An Insight To The Fields I Specialise In

"There are now two great nations in the world, which starting from different points, seem to be advancing towards the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans....Each seems called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world" (Gaddis, 1997: p1) This prophecy by famous French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville is a pivotal insight to the causation of the Cold War. Although this was written down in 1835, the overwhelming relevance it bore a century later shows the incremental nature of conflict between America and Russia. The incompatible growth of both these global giants was betrothed for confrontation, because after world war two America could not return to isolation and the prospect of bipolarity with an entity completely ideologically opposite to them was simply unpalatable. Similarly, the USSR stimulated US suspicions, be it knowingly or unknowingly, which means both sides fuelled clashes. These clashes were evident in the years running up to the war and during the war, but the polar opposites were unified behind the solidarity of a common enemy hence had to tolerate one another as they both knew the battle could not be won without this cooperation. However, what this also implies is that once the war was over there was no incentive to remain diplomatic and tolerant, arguably they couldn't as one was the world's greatest capitalist power whilst the other was the world's greatest communist. This tension is further fuelled by the nature of the world order after the war as it was one of transition between superpowers. This is seen in the domination of Britain, France and Germany before the war, but post-war they are unfit to be classified as superpowers hence the hegemonic throne is fought for between the two remaining global powers; US and USSR. Therefore this essay will argue the Cold War was an inevitable contest, birthed as a product of a number of provocations from both sides rather than one absolute event or being.

The US was the first country to possess any form of nuclear capability, which means they hold a fundamental share of blame for the causation of the cold war as the arms race was a key stimulant. In August 1945 the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman justified this as an aim to "shorten the war and save lives" (Offner, BBC: 2011). However, by early 1945 the Japanese were ready to surrender (Bulletin, 1975: p40) due to the effectiveness of the sea blockade. This means that the atomic bombings can be interpreted to be indirectly aimed at the Soviet Union rather than to 'fold up' the situation in Japan, as Truman voiced the fact that he was "tired of babying the Soviets" (Offner, BBC: 2011) so they needed to be "treated with an iron fist" (Offner, BBC: 2011). Therefore, this was a tactical move that represented American nuclear supremacy on the global stage. However it can be argued that the American application of the atom bomb was justified to some extent. This is because the USSR were arguably getting out of hand due to expansionist strategies such as the Baltic offensive, as well as the disregard of the declaration of a liberated Europe, despite Stalin's agreement to it at the Yalta conference of early 1945. Moreover, the startling nature of Soviet behavior is strongly captured in the creation of Russian offensive, infamously known as "Operation Unthinkable", proving that dialogue was not working hence Stalin needed a more direct threat. Whether this was achieved is debatable as Truman's deploying of atomic diplomacy did not grant him the political leverage he hoped it would, instead the USSR engaged in the arms race to achieve nuclear parity; and did so in 1949. Furthermore, Stalin already knew about the 'Manhattan Project' through espionage (Rubel, 2009: p242) meaning the threatening nature of the atomic bomb was diluted to some extent as the USSR were not caught unaware. Nevertheless, it was the US who introduced the military shift from conventional to a more costly nuclear form; evident in later events such as the nuclear brinkmanship of the Cuban missile crisis (1962). An argument could also be made for American overreaction to Soviets, as the war had left the USSR hugely damaged; evident in the attacks on Soviet soil as well as loss of life being more than the west's combined "27 million Soviet civilians and soldiers did not live to see D-Day" (Fabian, 2005: p18), thus Stalin's priority was reconstruction at home. This means that Soviet attainment of satellite states can be argued to fit the purpose of defence, as Stalin was paranoid of such a conflict happening again hence needed to take pre-cautions. Again this reinforces the blame upon the US for the cold war as it can be argued Truman misunderstood Stalin's intentions. This means that a key share of the blame for the cold war must be that of the US' as they compelled the USSR to engage in the arms race; whether for self-defence or as a means not to be undermined by their ideological rival in the struggle for hegemony. Regardless of Soviet reasoning, this American provocation dramatically contributed to the causation of the cold war.

Disagreement over Germany was a prominent contribution to the cold war and its origins, after all, "whoever has Germany, has Europe" (Shlaim, 1983: p16). Whilst both sides agreed on a four zone division of occupation in Germany as well as the four D's (denazification, demilitarization, etc.) that was where the consensus ended, as Stalin wanted Germany to remain weak as a deterrent for future threat. The US on the other hand understood the importance of Germany's revival for a prosperous Europe, and feared the overwhelming Soviet presence in Europe hence wanted to successfully reestablish Germany. The central contention was over reparations in terms of whether it should be taken from current production, as the US disagreed whilst the USSR were in favor. Moreover, Stalin feared the US may use west Germany as a platform for expanding their influence in Europe (Bar-Noi, 2008: p159). These incompatible interests were evident in the lack of success at the Potsdam conference, which highlighted a key disagreement between the two superpowers over the governance of Germany and reparations. This contributed to the origins of the cold war, as both sides understood the importance of disallowing the others aims to come to fruition. Throughout the cold war period, Germany was often at the heart of conflict through crisis' such as the Berlin Blockade of 1949 which "reinforced western impressions of a reckless and irreconcilably expansionist Soviet Union" (Junker, volume1 : p82). Furthermore, Berlin is seen as the symbol of the cold war (Junker, volume1: p3) as the nature of international relations after world war two would be determined by the superpower's handling of Germany (Junker, volume1: p1). Therefore the constant insecurity of the status quo between east and west Germany was a key factor in the birth of the cold war, as it the answer to the German question was uncoordinated.

History played a big part in the lack of trust between both superpowers, but it can be argued that the Soviet Union had the most suspicious policy strategies than the US in the years running up to the war. The expansionist nature of USSR foreign policy before 1945 placed the US on edge, making Roosevelt doubtful of how trustworthy Stalin actually was, but at the same time the US needed the Soviets for the war effort thus prioritized strategically. Despite ongoing tripartite talks between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, Stalin abandoned these negotiations to form a non-aggression pact with Hitler in August 1939. After this, war became inevitable as Britain and France simultaneously made a pact with Poland, which became even more vulnerable to invasion through this agreement between Hitler and Stalin. This exemplified Soviet priorities, as despite global tensions Stalin chose to join hands with the enemy. Arguably, the Soviets were still skeptical of any pact with the west due to their attempts of stifling the Russian revolution of 1918 (Minnot, 1988: p2). The American delay of deploying the second front during the war was interpreted by Stalin as the US attempt at weakening German forces at the expense of the red army. This resentment maintained Soviet suspicion of the US even after the war. Though in regards to the Soviet decision to for the pact with Hitler, one has to understand that foreign policy is about maximizing ones self-interest where possible (Belle, 2000: p14) and the benefits of a non-aggression pact outweighed those of a mutual assistance pact with the west; viewed as "camouflaged chicanery" (Hanhimaki et al, 2003: p21). Nevertheless this self-interest embodied the unbalanced priorities of the USSR, because after Germany was defeated the secret protocols of this controversial non-aggression pact were revealed to show that Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland were supposed to be divided into German and Soviet spheres of influence, confirming western suspicions of Soviets expansionist nature. Furthermore, the winter war whereby the red army invaded Poland in September, and Finland in December 1939, degraded the Soviets even further, in the eyes of the US. This compelled Roosevelt to openly condemn the USSR; "a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship" (Dallek, 1995: p212) and he imposed a 'moral embargo' on Soviet exports. However with the Nazi defeat of France in June 1940, Roosevelt was aware that the real threat to world peace were the Nazi's and if needs be then he would "hold hands with the devil" (Walt, 1987: p38) to defeat them. In an attempt to improve relations, a series of negotiations between Sumner Welles (under-secretary of state) and Constantine Oumansky (Soviet ambassador) took place, during July 1940. This led to the US lifting embargo restrictions in January 1941 as well as Roosevelt preventing attempts of disallowing the USSR to receive US assistance in the land-lease bill (1941). Though it was only after Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941 that Stalin turned to the US for assistance. From this one can interpret the cooperation between the two superpowers as temporary; a means to a military end. Similarly, the infamous Katyn massacre (1940) discovered in 1943 fuelled US skepticism of the USSR; although it was hushed up due to the need for the west to maintain cordial relations with the USSR. This can be seen in Roosevelt's letter of instruction to Churchill on how to handle the Lublin government's request to investigate the matter; "Prime Minister Churchill must find a way of prevailing upon the Polish government in London to act with more common sense" (Heilbrun, 2012). Translated as the war is at a crucial stage and would be affected by any shift in US-Soviet relations, thus the 22,000 murders would be followed up after the Germans were defeated. Therefore, whilst it was strategically crucial for the US to have the Soviets on side, Stalin provided much room for mistrust, ultimately through his pact with Hitler but also his repression and expansionist tactics suggesting that the US kept this in mind when forming post war relations with the Soviet Union. This means the USSR hold a significant share of blame in the causation of the cold war as their actions led to it. An argument can be made for the leadership of Truman being a pivotal causation of the cold war, as he was much more politically provocative than his pragmatic predecessor. This is evident in the Truman doctrine which is regarded by many historians as the start of the cold war (Kaplan, 1991: p2) because it preached the policy of containment which advocates an open handling of the spread of communism. The doctrine came as a solution to preventing Greece and Turkey from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, once Britain has stopped supplying them with aid. However this was an overreaction on the American part as Stalin had no such intentions, though this represents the degree of mistrust between both superpowers. The Truman doctrine was one of the many sources of provocation under Truman as it followed on from Kennan's long telegram and Churchill's iron curtain speech, both in 1946. Churchill's Fulton speech was looked over by Truman meaning he was aware of what Churchill was going to announce to the world. This open incitement of the Soviet Union led to Stalin giving a speech containing an analogy between Churchill and Hitler, further straining relations between both sides of the iron curtain. The Soviet Union also issued the Nokivov telegram in late 1946 as a response to article X by Kennan. However Soviet reaction was in retaliation to what Truman had started, again reinforcing the impact of his leadership on the formation of the cold war. Similarly Truman's attitude to the Soviets was a lot less accommodating than that of his predecessor, seen in the change of atmosphere at the Big 3 summit of July 1945. One can interpret this change in approach as the product of American attainment of the atom bomb. This is supported by the interpretation that perhaps Roosevelt would have taken this stance too but he needed Stalin to agree to enter the war in Japan, therefore was accommodating. However once the US obtained nuclear power they no longer needed the USSR to support American soldiers in Japan, hence Truman's brash use of atomic diplomacy. This justifies Stalin's uncooperative behaviour to some extent, as this change in attitude was not familiar to him because he and Roosevelt shared a fairly good relationship. Therefore some of the blame for the origins of the cold war can be placed upon Truman as his intolerant and paranoid attitude strained US-Soviet relations, compelling Stalin to give as good as he got.

To conclude, this essay has taken a post-revisionist stance as both revisionist and orthodox perspectives are far too simplistic to account for such a global phenomenon i.e. the cold war. The collapse of the grand alliance hinted at the inevitable contest to come, as the only superpowers that remained post-war would be the US and the USSR. Arguably, American actions such as those under the Truman administration advocated the power relations of the world being one of a junior partnership between itself and Russia. Whilst countries like the UK could settle for this type of world order, Russia could not and as the only other superpower of that era it was obliged to compete in the fight for hegemony. However this conflict was one with origins located in the differences within both countries, the most fundamental being their ideological differences. The causation of the cold war was one of a build-up of many events and beings ranging from the US obtainment of nuclear arms, Stalin's misunderstanding of the present to the mutual historical resentments.

Bibliography Bar-Noi, Uri "The Cold War and Soviet Mistrust" (2008)

Belle, Douglas "Press Freedom and Global Politics" (Douglas A. Van Belle, 2000)

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December 1975)

Dallek, Robert "Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy: 1932-1945" (Oxford University Press 1995)

Fabian, Kati "Eagles over Berlin" (2005)

Gaddis, John "We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War" (Oxford University Press 1997)

Hanhimaki, Jussi. Westad, Odd. "The cold war, a history in documents and eyewitness accounts" (Oxford University Press, 2003)

Junker, Detlef "The US and Germany in the era of the cold war 1945-1968" (Cambridge Press, Volume 1)

Kaplan, Lawrence "American historians and the Atlantic Alliance" (Kent State University Press, 1991)

Minnot, Rodney "US regional force application: the Maritime strategy" (Stanford Junior University Press, 1988)

Rubel, David "The bedside baccalaureate" (Agincourt Press, 2009)

Shlaim, Avi "The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948-1949" (University of California Press, 1983)

Walt, Stephan "The origins of alliance" (Cornell University Press, 1987)

Internet sources:

(Offner) http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/truman_01.shtml last accessed: 14/12/12 01.23am

(Heilbrun) http://nationalinterest.org/blog/jacob-heilbrunn/how-churchill-roosevelt-helped-stalin-cover-the-katyn-massac-7464 last accessed: 14/12/12 01.23am