The Provisional Government

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The July Days were armed demonstrations in Petrograd in early July 1917 by soldiers, Kronstadt sailors and workers, who demanded that the Soviet take power. They were put down by troops loyal to the Provisional Government; the Bolsheviks were blamed and accused of being German agents, so Lenin fled to Finland and Trotsky was arrested.

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The authors may differ because of who they were and when and why they were writing. The author of Interpretation A was a British officer. Britain needed Russia to keep fighting so that Germany could not move its armies to the Western Front, so he saw the June Offensive as 'a brave attempt' by Russia to 'stand by her allies'. He served with the army staff and saw discipline collapse as soldiers' committees debated orders, so he blames 'the poison of propaganda'. Writing in 1925, when Britain was hostile to the communist government, he puts the blame on the 'agitators' rather than on the Provisional Government.

The author of Interpretation B was a peasant soldier who suffered the war and whose family was hungry at home, while peasants were seizing land in 1917. He had every reason to want peace. His memories were also recorded by a Soviet researcher in 1967, the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution, when accounts were expected to praise the Bolsheviks, which may be why he says 'only the Bolsheviks told us the truth'.

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Interpretation A argues that Kornilov was 'a patriot, not a plotter', let down by Kerensky. There is some truth in this. Kerensky had appointed Kornilov Commander-in-Chief in July 1917 because the army was collapsing after the failed June Offensive, and Kornilov genuinely wanted to restore discipline and stop the Bolsheviks. The messages between the two men were confused, and historians still debate whether Kerensky had agreed to troops being sent to Petrograd. A is also right that by freeing the Bolsheviks and arming the Red Guards, Kerensky helped his enemies, so 'the road to October began here'. But A was written by one of Kornilov's own officers, in exile, and it ignores the fact that Kornilov was demanding sweeping powers - the death penalty at the front and limits on the soldiers' committees - which made many fear a military dictatorship.

Interpretation B argues that the workers and soldiers, 'led by the Bolshevik party', saved the revolution. This is convincing about how Kornilov was stopped: the Red Guards were armed, the railwaymen held up the trains and agitators persuaded Kornilov's soldiers not to fight, so his advance collapsed without a battle and he was arrested. B is also right that the Bolsheviks gained most, winning majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets by September. However, B is a Soviet history of 1967 that gives the Bolsheviks all the credit, although Mensheviks and SRs in the Soviet also organised the defence, and its claim about Kornilov's aims is stated as fact when it is debated.

Overall, B is more convincing about the Kornilov affair because it explains accurately how Kornilov was defeated and why the affair transformed the Bolsheviks' position. A offers a fair point about Kerensky's mistakes, but it is a defence of Kornilov that plays down the threat he posed.

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Bolshevik propaganda and slogans were an important reason for their growing support. After Lenin's return in April, the party campaigned for 'Peace, Bread and Land' and 'All power to the Soviets'. These short slogans offered exactly what war-weary soldiers, hungry workers and land-hungry peasants wanted, and because the Bolsheviks were the only major party not in the Provisional Government, they could attack it for failing to provide them. They spread their message through Pravda, Soldiers' Pravda and Trench Pravda for the front, through leaflets and through speakers at factory gates and barracks, while the party's Military Organisation worked among the garrison and the Kronstadt sailors. Trotsky's speeches drew huge crowds. Membership grew roughly tenfold during 1917. However, propaganda alone did not guarantee success: after the July Days the Bolsheviks were branded German agents, Lenin fled and Pravda's offices were wrecked, and their support fell sharply.

The Kornilov affair reversed this setback. In late August, General Kornilov sent troops towards Petrograd. Kerensky had to turn to the Soviet for help: Bolshevik prisoners, including Trotsky, were released, the Red Guards were given rifles and Bolshevik agitators helped persuade Kornilov's soldiers not to fight. Instead of traitors, the Bolsheviks now looked like the saviours of the revolution, while Kerensky was distrusted by both the officers and the left. The results were dramatic: by early September the Bolsheviks had majorities in both the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, and Trotsky became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. The Red Guards also kept their weapons, which they used in October.

Overall, the Kornilov affair was the more important reason. Propaganda built steady support from April, but after the July Days the party was on the defensive and its leaders were in hiding or prison. The Kornilov affair turned that support into control of the soviets, the bodies through which the Bolsheviks seized power in October. However, the affair helped the Bolsheviks so much partly because months of propaganda had already made them the obvious alternative to a failing government, so the two factors worked together.