How Important Was The Role Of Nationalism In The Unification Of Germany In 1871?

Nationalism certainly had a role to play in the unification of Germany in 1871; it was, however, a rather different breed of nationalism to that seen in 1815, the 1830s and 1848, and it was more often than not manipulated by powerful diplomats (especially Otto von Bismarck) to their own ends. The events of the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s, particularly the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and the Franco-Prussian War, served to demonstrate that it was a jingoistic strain of nationalism (rather than ideologues bent on self-determination) that proved most effective in unifying Germany. It was this nationalism in particular that Bismarck sought to exploit as Germany underwent not a meaningful unification, but a 'Prussification', and even then it is somewhat doubtful, as we will see, that nationalism was the most important factor. In order to understand how Prussia came to be so dominant in the middle part of the 19th Century, it is necessary to examine some of the factors that enabled it to go from being a thoroughly divided (and in many places backward) region of Germany in 1815 to a genuine European power by about 1864. The economic growth that took place after 1815 and the transfer of the Rhineland to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna is certainly significant in this instance. The advent of the Zollverein in conjunction with a more efficient system of public administration, as well as the continued industrialisation of the already flourishing agricultural and mineral industries in the Rhineland, saw Prussia far outstrip all other German states in economic growth: in 1865 Prussia had 15 000 steam engines, almost five times more than agriculture-dependent Austria, and both its coal and steel production increased fivefold from 1850 to 1875. It was this economic dominance that allowed it to invest in cutting-edge military technology such as the Dreyse needle gun, which was a major contributing factor in Prussia's swift victory in the Austro-Prussian war, as was its ever-expanding network of railways that allowed troops to be transported to Schleswig-Holstein, South Germany and France at short notice. It is clear, then, that compared to Austria, who were significantly disadvantaged by not being part of the Zollverein and close to bankruptcy in 1866 as war began, Prussia was in an economically dominant position from where it would be easy to influence and annex smaller states, which Prussia did with the North German Confederation in 1866-67. What we can see, therefore, is that economic power made a great deal of Bismarck's political ambition possible rather than fanciful; since the realisation of Bismarck's political vision (in the form of wars against Austria and France and annexations of various states) was perhaps the most significant contributing factor to unification, we cannot ignore the underlying economic factors at play. The question of nationalism here is an interesting one: on the one hand, the Zollverein can be seen as Prussia convincing (or strong-arming) other states that freer trade is better for Germany as a whole, in which case perhaps the economic climate in Germany at the time was inherently nationalistic when unification occurred. Furthermore, the liberal nationalist movement embodied in the Nationalverein (whose membership peaked at 25 000 members in the early 1860s in Prussia) was strongly supported by the middle classes, who had been the main beneficiaries of the economic advances of industrialism. More likely, though, is that the economic climate actually created a division where it mattered most, namely between Austria and Prussia. Austria, to its detriment, persisted with an isolationist economic policy throughout the middle of the 19th Century and its agriculture-dominated economy suffered during the harvest failures of the 1840s. Not only this, but most of the Zollverein states allied with Austria against Prussia in 1866, suggesting that the Zollverein did not produce political or diplomatic nationalistic feeling. What we can see, then, is that the economic factors at play in the mid-19th Century may have facilitated Prussia's unification of Germany, but those same factors were not nationalistic in origin or execution. We can, however, see a much clearer demonstration of the true nature of German nationalism on the road to unification when examining the series of diplomatic crises that engulfed Europe in the 1850s and 1860s. This, of course, requires the introduction of Bismarck and his effect on the nationalist cause within Germany. Bismarck, much like a great number of arch-diplomats, was a master of realpolitik and was prepared to do more or less anything to guarantee Prussian supremacy; since it was ultimately Prussian supremacy that secured unification, we must therefore consider his role in the unification process as being of paramount importance. There are countless instances of Bismarck leaning on international and German rivals to ensure that Prussia's interests were secured. He opposed the proposals of the Nationalverein at Frankfurt in 1863 to the point that he refused to send a delegate to the Diet; he secured Austrian help in the Schleswig-Holstein succession crisis of 1863-64 before using an agreement with Austria at Bad Gastein in August 1865 to generate a war against them in 1866, won in no small part because Austria could not really afford the cost of continuing to fight after Königgratz in July and because Bismarck had secured French neutrality through Napoleon at Biarritz; he secured a significant number of northern German states for Prussia at the Treaty of Prague in August to form the North German Confederation; he put pressure on the Hohenzollern family and the Spanish court to accept Leopold's candidature for the Spanish throne in 1870 and used French anger to incite pan-German hatred and strengthen the ties made with southern German states in 1866, resulting in a war won slowly but decisively. Luck was on Bismarck's side - he managed to secure an unexpected victory against Austria in spite of Italian weakness, Britain was more concerned to keep France in check and Russia (despite the problems of integrity lost at Prussian hands during the Polish Revolt) were too weak to contemplate intervening - but it cannot be denied that he stage-managed Prussia's progress from 'big fish in a small pond' to genuine European superpower. Nor should we overlook the role of General Moltke, an anomalous European commander insofar as he was a strategist rather than a soldier: he had a significant role to play from 1857, when he was appointed Chief of General Staff, in reforming the training and tactics of the Prussian army, and his changes were crucial in securing victories against superior numbers of Austrian forces in 1865-66 and against a weak French army in 1870-71. Even taking into account Moltke's contribution, Bismarck's diplomacy in the context of an international situation conducive to Prussian gains were the most important factor in securing what amounted to the 'Prussification' of Germany through various means. Where, though, does nationalism fit into the diplomacy of Bismarck and the story of Germany's unification? To answer this we must return to our initial distinction between the two types of nationalism that emerged during this period, namely jingoism and liberal nationalism; as we will see, the first was significantly more important than the second. As a natural conservative from Junker stock, Bismarck took a relatively dim view of the liberal nationalism present in institutions such as the Nationalverein, and as discussed above, he was not prepared to humour the liberal nationalists at the Frankfurt Diet. This suspicion of the liberal nationalist cause can be seen perhaps most clearly in Bismarck's constitution of the North German Confederation (which later became the basis of the constitution of the German Empire), which perpetuated Prussian dominance by making the Prussian king solely responsible for foreign policy and giving Prussia dominance in the Bundesrat, both of which incensed the Nationalverein. Similarly, he was more than prepared to disregard the cries of liberal nationalists during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis regarding the rights of Holstein Germans, saying it was 'no concern of ours': his aim was not to secure German rights, but Prussian territory. This is not to say, though, that Bismarck was loth to even admit the importance of nationalism - indeed, he was prepared to fan jingoistic flames in order to secure Prussian dominance. The best case in point must be the Ems telegram, which he doctored slightly such that it no longer read like a purposeful request but more like a declaration of war. Releasing this to the press allowed Bismarck to cite "national honour" as a cause for war against 'the old foe', which he believed 'could only increase Prussian prestige'. Sure enough, war against the French convinced the south German states to ally together with Prussia, supported by a wave of popular nationalism and hatred of France; there can be little doubt that this wartime alliance and the success of the war were more effective in convincing the southern states of the benefits of German union than the bleating of middle-class idealists. This is an interesting contrast with the debates of the Zollparlament in 1866, when 49 of the 85 southern delegates elected had been opposed to union with the north. This shows that, even in the wake of matters such as the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, which provoked a mass meeting at Altona in favour of the Augustenburg candidature, the policymakers did not feel hugely swayed by the arguments of liberal nationalists, whereas they were clearly swayed some five years later by the more jingoistic arguments of the common man and Bismarck. In truth, the liberal nationalist movement was really only ever prevalent in Prussia, where the majority of chapters of the Nationalverein were based; this is not without irony, given that Bismarck eventually secured a union that was much more about acquisition of territory than a realisation of an ideology. That being said, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that, of the two dominant German powers, Prussia, being the smaller and less ethnically diverse of the two, was the epicentre of nationalist thought and the wellspring of the German cultural and national identity by 1871. Although the development of German cultural unity through institutions such as the Nationalverein and the Deutsche Zeitung and were significant insofar as they took the legacy of 1848 and developed it such that Prussia's antics were not seen as annexation but unification, it is very difficult to imagine unification taking place without the efforts of Bismarck to convince other states of the idea of France as a common enemy. Therefore it seems that, while nationalism was a significant factor in the unification of Germany, it was not the most significant.