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Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The birth of the state of Israel, 1945-63
Unit 2
Key topic 2: The escalating conflict, 1964-73
Unit 3
Key topic 3: Attempts at a solution, 1974-95
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Attempts at a solution, 1988-95

Practise 30 exam-style questions on Attempts at a solution, 1988-95 for Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 30 questions
  • 4–8 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one consequence of the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel (January-February 1991).

Model answer

One consequence of the Iraqi missile attacks was that Israel, under strong US pressure, chose not to retaliate, which kept the coalition against Iraq together. From 18 January 1991 Iraq fired about 40 Scud missiles at Israeli cities such as Tel Aviv and Haifa. Saddam Hussein hoped that if Israel struck back, Arab states such as Egypt and Syria would refuse to fight on the same side as Israel and would leave the coalition. Some Israeli ministers, including the Defence Minister Moshe Arens, wanted to hit back, but President Bush urged Shamir to hold back and sent US Patriot anti-missile batteries, with American crews, to defend Israel. As a result, Israel stayed out of the war, the Arab members of the coalition stayed in it, and Saddam's plan failed. Israel's restraint also left the USA in a strong position to press Israel to attend the Madrid Conference later in 1991.

Explanation

This reaches Level 2 because it explains one clear result (Israeli restraint kept the coalition together) and supports it with precise detail: the number of missiles, the targets, Arens's view and the Patriot batteries. Weaker answers describe the attacks without saying what they led to, or wrongly claim that the missiles carried chemical weapons or that Israel bombed Iraq.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a consequence. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the explanation, showing good knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a consequence. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): During the Gulf War Iraq fired about 40 modified Scud missiles (estimates range from 39 to 43) at Israel, mainly at Tel Aviv and Haifa, from 18 January (some accounts give 17 January) to late February 1991, aiming to provoke Israel into retaliating so that Arab members of the coalition would withdraw. The warheads were conventional. Two Israeli civilians were killed directly and many more deaths were linked indirectly (e.g. heart attacks and the misuse of gas masks; estimates vary), about 230 people were injured and thousands of buildings were damaged, especially in Ramat Gan. Valid consequences include: (1) Israeli restraint under US pressure: the Shamir government, although some ministers such as the Defence Minister Moshe Arens wanted to strike back, did not retaliate, so the coalition, including Egypt and Syria, held together and Saddam's plan failed. (2) Direct US military protection: the USA sent Patriot anti-missile batteries with US crews to Israel (from about 19 January 1991), an unusual step, and gave extra aid; coalition forces also hunted Scud launchers in western Iraq. (3) US leverage: Israel's restraint earned US gratitude but also showed how far Israel depended on the USA, and after the war the Bush administration used its stronger position to press Shamir to attend the Madrid Conference (October 1991). (4) Effects inside Israel and the territories: Israelis sheltered in sealed rooms with gas masks, the economy was disrupted, and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were placed under a long curfew. (5) Israel's security thinking: the attacks showed the danger of long-range missiles and encouraged Israel's work on missile defence (e.g. the Arrow programme, begun with the USA in 1988). Level 2 needs one consequence explained with specific supporting information. A general statement such as 'Israel was attacked but did nothing' with no development is Level 1. Do not credit: the claim that the missiles carried chemical warheads; the claim that Israel bombed Iraq in 1991; consequences of Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor (1981).

Question 2

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in attempts to start Arab-Israeli peace talks in the years 1989-91.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the Shamir Plan (1989)
- James Baker's visits to the Middle East (1991)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

In 1989 the USA was talking to the PLO, but Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, refused to deal with it. Instead, in spring 1989 he put forward the Shamir Plan: Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would elect representatives to negotiate self-government with Israel, but there would be no PLO role and no Palestinian state. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, and Egypt's President Mubarak tried to build on the plan by agreeing who could take part.

These efforts failed because the two sides disagreed about who should represent the Palestinians. Israel rejected anyone linked to the PLO or living in East Jerusalem. In March 1990 a dispute over Baker's proposals brought down Israel's coalition government, and Shamir formed a right-wing government. Then, in May 1990, a PLO faction attempted a raid on the Israeli coast, and when Arafat refused to condemn it the USA suspended its dialogue with the PLO in June. By mid-1990 the peace effort had collapsed.

The Gulf crisis transformed the situation. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia joined the US-led coalition, while the PLO supported Saddam Hussein and lost Arab friends. Victory in February 1991 left the USA dominant, and on 6 March President Bush told Congress that it was time to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As a result, Baker made eight visits to the region between March and October 1991. He persuaded Syria to accept a conference in July, and he got the Palestinians to agree to be represented only by people from the West Bank and Gaza within a joint delegation with Jordan, which Shamir could accept. In September Bush also asked Congress to delay the loan guarantees Israel wanted, which kept up the pressure on Shamir.

The outcome was that the USA and the Soviet Union issued invitations, and the Madrid Conference opened on 30 October 1991, the first time Israel held direct talks with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians together.

Explanation

A top-level narrative explains why the efforts of 1989-90 failed (the dispute over Palestinian representation, the fall of Israel's government, the suspension of US-PLO talks) and how the Gulf War and Baker's diplomacy then made the Madrid Conference possible, using linking phrases to show cause and consequence. Weaker answers start in 1991, list Baker's visits without explaining what he achieved, or claim that the PLO officially took part in the conference.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The narrative should show why efforts to start talks failed in 1989-90 and how they succeeded in 1991, with the links between developments. Key developments, in sequence: after the PLO's statements of December 1988 the USA held low-level talks with the PLO in Tunis, but Israel refused to deal with it. In spring 1989 Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, put forward a plan (presented in Washington in April and approved by the Israeli cabinet on 14 May 1989) for elections in the West Bank and Gaza to choose Palestinian representatives who would negotiate interim self-government, with no role for the PLO and no Palestinian state. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, backed talks but told Israel (May 1989) to give up the idea of a 'Greater Israel'; Egypt's President Mubarak (a ten-point plan, September 1989) and Baker (five points, autumn 1989) tried to settle who the Palestinian representatives would be. The effort stalled over Israel's refusal to accept anyone linked to the PLO or living in East Jerusalem; in March 1990 Israel's national unity government fell in a dispute over Baker's proposals, and Shamir formed a right-wing government in June 1990. On 30 May 1990 a PLO faction, the Palestine Liberation Front, attempted a seaborne raid on Israeli beaches; when Arafat would not condemn it, President Bush suspended the US-PLO dialogue (20 June 1990). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (2 August 1990) and the Gulf War (January-February 1991) changed the situation: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia joined the US-led coalition, the PLO's support for Iraq weakened it, and the Soviet Union co-operated with the USA. On 6 March 1991 Bush told Congress that the time had come to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Baker then made eight visits to the region (March-October 1991); Syria accepted a conference in July 1991, and Israel and the Palestinians agreed that the Palestinians would be represented by people from the West Bank and Gaza, not PLO officials or East Jerusalem residents, within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In September 1991 Bush asked Congress to delay the 10 billion dollars of loan guarantees Israel wanted for housing Soviet Jewish immigrants, keeping pressure on Shamir. The USA and the Soviet Union sent out invitations in October. Outcome: the Madrid Conference opened on 30 October 1991, the first time Israel held direct, public talks with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians together. Linking language should show cause and consequence. Answers that use only the two stimulus points without a third aspect of content cannot reach Level 3. Events after the opening of the conference (e.g. the Washington talks) should be credited only as a brief concluding comment. Do not credit: the claim that the PLO officially attended Madrid; the claim that Israel and Egypt first met at Madrid (they had been at peace since 1979); events of the Oslo talks (1993).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

8 marks

Explain the importance of US involvement in the Gulf War (1991) for the USA's relations with the Arab states.

Model answer

US involvement in the Gulf War was very important for the USA's relations with the Arab states because it made the USA the protector of several Arab governments and the leading power in the region. Saudi Arabia had never before allowed Western forces on such a scale onto its soil, but after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 it accepted hundreds of thousands of US troops. After the war the USA kept forces in the Gulf and signed defence agreements with Kuwait and other Gulf states, which now relied on American protection against Iraq and Iran.

The war also strengthened US ties with Egypt and Syria. Egypt sent troops to the coalition and was rewarded when the USA wrote off about 7 billion dollars of its military debt. Even Syria, a former Soviet client that the USA regarded as a sponsor of terrorism, joined the coalition, and afterwards James Baker visited Damascus several times. As a result, Syria agreed to attend the Madrid Conference in October 1991.

These new friendships came with expectations. Arab coalition partners wanted the USA to show that it cared about the Palestinians, not only about Kuwait's oil. On 6 March 1991 President Bush promised to work for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Madrid Conference was the result.

However, US involvement also damaged some relationships. Jordan had stayed neutral and was seen as pro-Iraq, so Congress suspended aid to it, and the PLO's support for Saddam kept it cut off from the USA until 1993. Many ordinary Arabs also resented Western troops in Saudi Arabia and the suffering caused in Iraq by bombing and sanctions.

Overall, US involvement in the Gulf War was very important because it bound the Gulf states, Egypt and even Syria more closely to the USA and gave it the influence to start a peace process, but it also created resentment that some Arab governments' opponents would later exploit.

Explanation

This reaches Level 3 because it explains how the war changed relations with particular Arab states (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO), with specific evidence, and balances gains against costs in a judgement. Weaker answers retell the war, or treat 'the Arab states' as one group without distinguishing between those that joined the coalition and those that did not.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain how leading the war against Iraq changed US relations with Arab governments. (1) Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia accepted hundreds of thousands of US troops from August 1990; after the war the USA kept forces, aircraft and warships in the Gulf, signed defence agreements with Kuwait (September 1991) and other Gulf states, and sold them large quantities of arms, so the Gulf monarchies came to depend on US protection. (2) Egypt: Egypt sent troops to the coalition, and the USA wrote off about 7 billion dollars of Egypt's military debt (1990), strengthening the alliance that had grown since Camp David. (3) Syria: President Assad, a former Soviet client on the USA's list of states sponsoring terrorism, joined the coalition; James Baker visited Damascus repeatedly and Syria attended the Madrid Conference (October 1991). (4) Jordan and the PLO: Jordan's neutrality and the PLO's support for Iraq damaged their relations with the USA; Congress suspended aid to Jordan (1991) and the US-PLO dialogue stayed suspended; both had to rebuild relations through the peace process (Jordan at Madrid, the PLO only in September 1993). (5) US credibility and the peace process: Arab coalition partners expected the USA to address the Palestinian issue in return, and Bush promised to do so (6 March 1991), leading to Madrid; US prestige in the region was at its height. (6) Limits and costs: many ordinary Arabs opposed the war and the presence of Western troops in Saudi Arabia, the bombing and the sanctions on Iraq caused resentment, and Islamist opponents of the Saudi government and the USA later exploited this (credit as brief context); Iraq and Iran remained hostile to the USA. A judgement might be that US involvement made the USA the leading power in the Arab world, with closer ties to the Gulf states, Egypt and even Syria, but that it also created resentment among many Arab people. Level 3 needs analysis of how US involvement changed relations with particular Arab states. Do not credit: a narrative of the war with no link to US-Arab relations; the claim that all Arab states joined the coalition; events of the Iraq War of 2003.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in relations between Israel and Jordan in the years 1991-94.

You may use the following in your answer:
- King Hussein
- the peace treaty (October 1994)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

In 1991 Israel and Jordan were still formally at war, although King Hussein had held secret meetings with Israeli leaders for many years. The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 left Jordan weak and isolated. Hussein refused to join the coalition against Iraq, so the USA and the Gulf states cut their aid, and Jordan had to absorb hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who left Kuwait.

To repair relations with the USA, Hussein agreed to take part in the Madrid Conference in October 1991, with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In the talks that followed in Washington, Jordan negotiated with Israel on its own track, and the two sides discussed issues such as water and borders, although Hussein would not make a separate peace while the Palestinian talks were stuck.

The Oslo agreement changed this. Hussein had not been told about the secret talks between Israel and the PLO, and he feared that Jordan would be left behind. On 14 September 1993, the day after the Declaration of Principles was signed, Jordan and Israel agreed a Common Agenda for negotiations. President Clinton encouraged Hussein by promising to help with Jordan's huge debts, and Hussein and Rabin met in secret.

As a result, on 25 July 1994 Hussein and Rabin met publicly for the first time at the White House and signed the Washington Declaration, which ended the state of war between their countries. The next day they addressed the US Congress together. A new border crossing at Aqaba and Eilat opened in August, and the negotiators quickly settled the remaining issues.

The outcome was the peace treaty signed at Wadi Araba on 26 October 1994, with Clinton present. It fixed the border, shared water from the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, committed both sides to prevent attacks from their territory, and recognised Jordan's special role in Jerusalem's Muslim holy shrines. Jordan became the second Arab state to make peace with Israel, although many Jordanians, especially Islamists, opposed it.

Explanation

A top-level narrative follows relations in time order from the Gulf crisis through Madrid and the Common Agenda to the Washington Declaration and the treaty, explaining why each step led to the next (for example, why Oslo pushed Hussein to move quickly). It goes beyond the stimulus points and ends with a clear outcome. Weaker answers describe the treaty only, or confuse it with the Oslo agreements.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The narrative should show how relations moved from a formal state of war to a peace treaty, and how each development led to the next. Starting point: Jordan had cut its legal and administrative ties with the West Bank in 1988; King Hussein had held many secret meetings with Israeli leaders since the 1960s, but Jordan had never made peace. During the Gulf crisis (1990-91) Hussein refused to join the coalition, lost US and Gulf aid and received about 300,000-400,000 Palestinians from Kuwait (estimates vary); he warned that Jordan would resist any use of its territory in the war, and after a secret meeting with Shamir in early January 1991 Israel did not use Jordanian airspace to strike Iraq. To repair relations with the USA, Hussein agreed to join the Madrid Conference (October 1991) with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; in the Washington talks (from December 1991) Jordan negotiated with Israel on its own track. After Israel and the PLO announced their agreement, Jordan and Israel signed a Common Agenda for negotiations in Washington on 14 September 1993, the day after the Declaration of Principles; Hussein, who had not been told about the Oslo talks, feared being left behind, and President Clinton encouraged him with promises of debt relief. Secret meetings between Hussein and Rabin followed. On 25 July 1994 Hussein and Rabin signed the Washington Declaration at the White House, ending the state of belligerency, and addressed the US Congress together the next day; a border crossing at Aqaba-Eilat opened on 8 August 1994, and talks on borders, water and security moved quickly. Outcome: the peace treaty was signed at Wadi Araba (the Arava) on 26 October 1994 by Rabin and Jordan's Prime Minister Abdelsalam al-Majali, with Hussein and Clinton present; it fixed the border (the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, the Dead Sea, Wadi Araba and the Gulf of Aqaba), shared water (Israel would supply 50 million cubic metres a year), committed both sides to prevent attacks from their territory and recognised Jordan's special role in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem; Jordan became the second Arab state, after Egypt, to make peace with Israel; Hezbollah, and many Jordanians, especially Islamists, opposed it (credit as part of the outcome). Linking language should show cause and consequence. Answers that use only the two stimulus points without a third aspect of content cannot reach Level 3. Events after 1994 (e.g. Hussein's speech at Rabin's funeral in November 1995) should be credited only as a brief concluding comment. Do not credit: the claim that Jordan fought in the Gulf War; the claim that Jordan was the first Arab state to make peace with Israel; confusing the Israel-Jordan treaty with the Oslo agreements.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

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