How And Why Did The Soviet Sphere Of Influence In Eastern Europe Collapse?

How and why did the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe collapse?

As with the end of the cold war in general, few predicted the timing, speed or peacefulness of the collapse of soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Until the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had been able to maintaining the communist monopoly of power, keeping them in a military alliance and, although not perfectly, imposing a centralised economic model. In the space of a few months in autumn 1989 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania (sometimes grouped as the 'CNEA 6') all underwent revolutions and regime changes which ended the forty years of communist rule. I will argue that first and foremost, these revolutions would not have been possible was it not for reforms in Soviet policy, driven by Gorbachev as part of his plan to create a more civilised and viable Soviet Union. Secondly, once Eastern Europeans realised their new freedom from soviet rule, the communist regimes were left powerless and toppled under the ensuing outpour of built up resentment to the repression and low living standards which they had presided over. The end of Soviet influence was completed by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the eastern European states moving closer to the west, which had far more to offer them.

Changes in Soviet eastern European policy explain the timing and much of the nature of the subsequent changes in eastern European regimes. Prior to Gorbachev there had been cases of eastern European regimes attempting to deviate from Moscow's directives, such as in 1968 when Czechoslovakia tried to reform the Soviet economic model and consequently Prague was occupied by Soviet troops, assisted by other Warsaw Pact members. 1968 was the first clear application of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', which made and attempt by the CNEA 6 to deviate from soviet-model communism or try to leave the Warsaw Pact inexcusable, and punishable by military intervention. The Soviet Union had a vast preponderance of military power in Eastern Europe and since WW2 had hundreds of thousands of troops stationed in bases in Eastern Europe. For this reason, it was widely acknowledged by the European communist regimes and dissenters alike that until the Soviet Union ended the Brezhnev doctrine, serious domestic change was impossible. Their predictions were correct. Even before Gorbachev came to power, the Brezhnev doctrine was being weakened. In 1980 there was a wave of strikes and protests in Poland. Moscow secretly resolved not to militarily intervene, for fear of triggering a violent rebellion, but instead conducted aggressive military manoeuvres one the Polish border. However, this was far from seen as Moscow accepting reform in Eastern Europe. Once Gorbachev came to power, he accelerated the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine. In 1985 he stated that people in Europe should have the right to choose their own social and economic system and in 1987 he formally renounced the doctrine, stating instead his desire for a more equal and cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and CNEA 6. However, even in 1988, Eastern European leaders did not feel to defy Moscow; at the round table talks between the Polish communist party and trade union organisation Solidarity, foreign policy was mutually acknowledged as beyond negotiation. However, eastern European leaders eventually learnt the truth of Gorbachev's promise of non-intervention. In July 1989 he officially renounced the Soviet infringement of other state's sovereignty and reforms in Eastern Europe met no condemnation from Moscow while during riots and protests, Soviet troops remained in their barracks or where withdrawn from the country. This finally made eastern Europeans realise that Moscow was no longer preventing domestic reform. There was a mixture of strategic, domestic, and ideological reasons behind the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe. The retreat was orchestrated by Gorbachev, who once he had come to power promoted his allies like Shevardnadze to key positions like Foreign minister which gave him huge influence over Soviet policy. Contrary to the outcome of his actions, Gorbachev never wanted the total collapse of soviet influence in Eastern Europe, but rather a less dominant relationship. He wanted to maintain the Warsaw pact and socialist economic models, but with a closer relationship with the west and democratic and humane regimes. Gorbachev was very enthusiastic about the (somewhat) democratic power sharing arrangements between communists and non-communists which were established in Hungary and Poland until the Berlin Wall came down. However, given the vast military and economic preponderance of the Soviet Union, these reforms would not have freed the CNEA 6 from the sphere of influence of their eastern neighbour. Although the original use for the Soviet sphere of influence was to strength the Soviet Union by providing a buffer and resources, by the 1980s this was ceasing to be the case. The cost of stationing thousands of troops and providing economic support to the faltering economies made the CNEA 6 overall a huge burden on the Soviet economy, which was struggling itself. The position of the Soviet Union in the 1980s of often referred to as one of 'imperial overstretch', where the cost of controlling other states actually serves to weaken it. Therefore, it is often in the state's security interests to reduce the extent of its influence to a smaller, but more viable area. Gorbachev was probably aware that with the economic deterioration of the Soviet bloc, its international commitments were unsustainable and if not reduced under conditions of Moscow's choosing, could lead to bloody revolutions that might destroy the Soviet Union as a whole. The Afghanistan conflict had shown the costs of propping up communist regimes by force. As well as the integrity of the Soviet state, maintaining the sphere of influence required huge military expenditure (30-40% of their GDP) which reduced expenditure on social and economic programs to improve the welfare of the Soviet people and increase support for the regime. As Tony Judt said, Gorbachev let communism fall in Eastern Europe to try and save it in Russia, although he clearly failed in the second part. The dominance of Eastern Europe was also an obstacle to closer relations with the USA and Western Europe. The division of Europe was the main cause and symbol of the cold war and, given Gorbachev's aim of ending the cold war, had to be overcome by weakening soviet influence and forming closer relations with the west. Gorbachev believed that the Soviet Union could not 'win' the cold war, and so its security could only come through strengthening ties with the west and resolving disputes. The good will of the west was vital for Gorbachev's reforms (perestroika) to be undertaken without the west exploiting the changes for their own advantage. If the West jumped upon Gorbachev's reforms, it would have given those in the Kremlin who were worrying for Soviet security a far stronger case and would have made perestroika more difficult. However, Reagan and Bush kept their distance and, although providing large financial support to Solidarity, did not aid rebellion as they had been doing in Afghanistan while Thatcher declared the cold war over in 1988. Gorbachev had already been trying to create 'space' to implement his reforms with unilateral disarmament agreements. However, he planned to pursue his reforms much further than he was able to, and a more relaxed policy to Eastern Europe would have made his job easier on the international stage. Historians have also emphasised Gorbachev's ideological motives. Like many, he was terrified of nuclear war, having witnessed the long term suffering and desolation of radiation with the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Gorbachev and many of his appointed ministers were also far more westernised than their predecessors. Many of them had spent large amounts of time in Western Europe and seen first had not only the greater prosperity and freedom but also, in many cases, greater social mobility and social support. Given that equality was one of the key goals of communism, it undermined their faith in the soviet economic model and inspired their drive for reform. Also, the increased exposure to the west convinced Gorbachev that the military threat which it posed to the Soviet Union had been greatly overstated, despite hardened rhetoric in the early Reagan years. This strengthened Gorbachev's desire for disarmament and made the security purpose of the eastern bloc seem less essential (although given Gorbachev wanted to keep the Warsaw pact, he had not abandoned all security concerns).

Gorbachev's leniency was vital for the Polish and Hungarian regime changes in 1988/9, in which the communist governments were replaced with more-or-less democratic, but still communist led, coalitions with non-communist parties. The overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania and Zhivkov in Bulgaria also were welcomed by Gorbachev, who saw both of the dictators as incapable of implementing the liberalising reforms which he wanted. They were replaced with socialist-led governments that still, by their membership of the Warsaw pact and socialist economic models, would be to some extent in the soviet sphere of influence. Gorbachev supported these new regimes as they adhered to his vision of the future of Eastern Europe. However, in other countries in Eastern Europe their reforms went far further which undermined the semi-communist regimes in Poland and Hungary. After Hungary's reforms in 1989, which included relaxing the border controls with Austria, tens of thousands of East Germans poured into the country with the aim of escaping to the west. In response, the GDR increased its border controls and cut itself off from its neighbours. This drew huge protests which escalated due to violent retaliations by East German police, which were widely reported in the media. Unable to control the protests, the government decided to reopen the borders, including eventually the berlin wall, and the leader Honecker, whom Gorbachev had dismissed as 'incapable of change' was replaced. Eventually a non-communist government was established. The unrest in East Germany led to similar mass demonstrations in Czechoslovakia which led to the collapse of the regime and the replacement with a non-communist one. The fall of two of their communist neighbours had huge impact on the Polish and Hungarian governments. Communism was shown to be belonging to the past and Hungarian and Polish communists, including the Polish head if state Jaruzelski, were removed from the government. Had it not been for Gorbachev's non-intervention, the revolutions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia might never have happened, for fear of soviet reprisals, or been crushed like in 1956 and 1968. However, this does not explain why the revolutions went as far as they did, to end communist rule and defy the wishes of Gorbachev, whom having repeatedly promoted a policy of non-intervention could do little to stop them without undoing all of his international good-will building. The main reason for the total collapse of the communist regimes, which was necessary for the total departure from the soviet sphere of influence, was the unexpected fragility of the regimes and the popular desire for change. With the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, none of the CNEA 6 states had ever wanted a communist government and after popular elections failed, Stalin encouraged intimidation and fraud to fill the governments with communists. The relatively stability of the regimes was largely due to soviet military support. The despotic nature of the regimes made them unsuited to reform as once they relaxed their grip on power, the primary use by opposition factions of their new freedom was the destruction of communist rule. By agreeing to form coalitions, the Polish and Hungarian governments demonstrated an enormously excessive opinion of their own popularity (the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party estimated their electoral support at 40% when their eventual result was around 8%). The sources, and extent of the unpopularity of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe varied, for example Poland had a large Catholic population which resented the communists' atheism as well as having historical grievances with Russia. However, in all of the CNEA 6 there was dissatisfaction with the standard of living and the lack of freedom. In the 1980s economic growth in Eastern Europe lagged far behind that of the west and the average life expectancy was four years lower. Increased exposure to western consumer goods through the increased trade of Ostpolitik made eastern Europeans more aware of the disadvantages of their economic model. The desire for political change was increased by the signing of the Helsinki accords in 1975, whereby all the governments of Europe agreed to support human rights which gave the criticisms of human rights protesters much more weight. Also, the transition of Spain, Portugal and Greece from dictatorships to democracies provided an example political reform and European integration could occur with little upheaval and improve the quality of life for the citizens of the country. Because of their greater geographical separation from Western Europe and hence lesser contact, in Bulgaria and Romania there was less of a demand for reform along the lines of the Western model which allowed the countries to remain socialist after the 1989 revolutions.

The collapse of (most of) the eastern European communist regimes did not, in itself, remove them from soviet influence. What did was their subsequent dramatic movement to the west. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union could have remained the main trading partner and military ally with its newly democratic capitalist neighbours, had the new Eastern European regimes invited them to. They did not, mainly because there was more to be offered from the west than the east. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact showed that the Soviet Union had nothing more to offer Eastern Europe militarily. Gorbachev conceded to the US that united Germany was to become only part of NATO and not the Warsaw Pact, in return for foreign troops not being stationed in the east. Once East Germany left the Warsaw Pact, the other five eastern European states quickly followed. They realised that the west posed less of a threat if they left the Warsaw pact and sought greater integration with the rest of Europe than remaining in an alliance, which was primarily created to balance against it. Greater European integration was hoped to allow greater independence by being amongst a larger number of more comparably sized states, rather than in a small alliance with a very powerful state, as in the Warsaw pact. Western Europe and the USA also were more able to provide the economic help which Eastern Europe desperately needed, due to their far larger economic strength. Through trade with Western Europe, the most of the eastern European states had large debts to the west and through greater cooperation they hoped to be able to reduce the burden. Also, Eastern Europe had already been receiving financial support from Western Europe, such as the 'Poland and Hungary: Assistance for restructuring their Economies' (PHARE) program in 1989 which showed the benefits of closer relations with the West. Finally, there were cultural reasons for the move west. Eastern European nationalists resented the years of soviet influence and hoped that they would be able to preserve their identity by membership of a European, rather than soviet system in which they would have a larger voice. Also, there was much pan-European nationalism with eastern Europeans frequently talking hopefully of 'returning to Europe', with the cold war artificially separating them from their western kin.

To conclude there were three stages to the end of soviet influence in Eastern Europe, each of which was a necessary condition for the next. Firstly, Gorbachev abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine and allowed the eastern European people to decide their own political and economic system without threat of military interference. This was primarily to give Gorbachev the diplomatic freedom and resources to restructure, and hopefully save, the Soviet Union. The deliberate retreat from imperial overextension makes the descri ption of the end of soviet influence as a 'collapse' somewhat inappropriate; it was more a controlled demolition that destroyed too much. The end of military support for the CNEA 6 regimes allowed popular protestors and opposition groups, who resented the lack of freedom and low standard of living of the regimes, to replace them with either capitalist democracies or more liberal socialist regimes. The opposition was heavily inspired by perceived superiorities of western European economic models. Having changed regime, the Eastern European states replaced their economic and military ties to the moribund Soviet Union with those to the stable and prosperous West.

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