What Did The Falklands War Reveal About Britain's Role In The World?

The Falklands war was primarily regarded by many contemporaries as evidence of Britain's revival as a world power following the loss of the Empire and the humiliation of Suez, 1956. This sentiment is predominantly presented in the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher; nevertheless, despite the Falklands war ultimately being a military triumph, it can be argued that it did not epitomise any form of revival in Britain's role in the world, and in some ways presented the weakness in her position. Its success should correspondingly be deemed as an isolated incident and understood within its wider framework of the on-going dismantling of the Empire and Britain's subordinate power rating in contrast to the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This question deals with numerous themes such as decline, power and status all of which were fundamental issues in British politics throughout the twentieth century. Decline appeared unstoppable, its power continually undermined and the relentless desire for some form of revitalisation of past glory days, of which Thatcher had vowed to achieve. The Falklands war should consequently be understood in this context, and it is the duty of the historian to divorce rhetoric from reality. To explore and determine therefore what the Falklands exposed about Britain's role in the world this paper will be divided into the subsequent themes: account of the debate as to whether the Falklands represented a revival of Britain's role in the world; diplomacy; military and perceptions of Britain's role in the world both domestically and internationally as a result of Falklands war.

At the end of the Falklands war, Margaret Thatcher claimed victoriously: "they too had their secret fears that it was true: that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world. Well, they were wrong." Nevertheless the Falklands should be viewed in a much more complex perspective that this, and historians have become increasingly divided surrounding whether the Falklands really represented a revival of British prestige. Historiography can be divided between historians such as Robbins , Young and Beck who place emphasis on the ultimate successful outcome of the war as indication of renewed respect and status within the international scene. Robbins particularly presents this in terms of the revitalisation of the special relationship between Britain and America, which he claims was a result of the renewed perceived military ability of Britain. This interpretation however, is considerably flawed and its analysis is based on short term reactions to British success in the Falklands war as opposed to the military and diplomatic realities, in addition to the long term trends which suggest little change in Britain's status and power. In comparison, historians such as Pugh have claimed that notions that the Falklands war presented a revitalisation of British power are 'delusions of grandeur'. This view is supported by historians such as Little, Reynolds and Sanders , who base their argument on the little practical change to Britain's position and the diplomatic and military failings of Thatcher's government. In terms of ultimate outcome, of course it is true that Britain was successful nevertheless; success was not inevitable and was dependent on a range of variables, including the support of the United States (US) and France. The time leading up the war certainly does not reveal any sudden revival of Britain's role in the world nor in the immediate days of the conflict. Most significantly however, British international power and status remained unmoved. One nevertheless, should be aware that new evidence is still coming out on the Falklands. For instance on the 28th December 2012 the National Archives received six thousand more files from 1982 which apparently challenged some previous assumed facts, especially concerning how early Thatcher was aware of the Argentinian invasion. Therefore the historiography may be subject to change and new theories may progress as a result.

An example of British 'soft power', the diplomatic skills and ability of Britain in the period leading up to the war should be carefully assessed. Largely historical opinion has been negative, claiming it showed lack of power, status and ability to influence Britain's will. Firstly, Thatcher's government was unable to find any form of compromise which all parties saw as satisfactory, but according to Little, worst of all there had been a complete misreading of Argentinian's desires and how far they would go to claim sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. In addition to this, it appeared that in the situation of invasion Britain would not react in order to prevent it, leaving Argentinian Admiral Jorge Anaya believing there was an opportunity to invade. The results of such lack of initiative and strong stance by the British have even been described by Young as 'arguably the most disastrous lapse in any Britain government since 1945'. Even if we accept that Young's claim may be an exaggeration, it certainly is of huge significance for understanding British decline and weakness within the post 1945 period. However such arguments have the benefit of hindsight. Argentina's political establishment at this time was a military dictatorship which was not operating within the normal process of diplomacy and therefore had a degree of unpredictability. In addition as pointed out by Thatcher there had been various points in which Argentina had presented aggressive threats, yet had not acted upon them. Nevertheless, Britain had failed to show a strong stance on the issue of and the way Argentina, then a minor power seized the opportunity to invade is of significant importance. It presents to the historian the extent of British decline as perceived by the international stage and the continuing small role she had within the world.

Traditionally, military prowess has been viewed as a key cornerstone of power and within the nineteenth century, for instance the strength of the British navy suggested it had once 'ruled the waves'. By examining the outcome alone it would appear that the Falklands war presents a revival of military greatness. For instance, in official document on The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons states: 'To despatch a task force in such a short space of time was a remarkable achievement'. The operation had been both long distance and risky, impressing much of the international community suggesting Britain could have a role in defending Western ideals in a time of increased hostility. Nevertheless, despite the ultimate military victory the Falklands war presented the weakness of the British military, and the continuing struggle the government faced in maintaining military commitments within Europe, NATO and internationally. Most importantly it should be remembered, military success was not inevitable and several military mistakes were made in the early stages of the war, including the loss of nuclear weapons. There had been several defence cuts in the years leading up to the war, such as the Nott's Defence White Paper Cuts, 1981 which resulted in the withdrawal of HMS Endurance from the Falkland Islands. This has been criticised for encouraging the Argentinian invasion. Additionally, to poor military intelligence which had failed to undercover Argentinian plans until it appeared too late to actually stop it from happening. The ultimate military success was also dependent on US and French support, which if had not been given may have altered the outcome. Nevertheless, Sanders argued Britain repaid the favour to America by aiding it in the Middle East in the period following and whilst this did not change the hierarchy in the 'special relationship' it represented at the very least an acknowledgement of British aid was beneficial to US aims. Nevertheless this does not represent a change in Britain's position in the relationship in which she remained the junior partner. Also the US was still happy to take crucial international military and diplomatic decisions with Britain such as when American troops were sent to Grenada in 1983 without any consultation with Britain. The cost of the Falkland War however, would be damaging to the British military and was clearly concerning to Nott himself, who was questioned on the exact cost of war concerning the loss of ammunition and equipment of which he estimates to be five hundred million.

At the most basic level however, one may conclude that despite no tangible changes to Britain's role in the world, there was a least a degree of changing perception of British decline and status. Domestically the Falklands was viewed as a revival of British power and confidence in her ability to achieve which had seem impossible in the post WW2 period. Reflected in newspaper interviews for instance, contemporary Riley Smith stated: 'At last we have achieved something tangible'. This was of significant importance and was crucial to Thatcher being re-elected. Internationally, there were mixed feelings. There were some initial doubts over British claims in the Falklands, and the war was perceived as some form of a post-colonial hangover. In spite of this, significantly Britain won the support of both the US and European Union. Even the USSR was said to have remarked at their shock at British military ability presented during the Falklands war and had not believed that Britain would have been successful. This adds to Reynolds's claim that Thatcher saw even prestige in itself as a form of power. However, whilst accepting that power should be defined more rigidly than simply by economic and military capabilities, prestige is arguably a poor measure of power. For instance, it did very little to alter Britain's world role. Britain still remained the lesser partner in her special relationship with the US. As well at this, Britain remained out of the race for superpower between US and USSR, perceived rather as a regional European power.

From the evidence presented the Falklands war can be viewed as an isolated event and not representative of British revival. This remained a period in which Britain continued to retreat from her colonial possessions and due to economic constraints cut back on her commitments globally. Rather Britain would become increasingly a regional power within Europe, and not necessarily the leading power continually rivalled by France and Germany following its reunification in 1990. In addition, that she still remained on the periphery of the major powers and that her decline had been so far that even a small power such as Argentina had believed itself capable of challenging Britain's sovereignty. Perceptions of revival were only temporary and it may even be viewed that Britain had still not managed to find itself a world role even following her success in the Falklands. Nevertheless, as noted new evidence is continually coming to light and the historian should be aware of the significant impact these may have and opportunities for revision of traditional perspectives and arguments.