Ireland 1957-61

Punching Above Their Weight? Focusing on the period 1957-61 this essay will consider whether Ireland's involvement in the UN had a significant impact on international relations during the Cold War.

This essay seeks to explore whether Ireland 'punched above its weight' in the United Nations during its first years in the organisation. Focusing primarily on the 1957 Indian resolution and the 1959 Tibet resolution, both related to the Chinese role in international affairs, this essay will explore whether Ireland had a significant impact on international relations in the UN or if it was a puppet for more powerful nations.

One of the pivotal figures in Irish foreign affairs especially within the UN was Fianna Fail's Minister of External Affairs (1951-54 and 1957-69) Frank Aiken. Aiken had been a fighter on the anti-treaty side during the civil war and saw himself as a freedom fighter against colonialism. He therefore had deep-rooted empathy with those countries battling colonialism. This topic was highly significant during the period of rapid decolonisation that followed the Second World War. Arguably, Aiken's and Ireland's dogged persistence in pursuing enquiries into colonial behaviour and endeavour to bring about the best possible outcomes from decolonisation added a unique element to international relations during this period.

Yet, Ireland's position was very different to that of most former colonies, especially those in Africa. It did not suffer from extensive tribal conflict and racial divide. Thus, Aoife Bhreatnach states:

'Aiken clearly believed that Ireland was part of a fraternity of anti-colonial nations, but the Irish attitude to the United Nations differed significantly from that held by the recently emancipated African and Asian states.'

However, although Ireland's experience and incentives may have been different to many other former colonies there is significant evidence that Irish policy in the United Nations helped empower the position of smaller nations. One such example of Ireland's preeminent role in forwarding the case for lesser countries is the Tibet resolution of October 1959, which followed the Tibetan uprising of March that year. As American ambassador James J. Wadsworth was said to have encouraged the Irish initiative it has been said that the resolution was just an example of 'belling the cat.' This process, common during the Cold War, consisted of a major power, in this case the United States, encouraging a smaller state with a neutral past (Ireland) to forward an initiative to undermine the position of another superpower, in this case China. This view would consequently brand the Irish's role in the UN, at least in this instance, as that of a puppet to a greater power.

Furthermore, outside of the Cold-War paradigm there were significant powers unwilling to allow a Chinese take over of China. The Fabian inspired government in India for one had very limited interest in bordering a highly aggressive Communist state. The independence of the kingdoms of Bhutan in particular was important to act as buffer to Chinese strategic interests. The Indian resolution of 1957, for instance, was a concerted effort to bring China into the UN and thus garner some obligation on China's part to recognise the statehood of Tibet. Ireland would go on to vote with India and the USSR on the subject of negotiation over Chinese membership to the United Nations. Therefore, evidence suggests that Ireland had a definite degree of independence from the United States who voted against the resolution. supporting the resolution to begin negotiations on Chinese UN membership. Aiken stated in a speech to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 1958:

'Our aim should be to win acceptance for the Principles of the Charter in China and to secure self-determination for the People of Korea.'

This action arguably set a precedent for Irish neutrality within the UN and enhanced its reputation as a country independent from any geo-political or ideological block.

It is conceivable that Ireland's relatively active and influential role stemmed from its initial rejection from the UNO in 1946. In the years that followed the boundaries of the Cold War were set, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were put in place and Ireland had stayed neutral. Ireland was thus able to present itself as a newly decolonised state, with a clean slate that could forward. Paula Wylie even suggests that Frank Aiken's support of the Indian resolution even made the United States reconsider supporting Freddie Boland's attempts to become the next president of the General Assembly.

However, concerned with this development Wylie argues that Boland forwarded the idea of the Tibet resolution as a means of making amends for the 'fiasco of the Chinese representation vote.' Joseph Morrison Skelly states:

'He (Boland) hoped to provoke an Irish censure of China to temper the negative reaction in the west tot the delegation's China vote.'

Consequently, Ireland's successful and influential role in UN diplomacy, at least in the case of Tibet, can be seen as rooted in an effort to placate American hostility to the Irish delegates in the UN. In this respect it would appear that Bhreatnach's 'Belling the Cat' theory may indirectly have some resonance. At least what clearly was on display were desperate attempts at personal gain from Freddie Boland. However, there is evidence to suggest that Ireland provided a unique slant to the Tibet resolution. Supported in the initiative with another newly decolonised nation, Malaya, Aiken proceeded to reject the proposals of America who wished for the Dalai Lama to make a speech at the UN. Ireland conceivably didn't want to further tension with China by inviting a man who was claiming to be the legitimate Tibetan political and spiritual authority. Ireland further rejected certain aims of the British government who wished primarily to protect their own colonial interests by trying to remove the human rights element . Thus, Ireland stepped away from the influence of the capitalist superpower, America, which was arguably trying to win points against Red China as well as the wished of their former colonial masters, Great Britain. The agenda was altered and this is illuminated by Aiken's insistence on placing the issue in the paradigm of colonialism not the conflicting Cold War ideologies. Aiken in his biography stated:

'Actions like that of China in Tibet have more than a local effect. They set the clock back the world over.'

Ireland and Malaya's initiative, arguably, was only passed due to its history as a former colony pursuing the popular goal of decolonisation. Although the success of the vote could have been seen as a victory for the US, Bhreatnach determines that 'Aiken had also strengthened the General Assembly's remit on tackling human rights issues' , an element that is likely to have been side lined if this had been an Anglo-American initiative. Furthermore, regardless of personal or state power politics, it is widely regarded that Ireland's performance in UN negotiations surrounding Tibet was of the highest standards. In a telegram written by Henry Cabot Lodge to Secretary of State Herter endorsing Boland's candidacy for General Assembly president, Lodge stated:

'(The) Tibet question is completed with the Irish having played a major role with skill and distinction.'

Thus, although the Irish delegation may have followed the general agenda in regards to following US policy on Tibet they did so with distinction. They had gained a reputation of neutrality and diplomatic skill. This is perhaps best justified by the fact that by 1961, with Ireland having been in the UN for just over five years, they had been elected to the UN Security Council (1961) and had a member of their delegation made president of the General Assembly.