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Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
Key topic 1: The birth of the state of Israel, 1945-63
Unit 2
Key topic 2: The escalating conflict, 1964-73
Unit 3
Key topic 3: Attempts at a solution, 1974-95
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Diplomatic negotiations, 1973-79

Practise 30 exam-style questions on Diplomatic negotiations, 1973-79 for Edexcel GCSE History (Conflict in the Middle East 1945-95). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

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  • 4–8 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one consequence of President Nixon's visit to the Middle East (June 1974).

Model answer

One consequence of Nixon's visit to the Middle East was that the USA and Syria restored diplomatic relations, which strengthened the American position as the main peacemaker. Syria had broken off relations with the USA during the 1967 war and relied on the Soviet Union for its weapons. However, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy had just produced the Syria-Israel disengagement agreement of 31 May 1974, so President Asad had a reason to deal with Washington. When Nixon visited Damascus, he and Asad announced on 16 June 1974 that relations would be re-established. This meant that the USA now had working relations with both Egypt and Syria, the two Arab states that had fought Israel in 1973, while the Soviet Union, which had armed them, was left on the sidelines of the peace talks. The USA could now act as the go-between for both Arab states and Israel.

Explanation

This reaches Level 2 because it explains one clear result of the visit (restored US-Syrian relations) and supports it with specific detail: the date, the background of the Syrian agreement and the effect on the Soviet Union's position. Another valid answer is the US-Egyptian agreement of 14 June 1974, which confirmed Egypt's move towards the USA. Weaker answers simply list the countries Nixon visited.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a consequence. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the explanation, showing good knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a consequence. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Nixon toured Egypt (12-14 June 1974), Saudi Arabia (14-15 June), Syria (15-16 June), Israel (16-17 June, the first visit to Israel by a serving US president) and Jordan (17-18 June), and returned on 19 June; he was by then badly weakened by the Watergate scandal and resigned in August 1974. Valid consequences include: (1) The USA and Syria re-established diplomatic relations, broken since the 1967 war (announced in Damascus on 16 June 1974), so the USA could deal directly with Asad, a leading Soviet partner, which strengthened its role as the main mediator. (2) Egypt's move towards the USA was confirmed: on 14 June Nixon and Sadat signed the 'Principles of Relations and Cooperation Between Egypt and the United States', which set up a Joint Cooperation Commission and promised Egypt nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; large crowds welcomed Nixon in Egypt, and US economic aid to Egypt grew. (3) The Soviet Union's position weakened, as its two main Arab partners, Egypt and Syria, now had working relations with Washington (credit if linked to the visit). (4) Israel was reassured: Nixon discussed Israel's long-term arms needs with Prime Minister Rabin, which helped keep Israel committed to step-by-step diplomacy. (5) In Jordan, Nixon and King Hussein discussed the West Bank and the Palestinians and agreed to set up a joint commission, but no Jordanian-Israeli agreement followed. Level 2 needs a valid consequence explained with specific supporting information. A comment such as 'it improved relations' with no development is Level 1. Do not credit: describing the tour without explaining a result; claims that Nixon negotiated a peace agreement on the trip; claims that he visited Iraq or Lebanon.

Question 2

8 marks

Explain the importance of Saudi Arabia for the Arab use of the 'oil weapon' in 1973-74.

Model answer

Saudi Arabia was very important for the Arab use of the oil weapon because, as the largest Arab oil producer, its decisions made the embargo effective, and it also set limits on how far the weapon was used. Saudi Arabia held about a quarter of the world's known oil reserves. King Faisal was a close partner of the USA, but he was deeply committed to the Palestinian cause and to Jerusalem, and during 1973 he had warned the Americans that Saudi oil policy could change if they did not move towards the Arab position.

When the Yom Kippur War began, Faisal supported Egypt with money, and on 17 October 1973 the Arab oil ministers meeting in Kuwait agreed to cut production by 5 per cent a month. Faisal had resisted a total embargo, but when Nixon asked Congress on 19 October for 2.2 billion dollars of military aid for Israel, he announced a complete embargo on the USA the next day. Because Saudi Arabia was the biggest exporter, other producers followed, and by November Arab production had been cut by a quarter. Saudi diplomats, such as the oil minister Yamani, then used the threat of further cuts to push European countries and Japan towards more pro-Arab statements.

Saudi Arabia was just as important in ending the embargo. Faisal wanted to keep good relations with the USA, and once Kissinger had arranged the Sinai I agreement in January 1974 and opened the way to talks between Syria and Israel, the Saudis led the move to lift the embargo on the USA in March 1974.

However, Saudi Arabia was not the only factor. Libya imposed its embargo first, and radical states such as Libya and Iraq wanted tougher action. The huge price rises were decided by OPEC's Gulf members, driven especially by Iran, and Faisal opposed the December increase. Overall, Saudi Arabia was the key state: without it the oil weapon would have been weak, but it also kept the weapon limited and ended it when the USA began to act.

Explanation

This reaches Level 3 because it explains how Saudi Arabia made the oil weapon effective (its size, Faisal's decision after Nixon's aid request, its diplomacy) and how it ended it, and it weighs this against the roles of other producers and of OPEC. Weaker answers simply narrate the oil crisis without analysing Saudi Arabia's part. Avoid crediting Saudi Arabia with every price rise: OPEC's Gulf members, led by Iran, set the December 1973 price.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers should explain Saudi Arabia's part in the decision to use oil as a political weapon during and after the Yom Kippur War, how it made the weapon effective, and its role in ending it. Saudi Arabia was the largest Arab oil producer and held about a quarter of the world's known oil reserves; King Faisal (reigned 1964-75) was strongly committed to the Palestinian cause and to the return of East Jerusalem, but was also a close partner of the USA and strongly anti-communist. (1) Before and at the start of the war: Faisal had promised Sadat support and had warned the USA during 1973 that Saudi oil policy could change if it did not move towards the Arab position; when the war began he pledged money to Egypt. (2) The decision: at the OAPEC meeting in Kuwait on 17 October 1973 the Arab producers agreed to cut production by 5 per cent a month; Faisal had resisted a total embargo, but when Nixon asked Congress on 19 October for 2.2 billion dollars of emergency aid for Israel he announced a total embargo on the USA (20 October), and other producers followed (Libya had already acted on 19 October). (3) Effect: because Saudi Arabia was the biggest exporter, its participation made the cuts real; by November Arab production was 25 per cent below September levels; the Saudi oil minister, Yamani, toured Western capitals to press Arab demands; countries that moved towards the Arab position (e.g. the EEC declaration of 6 November 1973, Japan) were rewarded with easier supplies. (4) Ending: Faisal wanted good relations with the USA; after Kissinger's diplomacy (he met Faisal in November 1973; Sinai I, January 1974; the opening of Syrian-Israeli talks) Saudi Arabia led the move to lift the embargo on the USA (17-18 March 1974), and Saudi-American ties were quickly repaired (e.g. Nixon's visit to Jidda, June 1974). (5) Limits: Libya and Iraq pressed for tougher action, and Iraq refused to join the production cuts; the price rises were decided by OPEC's Gulf members, driven especially by non-Arab Iran, and Faisal opposed the December 1973 increase; the oil weapon depended on the war launched by Egypt and Syria, which created the crisis, and on Sadat's encouragement; the embargo did not force Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines. A judgement might be that Saudi Arabia was the most important single state, because without it the embargo would have been weak, but that it also kept the weapon limited and ended it once the USA began to act. Level 3 needs analysis of Saudi Arabia's importance, not a narrative of the oil crisis. Do not credit: claims that Saudi Arabia's forces fought in the war as a main combatant; claims that Saudi Arabia alone was responsible for the whole price rise (OPEC's Gulf members, led by Iran, set the December 1973 price); claims that the embargo lasted until 1979.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in the Soviet Union's involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy in the years 1973-79.

You may use the following in your answer:
- Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy (1974-75)
- Soviet opposition to Sadat's peace policy (1977-79)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

At the end of the Yom Kippur War, the Soviet Union seemed to be an equal partner in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It had armed Egypt and Syria, and it had worked with the USA to arrange the ceasefire resolution of October 1973. At the Geneva Conference, which opened on 21 December 1973, the Soviet Union was co-chair with the USA.

However, Geneva quickly adjourned, and the real negotiations were led by Kissinger alone. His shuttle diplomacy produced the Sinai I agreement in January 1974, the Syria-Israel agreement in May 1974 and Sinai II in September 1975, with the Soviet Union left on the sidelines. This happened because Sadat believed that only the USA could persuade Israel to return land.

As a result, Egypt moved steadily away from Moscow. It restored diplomatic relations with the USA in February 1974, and Sadat complained that the Soviet Union would not supply spare parts or reschedule Egypt's debts. In March 1976 Egypt ended its Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Moscow turned instead to Syria, Iraq, Libya and the PLO.

In 1977 the Soviet Union briefly regained a role. President Carter wanted a comprehensive settlement at a reconvened Geneva Conference, and on 1 October 1977 the USA and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement on the principles for it. Israel objected strongly, and Sadat feared that the Soviet Union and Syria would block any deal. He therefore bypassed Geneva altogether by going to Jerusalem in November 1977.

From then on, the Soviet Union opposed the peace process. It condemned Sadat's initiative and supported the Arab states that formed the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. It denounced the Camp David agreements of 1978 as a separate deal that ignored the Palestinians, and after the 1979 treaty its opposition prevented the UN force in Sinai from being renewed. The outcome was that by 1979 the Soviet Union had lost Egypt and been shut out of peace-making, while the USA had become the only effective mediator.

Explanation

A top-level narrative follows the Soviet Union's position in sequence, from co-chair at Geneva, through its exclusion from the shuttle diplomacy and the loss of Egypt, to its brief return in 1977 and its opposition to Camp David, ending with a clear outcome. It uses own knowledge beyond the stimulus, such as the Geneva Conference, the end of the Treaty of Friendship and the joint statement of October 1977. Weaker answers describe US diplomacy without explaining what happened to the Soviet Union's role.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The narrative should show how the Soviet Union, co-chair of the peace process in 1973, was gradually excluded from it, with the links between developments. Key developments, in sequence: the Soviet Union had armed Egypt and Syria and resupplied them during the Yom Kippur War; it worked with the USA on the ceasefire (Resolution 338, 22 October 1973) (background only: the war belongs to topic 2.3). At the Geneva Conference (21 December 1973) the Soviet Union was co-chair with the USA under the UN Secretary-General, but the conference adjourned after its opening sessions, and Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy (Sinai I, January 1974; the Syria-Israel agreement, May 1974; Sinai II, September 1975) was conducted by the USA alone, leaving the Soviet Union on the sidelines. Egypt moved towards the USA: diplomatic relations were restored (February 1974); Nixon visited Egypt and Syria (June 1974); Sadat complained that the Soviet Union would not supply arms and spare parts or reschedule Egypt's debts, and on 15 March 1976 Egypt ended the 1971 Treaty of Friendship. The Soviet Union turned to Syria, Iraq, Libya and the PLO, and rearmed Syria. In 1977 Carter sought a comprehensive settlement at a reconvened Geneva Conference, and on 1 October 1977 the USA and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement on principles for it, which gave the Soviet Union a central role again; Israel objected, and the USA and Israel agreed a working paper that moved away from it. Sadat, fearing a Soviet and Syrian veto, went to Jerusalem instead (19-21 November 1977), bypassing Geneva. The Soviet Union condemned his initiative and backed the Arab states that formed the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (Tripoli, December 1977). It denounced the Camp David agreements (September 1978) as a separate deal that ignored the Palestinians and supported the states that rejected them; after the Treaty of Washington (March 1979), Soviet opposition in the Security Council meant that the UN Emergency Force's mandate in Sinai was not renewed (1979), so a non-UN Multinational Force and Observers was later created (1981-82). Outcome: by 1979 the Soviet Union had lost Egypt, had been shut out of Arab-Israeli peace-making and was aligned with the states that rejected the treaty, while the USA had become the sole effective mediator. Answers need at least three aspects of content for Level 3. Do not credit: long accounts of the military events of October 1973; claims that the Soviet Union took part in the Camp David talks; claims that Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1976 (it ended the treaty; relations continued until 1981).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Washington, September 1978-March 1979.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the Blair House talks (October 1978)
- Carter's visit to Egypt and Israel (March 1979)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The Camp David frameworks, signed on 17 September 1978, set a target of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty within three months. At first progress was quick: in late September the Knesset approved the agreements, including the removal of Israeli settlements from Sinai. However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia refused to support them, and Carter and Begin soon disagreed over how long Israel had promised to freeze new settlements in the West Bank.

These tensions shaped the formal talks, which began at Blair House in Washington on 12 October 1978. The negotiators soon became stuck on three issues: the timetable for Israel's withdrawal, whether the treaty should be linked to progress on Palestinian autonomy, and whether it would override Egypt's obligations to other Arab states. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Sadat and Begin later that month raised hopes, but Arab opposition increased the pressure on Sadat. In November an Arab summit in Baghdad condemned Camp David and threatened sanctions if Egypt signed a treaty, so Sadat insisted on stronger links to the Palestinian issue.

As a result, the three-month deadline passed in December 1978 without agreement. The Iranian revolution in early 1979 then added new problems: it distracted the USA and left Israel worried about its oil supplies, but it also made a treaty between Egypt and Israel even more important to the Americans. Talks in February and a visit by Begin to Washington in early March failed to break the deadlock.

Carter therefore took personal charge again. Between 7 and 13 March 1979 he travelled to Cairo and Jerusalem, and through a series of compromises, including an American guarantee of Israel's oil supply and Egyptian sales of oil to Israel, the treaty text was agreed on 13 March. Sadat quickly accepted it.

The outcome was the Treaty of Washington, signed at the White House on 26 March 1979. Israel would withdraw from Sinai within three years and the two countries would establish normal relations, but the Arab states responded by isolating Egypt.

Explanation

A top-level narrative shows why the three-month target was missed (the Blair House disputes, Arab pressure, the Iranian revolution) and how Carter's trip broke the deadlock, ending with the signing of the treaty. It goes beyond the stimulus with own knowledge such as the Knesset vote, the Baghdad summit and the oil guarantee. Weaker answers jump from Camp David to the treaty without explaining the delay, or confuse the treaty with the frameworks of 1978.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Key developments, in sequence: the Camp David frameworks (17 September 1978) set a target of a treaty within three months; the Knesset approved the agreements, including the removal of the Sinai settlements, by a large majority in late September; Jordan and Saudi Arabia refused to support them; Carter and Begin disagreed over how long Israel had agreed to freeze new settlements in the West Bank. Negotiations began at Blair House in Washington on 12 October 1978; they stalled over the timetable of Israel's withdrawal, any link between the treaty and Palestinian autonomy, and whether the treaty would override Egypt's obligations to other Arab states. On 27 October the Nobel Peace Prize for 1978 was awarded jointly to Sadat and Begin. The Arab summit in Baghdad (2-5 November 1978) condemned Camp David and threatened sanctions if Egypt signed a treaty, increasing the pressure on Sadat to secure links to the Palestinian issue. The three-month deadline (17 December 1978) passed without a treaty. The Iranian revolution (the Shah left Iran in January 1979) distracted the USA and alarmed Israel about its oil supplies, but also made an Egyptian-Israeli treaty even more important to the USA. Further talks in February and Begin's visit to Washington in early March failed to break the deadlock. Carter then travelled to Cairo and Jerusalem (7-13 March 1979) and addressed the Knesset; compromises included a US guarantee of Israel's oil supply, Egyptian sales of oil to Israel, dropping a 'special role' for Egypt in Gaza and Israeli gestures to the Palestinians; the treaty text was agreed on 13 March and Sadat accepted it; the Knesset and the Egyptian government approved it. Outcome: the Treaty of Washington was signed at the White House on 26 March 1979 by Sadat and Begin, with Carter as witness; Israel would withdraw from Sinai within three years and the two states would establish normal relations, exchanging ambassadors after the first stage of withdrawal; Arab sanctions against Egypt followed. Answers need at least three aspects of content for Level 3. Do not credit: detailed accounts of the Camp David summit beyond the starting point; events after March 1979 beyond a brief conclusion; claims that the treaty settled the future of the West Bank.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

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