unit 101 (1953)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The armistice agreements of 1949 ended the war, but they left long, unmarked lines that cut many Arab villages off from their fields. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees now lived in the West Bank and Gaza, within sight of their former homes.

This led straight to infiltration. Thousands of people crossed the lines each year. Most wanted to harvest crops, recover belongings or visit relatives, but some stole livestock and a minority attacked Israelis, and dozens of Israelis were killed each year. Israel responded with patrols, ambushes and expulsions, in which many infiltrators, most of them unarmed, were killed, and it built new border settlements. The Mixed Armistice Commissions investigated complaints, and Jordan's Arab Legion tried to stop crossings, but the incidents continued.

As a result, from about 1951 Israel began reprisal raids across the lines against villages it believed were helping infiltrators. Many raids failed, so in August 1953 Ben-Gurion approved Unit 101, a small commando force led by Ariel Sharon, to carry out more effective night attacks.

This new force soon caused an international crisis. After a grenade attack killed a mother and her two children at Yehud in October 1953, Unit 101 and paratroopers attacked the West Bank village of Qibya, blowing up houses and killing dozens of villagers, many of them women and children. The UN Security Council censured Israel and the USA condemned the raid. After Qibya, Israeli raids were aimed more at army and police posts, and in January 1954 Moshe Dayan, the new chief of staff, merged Unit 101 into the paratroopers to spread its methods.

However, the violence did not stop: in March 1954 eleven people were killed in an attack on a bus at Scorpions' Pass in the Negev. The outcome by the end of 1954 was a cycle of infiltration and reprisal that made the armistice lines dangerous, damaged Israel's standing at the UN and pushed relations with Jordan and Egypt towards bigger clashes.

Explanation

This narrative reaches Level 3 because it follows a clear sequence from the armistice lines to the reprisal policy, Unit 101 and Qibya, using linking phrases ('this led straight to', 'as a result') and reaching an outcome. It goes beyond the stimulus points (Qibya, UN censure, Dayan, Scorpions' Pass) and recognises the motives and losses of both sides. Weaker answers list incidents without linking them, or jump to the Gaza raid of 1955, which is outside the period.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The narrative should show how incidents along the armistice lines grew into a cycle of raids and reprisals, with the links between events. Key developments, in sequence: the armistices of February-July 1949 left long lines that cut villages off from their fields, with hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees living close to their former homes. Crossings began at once and numbered thousands a year (Israeli estimates for the early 1950s run to well over 10,000 incidents a year; estimates vary). Most infiltrators crossed to return home, harvest crops, recover property or see relatives; some came to steal or smuggle; a minority came to attack Israelis, and dozens of Israelis were killed each year (credit any reasonable figure; Benny Morris puts Israelis killed by infiltrators in 1949-56 at about 200-250). Israeli forces also killed large numbers of infiltrators, most of them unarmed (estimates for 1949-56 run from about 2,700 to 5,000). Israel responded with border patrols and ambushes, orders to fire on infiltrators, the expulsion of those caught, and new border settlements of immigrants and Nahal soldiers. Mixed Armistice Commissions with UN observers investigated complaints. Jordan's Arab Legion and the Egyptian authorities in Gaza tried to restrain infiltration, with limited success. From about 1951 Israel carried out reprisal raids across the lines against villages believed to shelter infiltrators, but several failed, so in August 1953 Ben-Gurion approved Unit 101 under Ariel Sharon, a small commando unit trained for night raids (e.g. on al-Bureij refugee camp in Gaza, August 1953). After a grenade attack killed an Israeli mother and her two children at Yehud (12 October 1953), Unit 101 and paratroopers attacked the West Bank village of Qibya (14-15 October 1953), blowing up houses and killing dozens of villagers, many of them women and children (the figure most often given is 69; estimates vary). The UN Security Council censured Israel (Resolution 101, November 1953) and the USA condemned the raid. In January 1954 Moshe Dayan, chief of staff from December 1953, merged Unit 101 into the paratroopers, and reprisals were aimed more at military and police targets. Attacks continued, e.g. the ambush of a bus at Ma'ale Akrabim (Scorpions' Pass) in the Negev in March 1954, in which 11 people on board were killed (Israel blamed infiltrators from Jordan, but the attackers were never identified with certainty, and Sharett held back from a reprisal). Outcome: by the end of 1954 a cycle of infiltration and reprisal had made the armistice lines violent, damaged Israel's relations with Jordan, Egypt and the UN, and led towards larger clashes such as the Gaza raid of February 1955. Students may use the terms 'reprisal' or 'retaliation', and 'infiltrators' or 'fedayeen', and may call the attack on Qibya a raid or a massacre. A balanced narrative recognises the losses and motives of both sides. Answers that use only the two stimulus points without a third aspect of content cannot reach Level 3. Do not credit: the claim that the trouble began only in 1955; a narrative centred on the Gaza raid (1955) or the Sinai campaign (1956), which are outside the period (a brief concluding comment is fine).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

8 marks

Explain the importance of David Ben-Gurion for the creation of a single national army in Israel in the years 1948-49.

Model answer

David Ben-Gurion was very important for the creation of a single national army in Israel because he insisted that all armed groups be brought under the government's control and was prepared to use force to achieve this.

First, he founded the Israeli Defence Forces. As prime minister and defence minister, he ordered the formation of the IDF on 26 May 1948, built mainly from the Haganah, and the same order banned all other armed groups. This was vital because, before independence, several Jewish forces had acted separately, including the Irgun and Lehi.

Second, he dealt firmly with the Irgun and Lehi. When the Irgun's ship Altalena arrived with weapons in June 1948 and the Irgun wanted some of them for its own units, Ben-Gurion ordered the ship stopped. It was shelled off Tel Aviv and about 19 people were killed. This showed that no group could keep its own army. After Lehi members assassinated the UN mediator Count Bernadotte in September 1948, he banned Lehi and disbanded the remaining Irgun units in Jerusalem.

Third, he removed party politics from the army. The Palmach, the Haganah's elite force, was closely linked to the left-wing Mapam party. Ben-Gurion wanted an army loyal to the state rather than to any party, so he disbanded its separate headquarters in late 1948 and its brigades were absorbed into the IDF.

Fourth, he turned the IDF into a citizen army. The Defence Service Law of September 1949 made military service compulsory for Jewish men and women.

However, Ben-Gurion did not create the army alone. The Haganah had already trained commanders such as Yigael Yadin, the pressure of war forced the groups together, and Menachem Begin ordered the Irgun not to fight back after the Altalena, which avoided civil war. Overall, Ben-Gurion was decisive because his determination made the IDF Israel's only army.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 3 because it explains how Ben-Gurion's decisions (the founding order, the Altalena, Lehi, the Palmach, conscription) created one army, and it weighs his role against other factors such as the Haganah's earlier work and Begin's restraint. Weaker answers narrate the battles of the 1948-49 war instead of explaining how the army was created.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how Ben-Gurion, Israel's prime minister and defence minister, shaped the creation of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as one army under government control, replacing the separate Jewish armed groups of the Mandate period. Ways in which he mattered: (1) The order founding the IDF: on 26 May 1948 Ben-Gurion ordered the formation of the IDF from the Haganah, and the same order banned all other armed forces. (2) The Irgun and Lehi: the Irgun agreed in June 1948 to join the IDF; when the Irgun ship Altalena arrived with weapons in June 1948 and the Irgun wanted part of the arms for its own units, Ben-Gurion ordered it stopped by force, and it was shelled off Tel Aviv (about 19 people were killed; estimates vary), showing that there would be only one army; after Lehi members assassinated the UN mediator Count Bernadotte in September 1948, Ben-Gurion had Lehi banned and the separate Irgun units in Jerusalem disbanded. (3) The Palmach: the elite Palmach was linked to the left-wing Mapam party, and Ben-Gurion, who wanted an army free from party politics (his idea of 'mamlachtiut', or statism), disbanded its separate headquarters in late 1948, and its brigades were absorbed by 1949. (4) A citizen army: he pushed through the Defence Service Law (September 1949), making service compulsory for Jewish men and women, and created the Nahal programme (1948), which combined service with founding farming settlements. Limits: the Haganah had already built the structure and commanders of an army (e.g. Yaakov Dori, Yigael Yadin) before May 1948; the pressure of war made unity necessary; Menachem Begin's decision not to let the Irgun fight back after the Altalena prevented civil war; and Ben-Gurion's methods caused bitter divisions (e.g. disputes with commanders in 1948 and lasting anger over the Altalena). A judgement might be that Ben-Gurion was decisive, because he was prepared to use force to make the IDF the only army, but he built on the Haganah's work and others' restraint. Level 3 needs analysis of Ben-Gurion's role, not a description of the 1948-49 war. Do not credit: a narrative of the fighting in 1948-49 not linked to the creation of the army; the claim that the Irgun and Lehi remained independent forces after 1948.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

8 marks

Explain the importance of the Eisenhower administration's policy towards the Middle East for relations between the USA and Israel in the years 1953-55.

Model answer

The Eisenhower administration's policy was important for relations between the USA and Israel because its wish to win Arab friendship against the Soviet Union made relations noticeably cooler, although American economic support continued.

Eisenhower became president in January 1953, and he and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, believed that Truman had been too close to Israel. In May 1953 Dulles toured the Middle East and afterwards said the USA should follow a more impartial policy to reduce Arab resentment. This signalled a change that worried Israel's leaders.

The change soon had practical effects. In autumn 1953 Israel was building a canal to divert water from the River Jordan in the demilitarised zone with Syria, although UN observers had asked it to stop. The USA held back its economic aid until Israel agreed, in late October, to suspend the work. The same month the USA condemned the Qibya raid, and in November it supported the UN's censure of Israel. These events showed that the USA would use its aid to pressure Israel.

Relations were strained further in 1954. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade made speeches telling Israel to see itself as a Middle Eastern state, which angered Israelis. In April 1954 the USA agreed to give military aid to Iraq, while refusing Israel's requests for weapons or a security guarantee. Israel feared that the balance of arms was turning against it.

However, relations did not break down. US economic aid continued, about 75 million dollars in 1954 and 53 million in 1955, and many Americans and members of Congress remained sympathetic to Israel. Israel's own reprisal raids also caused friction. Israel responded by turning to France for arms.

Overall, the policy was very important because it showed Israel that it could not rely on the USA for weapons or protection, but the economic relationship between the two countries survived.

Explanation

This answer reaches Level 3 because it explains how the policy affected relations in several ways (the change of approach, the aid suspension of 1953, the arms question) and weighs this against the continuing economic aid. This is a demanding question: weaker answers describe US aid in general or jump to the Suez Crisis of 1956 without analysing these years.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how the policy of President Eisenhower (from January 1953) and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles affected US-Israeli relations. The administration wanted to contain Soviet influence by winning the friendship of the Arab states and building a regional defence system, so it aimed to appear more even-handed than the Truman administration. Ways in which it mattered: (1) Dulles toured the Middle East in May 1953, the first US Secretary of State to do so, and afterwards said the USA should follow a more impartial policy and reduce Arab resentment over its support for Israel. (2) In autumn 1953 the USA held back economic aid to Israel until Israel agreed (late October 1953) to suspend work on a canal to divert water from the River Jordan in the demilitarised zone with Syria, which UN observers had asked it to stop; this showed that the USA would use aid as pressure. (3) The USA condemned the Qibya raid (October 1953) and supported the UN Security Council's censure of Israel. (4) Eisenhower sent Eric Johnston (from October 1953) to negotiate a plan for sharing the Jordan's waters between Israel and its neighbours. (5) In April-May 1954 Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade made speeches telling Israel to give up the attitude of a conqueror and to see itself as a Middle Eastern state, and calling its open Jewish immigration a legitimate concern for the Arabs and the West, which angered Israelis (he also told the Arab states to accept Israel as an accomplished fact); in April 1954 the USA agreed to give military aid to Iraq and considered arms for Egypt, while refusing Israel's requests for arms or a security guarantee. (6) In 1954-55 the USA and Britain prepared a secret peace plan ('Alpha') that would have asked Israel to make concessions, e.g. in the Negev and on refugees. Limits: relations were cooler but not broken: US economic aid continued (about 75 million dollars in 1954 and 53 million in 1955), Congress and much of the American public remained sympathetic to Israel, and the USA still supported the Tripartite Declaration's guarantee of the armistice lines; Israel's own actions (e.g. reprisal raids) also caused friction; and Israel's response, turning to France for arms from the mid-1950s, shows it adapted rather than broke with the USA. A judgement might be that the policy made relations noticeably cooler and showed Israel that it could not rely on the USA for arms, but the economic relationship continued. Level 3 needs analysis of how the policy affected relations. Do not credit: Eisenhower's policy during the Suez Crisis (1956) except as a brief concluding comment; US military aid to Israel of the 1960s-70s.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

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