Was The Safavid State A Continuation Of The Turkman Tribal Regime Of The Aq-qoyunlu?

In reference to the Safavids, the continued usage of the term `state` connoting fixed, internationally recognized borders, a common language and a monopoly at the centre of the use of force, is itself particularly problematic. Newman, in his book Safavid Iran, dispenses with the term `state`, preferring instead such terms as `project`, `polity` and `realm`. With this in mind, we would be beginning on false pretenses if we were to attempt a study of transition from nomadic (Aq-Qoyunlu) tribal society to a centralized bureaucratic (Safavid) state. In the sense that this transformation did not occur, at least in the case the early Safavid realm with which we are concerned, we could indeed argue that the period of transition between Aq-Qoyunlu and Safavid leadership was just that, a period of transition which marked direct continuation of what had come before it.

History has often treated continuity as a concept to be taken for granted, preferring to analyse violent or sudden transformation. Yet in our age of rapid social change, continuity no longer seems self-explanatory, and historians, like other people, are beginning to revise their ideas. Perhaps then it is helpful to begin with this idea of continuity and to deconstruct it, rather than to attempt a blow by blow analysis of the changes which took place during the Aq-Qoyunlu to Safavid transition, in several of the myriad elements of society.

As J. R. Walsh has considered, historiography...in its prejudices and its assumptions, in its omissions no less than its contents...is the reflection of the inconsistent human situation and it is certainly true that changes in notions of legitimacy during the medieval period in Iran, led to the writing and rewriting of both Safavid and Aq-Qoyunlu history. All that is known of this period of Iranian history comes from written documents, therefore it is important to consider the availability or paucity of sources as well as their objectives. In looking at legitimacy of the ruler I will take two sources: an Aq-Qoyunlu chronicle completed by Khunji Isfahani in 1490 before the rule of Ismail; a later source written by Khwandamir and completed just before the death of Ismail.

The common theme between each of these extracts is that of religion and the perceived legitimacy (or not) of the leader in terms of this religion. The Isfahani text makes clear the Aq-Qoyunlu`s lack of Messianic claims and the conviction that such claims would indeed be blasphemous, condescendingly noting that "they [the Safavids] openly called Shaykh Junayd God" and referring to Haydar and his "banner of delusion". In this sense it is clear that the Aq-Qoyunlu historian wished himself to be distanced from such Safavid practices and would in no way have thought of the new regime as a continuation of his own.

Similarly the later Safavid source of Khwandamir wished to distance itself from the Aq-Qoyunlu leaders who had "exchanged their faith for treachery and enmity" and he would presumably have been horrified at the thought of being seen as a mere continuation of such treachery. In contrast to this there is a strong promotion of Ismail`s comparative legitimacy through Messianic claims, which become clear when Khwandamir talks of Ismail as the "defender of the faith and heir to the Alid succession" as well as mention of his concern for "the propagation of the Imami sect and the strengthening of the Prophet`s law." Such claims are also supported in the poetry of Ismail himself and he openly refers to himself as "God`s mystery" and claims that "In me is Prophethood and the mystery of Holiness".

Clearly therefore, both the Aq-Qoyunlu and the Safavid regime had no problem in considering themselves entirely different entities, an aspect little considered by modern historians of the Safavid period. As Willem Floor has argued, there is a trend in writing of the history of Iran...to provide new insights and theoretical contributions to the so-called intellectual discourse. What these new insights often lack however, is a thorough investigation of sentiments found at the time of the events, and instead they rely on the academic discourse produced in the more contemporary era.

In addition recent Safavid historiography has shown a tendency to focus heavily on the `events` of history or in the French historian Fernand Braudel`s terms, the short span, and hence obscure the vision of larger and ultimately more influential developments. Braudel, has focused on the importance of what he termed the longue duree, or long span view of history, which privileges a temporality that transcends rupture and discontinuity, looking instead towards a long term view of history which remains beyond the consciousness of the actors involved. Hence I would argue that it is more helpful for us to put aside such a focused view of specific events or changes which occurred during the Aq-Qoyunlu to Safavid transition and to see the period rather as part of a wider trajectory. The question we must then ask is what was this trajectory headed towards and did the characteristics of the early Safavid period play any part in altering the course of this trajectory?