Is Mill`s Vision Of Sexual Equality Compromised By `masculinist` Ideals Of Freedom And Citizenship?

As part of Mill`s political and moral theory, he argues for what he sees as sexual equality, most notably in `The Subjection of Women`. Feminists, both at the time, and since have criticized him for not being radical enough. Women can only exercise their freedom and citizenship if they adopt masculine characteristics as the public sphere is correspondingly masculine. However, this is based on different understandings of character, citizenship and the private/public distinction than the ones Mill sets out. Sexual equality must entail the transformation of the whole of society not merely adapting women so that they fit into a male world. Mill argues that the subordination of women to men is based on the law of the stronger and sustained by artificial feelings and prejudices. Nothing inherent about the nature of either sex justifies this relation because their natures are produced by the arrangement of society. Consequentially, women have generally become narrow-minded and induced into willing servitude. Whereas, men have become corrupted by power and are prone to domestic violence. To rectify this, there needs to be sexual equality and men must give up their advantages gained "by the mere fact of being born a male" . This will involve giving women the vote, reform of divorce laws, legal protections and equal access to education, professions and public positions. Contemporary feminists oppose Mill on the grounds that liberalism is not compatible with feminism. Classical liberalism sets up a world view that distinguishes between a public and private sphere. The public sphere grants universal rights in virtue of a person`s impartiality and rationality - characteristics associated with males. The private sphere is populated by women and children and associated with emotion and the body. The abstract nature of liberal rights can`t attend to the differences between the sexes so will benefit men. So liberal feminism extends citizenship rights into a male sphere to women who, in order to participate, must compromise their identities. Likewise, the freedom granted in the private sphere can`t apply in the same way to women, who are dependent on their husbands and usually have dependent children. These are inherently masculinist ideals of freedom and citizenship because they entail that women must either become like men or they cannot exercise these rights. This version of liberalism is not the same as the one Mill wants to defend. First of all, he doesn`t believe women must become like men to exercise citizenship. He lists in chapter three, qualities observable in women which would make them particularly suited to politics such as their "intuitive sagacity" and "rapid and correct insight into present fact". Clearly this seems inconsistent with his earlier assertions that we cannot know the natures of women or men due to the distorting effect of the unequal relationship between them. However, he is not suggesting that these are an inherent part of female nature, just that they are conventional feminine characteristics; "the least contestable of the differences which now exist" which "may very well have been produced merely by circumstances". The point he is trying to make is that conventional feminine characteristics have utility as well as male ones. He is not saying that this is the reason women should be included because these qualities may change as society does. Stafford argues that Mill`s ideal citizen is one who displays both conventional masculine and feminine characteristics, so could equally be male or female. He thought men were concerned mainly with justice, curbing impulse and pursuit of wealth which led to egoism and selfishness. To become better citizens, men could benefit from developing feminine characteristics like sympathy and feeling. So the ideal citizen is not defined by masculine features. Instead he believes that through education in a loving and equal household, children will grow into better citizens by cultivating almost androgynous characters. Mill does believe that people need a minimum level of rationality (including the ability to read, write and multiply) to qualify as citizens. However, for Mill this isn`t a masculinist ideal because rationality isn`t gendered. As they exist at present, he does think that a lot of women are limited in their rationality but it is clear throughout `On Liberty` and `Considerations on Representative Government` that he believes most men are too. He defends plural voting for the better educated (without a gender requirement) and asserts that the only faculty most men (and women) employ is the "ape-like one of imitation". But as the situation stands almost everyone does qualify (excluding groups like children and the mentally ill) and then through participation in politics both men and women who are currently lacking, will develop their rationality and public spirit. One qualification for citizenship which does strike as masculinist is his criteria that people must pay tax in order to vote. Most women did not pay taxes because they were economically taken care of by their husbands or fathers due to very unequal property laws. However, the reason for including this tax clause is that voting would allow some non-tax payers "to put their hands into other people`s pockets for any purpose they think fit to call a public one". Most women who don`t pay tax do not have this motive as they would not be in receipt of public funds whilst being provided for by their husband or father. So Mill probably didn`t intend this criterion to apply to women, or at least it is consistent with his theory that he didn`t. So in order to participate in the public sphere according to Mill, women do not need to take on masculine characteristics. Women as they are qualify for citizenship. Rationality is a criterion of good citizenship but this isn`t a masculine quality. Both men and women develop it through participation in public affairs such as jury duty and voting at the minimum. Then once society has transformed through sexual equality, ideal men and women will "combine reason and feeling in the highest degree". Against the charge that Mill`s concept of liberal rights doesn`t take into account the differences between the sexes: the differences are precisely why Mill thinks rights for women are so important. He believes that different groups in society have different interests which require different protections. In `Consideration of Representative Government` he argues: "in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked". He uses this to defend enfranchising women and working class men. However paternal and genuine the motives of the government may be they are not going to make the best laws for other sections of society. This is why Mill puts extension of suffrage to women is the first step; why he devoted much of `The Subjection of Women` and his political career to this cause. "In what concerns the relations of Man with Woman, the law which is to be observed by both should surely be made by both". The laws on domestic violence, prostitution, custody of children, divorce etc need to be created with the equal input of women because while men have been the sole legislatures the laws they have produced have been fundamentally injurious to women. Furthermore, from a utilitarian approach, the different perspectives and talents of the women are wasted in an unequal society. He says the effect of giving women free choice in education, employment and public service would be: "doubling the mass of mental faculties available for the higher service of humanity." So he is neither asserting that women are the same as men or that they need to become the same; there is the same potential excellence existing in the female half of the population as there is in the male half. Women just have no opportunity to exercise it. Contemporary feminists argue that Mill`s concept of freedom is masculinist because it draws a line around private affairs, within which, a person is free to do whatever they wish. Locke, James Mill and other classic liberals all supported a minimum realm of freedom within domestic and commercial affairs. This is masculinist because it is often within this private sphere that women are vulnerable to abuse and subordination, also because women do not have the same scope for exercising this freedom due to their dependency on their husbands or fathers and their primary responsibility for their children. Mill however moves the line between private and public. Implicit in the Harm Principle is a definition of private which covers that which affects the individual only; so-called self-regarding acts. So there is no absolute right to freedom in domestic affairs because your actions may cause harm to others. For example he says that a person is free to get drunk but not if this impairs his ability to fulfil his responsibilities to his family and others. Also, parents can be forced to provide adequate education for their children. The implications of this are that laws which are necessary for sexual equality within the domestic sphere are compatible with Mill`s provision for personal liberty. He gives a passionate account of the injustice of the legal status of women; that they can have no custody of their children, no protection from domestic violence, no rights to their own property, and are essentially "the personal body-servant of a despot". It is clear that Mill wants the private relations between men and women to alter and his concept of freedom allows for this and is not undermined by a masculine bias. Furthermore, both men and women have responsibilities which restrict their freedom within the domestic sphere but have the same freedom in self-regarding acts. It could be argued that this doesn`t change the actual exercise of freedom because women have less scope for self-regarding acts within a marriage and with children. Mill believes that his provisions for sexual equality will transform marriage -women will be able capable of supporting themselves so that they are not dependent. Husband and wife will become voluntarily and mutually dependent on each other through affection. Also, both parents have responsibility for the children. So within the private sphere women have the same degree of freedom as men and this is not set up as a masculine ideal. He does think most women will choose to exercise their freedoms in domestic life rather than subsistence. This isn`t a requirement, probably just a practical prediction which has its basis in Mill`s Victorianism and utilitarianism. It is mainly directed at middle class women, for whom managing houses and staff has to be a full time occupation. This arrangement could be abandoned on utilitarian grounds if it perpetuated a state of inequality. He still sees important roles for women in employment, co-operatives and School Boards etc. In conclusion, Mill`s ideals of citizenship and freedom are not masculinist so do not undermine his vision of sexual equality. The point is not extending freedoms and rights currently enjoyed by men to women when they do not apply but transforming society until it creates the best arrangements for the flourishing of both. Enfranchisement of women (and working class men) will allow them to enter the public sphere, develop their rationality and public spirit (which is not a masculine quality) and have equal input on laws which directly affect them and their position in society. Men will also be free from the corrupting effect of dominance and helped to develop their sympathetic sides. The fact that both genders will change and develop through this process implies that the end result is not intended to be a masculine concept of citizenship or freedom but one that it produced and sustained by everyone.

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